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ABSTRACT 
This ethnographic research study documented the use and effects of an electronic 
medical records system (EMR) by healthcare providers working in a community hospital-
based emergency room.  Using data collected from participant observation, in-depth 
interviews, questionnaires, and hospital documents, the research findings suggest EMRs 
impinge providers’ agency, alter emergency room systems, affect communication 
patterns among providers, and exacerbate structurational divergence (SD) conditions.  
Findings suggest that providers’ attempts to regain lost agency tips the SD-nexus into an 
SD-cycle, characterized by negative communication spirals between providers.  The 
discussion chapter examines the impact of EMRs on emergency room structures, system 
reproduction, providers’ workflow and communication patterns, patients’ experiences, 
and unintended consequences, and it expounds implications of the study with regard to 
what lessons learned from this analysis suggests might be best practices for hospitals and 
emergency rooms adopting EMRs. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
In September 2014, a 42-year-old man with abdominal pain and a fever sought 
medical care in a Dallas emergency room.  A nurse assessed his condition and 
determined that his symptoms did not require immediate medical attention, so he was 
sent back to the waiting room.  A short while later, a nurse called him into an 
examination room, where a more thorough history was solicited from him and recorded 
into an electronic medical records (EMR) system.  The patient then was examined 
medically, first by a nurse and then by a physician.  The physician gave the patient a 
prescription for antibiotics and discharged him from the emergency room.  A few days 
later, on September 28, the man’s symptoms worsened, an ambulance was dispatched to 
his home, and the emergency medical services crew returned the man to the same 
emergency room from which he had been discharged on September 25.  The patient was 
diagnosed with a virus and was admitted to the hospital’s intensive care unit—he died 10 
days later from complications associated with the virus.  The patient was Thomas Duncan 
and the virus was Ebola. 
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2015b), the 2014 
Ebola epidemic, the largest Ebola epidemic in history, killed nearly 10,000 people in 
West Africa.  Mr. Duncan, a Liberian, traveled from West Africa to the United States at 
the height of the epidemic.  He became symptomatic for Ebola (e.g., fever, vomiting, and 
diarrhea) a few days after he arrived in Dallas, and, subsequently, he exposed almost 50 
people to the virus, including members of the ambulance crew who transported him back 
to the emergency room where he had been misdiagnosed initially and sent home with 
antibiotics (Neergard & Weber, 2014; Stengle, 2014).  Mr. Duncan infected two of the 
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nurses who cared for him at Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital (Stengle, 2014), which 
set off a media firestorm.  The public demanded to know how a “hospital slip up” 
(Neergard & Weber, 2014, para. 12) could send an Ebola patient into the local 
community, exposing dozens of individuals, including five school children, to the deadly 
virus (Stengle, 2014). 
In investigating the case, reporters uncovered certain key facts relating to Mr. 
Duncan’s initial misdiagnosis and discharge from the emergency room.  It appeared that 
although Mr. Duncan told a nurse that he had been in “disease-ravaged West Africa” just 
days before, “that information was not shared,” with a hospital spokesperson explaining 
that Mr. Duncan’s travel history was “not fully communicated throughout the medical 
team” (Neergard & Weber, 2014, paras. 1, 7, 8).  Hospital administrators conceded that 
the lapse in communication meant that relevant information was not factored into Mr. 
Duncan’s initial diagnosis, which “led others to be exposed to the virus” (“Dallas Ebola 
Patient,” 2014, para. 15). 
Hospital administrators released a statement on October 3, 2014 that identified the 
reason for the communication breakdown between the healthcare providers in the 
emergency room: a flaw in the hospital’s EMR system (Jones, 2014).  The flaw, which 
separated “physician and nursing portions of the electronic health record [EHR]1” (Jones, 
2014, para. 3), meant that “doctors never saw a nurse’s note that an emergency room 
patient with fever and pains had recently been to Africa” (Gilblom & Chen, 2014, para. 
1).  The patient’s travel history “was located in the nurses’ portion of the EHR and, as 
designed, would not automatically appear in the physicians’ standard workflow” (Jones, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1The phrases “electronic health records system” and “electronic medical records systems” 
are synonymous. 
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2014, para. 5).  A hospital spokesperson admitted that the hospital “wrongly designed its 
digital record system” (Giblom & Chen, 2014, para. 5), but many members of the press 
wondered why the nurse did “not verbally alert Duncan’s emergency physician to the 
travel” (Gaddis, 2015, p. 36) or why the physician “did not double check himself rather 
than depend on someone else” (Giblom & Chen, 2014, para. 3) for pertinent patient 
details. 
According to Frazao (2014), “What happened at the Texas Presbyterian Hospital 
was a break down of critical information sharing using electronic health records, a 
relatively new technology now used in about every major American hospital” (para. 7).  
EMR systems were supposed to improve healthcare coordination and reduce errors, but 
“in the case of the Liberian Ebola patient, a major medical error––the decision to send the 
sick man home instead of into isolation––is blamed directly on an EHR” (Jones, 2014, 
para. 13).  Press coverage of the Dallas Ebola case “thrust into social scrutiny the impact 
of EMRs on workflow in hospitals” (Reyes, 2015, p. 7), especially with regard to the 
imperfect communication patterns that they, potentially, create among healthcare 
providers.  Because I had been studying an emergency room’s adoption of an EMR 
system for nearly a year when the Dallas Ebola case made headlines, an emergency 
medicine physician shared the following with me: 
The postmortem, as discussed on CNN and broadcast to millions, is that the house 
of emergency medicine failed (and potentially exposed a city to a catastrophe) for 
one specific reason: the [emergency room] nurses and doctors did not talk to each 
other.  They “talked” instead into an electronic medical record, and assumed that 
all knew what was reported.  So, a question: How often do we speak to each other 
about our patients, our thoughts about their care, what the plan is from the 
beginning and throughout the course?  How can we maximize our patients’ visit 
with us?  . . . What is the potential consequence of our failing to adequately talk to 
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each other, across the silos in which we live, and past the tunnels of our 
understanding and knowledge? (C. Overton, personal communication, October 9, 
2014) 
 
The Ebola case shows that communication is vital for effective and safe 
healthcare delivery, and, furthermore, it demonstrates that providers’ reliance on EMRs 
for pertinent patient information cannot take the place of providers communicating with 
one another.  Health communication researchers have bemoaned the “undeniable decline 
in the centrality of communication” (Rotor & Hall, 2011, p. 55)––the lack of talk––in 
healthcare delivery that the Dallas Ebola case epitomized.  To broaden understanding of 
communication in healthcare delivery, health communication researchers have focused, 
largely, on patient–provider interactions and, especially, on bounded exchanges, such as 
those occurring between patients and providers during medical examinations (Ackerson 
& Viswanath, 2009; Ellingson, 2003).  According to Ellingson (2003), the emphasis on 
patient–provider interactions has resulted in “a relative lack of problematizing of 
discourse among health care practitioners,” especially with respect to “backstage” 
interactions between and among providers “that occur away from patients” (p. 95).  The 
Dallas Ebola crisis brought the topic of communication (or, rather, the lack of 
communication) between healthcare providers to the forefront. 
Studying healthcare providers’ backstage interactions, as Ellingson (2003) 
endorsed, allows researchers to broaden understanding of cultural and communication 
processes that constitute medical practice (Chapman & Berggren, 2005).  Provider-
focused health communication research, for instance, has found that ineffective 
communication between healthcare providers during hospital admissions delays patient 
care (Apker, Mallak, & Gibson, 2007; Eisenberg et al., 2005), that poor communication 
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is a leading cause of medical errors (Shannon, 2012), and that nurses in emergency rooms 
do not talk regularly with physicians (Fairbanks, Bisantz, & Sunm, 2007).  Such findings 
may explain, in part, what happened in the emergency room at Texas Presbyterian 
Hospital. 
It is important to note that the communication breakdown at Texas Presbyterian 
Hospital occurred, primarily, between healthcare providers: Mr. Duncan told the nurse 
that he had come from Liberia and, presumably, he would have told the physician, had 
the physician asked.  Many in the press speculated that Mr. Duncan could have assumed, 
reasonably, that the details he shared with the nurse were part of a medical record that the 
physician would have accessed and/or that members of his healthcare team would have 
communicated with one another (Frazao, 2014).  The nurse, however, did not tell the 
physician what she knew––a man with a fever and abdominal pain had just arrived from 
Ebola-stricken West Africa––and the physician did not ask about Mr. Duncan’s travel 
history.  Hence, studying ways in which EMRs change nurse–physician interactions, 
especially in emergency room contexts, may explain what happened at the Texas 
Presbyterian Hospital and why it happened, and it may prevent similar communication 
breakdowns and/or medical errors from occurring in the future. 
There is, however, a lack of health communication research set in emergency 
rooms compared with research set in primary care venues, such as physicians’ medical 
offices and clinics (Cameron et al., 2010; Fairbanks et al., 2007).  Primary care-based 
research findings, unfortunately, are not generalizable to emergency rooms for many 
reasons.  For instance, unlike primary care providers, who treat one patient at a time, 
emergency medicine providers care for several patients at once in an atmosphere that is 
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“rife with staff shortages, limited resources, overcrowding, and long wait times” (Roscoe 
& Eisenberg, 2014, p. 393).  Additionally, emergency medicine providers rarely have 
established relationships with patients they treat (Govindarajan et al., 2010) and many of 
those patients are unable to communicate because they are impaired (e.g., they have 
dementia, are mentally ill, and/or are inebriated) or unconscious (Garra, Albino, 
Chapman, Singer, & Thode, 2010).  Moreover, frequently, interstaff conflicts compound 
problematic provider–patient communication (Person, Spiva, & Hart, 2013), as do 
“professional fault lines” (Eisenberg et al., 2005, p. 392) that separate physicians from 
nurses.  For these reasons, emergency rooms are especially ripe for communication 
breakdowns and are at risk for medical errors (McCarthy et al., 2013), which is why 
scholars have called for more research to be situated in emergency rooms (Paltved & 
Musaues, 2012). 
It is especially important for scholars to focus on emergency room practices, 
because understanding communication patterns within that healthcare context is essential 
for ensuring that safe, effective care is delivered to the millions of patients relying on 
emergency rooms for care.  Emergency rooms, increasingly, are becoming the primary 
source of healthcare for uninsured and publically insured patients, and for patients 
seeking care after hours and on weekends (O’Shea, 2007; Overton, in press-b).  In 2008, 
there were 124 million emergency room visits and the number of visits was expected to 
increase by 3%–6% each year thereafter (Hooker, Cipher, Cawley, Herrmann, & Lelson, 
2008).  By 2011, the annual number of emergency room visits hit 136 million (Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015a).  A shortage of primary care physicians 
contributes to emergency room overutilization, because patients without healthcare 
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homes have nowhere else to go when they become ill or are injured (Hooker et al. 2008; 
Overton, in press-b).  Moreover, the Affordable Care Act, which expanded Medicaid and 
insurance coverage to 30 million people in the United States, is expected to increase the 
number of emergency room visits: Studies show that Massachusetts’s healthcare reform 
(after which the Affordable Care Act is modeled) and the Oregon Medicaid experiment 
both resulted in more, not fewer, emergency room visits (Overton, in press-b; Smulowitz, 
O’Malley, Yang, & Landon, 2014).  The nation’s emergency rooms already are at or over 
capacity (Dunn & Becker, 2013; O’Shea, 2007), the number of emergency room visits is 
increasing steadily, and, in the last decade, “the number of emergency departments 
declined significantly” (O’Shea, 2007, p. 2), as did the number of emergency medicine 
physicians (Hooker et al., 2008).  There, thus, are fewer emergency rooms and 
emergency medicine providers available than ever before to meet the growing demand 
(Hooker et al., 2008), which means that an already communicatively challenged 
environment is poised to get worse. 
Health information technologies, such as EMRs, were supposed to reduce medical 
errors (Farley et al., 2013; Pipersburgh, 2011), cut healthcare costs (Hillestad, et al., 
2005), and improve the quality of healthcare (Noor, Mahmoo, & Kahn, 2012), but, 
instead, EMRs have introduced unintended negative consequences and new types of 
clinical errors (Shachak & Reis, 2009).  The Dallas Ebola case demonstrated what health 
communication researchers already knew: EMRs impede face-to-face communication 
between healthcare providers (Hill, Sears, & Melanson, 2013; Park, Lee, & Chen, 2012) 
and increase medical errors (Bukata, 2011; Kellermann & Jones, 2013).  A patient safety 
advocate interviewed by Frazao (2014) criticized the flawed EMR used at Texas 
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Presbyterian Hospital, declaring, “The electronic health record systems in this country are 
not even close to ready for prime time” (para. 8). 
Although EMRs may not be “ready for primetime,” federal legislation passed in 
2009 mandated that hospitals must adopt and use EMRs by 2015, or face fines.  That 
legislation has catapulted emergency medicine providers into unfamiliar territory: In 
2010, fewer than 2% of U.S. emergency rooms had fully functioning EMRs (Landman, 
Bernstein, Hsiao, & Desai, 2010).  As of 2015, most emergency medicine providers in 
the United States were struggling to adapt to EMR-induced changes in workflow and 
communication patterns; specifically, providers were spending more time completing 
documentation tasks and less time communicating face-to-face with other providers or 
with patients (Park et al., 2012).  These changes can have dire consequences for patients. 
Several studies, published since 2012, have examined how EMRs change 
emergency room dynamics and emergency medicine practice.  Those studies have 
focused on quantifiable changes in emergency room operations after EMR adoption, such 
as the number of laboratory tests ordered, time that providers dedicated to documentation 
tasks, and time that providers spent with patients (Callen et al., 2013; Hill et al, 2013; 
Ward, Froehle, Hart, Collins, & Lindsell, 2013).  Only one study to date, conducted by 
Park et al. (2012), followed an EMR adoption from start to finish, presenting a 
compelling account of an academic medical center’s emergency room before, during, and 
after its EMR installation.  However, fewer than 10% of the 5,724 hospitals in the United 
States are academic medical centers, hospitals affiliated with medical schools (Dunn & 
Becker, 2013); hence, although Park et al.’s findings are important, for several reasons, 
they are not generalizable to the majority of emergency room settings.  For instance, 
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academic medical centers offer extensive specialty and subspecialty support to patients 
(Dunn & Becker, 2013), and they rely on medical residents, who are physicians in 
training, to staff specialty services and emergency rooms; consequently, physician-to-
patient ratios are much lower in academic medical centers compared with community 
hospitals, which, typically, do not utilize medical residents and, thus, have fewer 
physicians available to treat patients.  Community hospitals, by contrast, have far fewer 
specialty services compared with academic medical centers, and community hospital-
based emergency rooms are staffed, usually, by one or two physicians, who will see as 
many as 40–50 patients a day. 
The current study, thus, addresses gaps in the scholarly literature and extends 
work on EMR adoption by investigating EMR-induced changes over time in a 
community hospital’s emergency room during its EMR adoption, especially with regard 
to how EMRs affect emergency medical providers’ day-to-day experiences; how their 
interactions with coworkers and patients are altered; how emergency room culture, itself, 
is changed by the presence of this technology; and unintended negative consequences that 
EMRs have on emergency medicine practice.  More specifically, this study documents (a) 
role reversal, dissonance, and reactance during EMR training; (b) ways that providers 
incorporate EMRs into their workflow and subsequent changes to workflow patterns; (c) 
the presence of conflicting structures, providers’ immobilization, and ineffective 
communication spirals associated with using the EMR; (d) providers’ strategies for 
coping with EMR adoption; (e) providers’ perceptions of changes in their communication 
patterns following the EMR installation; (f) EMR-induced changes in provider–patient 
interactions; and (g) unintended negative consequences of EMRs that affect providers 
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and patients alike.  In investigating these important matters, the study was guided by 
structuration theory, adaptive structuration theory, and structurational divergence theory 
(as explained in chapter 3), with the data collected using ethnographic methods and a 
survey questionnaire (as explained in chapter 4). 
This dissertation is organized into six chapters, including this first chapter.  
Chapter two reviews literature on interpersonal communication in healthcare contexts, 
starting with patient-focused health communication research, followed by provider-
focused health communication research.  Literature on communication and health 
information technologies, generally, then is reviewed, followed by emergency room 
communication research, with studies that privileged patients’ perspectives of emergency 
room communication reviewed first, followed by provider-focused studies.  I then discuss 
emergency medicine and EMRs, followed by literature on EMR legislation and use. 
Chapter three describes the preliminary research that I conducted in 2013, as well 
as the theoretical frameworks that inform this study, and it concludes with the research 
questions that were posed for this study.  Chapter four describes the qualitative, 
ethnographic methods that were employed to achieve the research goals: participant 
observation and in-depth interviewing.  I explain how the methodology that I employed, 
ethnography, allowed me to develop “understanding about complex social interactions” 
(Paltved & Musaeus, 2012, p. 773) in situ, by illuminating how processes and practices, 
such as providers’ workflow and communication habits,  changed over the course of the 
EMR installation.  I then describe the research sites, navigating access to those sites, 
study participants, institutional review board approval, and data collection, including 
sensitizing concepts that shaped that collection process.  I subsequently describe 
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additional data-collection procedures that I used (a questionnaire and document analysis), 
before discussing validity issues, researcher subjectivity, ethical concerns, and data-
analysis procedures.  Chapter five presents the findings from this study regarding EMR 
adoption in the community hospital’s emergency room studied.  Finally, chapter six 
discusses conceptual/theoretical and applied implications of the findings of this study 
about EMR adoption, describes limitations that characterized the study, and offers 
suggestions for future health communication research conducted in emergency room 
settings about health information technologies.	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CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
This chapter reviews literature that informs and supports the research agenda that 
was advanced in chapter one.  This chapter begins with a discussion of interpersonal 
communication research in healthcare contexts; specifically, with patient- and, then, 
healthcare provider-focused communication research, because both sets of literature 
contribute to understanding provider–patient interactions and are necessary for 
understanding how electronic medical records, consequently, impact provider–patient 
relationships.  A review of communication and health information technology research 
then precedes a discussion of emergency room-based communication research.  Finally, a 
brief history of electronic medical records research and recent legislation about them then 
informs a review of the adoption, use, and implications of electronic medical records for 
emergency medicine practice.   
Communication Research in Healthcare Contexts 
A substantial amount of interpersonal health communication research has 
explored interactions between healthcare providers and patients, often within the context 
of one-on-one bounded exchanges, such as those occurring during medical examinations 
(Ackerson & Viswanath, 2009).  Some of that scholarship has privileged patients’ 
perspectives and experiences, whereas other research has centered on healthcare 
providers (hereafter, “providers”).  Patient-focused research has examined issues such as 
patients’ satisfaction with providers’ communication skills, how communication between 
providers and patients impacts patients’ health outcomes, perceived communication 
barriers between patients and providers, interactants’ competing and mismatched goals 
during medical encounters, and ramifications of hierarchical differences for patient–
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provider relationships.  Provider-centered research has examined communication in 
healthcare teams, interactions among providers, and providers’ communication errors and 
inefficiencies.  Both types of interpersonal health communication research aim to 
improve communication between providers and patients to promote positive patient 
health outcomes. 
Arguably, the patient-focused perspective has received more attention from 
scholars, but by also focusing on providers, by shifting attention from the subordinate to 
the dominant in what Nader (1972) called “studying up,” researchers have an opportunity 
to broaden understanding of social, cultural, and communication processes that are part of 
medical practice (Chapman & Berggren, 2005).  Although this empirical study employs 
the concept of studying up, in that it focuses, largely, on providers’ experiences with and 
communication about electronic medical records (EMRs), the patient perspective is 
important and warrants review, because, as this dissertation demonstrates, providers’ 
experiences with EMRs influence their interactions with patients, and, for some patients, 
those consequences can be life-threatening.  Both sets of literature, patient- and provider-
focused, thus, contribute to understanding provider–patient interactions.  Furthermore, 
exploring both perspectives offers a more complete understanding of communication 
patterns that are unique to emergency room contexts, and, consequently, how EMRs 
affect provider–patient communication therein.  Therefore, below, an overview is 
provided first of patient-focused health communication research, followed by a review of 
provider-focused research. 
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Patient-focused Health Communication Research 
Themes relating to patients’ satisfaction with healthcare have driven much of the 
health communication research (Brundage, Feldman-Stewart, & Tishelman, 2010), and 
that research is important because, for most emergency rooms, financial reimbursements, 
mainly in the form of Medicare and Medicaid payments, are tied directly to patients’ 
satisfaction (McCarthy et al., 2013).  Satisfaction often is based on patients’ perceptions 
of physicians’ communication efforts (Bryant, Moshavi, Lande, Leary, & Doughty, 2011; 
Ruiz-Moral, 2009), with patients wanting their physicians to listen to them and to ask 
questions (Clark et al., 2008), and to encourage rapport, mutual understanding, and 
participation, as well as offer reassurance, guidance, compassion, and information 
(Smith-Dupre & Beck, 1996).  Clark et al. (2008) found that jointly negotiated treatment 
plans significantly and positively affected patients’ health outcomes; in particular, 
collaboration “was associated with subsequent reductions of patients’ emergency 
department and urgent care visits and hospitalizations” (p. 54).  Despite calls for more 
patient participation in medical interactions, however, the physician–patient dyad rarely 
is characterized by equally valid, negotiated selves (Smith-Dupre & Beck, 1996).  Many 
medical interactions continue to operate according to a consistent pattern that, typically, 
does not include patients’ participation (Thompson, Whaley, & Stone, 2011); instead, 
physicians too often are “more concerned . . . with efficiency—keeping the encounter 
short and to the point” (Smith-Dupre & Beck, 1996, p. 74).  Consequently, the medical 
examination has become “an area of struggle” (Thompson et al., 2011, p. 299) between 
patients and providers. 
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Patients who are dissatisfied with their providers’ communication efforts, when 
compared with patients who are satisfied, often have worse health outcomes.  For 
example, dissatisfied patients are more likely to have high blood pressure (Thompson et 
al., 2011).  One way that providers trigger dissatisfaction in their patients is by 
interrupting patients when they explain their symptoms or tell their stories (Thompson et 
al., 2011).  Rhodes et al. (2003), studying provider–patient interactions in emergency 
rooms, found that most providers’ interruptions consisted of closed questions that did not 
invite patients to elaborate on their symptoms or complaints—in fact, less than a quarter 
of patients finished describing their symptoms after having been interrupted by providers.  
According to Thompson et al. (2011), patients who tell their complete stories to 
providers, without interruption, typically, have lower blood pressure, comply more with 
prescribed treatments, and are more satisfied with their physicians.  Patients’ 
uninterrupted stories also can mean fewer diagnostic tests and lower healthcare costs 
(Duggan & Thompson, 2011). 
Although interrupted storytelling impacts patients’ dissatisfaction with provider–
patient interactions, patients’ dissatisfaction also can be attributed to mismatched goals 
that providers and patients bring to medical interactions, and to the asymmetrical nature 
that characterizes provider–patient relationships.  These interactions, typically, privilege 
providers’ objectives and perspectives.  Studies that have explored these two additional 
sources of patients’ dissatisfaction are described next. 
Competing and mismatched goals.  Research has identified at least two goals 
that are shared by physicians and patients: accurate diagnosis and effective treatment 
(Gu, 1996; Cegala, McGee, & McNeilis, 1996; Pilnick, Hindmarsh, & Gill, 2009; 
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Roberts & Aruguete, 2000; Smith-Dupre & Beck, 1996).  However, physicians and 
patients privilege these objectives differently, which can stymie communication between 
them.  The physician’s aim is for “the patient’s condition to improve after the visit, 
whereas the patient’s is that he or she gets cured” (Gu, 1996, p. 165).  Thus, patients who 
are not cured, do not have their goals met and are more likely to be dissatisfied with both 
their providers and their interactions with those providers.  Roberts and Aruguete (2000) 
identified at least one additional goal, aside from being cured, that patients have: anxiety 
reduction.  Physicians, however, rarely address patients’ anxiety because physicians fail 
to enact “socioemotional behaviors such as expressions of concern and reassurance” 
(Roberts & Aruguete, p. 310).  For most physicians, and, especially, primary care 
physicians, time constraints limit the number of goals they attend to during medical 
examinations because they are engaged in “managed care.” 
Managed care requires concise medical encounters; accordingly, physicians invite 
patients’ questions in fewer than half of examinations (Duggan & Thompson, 2011), and 
they restrict conversation to medically relevant topics by focusing on treatable complaints 
(Eisenberg, Baglia, & Pynes, 2006; Eisenberg et al., 2005; Gu, 1996; Herdon, Chaney, & 
Carden, 2011; Lateef, 2011; Smith-Dupre & Beck, 1996; Vance, 2010).  Emergency 
medicine physicians are especially vulnerable to managed care edicts that require short 
encounters with patients––regularly exceeding “length of stay targets” means that 
physicians can be fired (“Metric Madness,” 2014; Vance, 2010).  It is not surprising, 
then, that emergency medicine physicians usually dedicate less than five percent of their 
talk with patients to “friendly interactions” (Smith-Dupre & Beck, 1996, p. 76).  A study 
by Gu (1996) found that, typically, there was “no small talk” (p. 169) in emergency 
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rooms.  Patients, nonetheless, often “overrun the diagnosis and discussion” (Gu, p. 169), 
by offering multiple complaints and rambling sick narratives (Cegala et al., 1996), at least 
as viewed from providers’ perspectives.  Although most emergency room patients expect 
to have all or most of their issues addressed (Lateef, 2011), “physicians pressure them to 
focus on one complaint per visit” (Eisenberg et al., 2005, p. 401).  According to 
Eisenberg et al. (2005), “Physicians work at getting patients to get to the crux of the story 
quickly” (p. 401), which, as noted previously, means that patients rarely tell their stories 
without interruption (Thompson et al., 2011).  In fact, emergency room patients, 
typically, are interrupted after only 12 seconds of speaking (Burley, 2011).  
Instead of diagnose and treatment, some scholars have maintained that the 
medical interactions are characterized by two other goals: information exchange and 
relational development (Cegala et al., 1996).  Cegala et al. (1996) found that both patients 
and physicians prioritized information exchange as a measure of general communication 
competence.  Differing perceptions about how much and what information should be 
exchanged, however, contributed to misunderstandings between physicians and patients, 
with physicians rating themselves as far more competent communicators than their 
patients rated them (Cegala et al.).  Cegala et al. noted that patients wanted much more 
information than they were given, whereas physicians’ overestimated the quantity and 
quality of information that they provided to patients.  Moreover, physicians were “not 
relational enough in their interactions with patients either” (Cegala et al., p. 5); thus, they 
failed to achieve consistently either goal. 
Patients’ dissatisfaction with poor relational development with their physicians is 
related to physicians’ “lack of feedback, insensitivity to and misinterpretations of 
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relational needs, failure to express empathy, and disregard for patient input in decision-
making” (Cegala et al., 1996, p. 5).  However, patients also often are equally responsible 
for these problems, as they leave relational development to physicians.  Smith-Dupre and 
Beck (1996) found that patients felt inhibited by asymmetrical relationships between 
themselves and their physicians, and that they behaved as if they did “not have the right . 
. .  to express opinions, to ask questions, and to assert goals” (p. 80).  Hence, although 
patients often are dissatisfied with their interactions with physicians, many patients 
abdicate responsibility for improving the quality of their medical care.  How the 
asymmetrical nature of provider–patient interactions can hinder relational development 
and thwart patients’ satisfaction with health care is described next.   
Asymmetrical provider–patient interactions.  The asymmetrical nature of 
provider–patient relationships means that patients, usually, converge, or defer, to 
physicians (Giles, 2008).  Generally, people converge to others who have more power or 
high status (Giles, 2008); thus, in provider–patient interactions, patients’ deference gives 
providers the right to direct medical interactions, ask questions, and assert goals (Smith-
Dupre & Beck, 1996).  As noted previously, many communication problems stem from 
hierarchical differences that discourage patients’ participation in the medical examination 
(Real & Poole, 2011).  For example, as Goffman (1956) remarked, patients “may not 
have the right to question their doctor” because it would deny the physician “special 
apartness from the lay public” (p. 482).  Physicians sometimes rebuff patients’ questions 
with medical jargon (i.e., rescind downward convergence), in “a show of social ‘one-
upmanship’ . . . that results in a lack of understanding on the part of the patient” 
(Thompson et al., 2011, p. 295).  When patients perform defiance and/or withhold 
	   19 
deference (e.g., by asking questions), the relationship may become “unstable” (Goffman, 
1956, p. 480). 
Although O’Hair (1989) reported that patients assert themselves more than “they 
generally used to” (p. 9), studies still suggest otherwise; specifically, Bensing et al. 
(2006), analyzing videotaped provider–patient interactions that occurred between 1986 
and 2002, found decreasing rates of patient question asking during medical examinations.  
Gáspárik, Abram, Lörincz, and Ceană (2012) wrote that the typical patient “does not ruin 
[the examination] with long, elaborate descriptions of sufferings, questions, or worries” 
(p. 164).  Even when patients do have questions or concerns, they are not likely to speak 
up (Thompson et al., 2011). 
Physicians’ dissatisfaction with interactions with patients also is well documented 
and studies suggest that many physicians attribute communication failures 
disproportionately to their patients.  Coran, Arnold, and Arnold (2010), for instance, 
found that physicians wanted patients to improve their communication by listening more 
and by asking questions only when invited to do so by physicians, which underscores the 
assumed supremacy of physicians in many physician–patient relationships.  Studies 
privileging patients’ perspectives, however, have found that patients believe their 
physicians should spend more time listening to them (Roter & Hall, 2011; Sundar, Rice, 
Kim, & Sciamanna, 2011). 
Researchers have noted an “undeniable decline in the centrality of communication 
to the care process” (Roter & Hall, 2011, p. 55), with negative consequences for patients 
exemplified by poor medical outcomes, such as higher blood pressure (Thompson et al., 
2011).  Poor communication also means that physicians are less liked and trusted by 
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patients (Roter & Hall, 2011).  Nonetheless, physician-training programs remain focused 
on the development of “clinical skills” rather than “learning relational/patient centered 
communication skills” (Coran et al., 2010, p. 10).  Referencing a 2008 survey of medical 
students, Coran et al. (2010) noted that the majority believed that communication was 
“common sense” and that they already had “sufficient communication skills for 
practicing medicine” (p. 9). 
Because many physician-training programs do not develop physicians’ 
communication skills, as noted above, health communication scholars have advocated for 
a change in medical education to prioritize communication and relational development 
skills.  Coran et al. (2010) and Thompson et al. (2011), for example, suggested that rather 
than focusing on physicians alone, programs should adopt an interdisciplinary, dyad-
centered training approach that includes both physicians and patients.  The result, 
accordingly, would be medical interactions that better incorporate both providers’ and 
patients’ goals.  The move to a more patient-centered medical interaction, one that does 
not prioritize providers’ objectives over patients’ concerns, is “an achievable goal” 
(Roberts & Sarangi, 2005, p. 639) that slowly is being realized in some healthcare 
settings.  Described below is research that has highlighted changing patterns in provider–
patient communication.  
Changing patterns in provider–patient communication.  Researchers have 
noted a gradual shift in physician–patient discourse, with studies highlighting interactions 
that include more patient autonomy and collaboration (Clark et al., 2008; Grey, 2011; 
Herman, Karpinos, & Rothman, 2012).  Labeled patient-centered communication, this 
approach advocates a “humanistic perspective that emphasizes patient participation in 
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shared clinical decision making” (Schulman-Green, Naik, Bradley, McCorkle, & 
Bogardus, 2006, p. 145).  This approach, more specifically, strives to elicit patients’ 
thoughts, expectations, feelings, values, and goals (Grosch, Medvene, & Wolcott, 2008), 
with the goal of “understanding the whole person” (Cegala & Post, 2009, p. 203).  Sharf, 
Harter, Yamasaki, and Haidet (2011) theorized that integrating both physicians’ and 
patients’ perspectives during medical interactions would produce “genuine shared 
understanding” (p. 46) between them.  Similarly, Politi and Street (2011) described the 
ideal medical encounter as one in which physicians and patients have a “shared 
understanding of the patient’s health condition and each other’s perspective” (p. 401).  
Better outcomes, such as lower blood pressure (Thompson et al., 2011) and patients 
taking medications or adhering to treatment regimens as prescribed (Peck, 2011), are 
associated with “shared perspective and understanding” (Grey, 2011, p. 287) between 
physicians and patients.  
Patient-centered communication, arguably, represents a return to old-fashioned 
medicine.  Dr. Abraham Flexner, who was instrumental in revamping physicians’ training 
during the 1910s and 1920s, encouraged both “clinical reasoning and the development of 
. . .  compassion” (as cited in Cooke, Irby, Sulliva, & Ludmerer, 2006, p. 1339).  Flexner 
advocated a biopsychosocial approach to physicians’ communication that incorporated 
patients’ feelings, thoughts, and expectations (cited in Beach, Easter, Good, & Pigeron, 
2005).  Roter and Hall (2011) wrote that the “ascendency of chemistry-oriented sciences” 
and technology, however, directed “medical inquiry away from the person of the patient 
and to the pathophysiology of the patient” (p. 55).  Once the medical interview was recast 
as “wholly scientific and objective” (Rotor & Hall, p. 55), patients’ participation waned.  
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The resulting biomedical approach downplayed patients’ input and privileged physicians’ 
control, as noted earlier (Grey, 2011). 
Hence, although patient-centered communication currently is being encouraged 
(du Pré, 2010), many physicians persist in using a biomedical approach.  As described 
previously, medical training deemphasizes physicians’ skills of developing relationships 
with patients; thus, according to Rosenstein (2012), physicians, inevitably, adopt 
“autocratic, egocentric, domineering behaviors that are the antithesis of collaboration and 
[effective] communication” (p. 34).  Other health communication scholars have blamed 
patients for not participating, noting that engaged patients “who actively participate in the 
medical interview influence physicians to adopt a more patient-centered approach” 
(Cegala & Post, 2009, p. 203). 
Several obstacles deter physicians from engaging in patient-centered 
communication, with some medical specialties seemingly incapable of embracing the 
trend.  Although physician training remains focused on developing “clinical skills” rather 
than “learning relational/patient centered communication skills” (Coran et al., 2010, p. 
10), lack of time and insufficient financial reimbursement are the biggest impediments to 
physicians adopting patient-centered communication (Marcinowicz, Pawlikowska, 
Windak, & Chlabicz, 2013).  The “one complaint per visit” approach means that most 
conversations between physicians and patients are symptom specific, with little time left 
to discuss patients’ overall health and medical interaction goals. 
Ideally, medical encounters should encompass broader health issues, moving 
away from the acute problem presentation–treatment model (Marcinowicz et al., 2013).  
Lateef (2011) noted, however, that this shift is not likely to occur in busy emergency 
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rooms for many reasons.  Although emergency rooms have become the de facto primary 
care home for uninsured patients (Eisenberg et al., 2006), physicians rarely form 
meaningful partnerships with patients they see and treat once or twice (Lateef).  In 
overcrowded emergency rooms, where resources and staff usually are “stretched thin,” 
patient-centered communication would “add to wait times and delay care” (Lateef, p. 
165).  In that context, physicians must treat patients as quickly as possible, but they often 
are stymied by slow-to-report laboratory and radiology departments, and by specialists 
who delay consults (Apker et al., 2007; Shershneva, Carnes, & Bakken, 2006; Vance, 
2010). 
Emergency medicine physicians also treat patients with high acuity, many of 
whom present with several comorbidities, which further complicates diagnosis and 
treatment.  More than half of patients have health literacy skills at or below a ninth-grade 
level, and those patients rarely comply with prescribed treatments, are more likely to 
return to the emergency room with acute exacerbations, and report higher levels of 
dissatisfaction with their healthcare (Herndon, Chaney, & Carden 2011).  These, and 
other communication problems, as discussed later, are compounded by the use of EMRs. 
To review, patients’ satisfaction with their providers’ communication efforts is 
linked with better health outcomes, especially for patients who are not interrupted when 
describing their symptoms.  The competing and mismatched goals that patients and 
providers bring to the medical examination, however, impede effective communication, 
as well as relational development, between them.  Frequently, the managed care system 
dictates short encounters and, thereby, forces physicians to restrict conversations to  
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medically relevant topics.  Although, in response, scholars have advocated for patient-
centered communication, asymmetrical relationships continue to privilege providers.  
Patient-focused research, although taking providers’ perspectives into account, 
largely privileges patients’ experiences and their perceptions of communication with 
providers.  Provider-focused health communication research, however, focuses almost 
exclusively on providers’ perspectives, which are equally important if scholars are to 
understand and improve provider–patient interactions.  As described in the next section, 
much of the provider-focused research has examined interpersonal communication 
patterns between individual providers, as well as communication in healthcare teams. 
Provider-focused Health Communication Research 
Most communication research in healthcare contexts has focused on provider–
patient discourse, or what Ellingson (2003) called “the frontstage of medical care” (p. 
95).  That tendency, in her view, is problematic because it limits analysis to bounded 
episodes between patients and physicians (e.g., brief, examination room-based 
interactions), with the result being a “relative lack of problematizing of discourse among 
health care practitioners that occurs away from patients”; hence, she argued that “the 
clinic backstage . . . [also] must be recognized” (pp. 95, 109).  In her long-term 
ethnography of an oncology team, which consisted of physicians, nurses, a pharmacist, a 
nurse practitioner, a dietician, and a social worker, Ellingson noted that “team members 
conducted significant teamwork in hallways, desk areas, break rooms, and other clinic 
spaces not designated as meetings” (p. 109).  Meetings of healthcare personnel, like 
patient examinations by physicians, are bounded communication episodes, and such 
episodes are the focus of extensive research on healthcare providers and team 
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communication.  However, according to Ellingson, that focus limits scholarship because 
most communication about patient care, actually, is informal and unscheduled.  Informal 
and unscheduled discussions, for example, often are the only interactions between nurses 
and physicians in busy emergency rooms (Park et al., 2012; Xiao, Schenkel, Faraj, 
Mckenzie, & Moss, 2007).  
Research on healthcare team meetings, however, does contribute to understanding 
healthcare providers’ hierarchical relationships and communication patterns, which is an 
important area of study, because discordant interactions can have serious ramifications 
for patient care.  One such study by Atwal and Caldwell (2005) analyzed 14 
multidisciplinary team meetings and concluded that “doctors . . . had more dominant 
roles in teams” than did other members, and that “therapists, social workers, and nurses 
are reluctant to voice their opinions” (pp. 271, 268).  In their literature review, Atwal and 
Caldwell cited numerous studies that found nurses rarely questioned physicians, “even in 
matters of life and death” (p. 272).  In fact, studies examining interactions among 
healthcare providers have found consistently that divergent communication patterns, 
particularly between nurses and physicians, inhibit collaboration and affect negatively 
patients (see Eggertson, 2012; Johnson & Kring, 2012).  Several studies have noted 
nurses’ reluctance to challenge physicians’ orders, even when physicians make glaring 
mistakes (see Eggertson, 2012; Haddad, 2003; Johnson & Kring, 2012; Robinson, 
Gorman, Slimmer, & Yudkowsky, 2010; Tschannen et al., 2011).  Indeed, Duhigg (2012) 
reported that communication habits between physicians and nurses were “so toxic” at one 
hospital that they caused “terrible mistakes and patients died” (p. 157). 
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The problematic relationship between nurses and physicians is well documented 
in the health communication literature.  As Johnson and Kring (2012) noted, “The 
relationship has been an unequal one characterized by the dominance of the doctor, with 
the nurse assuming a position of lower status” (p. 343).  Physicians have more formal 
education than do nurses, and, hence, they enjoy “a higher standing in the social pecking 
order of the hospital” (Haddad, 2003, p. 28).  According to Goffman (1956), such 
hierarchical relationships are governed by “asymmetrical rules,” which lead “others to 
treat and be treated by an individual differently from the way that individual treats and is 
treated by them” (p. 476).  As Goffman (1956) explained, “Doctors give medical orders 
to nurses, but nurses do not give medical orders to doctors” (p. 476).  Apker, Propp, and 
Ford (2005) described the “nurse–doctor game” that takes place when nurses attempt to 
“guide or direct physicians’ clinical decisions by appearing to be passive to the traditional 
hierarchy” (p. 102).  Medical schools, arguably, deemphasize physicians’ relationship 
development skills, and the result, according to Rosenstein (2012), is that many 
physicians adopt “autocratic, egocentric, domineering behaviors that are the antithesis of 
collaboration and effective communication” (p. 34). 
Many physician-issued medical orders play up role differences (divergent 
communication) by asserting physicians’ dominance and by highlighting nurses’ 
perceived incompetence (Robinson et al., 2010), but worth noting is that the strong 
hierarchical culture in most hospitals, which elevates physicians over nurses, also favors 
certain physicians over others; specifically, primary versus secondary care designations 
prioritize specialists over general practitioners, with specialists having more authority and 
their orders superseding generalists’ orders (Shershneva et al., 2006).  In asymmetric 
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interactions between primary and secondary providers, fragmented care and ineffective 
communication have had “a negative effect on quality [of care], patient outcomes, and 
health care costs” (Shannon, 2012, p.16).  Indeed, communication problems were the 
most-cited cause of medical errors in 2010 (Shannon, 2012). 
Communication between groups of physicians, although not always divergent, 
often can be classified as “nonaccommodative,” which “can be manifest in ‘speech 
maintenance’ where the speaker sustains a communicative stance . . .  to maintain an aura 
of authenticity” (Giles, 2008, p. 165).  For example, generalists may refuse to converge to 
specialists (i.e., assume a subservient position), but they stop short of divergence and still 
save face.  Speech maintenance is most likely to occur when the conversational “Other” 
is a member of an undesirable group (Street & Giles, 1982), and the “Other” in many 
hospitals is the emergency medicine physician.  As Apker et al. (2007) noted, emergency 
medicine physicians and admitting specialists suffer routine communication breakdowns 
(see the discussion later on provider-focused emergency room communication research).  
Emergency medicine physicians often have to “sell or force admissions when they 
believe patients need inpatient care, whereas admittings believe they’re being dumped 
on—there’s a lack of collegiality between the two services” (Apker et al., 2007, p. 889).  
Ineffective communication during admission has been identified as a leading cause of 
medical error, and it plays a significant role in emergency room overcrowding (Apker et 
al., 2007). 
Communication research has shown that although interactions among providers 
can be problematic, many providers actually are interacting less with one another.  
According to Shannon (2012), communication between hospital-based and primary care 
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physicians happened in fewer than 20% of discharges.  Without effective communication 
and coordination of care, patients suffer.  The Joint Commission of Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations (the accrediting body for U.S. hospitals) has reported that 
nearly 70% of adverse patient outcomes are caused by communication failures 
(Eggertson, 2012).  Most consultations between providers are not billable, and 
asynchronous communication, particularly reliance on EMRs, limits conversations 
among providers (Shannon).  Fairbanks et al. (2007) noted that in emergency rooms, 
triage nurses and ambulance crews do not talk regularly with physicians, meaning that 
“most handoff information is either secondhand verbal or written” (p. 403).  Handoff or 
handover communication, which is the process of information exchange that occurs 
during transfer of a patient’s care from one provider to another to ensure both patient 
safety and continuity of care, is an especially problematic component of emergency 
medicine care that has been noted in several studies (Cameron et al., 2010; Eisenberg et 
al., 2006). 
Communication breakdowns have important ramifications for both patient care 
and hospitals’ finances.  Agarwal, Sands, and Schneider (2010) conducted a study of 
communication challenges among healthcare providers in seven hospitals, finding that 
those challenges were related to perceived communication delays (e.g., estimated time 
spent waiting for providers to return calls or respond to pages) and actual time “wasted” 
looking for providers and/or waiting for calls.  Agarwal et al. devised an economic model 
that quantified three categories of waste: physician time, nurse time, and patient length of 
stay.  They estimated that these communication inefficiencies cost U.S. hospitals more 
than $12 billion annually, with increased length of stay alone accounting for 53% of the 
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burden.  A typical 500-bed hospital, by Argarwal et al.’s projections, “loses over $4 
million annually as a result of communication inefficiencies” (p. 265).  Argarwal et al. 
suggested that “technologies aimed at improving communication inefficiencies in 
hospitals” should be adopted, because those communication technologies will “aid in 
connecting to the right person about the right patient at the right time” (pp. 278, 279).  
Numerous studies have pointed to improved communication and patient care following 
such adoptions, but, as explained below, other research has shown that communication 
and health information technologies negatively impact provider–patient relationships, 
communication efficiency, and patient safety. 
Communication and Health Information Technologies 
Abundant research has revealed mixed results concerning the effects of using 
communication and health information technologies in medical settings.  The 
ramifications of using such technologies, for both patients and providers, are well 
documented; however, many studies are situated in primary care clinics and privilege 
one-on-one bounded exchanges between patients and physicians (see the discussion later 
about emergency medicine and EMRs).  Nonetheless, an overview of this research shows 
the impact that these technologies continue to have on interpersonal relationships and 
communication within and across healthcare settings.  Research about effects of 
technologies on provider–patient interactions is especially important given that recent 
legislation has mandated that U.S. hospitals and emergency rooms adopt EMRs by 2015 
(see the discussion later about EMR legislation); hence, there soon will be even more 
computers in examination rooms, and, consequently, it is important to understand what 
this will mean for patients and providers alike. 
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Communication and health information technologies, broadly defined, include 
computers, EMRs, walkie-talkies, mobile phones, tablets, and electronic whiteboards.  
Health information technologies (HIT) can improve the quality of patients’ charts and 
medical histories, facilitate communication among providers, allow access to online 
resources, and may reduce medical errors, but technology also can have unintended 
consequences: it can increase work for providers, alter workflow, and introduce new 
types of clinical errors (Shachak & Reis, 2009).  Research also has shown that computers 
and EMRs decrease the amount of interpersonal contact between primary care providers 
and patients (Montague & Asan, 2014; Overton, in press-a).  According to Montague and 
Asan’s (2014) analysis of videotaped interactions between physicians and patients, 
computers in examination rooms hindered communication, with a third of the physicians’ 
time spent looking at the computer screen instead of at their patients, meaning that those 
physicians may have missed important nonverbal cues given by patients (e.g., facial 
expressions that may have signaled patients not understanding physicians’ use of medical 
terminology).  Other studies have found that patients express decreased confidence in 
physicians who use diagnostic support tools in examination rooms (Arkes, Shaffer, & 
Medow, 2007; Hall, 2014).  Although computers are supposed to improve operational 
efficiency, Teufel, Kazley, and Basco (2012), instead, found that hospitals using 
computerized physician order entry systems (CPOE) showed no significant difference in 
patients’ length of stay or total cost per stay compared to non-CPOE hospitals; in fact, 
CPOE hospitals averaged $70 more per case.  
Not all of the findings about the effects of HIT have been negative, as some 
patients have reported being more satisfied with providers who use EMRs (Hsu et al., 
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2005).  A study conducted in a Veterans Administration hospital that analyzed 
videotaped provider–patient interactions also found that physicians’ examination room 
computer use was associated with patients asking more questions, and, moreover, long 
pauses in high EMR-use conditions created more conversational turn-taking (McGrath, 
Arar, & Pugh, 2007).  Ward et al. (2013) also found that when EMRs were used in 
hospitals, patients’ length of stay was reduced. 
Hence, the literature has not provided a clear-cut answer regarding the effects of 
HIT in the medical context.  However, before reviewing additional findings, it is 
worthwhile to discuss briefly the history and practice of patient documentation, especially 
because most HIT and EMR research has centered on this aspect of medical practice. 
Healthcare Documentation 
Patient records have existed since the first hospitals were opened and they have 
evolved to serve two primary goals: documenting expenses and improving medical 
education (Overton, in press-c).  The first goal is of particular interest, because many 
physicians believe that the patient record still serves, primarily, a financial function for 
hospitals: facilitating billing and collections (Siegler, 2010).  Early hospitals established 
basic rules to track patient admissions, diagnoses, and outcomes, but the purpose, largely, 
was bureaucratic, with administrators using patient tallies to justify expenditures (Hess & 
Ledebur, 2011).  As far back as 1737, surgeons in Berlin, Germany were required to note 
patients’ conditions each morning and to prescribe lunches accordingly; for example, 
soup was prescribed for patients who were too weak to chew.  The purpose of this 
recordkeeping, according to Hess and Ledebur (2011), was to help administrators track 
food costs in hospitals; it had little bearing on actual patient care.  In 1791, according to 
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Siegler’s (2010) analysis of early medical recordkeeping, the New York Board of 
Governors required lists of patients’ names and their prescribed medications, but no 
descriptions of their conditions were required; the principal objective was to track fixed 
medication costs.  Documenting formally the care that individual patients received was 
fairly uncommon in U.S. hospitals at that time; it was not until the end of the 19th 
century that U.S. physicians began recording the specifics of daily patient care for all 
patients.  From 1860 on, physicians used standardized medical forms to record patients’ 
demographic data, along with their symptoms, treatments, daily events, and outcomes.  
The reports, however, usually were written retrospectively and in widely varying 
narrative styles. 
Widespread use of templates in U.S. hospitals helped to standardize patients’ 
records, but the resulting numerical data superseded narrative content (Overton, in press-
c; Siegler, 2010).  According to Siegler (2010), by the start of the 20th century, graphs 
and tables dominated patient records, and physicians’ narrative summaries began to 
disappear.  The freestyle narrative form that previously had comprised the bulk of 
patients’ records allowed physicians to write as much or as little as they wished.  
Templates, in contrast, left little room for lengthy narratives—no more than a few inches; 
consequently, summary reports gave way to brief descriptions of putatively pertinent 
findings.  As medical technology advanced, according to Siegler, the medical record 
became more complicated and cumbersome with the addition of yet more forms for 
reporting each new type of test conducted (e.g., chemistry, hematology, and pathology 
tests).  Although most physicians kept working notes on active patients, those scraps of 
paper notating observations, daily tasks, and physicians’ thoughts seldom made their way 
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into the official patient record.  The official record, which emphasized tests and numbers, 
as Siegler noted, changed medical discourse, with interactions between physicians and 
patients becoming more data driven.  This shift paralleled the change from 
biopyschosocial to biomedical-driven care, as discussed previously, with healthcare 
becoming less about the totality of patients’ experiences and physicians’ perceptions of 
those experiences. 
Today, irrespective of the charting format used, patient records are maintained 
according to strict guidelines (Overton, in press-c).  Several agencies publish 
recommended guidelines, including the American Association of Nurses, American 
Medical Association (AMA), Joint Commission of Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations (JCAHO), and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).  Each 
organization/association regards the medical record as a communication tool for everyone 
involved in patients’ current and future care.  The primary purpose of the medical record 
is to identify patients, justify their treatment, document the course of their treatments and 
the results, and facilitate continuity of care among healthcare providers.  Each agency’s 
charting guidelines require certain fixed elements in patients’ record: their name, address, 
birthdate, attending physician, diagnosis, next of kin, and insurance provider.  The patient 
record also contains physicians’ orders and progress notes, as well as medication lists, X-
ray records, laboratory tests, and surgical records.  Several agencies require patients’ full 
names, birthdates, and a unique patient identification number that appear on each page of 
the record, along with the name of the attending physician, date of visit or admission, and 
the treating facility’s contact information.  Every entry must be signed or initialed 
legibly, and the date/time must be stamped by the provider. 
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Although patient records have evolved to ensure continuity of patient care, Siegler 
(2010) claimed that their current form facilitates billing over communication concerns.  
Many EMRs, for instance, are modeled after accounting systems, with providers’ 
checkbox choices of diagnoses and tests, typically, being categorized and notated in 
billing codes.  All medical procedures and treatments administered in the United States 
are reported in Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) codes.  The AMA owns that 
coding schema and charges users a yearly licensing fee for the CPT codes and 
codebooks, which are updated annually.  CMS and most insurance companies require 
CPT-coded data for reimbursement (AMA, 2014).  The results often are medical charts 
that few providers, and even fewer patients, can decipher without a codebook (Overton, 
in press-c).  Bukata (2013) echoed this assertion, writing, “All that charting . . . is read by 
virtually no other medical person” (p. 4).  EMRs have evolved in this financially driven 
way, in large part, because the first computers used in healthcare settings were adapted 
from “the business world [and] have been directly and successfully applied to billing, 
scheduling, and numerical functions of medicine” (Ash & Ulrich, 1986, p. 361).  One 
important place where such technologies, including EMRs, have affected health care, as 
described below, is examinations rooms. 
Technology in Examination Rooms 
Computer-aided healthcare documentation is a fairly recent development.  Before 
computers were brought into examination rooms, providers documented findings on 
paper charts during or immediately after medical exams.  Although there were early 
adopters, the first EMR users (like many new technology users) struggled with inefficient 
and sluggish systems.  Some progressive hospitals experienced backlash when EMRs 
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were installed in the early 1980s: “Attempts to force [providers] to use charting or 
artificial intelligence systems have, in some cases, resulted in open rebellion” (Ash & 
Ulrich, 1986, p. 362).  Ash and Ulrich (1986), in their review of literature on the adoption 
of computer-based patient charting systems, dating back to 1980, surmised that EMRs 
were unsuccessful because they were difficult to use, did not generate reader-friendly 
reports, and were not interoperable (these reasons remain the most cited in present-day 
research).  Cost also was a factor, because mainframe terminals were very expensive in 
the 1980s.  Ash and Ulrich, however, lauded the introduction of “battery-powered” and 
“mobile” computers with “over 500K RAM” that were suitable for use in “hospital 
wards, specialty care units, emergency rooms, and the professional’s home” (p. 363).  
Although rudimentary by today’s standards, that groundbreaking technology allowed 
patients’ data to be stored and transferred on floppy discs.  Ash and Ulrich reviewed one 
of the first commercially available charting programs, SmartChart, and reported that 
when the system worked, it resulted in faster documentation over paper charting by 1 to 2 
minutes per patient.  Versions of the software installed on a Geneva 64K CP/M computer 
suffered memory overload in 20% of visits, but the prototype was received well by 
primary care physicians and by nurses working in intensive care units (Ash & Ulrich).  
The problems that plagued these early computer systems, however, persisted well into the 
21st century. 
Modern-day computer use in examination rooms has been well documented and 
researched.  Frankel et al. (2005), for instance, conducted a longitudinal study in which 
they videotaped interactions between primary care physicians and patients at prescribed 
intervals before, during, and after computers were installed in examination rooms.  
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Frankel et al. concluded that the “introduction of computers in the exam room affected 
the visual, verbal, and postural connection between clinicians and patients,” and that 
these factors “had the potential to alter the sense of connection . . . essential to 
relationship building and maintenance” (pp. 677, 681).  Frankel et al. also noted that 
preexisting “facilitators and barriers” in both physicians’ verbal and nonverbal 
communication were “carried forward and amplified when exam room computers were 
used” (p. 681).  In essence, computers magnified already engrained behaviors, both 
positive and negative. 
Pearce, Kumarapeli, and de Lusignan (2013) reached similar conclusions in their 
systematic review of empirical studies examining computer-induced changes in 
physician–patient interactions: Across numerous studies, the addition of computers 
amplified existing positive and negative communication behaviors.  Computer-specific 
behaviors (e.g., typing and screen gaze) also diminished rapport between physicians and 
patients, as well as the provision of emotional support by physicians.  Shachak and Reis 
(2009), whose study was cited by Pearce et al., concluded that computers negatively 
affected patient-centeredness but positively influenced biomedical information exchange, 
noting that the “introduction of the EMR organizes encounters around data gathering 
demands rather than the patient’s narratives” (p. 645).  This point can have repercussions 
for patients (see the discussion later about consequences of EMR use), with Shachak and 
Reis offering providers several recommendations for maintaining rapport with their 
patients.  These recommendations include opening visits by addressing patients’ 
concerns, explaining to patients why computers are being used, pointing to the computer 
screen, inviting patients to participate actively in building their medical charts, looking at 
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patients often, separating routine data entry from patient encounters, and learning to type.  
Typing, especially, “has a negative impact on communication” (Shachak & Reis, p. 647) 
insofar as communication grinds to a halt when providers type, leading Ventres, 
Kooienga, and Marlin (2006) to encourage physicians to become better typists. 
A study by Ventres, Kooienga, Vuckovic et al. (2006) identified typing as a main 
factor fueling physicians’ dissatisfaction with EMRs.  Ventres and his colleagues (2006) 
conducted an ethnographic study of four primary care clinics and amassed 80 hours of 
observations, interviews, and videotaped clinical encounters.  With respect to how 
computers are both used and regarded in clinical practice, they identified four themes: 
spatial (physical placement of the computer), relational (beliefs that both physicians and 
patients had about the computer), educational (physicians’ proficiency and ability to 
teach patients about the utility of computers), and structural (institutional and 
technological forces that influenced physicians’ perceptions of their computer use).  
Structural constraints included monetary concerns, “especially regarding the question of 
whether to type or dictate office visit notes . . . [and] typing was seen as the only way to 
limit further expenditures” (Ventres, Kooienga, Vuckovic et al., p. 129), because 
dictation would have required hiring one or more transcriptionists.  The result was that 
typing led physicians to rely on “quick-text features,” templates, and shortcuts to save 
time.  Ultimately, physicians’ shortcuts meant that patients’ charts “all started looking the 
same,” leading some study participants to bemoan the practice of “cookbook medicine” 
(Ventres, Kooienga, Vuckovic et al., p. 129).  Ventres, Kooienga, Vuckovic et al. 
concluded that the computer “becomes much like a third party to a conversation . . . and 
both physicians and patients project their perceptions onto this identity” (p. 130).  
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Because the use of computers affected several cognitive and social dimensions of medical 
practice, Ventres, Kooienga, Vuckovic et al. cautioned that “it would be a grave mistake 
to believe the effects of EMRs will be automatically and universally positive” (p. 130). 
Although one obvious benefit of using EMRs is readily accessible medical 
records (Shachak & Reis, 2009), providers often underutilize this feature because they 
lack the expertise and time to search for and retrieve patients’ histories.  A study by 
Christensen and Grimsmo (2008) found that physicians rarely spent time searching 
EMRs for patients’ histories; instead, they either relied on their memories or asked 
patients about previous visits.  Both tactics are problematic given the potential for poor 
recall, which could lead to medical mistakes.  Although virtually all of the physicians in 
the study reported that it would be useful to review patients’ histories before encounters 
with patients, 35% reported that asking patients about their past visits was easier than 
using the computer system.  For those physicians who attempted to access digital records, 
37% gave up because the task was too time-consuming.  More than half of the study’s 
participants reported difficulty displaying progress notes in a user-friendly, readable 
format, which harkens back to Ash and Ulrich’s (1986) findings and hints at a problem 
that is becoming more pronounced: the accessibility and readability of medical data. 
Patients’ records contain more data than ever before (Siegler, 2010), and the result 
is that healthcare providers are experiencing data overload.  Many providers have 
difficulty wading through mounds of data to discern important information from 
insignificant attestations and results.  Although computers and EMRs are supposed to 
make searching for patients’ data easier, Christensen and Grimsmo (2008) found just the 
opposite.  Even when electronic charts are accessed, making sense of the data can be 
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difficult, as providers have trouble processing quickly the amount of numerical data and 
graphs that are contained in most medical records (Overton, in press-a; Overton, in press-
c; Siegler, 2010).  Scott, Hallett, and Fettiplace (2013), for example, found that providers 
who were given narrative summaries of patients’ records performed better on questions 
about patients’ conditions than did providers who were given complete medical records, 
and they did so in half the time.  Their findings highlighted the importance of narrative 
summaries that should be included in patients’ records.  Hence, there is a clear need to 
balance numbers with words in medical records, and, thereby, ensure optimal patient care 
(Siegler, 2010). 
In addition to computers and EMRs in examination rooms, other technology has 
been studied in healthcare settings.  For instance, personal wireless communication 
devices (e.g., walkie-talkies) used in an emergency room were found to improve 
providers’ perceptions of quality communication, because rather than relying on a public 
address system, the wireless technology facilitated quiet and efficient access to on-call 
providers and specialists (Richards & Harris, 2011).  Fewer intercom announcements, 
participants maintained, created a better and safer work environment that was free from 
distractions (Richards & Harris, 2011).  To assess how patients viewed physicians using 
wireless devices, Miller, Ziegler, Greenberg, Patel, and Carter (2012) assigned 
participants to either a treatment group, in which they received information regarding the 
utility of these devices, or to a control group.  The treatment group expressed more 
favorable opinions, leading Miller et al. to conclude that “sharing even a small amount of 
information with [patients] about the utility of handheld wireless technologies such as 
PDAs, smartphones, or tablets may improve their perception of what physicians are 
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doing” (p. 59).  Sikka et al. (2012) found that patients were very receptive to the role that 
smartphones could play in managing lacerations; specifically, the majority of participants 
agreed that sending a mobile phone picture of a minor cut to a physician for treatment 
recommendations would be an acceptable alternative to going to the emergency room.  
As Sikka et al. explained, “Patients’ responses were in agreement that mobile health 
applications can reduce cost, save time, be more convenient, and improve communication 
with their healthcare providers” (p. 37).  In fact, this approach now is being used 
successfully by Stat Doctors, a telemedicine service that offers urgent medical care 
consultations via a smartphone app (DeGaspari, 2014). 
Whiteboards, which are dedicated bulletin boards used to track patients’ status 
and length of stay, also have been examined and have particular significance for this 
dissertation.  A 5-year ethnography conducted in a trauma surgical suite charted how the 
whiteboard facilitated communication and teamwork (Xiao et al., 2007).  Although Xiao 
et al. (2007) studied a whiteboard that could be written on with markers, they made the 
argument that “replacing traditional whiteboards with electronic systems may weaken 
communication if we do not fully understand how traditional whiteboards support 
collaborative work” (p. 388).  As it pertains to the present study, it bears mentioning that 
EMRs have electronic whiteboard components; before EMRs were commonplace, a 
quarter of communication events in emergency rooms occurred at or near whiteboards 
(Fairbanks et al., 2007).  Xiao et al. found that the surgical suite’s whiteboard encouraged 
synchronous communication, with staff members meeting frequently at the board, and 
“during face-to-face interactions, the operating room board provided common reference 
points . . . [that] enhanced communication while reducing the effort of explicit 
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communication” (pp. 391, 388).  The board also enabled asynchronous communication, 
as “notes were written to alert all staff to critical issues” (Xiao et al., p. 391).  The 
whiteboard, thus, supported collaborative work in these ways, but it also facilitated task 
management, status tracking, socialization, and team building.  Its location (at eye level), 
interactivity, and usability made it a valuable “communication information artifact” (Xiao 
et al., p. 387).  Electronic whiteboards, according to Xiao et al., “do away with the 
socialization and team building that the central board encourages,” and the placement of 
electronic boards, usually near the ceiling, discourages asynchronous communication and 
“impedes easy interaction [and] some aspects of visibility” (p. 392).  Applying these 
findings to emergency departments, Xiao et al. wrote: 
In the ED [emergency department], a central whiteboard provides an obvious 
gathering space for sign-out rounds . . . .  The obvious gathering of physicians 
encourages notice and involvement by other staff, whereas an isolated sign-out 
around a computer-based tracking system replicates the hospital’s underlying silo 
structure: physicians gather with physicians, nurses with nurses. (p. 393) 
 
This final point underscores some of the inherent communication challenges that 
providers experience in hospitals and, especially, in emergency rooms. 
In sum, research has revealed mixed effects of communication and health 
information technology.  Although these technologies have improved some aspects of 
healthcare delivery, they also have had unintended consequences; namely, increases in 
providers’ workload, medical errors, and healthcare costs.  Computers in examination 
rooms appear to amplify providers’ existing positive and negative communication 
behaviors, which can either bolster or stymy their interactions with patients.  Computer-
assisted documentation has privileged billing functions over medical records’ readability.  
Furthermore, data entry tasks, especially typing, have led providers to adopt shortcuts 
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that render patients’ charts almost indistinguishable.  Other technologies, such as 
electronic whiteboards, also can impact the collaborative nature of emergency room 
work.  The “silo structure” in many hospitals also contributes to communication 
challenges that plague providers, especially those who work in emergency rooms.  
Because emergency rooms are unlike other healthcare settings, it is important to 
understand both the unique nature of provider–patient relationships and communication 
patterns that occur in that site.  Therefore, the following section provides an overview of 
research that has examined how providers and patients communicate in emergency room 
settings. 
Communication Research in Emergency Room Settings 
Emergency rooms are high-stakes, fast-paced, communicatively challenged 
environments, yet few studies focus exclusively on emergency rooms or communication 
patterns in them (Cameron et al., 2010; Fairbanks et al., 2007).  Increasingly, emergency 
rooms are becoming default healthcare homes for underinsured and uninsured patients 
(Overton, in press-b; Roscoe & Eisenberg, 2014); consequently, it is especially important 
to study communication in that setting.  Moreover, for several reasons, findings about 
primary care practices, where a substantial amount of interpersonal health 
communication research takes place, are not generalizable to emergency rooms.  First, 
emergency medicine practice, inherently, involves “caring for multiple patients with 
highly variable complaints simultaneously,” whereas primary care providers see and treat 
just one patient at a time; hence, “work in [emergency rooms] is unbounded, as there is 
little control over the workload” (Roscoe & Eisenberg, 2014, p. 393).  Second, 
emergency care is provided in an atmosphere rife with “staff shortages, limited resources, 
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overcrowding, and long wait times” (Roscoe & Eisenberg, 2014, p. 393).  The 
environment is crowded and loud, and there is no backstage where providers can 
communicate outside of earshot of patients; such a setting creates a “significant source of 
communication vulnerability” (Eisenberg et al., 2005, p. 404).  There also are frequent 
interruptions and interstaff conflict in emergency rooms (Person at al., 2013).  Third, 
providers and patients in emergency rooms rarely have an established relationship 
(Govindarajan et al., 2010; McCarthy et al., 2013).  Most visits represent a single 
encounter, and, according to Hobgood, Riviello, Jouriles, and Hamilton (2002), 
the duration and quality of that encounter are influenced by time pressures . . . .  
The emergency physician must quickly establish rapport and trust with the 
patient, gather information, assess the cause of the emergency, and design a 
treatment plan. (p. 1257) 
 
Establishing rapport is especially difficult in an emergency room because the interactions 
that occur there are “between strangers in an emotionally charged environment and . . . 
[they are] often dominated by tests and painful procedures” (Hobgood et al., p. 1264).  
Additionally, emergency medicine physicians experience communication barriers in 
nearly half of their encounters with patients who are unconscious, suffer from dementia, 
confusion, or altered mental status, are mentally ill, or have limited intellectual ability 
(Garra et al., 2010).  From patients’ perspectives, “piecemeal delivery of information as it 
becomes available” from multiple care providers can be confusing, especially for those 
“accustomed to the normal flow of information in the outpatient setting” (McCarthy et 
al., 2013, p. 266).  The emergency room, therefore, is especially ripe for communication 
breakdowns and is at risk for medical errors (McCarthy et al., 2013; Wei et al., 2012). 
For these reasons, it is important to review communication research based in 
emergency rooms to understand how EMRs have and will affect that already 
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communicatively challenged environment.  As explained below, that research has 
focused on the patient’s perspective, communication strategies that providers use when 
interacting with patients, discharge communication, and interactions between groups of 
providers, including communication occurring during the transfer of care and admission 
processes.  
Patient-focused Emergency Room Communication Research 
Several studies have privileged patients’ experiences and their perspectives of 
communication with emergency room staff.  Much of that research, however, suggests 
that emergency room patients receive too little information from providers and have few 
opportunities to express their concerns or to ask questions (Crane, 1997; Farmer, Rotor, 
& Higginson, 2006; Rhodes et al., 2003; Samuels-Kalow, Stack, & Porter, 2012).  For 
example, Rhodes et al. (2003) videotaped and analyzed 93 interactions between 
emergency medicine residents and patients at an urban academic medical center, and 
concluded that “the physician–patient encounter was brief and lacking in important health 
information” (p. 262).  Specifically, Rhodes and her colleagues noted that residents 
introduced themselves only in two-thirds of encounters, only about half of the patients 
were told their diagnosis, only 60% were advised of specific symptoms that would 
warrant returning to the emergency room, fewer than 20% were told what they could 
expect over the course of their illness or recovery, only 16% were asked if they had 
questions, and none of the residents confirmed if patients understood the information that 
had been conveyed to them.  Despite most residents beginning examinations by asking 
patients open-ended questions about their health, only 20% of patients described their 
chief complaints without interruption.  Only 17% of the interruptions were categorized as 
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“elaborators,” whereby residents sought additional information or clarification; most 
interruptions were closed questions, and 82% of patients who were interrupted did not 
finish describing their chief complaints.  Interruptions, as mentioned previously, 
occurred, on average, only 12 seconds after patients began speaking.  These behaviors are 
commonplace among practicing physicians as well; in a study of 74 encounters between 
physicians and patients over a 4-month period, Farmer et al. (2006) found that physicians, 
typically, controlled examinations with interruptions and closed-ended questions. 
Seven years later, McCarthy et al. (2013), surveyed 266 patients in an urban 
academic medical center and found more positive outcomes, at least when compared with 
Rhodes et al.’s (2003) study, as the medical staff did not interrupt patients when they 
spoke and the staff communicated in terms that patients could understand.  The lowest 
scoring item on the patient questionnaire, however, was “encouraged me to ask 
questions.”  Although McCarthy et al.’s (2013) findings may have hinted that 
communication patterns in emergency rooms had improved in the decade since Rhodes et 
al.’s study was published, the majority of the research conducted in emergency rooms has 
concluded that physicians and residents perpetuate ineffective communication patterns 
because they do not receive adequate communication skills training (Coran et al., 2010; 
Hobgood et al., 2002) and/or because they lack the time needed to engage in highly 
person-centered communication (Cohen, Wilkin, Tannenbaum, Plew, & Haley, 2013; 
Crane, 1997; Farmer et al., 2006; McCarthy, Cameron, Courtney, & Vozenilek, 2012; 
Samuels-Kalow et al., 2012).  Because physicians are “under pressure for timely 
diagnosis and rapid disposition” (Farmer et al., 2006, p. 141), they often chose efficient 
communication at the expense of comprehension and rapport (Dean & Oetzel, 2014). 
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Cohen at al. (2013) found that although emergency room staff recognized the 
need for engaging in empathic communication, only the nonmedical staff were able to 
devote time to that type of communication.  Many physicians are familiar with techniques 
that could facilitate better communication with patients, but they rarely use them, 
according to McCarthy et al. (2012), who surveyed a nationwide sample of 169 
emergency medicine physicians and residents working in community hospitals and 
academic medical centers.  Effective techniques, identified by McCarthy et al. (2012), 
include talking slowly, using simple language, reading aloud, using pictures, “following 
home” (asking patients to explain how they will take medicines or dress wounds at 
home), and “teach back,” whereby patients demonstrate for providers what they have 
learned about their conditions or treatments.  Of these methods, McCarthy et al. (2012) 
found that physicians used only the first two regularly.  They surmised that this finding 
occurred because more advanced techniques involve asking patients questions, which 
could prolong the encounter. 
Effective provider communication (e.g., that which is sensitive to patients’ 
emotional and information needs) is associated with reduced anxiety in patients, as well 
as with increased trust of physicians (Shankar, Bhatia, & Schuur, 2013).  As McCarthy et 
al. (2013) noted, “The need for good communication is so widely accepted that patient 
satisfaction with physician communication is now linked to hospital Medicare incentive 
payments” (p. 262).  However, although good provider–patient communication 
throughout patients’ entire emergency room visit is important, as documented below, 
discharge communication is an especially important aspect of the emergency medical 
interaction. 
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Discharge communication.  Discharge communication is the exchange of 
information between providers and patients that occurs when patients have been 
evaluated, diagnosed, treated, and are being prepared to leave the emergency room.  
Typically, at that time, providers summarize the visit and clinical findings, teach patients 
how to care for themselves at home, and address questions or concerns that patients may 
have (Samuels-Kalow et al., 2012).  According to Samuels-Kalow et al. (2012), “At 
patient discharge, the emergency provider must effectively complete three tasks: 
communicate the crucial information, verify comprehension, and tailor teaching to areas 
of confusion or misunderstanding to ensure patient safety” (p. 152).  Frequently, 
however, discharge “becomes an afterthought, limited only to a brief exchange of forms 
and prescriptions” (Samuels-Kalow et al., p. 152).  In their analysis of empirical research, 
Samuels-Kalow et al. found that many patients did not know their diagnosis, suggested 
treatments, or reasons that would necessitate a return to the emergency room.  An earlier 
survey of 314 patients immediately upon their discharge from an emergency room by 
Crane (1997) yielded similar results, with a quarter of the patients not understanding their 
diagnosis or the purpose of their prescribed medications.  Furthermore, most patients 
were missing over a third of the necessary information that they needed for safe discharge 
from the emergency department (including reasons to return).  Crane (1997) identified 
time constraints, in particular, as a factor inhibiting effective discharge communication. 
Physicians consistently underestimate the time that is needed for discharge 
communication, according to Ackermann et al. (2012).  In their study, physicians were 
given a vignette involving a chest pain patient and a list of 81 items from which they had 
to select the most important to include in a 15-minute discussion with patients.  The items 
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chosen, by the authors’ estimation, would have taken more than a half hour to 
communicate.  Ultimately, this study and other studies suggest that physicians need 
additional training in discharge communication.  Samuels-Kalow at al. (2012) concluded 
that patients need “structured content, presented verbally, with written and visual cues to 
enhance recall” (p. 152).  Additionally, messages should be tailored to take into account 
patients’ level of knowledge, and providers should “provide education in a manner that is 
clear, comprehensible, and culturally sensitive” (Shankar et al., 2013, p. 21). 
Provider-focused Emergency Room Communication Research 
One of the communication studies about emergency rooms that is cited most often 
was conducted by Eisenberg et al. (2005), who spent 32 days over 10 months observing 
interactions among providers in two emergency rooms that were affiliated with academic 
medical centers.  Eisenberg et al. (2005) also interviewed providers and “attended 
regularly scheduled rounds, shift changes, case conferences, and formal and informal 
meetings” (p. 396).  One of the key findings to emerge from the nearly yearlong study 
was that providers subjugated patients’ stories into actionable lists, a practice that can 
affect substantially patient care (see the discussion below about consequences of EMR 
use). 
Although Eisenberg et al.’s (2005) study privileged patient outcomes, it also shed 
light on providers’ experiences and interactions.  Eisenberg et al. (2005) noted that 
emergency departments were especially susceptible to communication challenges given 
their fragmented and hierarchical environment.  As Eisenberg et al. (2005) explained: 
The ED is internally fragmented by professional fault lines separating physicians 
from nurses and nurses from techs/aids/EMTs, and externally fragmented by the 
frequent presence and influence of extra–ED entities (e.g., consultants, pre-
hospital services, laboratory, radiology). (p. 392) 
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In particular, they claimed, these divisions were apparent when nurses disagreed with 
physicians.  Ownership over patients often fueled disagreements; whereas physicians see  
every patient and, therefore, spend less time with each patient, nurses are responsible for 
just a few patients.  The result, as described by Eisenberg et al. (2005), is that 
nurses spend more uninterrupted time with patients and feel more of an authority 
on particular individuals.  Physicians, on the other hand, have more technical 
training and can claim more authority over diagnosis and treatment; final word 
always goes to the physician in terms of diagnosis and patient care.  Many nurses 
simply remained silent when they disagreed, following physicians’ orders and 
only later expressing their objections to other nurses.  This hierarchical behavior 
is a serious weakness in the system, and is reminiscent of flight attendants’ 
unwillingness to assert themselves with pilots when they feel something is amiss. 
(p. 402)   
 
This passage is evocative of findings described in the sections above, underscoring the 
magnitude of problematic physician–nurse relationships and communication across 
healthcare settings. 
Hierarchical behavior, as described by Eisenberg et al. (2005) and elsewhere (see 
Eggertson, 2012; Haddad, 2003; Johnson & Kring, 2012; Robinson et al., 2010; 
Tschannen et al., 2011), is problematic, as is the tendency of providers to cluster in 
similar groups.  As Xiao et al. (2007) found, the hospital “silo structure” means that 
providers tend to maintain professional boundaries, congregating and communicating 
with ingroup members, such that “physicians gather with physicians, nurses with nurses” 
(p. 393).  Eisenberg et al. (2005) also observed ingroup members clustering together, 
noting that, unlike scheduled physicians’ rounds, there were no formal “face-to-face 
interactions between nurses and physicians”; instead, nurses either sought out physicians 
if they had questions or relied simply “on the chart as their primary medium of  
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communication” (p. 402).  EMRs, however, do away with the common chart, further 
restraining “the collaborative and social nature of clinical work” (Park et al., 2012, p. 
215). 
Although Eisenberg et al.’s (2005) study is an important example of the type of 
communication literature that informs the present study, the medical literature also 
abounds with examples of between-group differences that are applicable to the current 
study and, therefore, warrant mention.  For instance, in a study assessing physicians’ and 
nurses’ perceptions of nonurgent communication and communication barriers in an 
academic medical center,	  Morgan, Kawar, Rahman, Gatewood, and Fairbanks  (2011) 
found that opinions varied largely by group.  Interestingly, half of respondents reported 
that communication difficulties resulted in negative outcomes and medical errors during 
some shifts.  Wei at al. (2012) also found that physicians, nurses, and technicians had 
significantly different views about teamwork, patient safety, and communication.  
Moreover, Farhan, Brown, Woloshynowych, and Vincent (2012) found that group 
differences influenced perceptions of handoff communication, its purpose, and its 
execution in an academic medical center.  Like discharge communication, as described 
next, handoff is particularly problematic (Eisenberg et al., 2005), as poor handoff and 
admission communication often lead to medical mistakes (Farhan et al., 2012; Kessler, 
Kutka, & Badillo, 2012).  
Handoff communication.  Handoff or handover communication, as defined 
previously, is the process of information exchange that occurs during transfer of patients’ 
care from one provider to another, and it happens under several conditions: during shift 
changes, when patients are brought to emergency rooms by ambulance, or when patients 
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are transferred from another hospital.  In the first scenario, providers educate incoming 
staff about patients’ conditions, tentative diagnoses, pending test results, and treatment 
plans (Farhan et al., 2012); in the second case, the ambulance crew communicates 
pertinent findings from the field, which may include patients’ vital signs, medications, 
symptoms, and social histories (Redfern, Brown, & Vincent, 2009).  The ambulance 
crews’ report may be the only information available about unconscious patients and, 
therefore, is very important for ensuring that providers give patients the most appropriate 
care (Redfern et al., 2009).  When patients are transferred from another facility, handoff 
may occur over the phone between the referring and accepting providers, or it may occur 
asynchronously through medical charts accompanying patients upon presentation.  In all 
scenarios, “handover is a vulnerable time for patient safety” (Farhan et al., 2012, p. 941). 
Farhan et al. (2012), in their study of handoff in an academic emergency medicine 
department, found that perceptions of good handoff communication varied as a function 
of role and training.  As Farhan et al. noted, “Handover is a skill that is not formally 
included in medical training” (p. 941).  Study participants estimated that they wasted up 
to 3 hours of shift time “catching up with issues following poor handover” (Farhan et al., 
p. 943), with one respondent stating that an entire shift had been spent tracking down 
information about a patient after receiving no handoff communication.  Problematic 
handoffs were believed to have led to adverse events, including delays in treatment.  The 
authors devised a handoff tool that could be implemented easily, irrespective of staff 
members’ training or role.  Their recommendations included providing a written and/or 
verbal account of each of the following: acuity and diagnosis for each patient, any 
equipment problems, waiting times, number of available beds, number of admitted 
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patients housed in the emergency room awaiting inpatient beds, deaths occurring during 
the previous shift, violent or aggressive patients, and any staff issues or shortages.  
Farhan and her colleagues folded their recommendations into an easy to remember 
mnemonic: the ABC method.  It is formatted as follows: Areas and Allocations (location 
of patients and available resources); Beds, Bugs, and Breaches (available beds, infectious 
patients, and breaks with protocol); Colleagues and Consultants; Deaths, Disasters, and 
Deserters (patients who leave against medical advice); and Equipment and External 
Events.  Early tests demonstrated that the process “takes less than 5 minutes to complete” 
(Farhan et al., p. 945). 
Handoff communication can be especially problematic for patients arriving by 
ambulance.  As noted earlier, Fairbanks et al. (2007) found that triage nurses and 
ambulance crews do not talk regularly with physicians, meaning that “most handoff 
information is either secondhand verbal or written” (p. 403).  Redfern et al. (2009) made 
a similar observation in their analysis of the handoff process involving an ambulance 
crew in a London emergency room, noting that there was limited face-to-face 
interaction––the ambulance crew simply handed over written assessments of patients 
during brief verbal exchanges with nurses.  The written report, the bottom copy of a 
triplicate form, was given to a receptionist who then scanned it into the hospital’s digital 
record system.  The scanned document, however, was completely illegible 82% of the 
time and only partially legible for the remaining 18%.  The forms “contained substantial 
amounts of important clinical information that was often essential to proper care of the 
patient” (Redfern et al., p 659), but they never were read by physicians.  A simple 
solution was devised: scan the top sheet of the triplicate.  After implementing that small 
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change, the scanned forms were “100% wholly legible,” proving that “simple 
interventions produce significant results” (Redfern et al., pp. 659, 660).  Redfern et al. 
expressed dismay over staff members’ inaction, citing the “extraordinary tolerance of 
healthcare staff for inefficient or failure prone systems and the degree to which they cope 
with frustrating working conditions rather than attempting to change them” (p. 661).  As 
shown in chapter 3, such inaction may be explained, in part, by tenets of structurational 
divergence theory. 
To review, effective and safe handoff requires clear communication between 
groups of providers when care for patients is transferred.  However, although handoff has 
been examined within the context of shift change, patients arriving by ambulance, and 
patients being transferred from other hospitals, an additional domain of handoff 
communication, as described below, includes admission to the hospital from the 
emergency room. 
Communication during admission.  Ineffective communication during 
admission is a leading cause of medical errors and contributes to emergency room 
overcrowding (Apker et al., 2007).  Similar to handoff, admission involves transferring 
care; in this case, from the emergency department to an inpatient hospital unit.  The task 
of admitting patients often poses communication challenges for emergency room staff, 
because, according to Eisenberg et al. (2005), it “is a political process.”  From the 
perspective of emergency room physicians, admitting patients involves persuading 
another physician (typically, a specialist) to accept patients into their service, but 
specialists “are selective in whom they wish to admit, at times applying different criteria 
for admission than the ED” (p. 407).  As Stephens, Clark, and Patterson (2012) found, 
	   54 
communication barriers between physicians and specialists inhibit timely admission and 
delay patient care.  In their ethnographic study of an academic emergency department, 
Stephens et al. (2012) noted key barriers: paging system problems that resulted in delays, 
uncertainty as to who to contact regarding admitting patients to particular services (e.g., 
cardiology or internal medicine) and how to contact those providers, specialists who do 
not respond to pages or return calls, and inability of emergency physicians to follow up 
on communication requests given their workload (i.e., they are busy seeing new patients).  
These barriers, in addition to delaying timely care, create additional and duplicate work 
for emergency room staff forced to page and call specialists several times. 
Problematic communication plagues 14–24% of admissions, according to Kessler 
et al. (2012).  Kessler et al. found that poor admission communication increased costs for 
patients and decreased the quality of care that they received and their overall satisfaction.  
In their analysis of communication patterns that occurred in an academic emergency 
department, Kessler et al. uncovered interpersonal and communication conflicts that were 
a result of specialists “not responding to a page, not communicating, taking hours to get 
an answer, being rude to ER staff, and treating ‘us as if we’re stupid’” (p. 708).  When 
conversations did take place, emergency room staff were expected to “speak briefly” and 
get “to the point quickly” (Kessler et al., p. 708).  Marshall et al. (2011), surveying 
emergency medicine and internal medicine residents about the perceived quality of the 
admission discussions in which they engaged regularly, found equally problematic 
admission discussions.  Emergency medicine residents had a much more positive view of 
the quality of information that they conveyed during the admission process than did the 
internal medicine residents who received it.  Internal medicine residents reported that 
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admission communication was clear and organized only half of the time, whereas 80% of 
emergency medicine residents believed that most admissions were communicated clearly 
and effectively.  Internal medicine residents also thought that poorly communicated 
admissions led frequently to delays in patient care and actually harmed patients, whereas 
emergency medicine residents believed that these problems happened in fewer than 10% 
of admissions.  Taken together, both of these studies underscore the hierarchical nature of 
physician specialties and the problematic communication between them. 
Discordant provider interactions that delay admissions also contribute to 
emergency room overcrowding.  Patients “waiting for beds” often are boarded in 
emergency departments; admitted patients “are routinely pushed into the hallway to make 
room for new patients,” but this practice “creates significant physical and psychological 
noise that negatively impacts patient care” (Eisenberg et al., 2005, p. 408).  Ironically, 
these “visible” patients, according to Eisenberg et al. (2005), are “psychologically ‘out of 
mind’ and receive less attention” (p. 408). 
Admission also creates difficulties for both emergency room nurses and floor 
nurses who continually navigate differing expectations of the admission process and its 
associated workload.  Emergency room nurses push for quick admission because 
boarding patients, as described previously, compounds an already difficult working 
environment and erodes the quality of patient care.  Although boarded patients may 
receive less care than active patients (i.e., patients who have not been dispositioned 
and/or discharged), nurses still are responsible for them, along with all of the new 
patients presenting to the emergency room.  Most floor nurses, however, enjoy a “ratio of 
two patients to one nurse” (Eisenberg et al., 2005, p. 408).  Even if beds are available, 
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“the units will not accept new patients” if doing so violates the two patients-to-one nurse 
quota, even though emergency room nurses “may be caring for twice as many critical 
patients” (Eisenberg et al., 2005, p. 408).  This practice of delaying or refusing patient 
admissions results in perceived inequities, and, given the uneven distribution of patients, 
it creates tension between floor and emergency room nurses. 
In summary, emergency rooms are communicatively challenged environments, 
with studies demonstrating consistently that “key communication variables associated 
with rapport and satisfaction . . . are somewhat lacking in provider–patient interactions” 
(Rhodes et al., 2003, p. 266).  Incomplete discharge, poor handoff, and problematic 
admissions affect patients’ safety, but they also erode providers’ job satisfaction.  
Structural constraints demand timely and efficient care, but inadequate resources and 
overcrowding are ever-present obstacles in most emergency rooms.  The problem is 
compounded further by hierarchical relationships and discordant interactions between 
groups of providers.  As Person et al. (2013) noted, “The ED is an intense and stressful 
work environment and . . . frequent interruptions, overcrowding, inter-staff conflict, and 
technology barriers contribute to workplace stress” (p. 226).  Understanding these factors 
informs a more nuanced analysis of the impact that EMRs are having in an already 
compromised communication environment, with the next section examining literature on 
EMRs, EMR legislation, and effects of EMRs used in emergency room settings. 
Emergency Medicine and Electronic Medical Records Systems 
Although many primary care providers have used EMRs with varying degrees of 
success since the 1980s, emergency room EMRs are rare, with Landman et al.’s (2010) 
study finding that fewer than 2% of U.S. emergency rooms had fully functioning EMRs.  
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As noted earlier, studies have shown that EMRs change workflow patterns, 
communication, and patient care (Xiao et al., 2007).  In 2007, Fairbanks et al. called for 
more research on the effects that EMRs will have on emergency medicine practice; since 
then, the U.S. Federal Government has mandated that hospitals must begin using EMRs 
by 2015, and the consequences of that mandate are far-reaching. 
What follows is a review of that legislation, with a subsequent discussion of 
emergency room-focused EMR research.  I then review literature pertaining to factors 
inhibiting EMR adoption, as well as consequences of EMR use, including economic costs 
and implications for patients and providers. 
Electronic Medical Records System Legislation 
Although EMRs are not used widely in U.S. hospitals, recent legislation aims to 
change that practice.  The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical 
Health Act (HITECH) was passed in 2009 as part of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act.  The HITECH Act was modeled after the Wired for Health Care 
Quality Act of 2007 and the Healthcare Technology Act of 2008; both acts addressed 
healthcare privacy management and attempted to establish unifying technology standards 
(Stark, 2010).  These legislative acts were fueled, in part, by reports from the Institute of 
Medicine (IOM) and the World Health Organization (WHO).  IOM released To Err is 
Human in 1999, which reported medical errors as the eighth leading cause of death in the 
United States (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 1999).  In 2000, WHO ranked the United 
States 37th in overall health system performance, citing, specifically, its poor use of 
information technology as a factor contributing to the low ranking (Pipersburgh, 2011).  
In 2001, IOM’s Crossing the Quality Chasm suggested that widespread use of health 
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information technology (HIT) could reduce medical errors (Farley et al., 2013).  That 
claim was based, in part, on research that suggested EMRs could reduce medication 
errors by up to 80% (Pipersburgh, 2011).  Still other reports suggested that EMRs would 
cut health care costs; not only would EMRs “improve efficiency and amplify the quality 
of healthcare” (Noor et al., 2012, p. 15) but access to patients’ complete medical histories 
would prevent overprescribing medications, which, potentially, could save billions of 
dollars. 
In what has emerged as an oft-quoted and maligned report (Bukata, 2013), 
Hillestad et al. (2005) estimated that EMRs would result in a potential annual savings of 
more than $81 billion.  Hillestad et al. (2005) compared information technology (IT) use 
in other sectors (e.g., banking and online shopping) with healthcare’s IT adoption and 
projected enormous potential savings, provided “interconnected and interoperable EMR 
systems [were] widely adopted and used effectively” (p. 1104).  Telecommunication and 
retail industries invested heavily in IT during the 1990s, and, as a result, they later saw 
“60% annual productivity growth” (Hillestad et al., 2005, p. 1106).  Assuming similar IT 
investments, the report projected that hospitals could expect savings of $371 billion over 
15 years.  Many physicians, however, took issue with that comparison, noting that “the 
analogy doesn’t hold [because] healthcare is not the airline or banking industry, it’s about 
two humans, face-to-face, and computers don’t fit into this transaction” (Bukata, 2009, p. 
4).  Other highlights from the Hillestad et al. (2005) report included an estimated 
reduction in the number of medication errors by 200,000 a year and $147 billion in 
annual savings attributed to EMR-enabled chronic disease prevention and management 
programs.  Hilstead et al.’s report pointed out, however, that insurance companies would 
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likely reap most of the savings, and, consequently, “providers face limited incentives to  
purchase EMRs because their investments typically translate into revenue losses for them 
and [savings] for payers” (p. 1108). 
Despite promises of improved patient safety and operational efficiency, EMR 
adoption rates have remained low.  As Stark (2010) noted, “Our healthcare delivery 
system resisted the digital revolution that . . .  occurred everywhere else” (p. 24).  
However, the U.S. Federal Government wants to see the same innovations in healthcare 
that technology brought to banking and shopping (Ackerson & Viswanath, 2009).  That 
desire, potentially, is problematic, because many recent studies have identified some 
barriers that stymy EMR adoption; namely, EMRs are expensive, difficult to use, time-
consuming, interfere with the physician–patient relationship, and disrupt workflow 
(Ajami & Bagheri-Tadi, 2013; Nambisan, Kreps, & Polit, 2013; Pipersburgh, 2011; 
Tomes, 2010).  As Fontenot (2013) noted, “Evidence that (EMRs) will be essential and 
effective in enabling the improvement of healthcare quality is neither conclusive nor 
straightforward [and] the medical community doubt whether digital information benefits 
the quality of care at all” (p. 72).  Nonetheless, the HITECH Act requires EMRs in 
hospitals and emergency rooms. 
The HITECH Act is both promising and problematic; its Meaningful Use (MU) 
program, as described below, is divisive and widely contested.  HITECH’s major goals 
include reducing healthcare costs by improving healthcare quality and coordination, 
reducing medical errors, improving HIT infrastructure through incentives and grant 
programs, and creating a national electronic health information exchange (Pipersburgh, 
2011).  Before HITECH was passed, only 10% of hospitals used EMRs (Pipersburgh, 
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2011); by 2012, 27% of hospitals used some form of electronic charting (Berger, 2013).  
The increase in EMR use was attributed to the MU program, which provides financial 
incentives for hospitals and clinics adopting EMRs.  By May 2013, 80% of hospitals had 
received some incentive pay (DesRoches, Audet, Painter, & Donelan, 2013), but, overall, 
EMR adoption was slower than expected following the MU rollout (Diana, Kazley, Ford, 
& Menachemi, 2012).  As of 2013, only 10% of physicians reported meeting the MU 
requirements (DesRoches et al., 2013).  Noor et al. (2012) noted that the “complexity of 
the Meaningful Use measures” (p. 16) actually was an adoption deterrent for many 
physicians.  However, the goal of MU “is not simply adoption, but true meaningful use” 
(Callahan, 2013, p. 56), resulting in improved coordination of patient care, reduced 
disparities, and improved public health. 
To begin receiving MU incentive payments, hospitals and physicians must show 
that they are meeting at least 19 of 24 Stage 1 objectives for 90 days in the first year of 
EMR adoption and a full year thereafter (Colpas, 2013).  Stage 1 focuses on collecting 
health information in a standardized format, tracking select clinical conditions, better 
coordinating patient care, and implementing clinical decision support systems that 
include warnings about drug interactions or contraindications (Eastaugh, 2013; 
Pipersburgh, 2011).  Stage 2 requirements, which include using computerized provider 
order entry and electronic laboratory reporting, must be met for a full 2 years. Stage 3 
will involve improving quality, safety, and efficiency, as well as expanding clinical 
decision support tool use and providing patients access to their health information 
(Colpas, 2013; Piperburgh, 2011).  As of 2015, the U.S. Federal Government imposes  
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financial penalties for hospitals and physicians failing to meet MU objectives by 
withholding a percentage of Medicare and Medicaid payments (Nambisan et al., 2013). 
Despite promises of financial incentives and threats of withheld payments, MU is 
not working because the requirements are difficult to meet, costly to implement, and have 
affected physician productivity negatively (Noor et al., 2012).  Nearly 20% of 2013 Stage 
1 participants did not continue the program after 90 days, “despite 5 figure financial 
incentives” (Koriwchak, 2014 para. 6).  Verdon (2013), surveying nearly 1,000 
physicians using EMRs who had participated in MU, found that 70% believed that EMRs 
were not worth the cost, did not improve patient care, and did not improve coordination 
of care.  Forty-five percent believed that EMRs actually made patient care worse, and two 
thirds reported significant financial losses following EMR adoption (Verdon, 2013).  
Interestingly, as Koriwchak (2014) noted, satisfaction among EMR users has fallen 
considerably following MU, “from over 90% to about 30%” (para. 6).  Forced adoption, 
mandated by the HITECH Act, 
destroyed the base of satisfied EMR customers from 2008, replacing it with a 
much larger base of unhappy, resentful customers . . .  forced to spend huge 
amounts of money on unproven, underdeveloped EMR products that they did not 
want and were not prepared to properly use. (Koriwchak, 2014 para. 10) 
 
 Although early adopters made deliberate and calculated purchasing decisions in a 
market-driven economy, “MU-driven EMR purchasers” (Koriwchak, 2014, para. 9) 
grappled with vendors churning out untested products to meet legislated demand.  As 
noted above, most of those systems were designed with billing departments in mind, not 
end users.  According to P. Viccellio, a physician, “EMRs are not user friendly or 
medically oriented at all but pushed on us as a way to increase billing . . . .  Instead of 
looking at a medical chart, it’s like I’m looking at a spreadsheet” (personal 
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communication, February 10, 2014).  As Noor et al. (2012) noted, EMRs “won’t be  
functional and physician-friendly until or unless physicians themselves have more input 
into their design” (p. 17). 
Apart from design and usability issues, there are more pressing problems with 
EMRs.  Vendors rushing to meet forced demand produced software packages that 
“literally did not talk to one another” (Fontenot, 2013, p. 72), which is especially 
problematic given that HITECH’s goals include standardized and interoperable EMRs, 
meaning that “multiple clinics and hospitals should be able to access and update [records] 
as patients seek treatment at multiple locations” (Eastaugh, 2013, p. 42).  Most systems, 
however, are not interoperable (Berger, 2013; Colpas, 2013; Eastaugh, 2013; Likourezos 
et al., 2004; Rouf, Whittle, Lu, & Schwartz, 2006; Stark, 2010; Venkatraman, Bala, 
Venkayesh, & Bates, 2008).  DesRoches et al. (2013) found that the most difficult MU 
objective to meet was data exchange among providers, noting that “more often than not 
providers who do successfully adopt health IT systems find themselves on an information 
island where they cannot exchange clinical data with other providers . . . given the 
differing standards used by various developers” (p. 26). 
To correct the interoperability problem, the HITECH Act created the Office of 
National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONCHIT), which oversees 
EMR standardization and certification (Callahan, 2013).  ONCHIT now requires 
developers to use Health Level 7 international healthcare informatics interoperability 
standards to ensure the electronic exchange of health information between computer 
systems.  In 2011, six ONCHIT-recognized Authorized Testing and Certification Bodies 
began testing and certifying EMR systems; that year, only 309 of the nation’s 5,000 
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hospitals were using certified EMRs (Piperburgh, 2011).  That statistic means that many 
early EMR adopters will spend considerable sums to bring their “systems into 
compliance with the new standards issued by ONCHIT” (Stark, 2010, p. 27).  Although 
the U.S. Federal Government made $560 million available to state governments for  
developing health information exchange capabilities, interoperability remains a problem 
(Blumenthal, 2010). 
In a follow up to Hillestad et al.’s (2005) report, Kellermann and Jones (2013) 
addressed the issue of interoperability.  Acknowledging that EMR-induced savings fell 
short of projections, Kellermann and Jones blamed systems that function “less as ‘ATM 
cards’ allowing a patient or provider to access needed health information anywhere at any 
time, than as ‘frequent flyer cards’ intended to enforce brand loyalty to a particular health 
care system” (p. 64).  The authors maintained that the 2005 projections still were 
attainable but would require redesigning EMR systems to ensure interoperability, as well 
as usability.  Hard-to-use systems have stymied adoption, but, curiously “vendors [still] 
have not made usability a priority” (Kellermann & Jones, p. 65).  Rather than hinder 
providers, as Kellerman and Jones explained: EMRs should make documenting clinical 
care easier: 
User interfaces should be similar enough that a clinician working in one health 
system can intuitively discern how to use another without extensive retraining.  
For example, car makers offer a wide variety of makes and models, but important 
controls are consistent enough to enable a customer to drive any vehicle off a 
rental lot without instruction.  Health IT should be no different. (p. 66) 
 
Kellerman and Jones also noted that, contrary to predictions, EMRs “could be associated 
with boosting charges” (p. 65).   
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 In addition to EMRs increasing healthcare costs, as Kellerman and Jones (2013) 
acknowledged, there have been other unintended consequences.  As described previously, 
EMRs have affected both interpersonal relationships and communication patterns 
between providers and patients.  Although EMRs in emergency rooms are somewhat  
new, as reviewed below, several important studies, all published since 2012, have 
examined effects of EMRs in that setting. 
Emergency Room-based Electronic Medical Records System Research 
Several emergency room-based EMR studies have focused on quantifiable 
changes in the frequency of certain processes or tasks, and time needed to complete those 
tasks, after an EMR has been installed.  Hill et al. (2013), for instance, observed 16 
attending physicians, residents, and mid-level providers (e.g., nurse practitioners or 
physician assistants) in an academic medical center for 30 hours, and recorded the time 
that providers spent entering data into an EMR, interacting with patients, talking with 
other providers, and viewing test results.  Hill et al. found that providers, on average, 
spent 44% of their time using the EMR and only 28% of their time engaged with patients, 
whereas before EMRs, providers, especially physicians, spent more time on direct patient 
care.  This shift, as Bukata (2013) noted, “is the opposite of what should be happening . . 
. .  It is truly embarrassing to go to modern EDs and see 25 computer terminals with the 
majority of staff pecking and staring into flat panel monitors” (para. 3). 
Hill et al. (2013) found that face-to-face interactions with other providers 
accounted for only 13% of a typical shift, mirroring what Person et al. (2013) found in 
their emergency room-based ethnography: EMRs “impeded human-to-human 
communication and contact” (p. 225), especially between physicians and nurses.  Park et 
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al. (2012) also found decreased contact between physicians and nurses in their 6-month 
long naturalistic study of an academic medical center, observing physicians, residents, 
and nurses before, during, and after an EMR was installed.  Before the EMR, all of the 
providers shared a common chart for each patient, and, as Park et al. explained: 
Whenever ED doctors documented charts or put in orders, they had to go to the 
nursing station to pick up the paper charts.  As a result, the doctors naturally 
interacted with nurses and spoke about the progress of their patients whenever the 
charts were picked up. (p. 208) 
 
After the EMR, physicians spent more time “in the charting room” where the computer 
was installed and, consequently, “as the doctors’ work became more stationary, less time 
was spent in the nursing stations and the patients’ rooms” (Park et al., p. 211). 
Both Hill et al. (2013) and Park et al. (2012) found that EMRs reduced the time 
that physicians spent interacting with nurses and with patients, but Park et al. also noted 
an interesting paradox: Physicians relied on nurses for updates about patients rather than 
attending to patients themselves.  This outcome occurred because physicians who were 
busy documenting patients’ medical cases on the EMR were “less likely to check patient 
situations” (Park et al., p. 212) and, instead, they took cues from nurses regarding 
patients’ conditions, but that required nurses coming to the charting room. Despite fewer 
face-to-face interactions between physicians and nurses, patient updates were conveyed 
during nurse-initiated discussions.  Park et al. did not address, specifically, the frequency 
or number of nurse-initiated updates but other studies, as noted earlier, have found that 
nurses are hesitant to approach physicians with concerns (see Atwal & Caldwell, 2005; 
Eggertson, 2012; Haddad, 2003; Johnson & Kring, 2012; Robinson et al. 2010; 
Tschannen et al., 2011).  Ultimately, as Park et al. suggested, the absence of bedside talk 
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with physicians means that patients suffer because “the subtle pyscho-social aspects of 
patient experiences during emergency visits” are not attended to (p. 212). 
Park et al.’s (2012) study is important for several other reasons as well; namely, it 
is the only observational “before, during, and after” study published to date about EMR 
effects in an emergency room setting.  Key findings from the study, in addition to those 
discussed above, include a four- to fivefold increase in documentation time, an increased 
number of incomplete patient charts, duplication of charting efforts, and increased 
cognitive burdens for physicians tasked with remembering multiple patients’ data.  In 
using paper charts, Park et al. observed that physicians could complete their charting at 
each patient’s bedside in 2–3 minutes before moving on to see the next patient, but after 
EMRs were installed, documenting took up to 10 minutes per chart and had to be 
completed in the charting room after several patients had been seen.  The shift in charting 
location, from the bedside to the charting room, introduced several unintended 
consequences that affected adversely workflow.  Park et al. described those changes and 
the resulting workarounds:  
When doctors––especially residents who collected information initially––had to 
take care of multiple unfinished records at the same time, memorizing and 
transferring all the information often became a challenge.  To deal with this 
situation, ED doctors developed a habit of using personal hand-written notes as 
memory aids to carry bedside information back to the charting room for later 
documentation. (p. 210) 
 
This workaround, however, meant a duplication of effort: physicians first recorded 
histories and findings by hand, and, later, they had to type the same information into the 
EMR. 
When compared with “quick, free hand-writing on paper charts,” Park et al. 
(2012) found that data entry was tedious, because physicians had to “switch back and 
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forth from clicking through many checkboxes and radio buttons, to typing in text boxes” 
(p. 212).  Given the time that data entry took, up to 10 minutes per chart, most physicians 
delayed completing charts until after their shifts had ended, usually staying an hour or 
more to finish documenting.  Hence, another unintended consequence brought by the 
EMR is unfinished patient charts.  Sometimes, as Park et al. observed, charts would not 
be completed until hours or even days after patients had been discharged, which could 
“affect other nurses or attendings whose work was reliant on accessing timely 
information documented in the EMR system” (p. 211).  Furthermore, as Park et al. 
observed, the particular EMR installed at the research site “does not specify which part of 
the [medical] note is documented by whom” (p. 214), which made it difficult for 
providers to address questions to the appropriate person.  For these reasons, Park et al. 
concluded that despite the EMR improving “legibility, readability, and searchability of 
the medical record,” the EMR restrained “the inherent, collaborative, and social nature of 
clinical work” (p. 215). 
An important emergency room-based study that focused on emergency medicine 
performance metrics “before” and “after” an EMR implementation was conducted by 
Ward et al. (2013).  The authors collected data over a 6-month period at an academic 
medical center about five primary variables: length of patients’ stay, number of 
diagnostic tests ordered, number of imaging tests conducted, medication administration, 
and patients’ satisfaction.  They established baseline measurements for these variables 
over a 4-week period and then tracked changes after an EMR was installed.  Ward et al. 
found that “median length of stay increased for admitted and discharged patients, a 
change that lasted approximately 8 weeks . . . [but] the interval from clinician to 
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disposition showed a sustained increase and never returned to baseline” (p. 323).  
“Clinician to disposition” refers to the time that it takes a physician to diagnose a patient 
after an examination is conducted and tests results are evaluated.  Although the number 
of radiological studies (e.g., X-rays or CT scans) did not increase significantly during the 
study period, other tests did increase; for example, as Ward et al. noted, “the number of 
ECGs performed increased from 23.7 to 35.7 per 100 patients and laboratory testing with 
results available increased from 225.4 to 374.5 tests per 100 patients” (p. 323).  The 
amount of medication administered also increased, as “medication administration per 100 
patients nearly doubled after implementation, and this difference was sustained through 
the entire study period” (Ward et al., p. 323).  Patient satisfaction, presumably, because of 
the increased length of stay, decreased during the first 2 months after the EMR was 
installed, and although patient satisfaction rates improved over the subsequent 24 weeks, 
they did not return to the baseline (Ward et al.).  Ward et al. concluded that, for some 
variables, postimplementation disruption ranged from 4 to 16 weeks, whereas other 
variables (i.e., number of tests ordered and medications administered), never returned to 
baseline. 
The most pertinent finding from Ward et al.’s (2013) study was that “the observed 
increases in laboratory testing, radiologic imaging, and ECG rates appeared to persist 
throughout the follow-up period” (p. 326).  This additional testing affects adversely 
workflow, in that nurses and technicians assume more work with respect to administering 
more tests, further slowing patients’ throughput times and adding to length of stay.  
Increased testing also affects patients, whose hospital bills increase with each added test,  
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procedure, or medication (Bukata, 2011; Kellermann & Jones, 2013).  This unintended 
consequence (i.e., more tests), according to Ward et al. is attributed to “order sets”: 
Order sets are used by physician groups to increase adherence to local practice 
patterns and to speed the ordering of complex sets of orders, and when formalized 
as part of the electronic health record implementation they may also have 
increased the use of radiologic tests, medications, and laboratory tests that would 
not have been ordered in a paper-based system.  Also, the electronic health record 
may have enhanced the ability to order tests by simply clicking a button or 
through the use of order sets.  Although paper order sets were in use before the 
electronic health record implementation at this particular facility, adoption of 
electronic order entry has been shown to increase ordering of tests and 
medications through order sets. (p. 326)	  	  
Ultimately, the EMR, as Ward et al. concluded, was associated with “diminished patient 
experience,” “transient operational deficiencies,” and “sustained increases” (p. 327) in 
tests.	  
An additional finding from Ward et al.’s (2013) study, which, although not 
discussed in detail, merits mentioning: “Unit clerk hours had decreased by 33% from 
baseline by the end of the study period, which was a planned decrease because of the 
increased administrative work that would be performed in the electronic health record by 
clinicians” (p. 323).  This finding means that a class of employees, unit clerks, who, 
previously, had typed or processed orders for physicians, were being scaled back, 
whereas “highly trained clinicians,” for whom “clerical activity” is “a waste of time and 
expertise” (Foppe, 2014, p. 23), were tasked with data entry, in addition to seeing and 
treating patients.  Shifting data entry responsibilities to physicians has had unintended 
and negative consequences.  As discussed previously, Ventres, Kooienga, Vuckovic et al. 
(2006) identified typing (necessary for data entry) as a main factor fueling physicians’ 
dissatisfaction with EMRs, and the result was that “quick-text features,” templates, and 
shortcuts meant that patients’ charts “all started looking the same” (p. 129).  These quick-
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text shortcuts led study participants to bemoan “cookbook medicine,” whereby patients’ 
charts became almost indistinguishable (Ventres, Kooienga, Vuckovic et al., 2006, p. 
129). 
Callen et al. (2013) also noted that introducing an EMR into an emergency room 
shifted the data entry workload from clerks to physicians, and that the results, largely, 
were negative, as users “reported difficulty with assimilating the use of the technology 
with their work, particularly in relation to the significant data entry demands required and 
the time taken” (Callen et al., p. 136).  More time spent on data entry, consequently, 
meant that physicians spent less time engaged with patients.  EMR-users also complained 
that the system “was not user friendly or intuitive” and that the “electronic process 
entailed more steps in the completion of previously simpler tasks and generally created 
more work” (Callen et al., p. 138). 
Callen et al.’s (2013) study, despite the aforementioned negative findings, did 
report some advantages associated with the EMR.  Their ethnographic study, conducted 
in four Australian academic emergency departments, included observations, focus 
groups, and interviews conducted with 97 physicians and nurses.  Participants’ 
perceptions were recorded following introductions of an “ED information system” (akin 
to an EMR) into their emergency departments.  The system enabled almost immediate 
access to patient data and, thereby, allowed all providers, including specialists and 
consulting physicians, to see test results and findings, irrespective of who placed orders.  
Study participants reported that the quick access “contributed to improved care 
coordination, communication, clinical documentation, and the consultation process” 
(Callen et al., p. 131).  Prior to the EMR, requests for patients’ past medical histories 
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often meant a 4-hour wait for the records department to find and deliver paper-based 
charts.  Faster access was valued because “past clinical information was considered 
crucial, especially for those with extensive medical histories who are unable to 
communicate their clinical history” (Callen et al., p. 136).  The electronic records also 
were advantageous over paper charts because the issue of illegible handwriting became 
moot.  Despite the advantages, however, Callen et al. cautioned that although EMRs can 
“improve patient care delivery,” they also can “facilitate new kinds of clinical errors and 
introduce additional costs” (p. 132).  Ultimately, the ED information system led to 
“increased task complexity, duplicate documentation, and computer issues related to 
system usability” (Callen et al., p. 131). 
In summary, research on EMRs in emergency rooms has revealed mixed results.  
EMRs have shifted work patterns, increased documentation time, prolonged length of 
stay, and upped the number of tests and medications ordered, but, in some instance, 
EMRs also have improved access to patients’ medical records and led to better 
coordination of care between multiple providers.  Although the literature is inconclusive, 
the risks seem to outweigh the benefits––even studies with positive findings cautioned 
that EMRs introduced problems and unforeseen consequences (Callen et al., 2013; Ward 
et al., 2013).  As such, hospital administrators and emergency department directors have 
been slow to adopt EMRs, with, as noted above, fewer than 2% of U.S. emergency rooms 
having fully functioning EMRs in 2010 (Landman et al., 2010).  Several factors that 
contribute to that abysmal adoption rate are discussed in the following section. 
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Factors Inhibiting Electronic Medical Records System Adoption and 
Implementation in Emergency Rooms 
 
Medicine never has been a rapid adopter of innovation (T. Cook, 2014).  T. Cook 
(2014), a physician and Emergency Medicine News reporter, noted that physicians “take 
years to agree on anything, and older physicians seemingly do not want to change 
anything” (p. 25).  Although physicians often are cited for “not being comfortable with 
new technology” (Noor et al., 2012, p. 17), resisting change is not unique to medical 
professionals; in fact, most “people have a general tendency to stay with their current 
circumstances . . .  going with a new alternative is cognitively difficult, whereas a status 
quo choice is mentally less laborious” (Nesterkin, 2013 p. 576).  According to Lewin’s 
(1947) tenets of change theory, inherently, people resist change unless they believe that 
the way things are being done is problematic and that an improvement is available.  Even 
then, lasting change happens only if people are willing to learn the new process, feel safe 
in the learning environment, and regard the change as compatible with their other tasks 
and behaviors.  Similarly, diffusion of innovations theory suggests that, for a diffusion to 
be successful, people must be aware of an innovation, convinced that adoption of it is 
beneficial, and then use it (see Rogers, 2003).  Feedback is crucial to communicate that 
an innovation is an improvement, especially if it is to be adopted permanently.  EMRs, 
however, seem doomed, according to both change theory and diffusion of innovation 
theory, as few medical providers find the old way of charting problematic, few find 
EMRs to be an improvement, EMR training programs are flawed, and feedback about 
EMR use, largely, is negative (see sections below).  As a physician blogged, “So, we 
have replaced a very clear and simple ordering system which functioned well for years 
with this complex mess that few can navigate and no one understands and no one can 
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explain why” (cited in Armstrong, 2014, para. 14).  In most organizational change 
research, according to Nesterkin (2013, change is perceived as a loss that generates 
“negative emotions and dispositions” (p. 576). 
Innovations commonly are rejected when “talk” and “use” are at odds, according 
to Leonardi (2009).  Studying employee users of a new software program, Leonardi noted 
that “they did not resist organizational change because it was forced on them by 
management  . . . but because misalignments existed between the information they 
received about it in their social and material interactions” (p. 435).  Simply put, the 
software was rejected because it did not perform as employees expected; hence, what 
they were told and what they experienced firsthand were at odds.  Similarly, Huryk 
(2010) found that nurses viewed EMRs more negatively when preadoption accolades 
about their timesaving abilities did not materialize.  In a related study, Vishwanath (2009) 
found that positively framed messages about an innovation, especially messages 
emphasizing performance and usability, created higher expectations among would-be 
users who later rejected the innovation.  Thus, when a product’s attributes are overstated, 
users are disappointed more easily. 
According to Vishwanath, Brodsky, and Shala (2009), ease of use, ultimately, 
predicts sustained engagement with any innovation; moreover, Ilie, van Slyke, Parikh, 
and Courney (2009) found that usability, more than any other variable, influenced 
physicians’ decisions not to use an EMR.  When given the choice, overwhelmingly, 
hospital-based  physicians chose paper charts to document patient care, because paper 
charts were more accessible; EMRs impeded quick access to patients’ medical files with  
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multiple log-on screens and drop-down menus.  Even if the EMR had more up-to-date 
patient information than paper charts, using it required too much effort (Ilie et al., 2009). 
Regardless of physician specialty or practice environment, it appears that EMRs 
have long been thought to affect negatively the physician–patient relationship (Ajami & 
Bagheri-Tadi, 2013; Likourezos et al., 2004; Nambisan et al., 2013; Pipersburgh, 2011; 
Tomes, 2010).  As noted above, EMR use has decreased the amount of interpersonal 
contact between providers and patients (Montague & Asan, 2013; Rouf et al., 2007), and 
physicians’ examination room use of diagnostic support tools, a common EMR feature, 
erodes patients’ confidence (Arkes et al., 2007; Hall, 2014).  Citing an AMA report, Hall 
(2014) urged physicians to “do as much data entry outside the exam room as possible” 
(para. 9).  Huryk (2010) found that many nurses, even when computers-on-wheels were 
available for use, opted to leave them outside patients’ rooms because of perceptions that 
the technology interfered with the nurse–patient relationship.  Taken together, these 
studies paint an abysmal picture of EMRs.  Although there are some positive studies 
supporting EMR use, largely, they are lost amid negatively framed reports that decry the 
effects EMRs. 
Studies, such as those just described, frame EMRs’ benefits and drawbacks in 
terms of workflow changes and provider–patient relationships, but studies also have 
examined EMRs with respect to how end users (i.e., physicians and nurses) communicate 
about them, which is important, because how providers talk about EMRs influence how 
EMRs are received, utilized, and evaluated.  The following sections explore research on 
message framing, including both physician- and nurse-focused studies, and highlight the 
implications of that research for EMR adoption and implementation. 
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Framing physicians’ discourse about electronic medical records systems.  As 
noted above, research has shown that how people talk about an innovation influences its 
adoption (Leonardi, 2009; Vishwanath, 2009). In particular, message framing, whether 
within the confines of conversation or appearing in mediated form, is an important 
variable with respect to physicians’ adoption of and satisfaction with EMRs.  Message 
frames influence perceptions about an innovation by becoming “the lens through which 
the innovation is evaluated (and) experienced” (Vishwanath, 2009, p. 197).  Thus, when 
the results from EMR studies published in medical journals are framed negatively (see 
Fernando, Georgiou, Holdgate, & Westbrook, 2009; Feufel, Robinson, & Shalin, 2011; 
Francis, 2013; Georgiou et al., 2013; Lee, Kuo, & Goodwin, 2013; Makam et al., 2013; 
Ward et al., 2013), readers/users also are more likely to rate their experiences with EMRs 
as negative.  Moreover, in their literature review, Nambisan et al. (2013) found an 
“extreme culture of apprehension,” “distrust,” and “negativity” (p. 6) surrounding EMRs.  
Thus, both negatively framed journal articles and physicians’ negative communication 
about EMRs fuel this culture of apprehension and distrust of EMRs.  For example, a 
leading emergency medicine scholar described EMRs succinctly as “inventions of the 
devil” (R. Bukata, personal communication, February 3, 2014).  Furthermore, physicians’ 
blogs routinely recount tales of “doctors around the nation resigning over being forced to 
use EMRs” (Armstrong, 2014 para. 4).  In a blog post titled “My EMR/CPOE 
Rant/Tantrum,” Armstrong (2014) relayed the following story that was told to him: 
Started a job I was happy with. 4 months into the job, the hospital changed to 
EMR.  Within hours, the waiting times went from 45 minutes on average to 4 
hours on average.  We spent 80% of our time doing computer entry . . . .  I handed 
in my resignation that afternoon. (para. 5) 
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Merriman (2014) posted similar sentiments, saying, “The degradation of our profession 
started with the advent of EMR” (para. 1).  These messages, which circulate in journals, 
on message boards, and throughout emergency rooms, perpetuate physicians’ 
apprehension and dissatisfaction with EMRs. 
EMR condemnations also have appeared in the popular press.  Columnist Charles 
Krauthammer (2014) wrote that EMRs “are so absurdly complex, detailed, tiresome, and 
wasteful that if the doctor is to fill them out, he can barely talk to and examine the 
patient, let alone make eye contact” (para. 13).  Krauthammer concluded that physicians-
turned-clerks were “ridiculously wasting” (para. 14) their skills.  Taken together with the 
negatively framed medical literature and physician blogs, such popular press musings 
contribute to the negative perceptions of EMRs. 
Noor et al. (2012) conceded that the most “important step towards implementing 
adoption is to change the psyche of a user from ‘reluctant’ to ‘willing’” (p. 19).  Leonardi 
(2009) suggested that changing how people talk about new technology will change their 
opinions about adoption, and, therefore, administrators/managers should encourage 
positive discourse.  Peer support and organizational culture also have been shown to 
affect EMR satisfaction positively (Top & Gider, 2011).  For example, as Huryk (2010) 
noted, “If nurses work in a computer positive atmosphere, then the nurses were more 
positive about technology” (p. 610).  However, as the brief review of nurse-focused EMR 




	   77 
Framing nurses’ discourse about electronic medical records systems. 
Compared to physicians, nurses, generally, have been more accepting of and enthusiastic 
about EMRs (Lærum, Karlsen, & Faxvagg, 2004; Likourezos et al., 2004, Otieno, 
Toyama, Asonuma, Kanai-Pak, & Naitoh, 2007; Weiner et al., 1999).  Studies have found 
that more nurses than physicians describe EMRs as easy to use (Lærum, Karleson, & 
Faxvaag, 2004), and that EMRs help them to complete documentation tasks more quickly 
(Likourezos et al., 2004).  Nurses also have reported that EMRs made their jobs easier 
(Huryk 2010; Top & Gider, 2011), whereas most physician-focused studies have found 
otherwise (see above).  In her meta-analysis of nurse-focused EMR studies, Huryk (2010) 
reported that, overwhelmingly, nurses’ attitudes toward EMRs were positive.  Negative 
attitudes, although few, were associated with poor or slow EMR performance, lack of 
computer experience, and age (with older nurses being less satisfied with EMRs). 
Despite concerns that EMRs can dehumanize healthcare, perceptions of enhanced 
patient safety have strongly influenced positive attitudes toward EMRs (Huryk, 2010).  
Top and Gider (2011) found that such positive attitudes were driven by perceptions of 
enhanced communication with physicians and improved legibility of patient information, 
both of which are tied closely to patients’ safety.  Considering that nurses’ misreading of 
physicians’ handwriting is a reason that is cited commonly for medication errors (Hewitt, 
2010), improving legibility, clearly, is an EMR attribute that nurses value. 
In addition to negatively framed messages and discourse, there are two other 
factors inhibiting both EMR adoption and implementation processes in emergency 
rooms: reactance stemming from forced adoptions and training-induced cognitive 
dissonance.  The following sections examine these issues more closely.  
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Forced adoption and reactance.  User participation in the EMR adoption 
process merits discussion, as several studies have noted the importance of physicians’ 
involvement in the decision-making process (Brooks & Grotz, 2010; Farley et al., 2013; 
Francis, 2013).  Too often, however, management adopts a particular system without 
consulting end users; as Tomes (2010) found, “clinicians are not brought into the 
selection process until it’s too late” (p. 97).  Nambisan et al. (2013) also noted that 
physicians’ involvement is “crucial for the success of EMR adoption” (p. 4).  Nurses also 
are much more likely to embrace an EMR system if they had some role in selecting or 
modifying it (Estrada & Dunn, 2012; Huryk, 2010).  However, as Nambisan et al. noted, 
“‘Adoption by fiat’ has been found to be quite effective” (p. 5).  Recounting the U.S. 
Department of Veterans Affairs EMR adoption process, Nambisan et al. described “top 
leadership” implementing a system in which “physicians and other staff members were 
required to comply as system employees” (p. 5).  That example notwithstanding,  
“emboldened resistance” (Nambisan et al., p. 8) usually is the response to top-down 
decrees. 
Forced organizational change (e.g., EMR adoption) undermines employees’ 
freedom, arouses negative affective states, and activates their reactance (Nesterkin, 2013.  
Reactance is the motivational state following a threat to or elimination of freedom that 
aims to restore that freedom and/or to subvert and resist the endorsed behavior (Brehm, 
1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981).  Reactance, typically, triggers hostile and aggressive 
feelings (Brehm, 1966), and it is based on the premise that individuals value choice, as 
evidenced by the need for autonomy (e.g., self-determination), and that threats to 
autonomy invite resistance (Nesterkin, 2013.  Psychological reactance theory (Brehm, 
	   79 
1966), therefore, proposes relationships among freedoms, threats, reactance, and 
(attempted) restoration of freedoms.  Although direct restoration involves performing the 
forbidden act, freedom may be restored, symbolically, by increasing liking for the 
forbidden choice, by disparaging the source of the threat, or by exercising other freedoms 
to maximize feelings of control (Quick, Shen, & Dillard, 2013).  Studies have reported 
similar reactions to EMRs, with Lærum et al. (2005) noting that “many physicians find  
order entry is a task better performed by others, reducing their motivation for learning (or 
engaging with) the new system” (p. 9). 
Ongoing or frequent organizational change can evoke what Nesterkin (2013 
described as “multiplicative reactance.”  Lærum et al. (2005) noted that most EMR 
adoptions involve multistage processes, occurring over extended periods of time and 
involving hybrid electronic-paper systems that are error prone and that heighten users’ 
dissatisfaction.  Although EMR adoptions involve multiple phases, modifications, and 
updates, users face ongoing change that, according to Nesterkin, can leave employees 
with layers of negative emotions and cognitions.  Individuals’ dissatisfaction, multiplied 
amid ongoing cycles of change, can have ramifications for the organization as a whole.  
As Nesterkin explained: 
The lingering layer of pervasive negative affect accumulated after each freedom- 
infringing change, is, via reactance, likely to affect an organization negatively in 
various ways . . . by increasing employee turnover, increasing deviant and 
organization undermining behaviors, decreasing job dissatisfaction and job 
commitment, increasing job stress, and weakening work climate and 
organizational identity. (p. 586) 
 
 Reducing reactance is desirable, but difficult.  As Quick et al. (2013) noted, the 
presence of choice can diminish reactance.  As explained previously, however, few 
physicians and nurses have input in EMR selection and adoption, which led Nesterkin 
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(2013 to recommend “implementing and sustaining a socially supportive (i.e., 
interpersonally just) organizational environment, led by an emotionally intelligent 
management staff” (p. 589).  There is no research to date, however, about whether or how 
reactance can be reduced in an emergency room setting. 
 There is another affective state that affects perceptions of EMRs by providers and, 
especially, physicians: dissonance.  As described next, dissonance often occurs during 
EMR training; mainly, when trainers are nurses and trainees are physicians.  Because this 
hierarchical role reversal is typical of most EMR training sessions, it warrants further 
review. 
Training, role reversal/conflict, and dissonance.  Key factors impeding 
successful EMR implementation include poor or inadequate training, and training-
induced role reversal or conflict.  Organizational change, inevitably, requires learning 
new behaviors, and EMR adoption marks a major shift in how emergency care is 
delivered, and, thus, requires providers to learn a radically different approach to 
documenting care.  Inasmuch as many EMR adoptions are forced, the requisite learning 
that follows also is forced.  Nesterkin (2013) wrote that forced learning amid change 
invites reactance, because “learning requires a certain degree of deviation from one’s 
existing preconceived ideas which is often seen as inherently undermining one’s 
autonomy” (p. 573).  As noted previously, the organizational environment can ameliorate 
members’ reactance to change, and Top and Gider (2011) attributed positive learning 
environments and peer support to nurses’ ready adoption of EMRs, but they also noted 
that half of users received no training whatsoever. 
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Several studies have found that training programs are inadequate, particularly 
those provided by EMR vendors (Brooks & Grotz, 2010; Granlien & Hertzum, 2012); 
however, peer-to-peer training also is problematic.  Brooks and Grotz (2010) found that 
because physicians “do not want to spend time learning new computer systems” (p. 81), 
nurses and technicians are trained and then tasked with training physicians.  However, as 
T. Cook (2014) noted, “Watching an older surgeon yell at the poor guy trying to teach 
him how to use the EMR is not pretty” (p. 25).  Physicians’ lack of knowledge about how 
to use an EMR often leads them “to view themselves as novices . . . [and] the 
juxtaposition between concurrent roles of (medical) ‘expert’ and ‘novice’ creates a high 
degree of cognitive dissonance” (Nambisan et al., 2013, p. 4).  Reversing the hierarchical 
structure of the physician–nurse or physician–technician relationship during training also 
increases physicians’ cognitive dissonance; Nambisan et al. (2013) noted role-reversal 
induced dissonance with respect to “physician resistance toward learning and sharing 
knowledge” (p. 5).  Barley (1986) also noted reversal tensions between physicians and 
technicians who were tasked with training them to use new equipment.  Robinson, 
Purves, and Wilson (2003) cautioned that this type of cognitive dissonance can “lead to 
emotional tension and avoidance of learning” (p. 432) as physicians grapple with new 
technology. 
The concept of “cognitive dissonance,” as noted above, features prominently in 
many EMR studies and warrants further consideration.  Festinger (1957), in proposing 
cognitive dissonance theory, defined dissonance as “the existence of nonfitting relations 
among cognitions,” with cognitions understood as “any knowledge, opinion, or belief 
about the environment, about oneself, or about one’s behavior” (p. 3).  According to 
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dissonance theory, there is pressure to achieve or maintain consonance (i.e., balance), 
such that people’s thoughts are in agreement (e.g., “I’m concerned about my health” and 
“I quit smoking” are consonant, whereas “I’m concerned about my health” and “I smoke 
two packs of cigarettes a day” are dissonant; Festinger, 1957; Trenholm, 1989).  
Changing either cognitions or actions reduces dissonance, but attitudes are changed more 
easily than are behaviors.  Adding consonant elements also can reduce the magnitude of 
dissonance, because “their addition functions to reduce the proportion of dissonant 
relations among the perceiver’s cognitions” (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 473).  
Dissonance is “undoubtedly an everyday condition” (Festinger, 1957, p. 5), but it is 
experienced, especially, in three major circumstances: where a choice must be made 
between alternatives, in forced compliance situations that require persons to act in ways 
that contradict their existing beliefs, and in certain information-processing situations 
(Trenholm, 1989).  With regard to the last situation, exposure to counterattitudinal 
information triggers dissonance that can be alleviated by selective avoidance.  Because 
choice seldom is the source of dissonance for EMR users (see above), forced compliance 
is of greater interest, because dissonance is “an inevitable consequence of forced 
compliance” (Festinger, 1957, p. 89).  To reduce that type of dissonance, “either the 
attitude must be changed or the behavior denied or rationalized” (Trenholm, 1989, p. 
101).  Indeed, people offered large incentives for performing counterattitudinal behavior 
actually experience less dissonance and attitude change, because acting to receive an 
award justifies people’s counterattitudinal behavior; in contrast, people with minimal 
incentive or justification for engaging in counterattitudinal behavior, typically, reduce 
dissonance by believing in their actions (Trenholm, 1989). 
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Physicians who are forced to use EMRs in spite of their beliefs that EMRs 
undermine patient care and/or who submit to training that elicits role conflict/reversal 
may deal with the resulting cognitive dissonance in several ways.  Looking more broadly 
at primary care physicians and learning-related dissonance, Robinson et al. (2003) 
suggested that physicians respond to dissonance by dismissing the issue/message as being 
unimportant or wrong, by dismissing the messenger as unimportant, by seeking 
corroboration from others in support of the new information, by negotiating with the 
messenger, and/or by accepting the message and changing their beliefs.  As Festinger 
(1957) noted, however, “There is no guarantee that the person will be able to reduce or 
remove the dissonance” (p. 6). 
To review, several factors inhibit EMR adoption and implementation.  Resisting 
change, especially change having to do with new technologies, is common.  New 
technologies—specifically, those offering no or few perceptible advantages in terms of 
how things already are done—commonly are rejected.  Many healthcare providers do not 
regard EMRs as an improvement over paper charts; thus, their utility is questioned.  
Misalignments between “talk” and “use” also mar providers’ perceptions: typically, 
healthcare administrators “oversell” EMRs and, thereby, create false expectations, and, 
later, disappointment for users who are underwhelmed by the performance of EMRs.  
Resulting discourse impacts the climate surrounding EMRs.  As described previously, 
that discourse, largely, is negative.  Forced adoption leads to reactance, which emboldens 
providers’ resistance to EMRs.  Role-reversal during training also triggers a negative 
affective state, dissonance, which further impedes providers’ acceptance of EMRs in their 
emergency rooms.  However, given that legislation requires hospitals and emergency 
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rooms begin using EMRs in 2015 or face fines, it is important to examine ramifications 
of not only the adoption and implementation process but also consequences of EMR use, 
with the next section reviewing research on those known consequences. 
Consequences of Using Electronic Medical Records Systems 
The culture of negativity surrounding EMRs is fueled by studies identifying their 
postimplementation shortcomings; regarding EMR use in emergency rooms, predictably, 
there are few positive findings.  Likourezos et al. (2004) reported that both emergency 
room nurses and physicians believed that EMRs would not improve quality of care and 
would not decrease costs, waiting times, or emergency room overcrowding, and these 
claims have been substantiated in recent studies (Fernando et al., 2009; Feufel al., 2011; 
Georgiou et al., 2013; Ward et al., 2013).  Emergency medicine scholars have long 
predicted that EMRs would contribute to overcrowding (Flomenbaum, 2014), and 
increasing numbers of emergency room visits will compound that problem, with the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2015a) reporting that emergency room visits 
increased from 117 million in 2007 to more than 136 million in 2011, and that trend is 
continuing.  Although one of the aims of the Affordable Care Act is decreasing 
emergency room use, its Medicaid expansion actually increased visits in Oregon by 40% 
(Flomenbaum, 2014). 
Emergency rooms now account for 68% of all hospital admissions, and EMRs 
make processing those patients an inefficient and time-consuming chore, which 
contributes to overcrowding (Augustine & Holstein, 2014).  Physicians using EMRs also 
have bemoaned decreases in their productivity (Likourezos et al., 2004), but more recent 
studies reveal mixed results.  Brunk (2013) cited a 30% postimplementation decrease, but 
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Henning, Horng, and Sanchez (2013) found no evidence that EMRs reduced productivity 
permanently.  Additional studies have shown that EMR use increases the amount of time 
that physicians spend at the computer (Hill et al. 2013), the number of laboratory and 
imaging tests ordered, and overall healthcare costs (Georgiou et al., 2013; Ward et al., 
2013).  Although EMR use is correlated with shortened hospital stays (.11 days or 2.6 
hours), 30-day rehospitalization has increased by less than .19%  (Lee et al., 2013). 
Results also are mixed for EMRs’ effects on medical errors: Georgiou et al. 
(2013) found that EMRs decreased medication errors and adverse drug events, but Ward 
et al. (2013) found that EMRs increased errors.  Other studies also have linked EMRs 
with increases in medication errors (Koppel et al., 2005), causing one in five medication 
errors in children (Walsh et al., 2006), and worsening patient outcomes, including 
contributing to higher mortality rates (Han et al., 2005).  However, in ambulatory care 
settings, EMRs have had no measurable impact on quality of care (Linder, Ma, Bates, 
Middleton, & Stafford, 2007) and a minimal effect on medication-error interception rates, 
but no overall effect on injuries caused by errors (Walsh et al., 2008). 
EMR use, thus, has not led to highly anticipated improvements in patient care.  
Expected decreases in medication errors, for example, are not substantiated by EMR 
studies, nor are projected healthcare savings being realized.  In fact, healthcare costs 
actually are increasing, as are the economic consequences of EMR use, as discussed next. 
Economic consequences.  EMRs are expensive to buy, install, and maintain; 
consequently, EMRs diminish profits for hospitals and, simultaneously, increase costs for 
patients.  According to Bukata (2011), the average hospital’s IT expenses increased 80% 
during EMR installation, and higher costs are sustained for years afterward, with most of 
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those costs, eventually, passed on to patients and their insurance providers.  Increased 
laboratory and radiology tests, which are a function of predetermined order sets (see 
Ward et al., 2013), also mean increased costs for patients (Bukata, 2011).  In fact, 
hospitals using EMRs between 2006 and 2010 reported a 47% increase in Medicare 
billing (Bukata, 2014).  That increase, in part, likely occurred because of both increased 
testing and better charge capture associated with EMRs, the recording, and later billing, 
of the full range of medical services that are performed by providers, medical supplies 
used, and medications administered during patients’ examinations (Bukata, 2014).  EMRs 
improve charge capture in many ways; for example, scanners are used to track barcoded 
supplies, such as bandages and cotton swabs, which are tallied and notated in CPT codes 
that hospital billers use when filing insurance claims.  By comparison, most paper-
charting systems do not require that providers record each bandage or cotton swab used, 
and the resulting “lost charges,” therefore, contribute to hospitals’ overhead.	  	  Increased 
charge capture, however, does not offset the high cost of maintaining and updating EMRs 
(Bukata, 2011).  Across the board, studies have found that the most common economic 
consequences linked with EMRs are higher healthcare costs and increased documentation 
time (Fernando et al., 2009; Georgiou et al., 2013; Hoffmann, 2009; Kellermann & Jones, 
2013; Ward et al., 2013). 
Increased documentation time merits discussion because it has economic 
consequences for both hospitals and individual physicians.  Makam et al. (2013) found 
that EMRs, unquestionably, are associated with longer documentation times, and Hill et 
al. (2013), as noted previously, reported that the average emergency medicine physician 
spent nearly half of a typical shift documenting care and only 28% in direct contact with 
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patients.  Hill et al. counted an average of 4,000 mouse clicks per physician per shift, 
which accounted for 66 minutes of unbillable time; had that time been spent with 
patients, an estimated $153,000 in revenue could have been generated for the hospital in a 
single year.  Bukata (2009) noted that every minute a physician spends documenting 
rather than seeing new patients represents $18 lost in opportunity costs for the hospital. 
From physicians’ perspectives, increased documentation time often means unpaid 
time spent documenting care after physicians’ shifts have ended (most emergency 
medicine physicians are independent contractors who are paid hourly, and few hospitals 
pay physician-contractors overtime).  Because hospital “metrics” (time-based 
measurements of providers’ activity) require fast care and short lengths of stay, 
physicians, for whom violating metrics is a fireable offense (“Metric Madness,” 2014), 
often delay documentation until their shifts are over and they no longer are seeing new 
patients (Leep, 2014; Park et al., 2012).  As noted above, delayed documentation inhibits 
access to health information for providers who have assumed care for admitted patients 
(Park et al., 2012).  Furthermore, although hospitals and nonhospital-based physicians 
who demonstrate meaningful use of an EMR qualify for tens of thousands of dollars in 
HITECH-mandated incentive pay, emergency medicine physicians, along with 
radiologists, anesthesiologists, and pathologists, are exempt from incentive pay (Bukata, 
2011).  Thus, individual emergency medicine physicians using EMRs assume more work, 
for which they are not paid, whereas hospitals receive financial incentives for adopting 
EMRs.  These financial incentives, however, do not offset costs that hospitals assume 
when it comes to installing and maintaining EMRs. 
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Some hospitals have attempted to regain “lost revenue” by hiring scribes, who, 
according to a physician-scholar, are “a work around for systems that fundamentally do 
not value physician time” (R. Bukata, personal communication, February 3, 2014).  In 
theory, scribes follow physicians and document patient care, and, thereby, leave 
physicians more time to spend with patients.  The practice, however, has been criticized; 
as Krauthammer (2014) noted, scribes are “a whole new category of previously 
unnecessary health workers” (para. 11) that has been created by EMR mandates.  
However, physicians-turned-clerks are not efficient either, as Krauthammer admitted (see 
above).  
Scribes have the potential to alleviate 80% of the documentation burden that falls 
currently to emergency medicine physicians, inasmuch as they can document patients’ 
medical histories and findings (Foppe, 2014), but who should pay for scribes is a 
contentious issue (Bukata, 2009).  Scribes make between $10 and $20 an hour, and 
although most emergency medicine physicians believe that hospitals should pay for 
scribes, the cost usually is split evenly between hospitals and physicians (Bukata, 2009).  
An equitable arrangement, as proposed by Bukata (2009), has physicians paying 20% of 
scribes’ salaries, but a fair “splitting of costs rarely occurs” (para. 16).  Regardless, 
increasingly, scribes are a common solution for physicians seeking to circumvent 
inefficient EMRs.  
Despite the economic consequences associated with EMRs, the HITECH Act 
means that EMRs will become even more commonplace, and, as such, there are other 
consequences to consider; namely, the emotional toll that they extract from both 
providers and patients.  As Genes (2014) pointed out, “Hospital administration doesn’t 
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care too much about doctors’ . . . frustrations.  They care about the bottom line: are 
patients happy?” (p. 47).  As discussed below, however, recent studies (including Ward et 
al., 2013) have suggested that patients are not satisfied and that EMRs are partly to 
blame. 
Growing patient dissatisfaction.  Patients’ satisfaction scores are affected 
negatively by EMRs, albeit indirectly.  As noted above, EMRs decrease providers’ 
productivity and, thereby, increase patients’ wait times and lengths of stay—two factors 
that are tied directly to patients’ satisfaction (Ward et al., 2013).  Hospital administrators 
are fixated on patients’ satisfaction, “despite the fact that high patient scores are 
correlated with worse outcomes and higher costs” (Drake, 2014, para. 4).  Many hospitals 
have instituted “throughput times” to reduce long waits, with administrators monitoring 
carefully how long it takes to get from “door to doc,” and penalizing slow physicians 
(“Metric Madness,” 2014; Rosenstein, 2012; Vance, 2010).  That practice, however, fails 
to account for overcrowding and bottlenecks that begin in triage (Eisenberg et al., 2006).  
Matters are further compounded by EMRs that have doubled the average length of stay 
(“Electronic Health Record Blamed,” 2012).  Long before patients see emergency 
medicine physicians, slow triage and registration processes violate patients’ expectations 
of timely service; when they finally do see a physician, “they’re angry and hungry after 
waiting for hours” (Eisenberg et al., 2006, p. 202).  Primary care physicians add to 
overcrowding by dumping their patients after hours and on weekends; rather than taking 
call, these physicians tell their patients to go the emergency room, but they seldom 
explain that patients will have long waits in unpleasant and crowded conditions 
(Eisenberg et al., 2006).  Unfortunately, EMRs, which are supposed to make accessing 
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patients’ histories easier, are slow or incompatible, rendering those EMRs largely inept 
(Likourezos et al., 2004; Rouf et al., 2006). 
In addition to increased wait times and lengths of stay, EMRs have affected how 
information is solicited from patients in such a way as to almost eliminate their illness 
stories altogether.  For patients, “Stories are a way of making sense of an uncertain or 
chaotic set of circumstances and . . . enable control in the face of disorder” (Sharf et al., 
2011, p. 38).  As described previously, patients who tell their stories have better health 
outcomes (Pennebaker, 2000), but most patients’ stories are interrupted by providers 
(Thompson et al., 2011).  Truncated storytelling increases patients’ uncertainty and 
feelings of helplessness, thwarting their identity and arousal management goals.  As 
noted previously, Eisenberg et al. (2005) found that most interrupted stories were reduced 
to “actionable lists” (p. 390) that prioritized physicians’ goals.  Technical lists “fail to 
capture the whole meaning” (Real & Poole, 2011, p. 110), but EMRs limit the amount of 
free text that is available for generating either lists or stories.  As a physician explained, 
“The nurses can type some limited narratives, but the doctors usually just check boxes” 
(P. Viccellio, personal communication, February 10, 2014).  Resulting medical records, 
largely, lack context, and are comprised of “a bunch of numbers, lab results, and tests, but 
there’s no story” (L. Garranger, personal communication, January 10, 2014).  A Canadian 
physician whose government does not mandate EMR use commented, “We don’t have 
EMRs because patients are not check boxes; they’re people with stories, and I have to tell 
those stories to the consultings and admittings during handoff of care” (K. Milne, 
personal communication, February 10, 2014). 
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Although patients are affected negatively by EMRs, so, too, are providers, as has 
been well documented in the sections above, but beyond the frustrations associated with 
hard-to-use EMRs and economic penalties that they bring (namely, uncompensated after-
hours work), EMRs contribute to providers feeling dissatisfied with their careers.  As 
discussed in the next section, career dissatisfaction can lead to burnout, which has 
important consequences for both providers and patients. 
Providers’ dissatisfaction and burnout.  Many of the studies noted above posit 
that physicians are dissatisfied with EMRs, but that dissatisfaction also can extend 
beyond EMRs and affect physicians’ overall career satisfaction.  During a typical 12-hour 
shift, emergency medicine physicians manage interactions with dozens of patients, their 
respective family members, nurses, and consulting specialists, along with EMRs, 
laboratory, and radiology reports.  Moreover, physicians are “under the proverbial gun to 
deliver faster and faster care and earn a score of 5 on Press-Ganey patient satisfaction 
surveys, in the face of staff cuts and dwindling resources” (Vance, 2010, p. 144).  During 
a routine shift, emergency room physicians are interrupted up to 42 times an hour, 
whereas other specialists are interrupted only four times (Burley, 2011).  Hence, 
compared to other providers, emergency medicine physicians experience higher 
dissatisfaction and communication overload (Spencer, Coiera, & Logan, 2004). 
Irrespective of EMRs’ contributions, career dissatisfaction among physicians is 
well documented.  Analyzing cross-sectional data from a national survey of 6,590 
physicians, Leigh, Kravitz, Schembri, Samuals, and Mobley (2002) found that only two 
in five physicians were highly satisfied with their work, whereas 18% were very 
dissatisfied; 13% of emergency medicine physicians reported being dissatisfied.  Leigh, 
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Tancredi, and Kravitz (2009) ranked emergency medicine 31st of 42 specialties with 
respect to providers’ overall career satisfaction.  Although 44% had been very satisfied 
with their jobs in 2002, that number had fallen to 31% just 7 years later (Leigh et al., 
2009).  In the wake of costly EMR implementations and declining Medicaid/Medicare 
reimbursements, hospitals’ cost-cutting measures often include reduced physician 
staffing and increased reliance on midlevel providers.  Physicians oversee the work of 
those midlevel providers and, simultaneously, care for their patients, which increase 
physicians’ workload and malpractice risk.  Along with documentation encumbered by 
EMRs, these factors contribute to physicians’ dissatisfaction with their careers (Vance, 
2010).  As Kuhn, Goldberg, and Compton (2009) noted, overcrowding and increasing 
numbers of chronically ill patients compound physicians’ dissatisfaction; in emergency 
rooms, “high volumes, high acuity, and high complexity of disease are combined and that 
results in the need for rapid decision making in a highly ambiguous environment” (p. 
107), which is associated with high anxiety and concern for bad outcomes (e.g., fear that 
a patient may die or that a malpractice lawsuit may be filed), both of which are predictors 
of burnout. 
Maslach and Jackson (1981) defined burnout as “a syndrome of emotional 
exhaustion and cynicism” (p. 99), coupled with the tendency to evaluate oneself 
negatively, particularly with regard to work.  Burnout affects the quality of job 
performance and is a factor in job turnover, absenteeism, and low morale; burnout also is 
correlated with self-reported personal distress, physical exhaustion, insomnia, drug and 
alcohol use, and marital and family problems (Maslach & Jackson).  Physician burnout is 
“a pervasive health care problem characterized by a loss of emotional, mental, and 
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physical energy due to continued job-related stress” (Fortney, Luchterhand, Zakletskaia, 
Zgierska, & Rakel, 2013, p. 417).  About half of all physicians suffer burnout, with 
emergency medicine and primary care providers having the highest rates (Gregoire, 
2013).  In fact, burnout is more common among physicians than any other professional 
(Fortney et al., 2013). 
Physician burnout usually is measured along two dimensions: emotional 
exhaustion and depersonalization (i.e., feeling callous toward others, especially patients).  
Several studies have identified emotional exhaustion in large numbers of physicians who 
are dissatisfied with the percentage of night shifts that they are required to work (Rehder, 
Cheifetz, Markovitz, & Turner, 2014); lack of resources, compensation, and workload 
(Opoku & Apenteng, 2014); and a lack of “clinical autonomy, combined with the 
challenges of emergency medicine practice and life stress” (Kuhn et al., 2008, p. 110).  
Keller and Koenig (1989) found that 60% of emergency medicine physicians scored high  
in emotional exhaustion, 79% scored moderate to high in depersonalization, and 84% had 
a low sense of personal accomplishment. 
Similar findings were reported by Goldberg et al. (1996), but Kuhn et al. (2008) 
found that only 32% of emergency medicine physicians exhibited emotional exhaustion.  
According to Fortney et al. (2013), up to 60% of physicians experience burnout at some 
point during their careers, and 30–40% experience burnout at any given time.  Burnout 
also has even been reported in 34% of medical students (A. F. Cook, Arora, Rasinki, 
Curlin, & Yoon, 2014). 
Both providers and patients suffer when physicians experience burnout.  Mood 
disorder and suicide are “considerable occupational hazards for physicians” (Fortney et 
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al., 213, p. 417), with 300 physicians estimated to commit suicide each year, making it 
the nation’s second most suicidal occupation (Drake, 2014).  Fortney et al. (2013) noted 
that the problem of burnout is compounded by physicians’ tendency to give suboptimal 
attention to self-wellness, as well as affected by a medical culture that “places little 
emphasis on clinician well-being” (p. 419).  Burnout also affects many aspects of patient 
care, resulting in increased medical errors, decreased quality of healthcare, lower patient 
satisfaction, and poor treatment adherence (Fortney et al., 2013).  Moreover, burnout is 
associated with reduced provider empathy (West, Drybye, Slaon, & Shanafelt, 2009).  
The connections among patient dissatisfaction, poor treatment compliance, and lack of 
provider empathy also have been linked to physicians’ communication skills (Smith-
Dupre & Beck, 1996; Cegala et al., 1996; O’Hair, 1989), with several studies showing 
that patient dissatisfaction stemming from inadequate communication by physicians is 
correlated with poor medical outcomes and higher malpractice claims (Coran et al., 2010; 
Roberts & Aruguete, 1999; Roter & Hall, 2011). 
Patients are more satisfied when they believe that their physicians care about them 
and communicate accordingly (Ruiz-Moral, 2009), and burnout makes caring 
communication less likely between physicians and their patients.  Fortney et al. (2013) 
cautioned that burnout is poised to become an even bigger problem, as the Affordable 
Care Act means that more people will be seeking care in a market with fewer and fewer 
providers, and that increased workload, coupled with diminishing reimbursement, may 
increase alienation and/or depersonalization among physicians (Fortney et al., p. 412). 
In summary, numerous studies have linked EMRs with negative outcomes, 
ranging from emergency room overcrowding to decreased provider productivity.  EMRs 
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have been shown to increase the number of tests ordered, which, in turn, increase 
healthcare costs.  Several studies have found that providers spend more time using EMRs 
than engaging with patients; providers also spend more time completing electronic 
documentation, often after their shifts are over.  Documentation, in these instances, 
amounts to uncompensated work, and, furthermore, incomplete medical charts can 
impact negatively patient care.  Hospitals looking to boost productivity during 
postimplementation slowdowns have turned to scribes to offset providers’ inefficient 
charting, but paying scribes is a contentious subject.  The well-documented productivity 
slump that follows EMR rollout contributes to patients’ wait times and lengths of stay, 
and, consequently, patients are less satisfied with their emergency room experiences.  
Moreover, EMRs shape the information-gathering portion of the medical examination by 
constraining patients’ sharing of their stories, with providers ticking off checkboxes with 
little space available for free text that might, otherwise, be used to record patients’ 
stories.  EMRs also contribute to providers feeling dissatisfied with their jobs, which can 
lead to burnout. 
Conclusion 
 As demonstrated in this review of literature, provider–patient relationships and 
interactions are affected substantially by technology, and those effects are especially 
problematic in emergency room settings, where time constraints, limited resources, and a 
lack of established provider–patient relationships compound efforts in an already difficult 
communication environment.  Electronic medical records systems, which were instituted 
to improve healthcare delivery, have been associated, instead with increases in medical 
errors and spiraling healthcare costs.  Patients and providers alike suffer important 
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consequences when these systems are installed, which, in addition to higher costs, 
include longer wait times and lengths of stay for patients, and, for providers, increased 
workload, uncompensated work, and burnout.  A significant amount of research about 
electronic medical records systems, as demonstrated, has focused on quantifiable 
changes––the number of tests ordered, patients’ wait times, the time that it takes to 
complete medical charts, and how much time providers spend with computers versus 
with patients.  These studies have yielded important findings and, thereby, contribute to 
better understanding of workflow and communication patterns in emergency rooms.  This 
study extends that work by investigating how electronic medical records systems affect 
providers’ day-to-day experiences, how their interactions with coworkers and patients are 
altered, and how emergency room culture, itself, is changed by the presence of this 
technology.  This study also focuses on unintended consequences that electronic medical 
records bring to emergency medicine practice; some consequences have been identified, 
as this review of literature documents, but there may be additional unintended 
consequences that have yet to be documented.  Preliminary research, as explained in the 
next chapter, helped to hone my focus, the theoretical perspective that was employed to 
better understand those unintended consequences, and the resulting research questions 
that were posed for this study. 
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CHAPTER THREE: PRELIMINARY RESEARCH, 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS, AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This chapter presents the preliminary research that inspired both this study and the 
selection of theoretical frameworks that shaped the research agenda.  This chapter begins 
with a description of an ethnographic research project about emergency room culture that 
I undertook when I was enrolled in a qualitative research methods seminar, because the 
iterative process of that observational fieldwork, subsequent reflection, and analysis gave 
rise to the suppositions, deductions, and questions that were advanced in this study.  A 
review of theoretical concepts follows, starting with a description of conceptual linkages 
that were drawn from Goffman’s (1959) notions of “facework” and “performance,” 
which shaped the preliminary research and, ultimately, led to the theoretical frameworks 
that were employed for this study.  Those selected frameworks, including structuration 
theory and its derivatives, then are explained.  Finally, the research questions addressed 
in this study are presented. 
Preliminary Research 
In 2013, I studied emergency room culture as part of the assignments for an 
ethnography seminar in which I was enrolled, with some of the findings from that study 
becoming the foundation for this dissertation.  Ethnography is a “written representation 
of a culture” that is derived from fieldwork, which is the “investment of a researcher over 
a lengthy period of time (typically unspecified) and consists mostly of ongoing 
interaction with the human targets of study on their home ground” (Van Maanen, 2011, p. 
1, 2).  Before my fieldwork could commence, however, the seminar instructor cautioned 
that I would need several things: access to a research site and the site’s inhabitants, a 
reliable gatekeeper with whom I could coordinate my research efforts, and approval from 
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the University’s institutional review board (IRB).  With these considerations in mind, I 
chose to study emergency room culture because, in addition to a number of other reasons, 
my husband, an emergency medicine physician, could arrange access to a research site.  
Furthermore, he could facilitate introductions to key informants, including other 
physicians, nurses, midlevel providers, and technicians. 
My husband (hereafter, “Dr. C”2) has been practicing emergency medicine for the 
entirety of our relationship––nearly 20 years.  During those 2 decades, I spent a lot of 
time in the emergency rooms in which he worked, and I became an astute observer of 
emergency room customs and interactions, which proved invaluable as I completed the 
seminar assignment.  I studied emergency room culture for another reason as well: Long 
before embarking on a doctorate in health communication, I trained to be an emergency 
medical technician, volunteered on an ambulance crew, and, for a while, majored in 
premedicine as an undergraduate student.  Although, certainly, Dr. C shaped both my 
experience with and perspective of emergency medicine practice, I was interested in 
emergency room dynamics long before we met.  Thus, with the prodding of my 
instructor, and with Dr. C’s assistance, I began my ethnographic fieldwork in September 
2013. 
Fieldwork commenced after receiving an IRB exemption, which was granted, in 
part, because I proposed limiting my observations to emergency room workers.  Focusing 
on providers and excluding patients from the study was done for several reasons.  First, 
an emergency room’s “culture” is constructed by occupants who inhabit that space every 
day insofar as culture is “understood as residing largely within a sphere of social 
2The names and/or initials of all emergency room workers used in this report are 
pseudonyms. 
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relationships . . . [and] refers to the meanings and practices produced, sustained, and 
altered through interaction” (Van Maanen, 2011, p. 155).  Furthermore, culture is 
“expressed (or constituted) only by the actions and words of its members [emphasis 
added]” (Van Maanen, 2011, p. 3).  Patients, for whom emergency room visits largely are 
atypical or infrequent, certainly engage with and may, at times, impact an emergency 
room’s culture, but that culture is crafted and reproduced by regular and daily interactions 
of healthcare providers.  Second, as noted in chapter two, health communication research 
often has privileged the patient’s perspective.  By studying up (Nader, 1972), and, 
thereby, focusing on providers, a more complete understanding is possible of social, 
cultural, and communication processes that characterize medical practice (Chapman & 
Berggren, 2005).  Lastly, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) restricts nonessential access to “individually identifiable health information” 
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2015, para. 1), and, thereby, protects 
patients’ privacy. 
Because I was studying the culture of providers working in emergency rooms, I 
had little reason to interact with patients, for whom my presence during a medical 
interview or examination, arguably, may have constituted a violation of HIPAA-
mandated patient privacy.  Additionally, patients’ medical information is protected data, 
and access to those data, even tangentially, may have required full institutional oversight 
of my research.  As such, eliminating patients’ perspectives meant that IRB approval was 
obtained more quickly and easily (see Appendix A).  Nonetheless, because, almost 
certainly, I would overhear or witness portions of provider–patient interactions during the 
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course of my fieldwork, I signed HIPAA agreements attesting to my willingness to 
uphold patient confidentiality (see Appendix B). 
Three hours a week for 14 weeks, I observed and interviewed physicians, nurses, 
midlevel providers, unit secretaries, and technicians in three emergency rooms (see 
chapter four about research methods that were employed, both in the preliminary research 
and in the dissertation study).  One of the emergency rooms that I studied was in rural 
Mississippi (hereafter “Hospital M”3), and the remaining emergency rooms were in 
southern Louisiana: one was in a major metropolitan area (hereafter, “Hospital T”) and 
the other was near several densely populated suburbs (hereafter, “Hospital H”). 
I studied three emergency rooms for several reasons.  First, I was curious about 
regional differences that might manifest in the everyday practices of emergency room 
workers in rural, suburban, and urban hospitals.  Second, Dr. C, my gatekeeper, worked 
in several emergency rooms and, therefore, could facilitate my access to multiple 
research sites, which allowed me to observe differences in three practice environments 
(in addition to locale, each site varied in terms of annual patient volume; daily patient 
census; average patient acuity, as gauged by either admission or discharge from the 
emergency room; and how its providers documented patient care).  Additionally, I took 
inspiration from Wolcott (2010), who conducted a similarly structured multisite analysis 
of beer garden culture in Africa.  Reflecting on that research, Wolcott commented:  
I could not make one particular beer garden the center of my attention.  That 
would have been impossible under the circumstances.  (I did not speak either of 
the local indigenous languages, and my repeated presence would have raised 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3The names of the hospitals described in this study are withheld to further protect the 
identities of informants whose working affiliations, if known, could compromise their 
confidentiality. 
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untoward suspicions among people already superstitious) . . . .  I felt I should look 
at the whole set of practices surrounding the beer gardens. (p. 73) 
 
Although I could have studied just one emergency room without raising suspicions, I 
chose to look “at the whole set of practices surrounding” (Wolcott, p. 73) emergency 
rooms.  This tactic allowed me to draw comparisons between emergency rooms that, 
eventually, would lead to the issues addressed in this dissertation study (see the 
discussion later about research questions). 
During the completion of the preliminary fieldwork in 2013, I found that there 
were many shared behaviors, customs, and interactions across the three research sites, but 
I also observed one stark difference: the presence of an electronic medical records system 
(EMR) appeared to change the type, duration, and frequency of talk among providers.  
Because EMRs, subsequently, became the focus of this dissertation study, I limit my 
discussion here to pertinent observations about EMRs that I detailed in my fieldnotes and 
described in the seminar assignment. 
To that end, my fieldwork began on September 8, 2013 at Hospital M in 
Mississippi, which still was using paper charts to document patient care but was prepping 
for an eventual adoption of an EMR.  I showed up, wearing surgical scrubs, and hoped 
that I would blend into the scene.  Dr. C escorted me to a small desk near the nurses’ 
station, and then he grabbed a patient chart and headed into an examination room.  The 
head nurse introduced me to the staff as “Dr. C’s wife,” and for those who had not been 
told beforehand about my research, I explained that I was studying emergency room 
culture.  I sat there, alone, scribbling in my notebook and craning to hear the nurses 
conversing at the far end of the counter.  I interpreted their hushed tones and physical 
distance as conveying suspicion of me; after all, I was a stranger in their space.  After 
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about 30 minutes, most of the nurses resumed what, eventually, I would categorize as 
“normal chitchat.”  I often heard such chitchat in the ensuing weeks and it revolved, more 
or less, around five topics: what they had eaten, or were going to eat, for lunch; whose 
spouse had behaved poorly; whose children were mischievous, gifted, or ungrateful; who 
had seen a good movie recently; and who had weekend plans.  Regularly, the talk 
centered on food.  On my first day at Hospital M, I recorded conversations about who had 
eaten breakfast, who brought the cookies that were in the breakroom, who ate the last of 
the potato chips, which brand of smoked almonds was best, whether the cafeteria’s tilapia 
was “too fishy,” and how much they liked that Dr. C brought them Goldfish crackers 
every day (the Goldfish crackers were my idea). 
The frequency of talk at Hospital M did not strike me as unusual or excessive, 
until I visited Hospital H’s emergency room the following week.  The nurses working in 
Hospital H were different from those at Hospital M in that they said very little; indeed, 
the emergency room at Hospital H was comparatively quiet.  On my first day at Hospital 
H, I observed nurses sitting at computers, clicking checkboxes, and, occasionally, cursing 
to themselves.  Other nurses pushed portable EMRs from room to room.  At times, I 
could hear alarm bells dinging, phones ringing, and fluorescent lights buzzing.  The 
“silence” was punctuated with occasional mumbles by nurses about “damned 
computers.”  I did not, however, hear much in the way of conversation.  There were 
utterances from several nurses along the lines of “I need a wheelchair for 64” or “We got 
a knee lac [laceration] in 2,” but there was no chitchat.  In fact, there was no indication 
that the people working side-by-side even knew each other.  Information exchange, at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4Patients, typically, are referred to by their chief complaints and/or room numbers instead 
of by their names. 
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least as it seemed to me on that day, was the primary focus of any and all discussion.  
Later, after reviewing several sets of fieldnotes taken at Hospital M in Mississippi, I 
surmised that the nurses there talked a lot and that most of their conversations were 
marked by an intimate knowledge of one another––their talk revolved around relational 
growth with each other just as much as it involved information exchange about patients.  
The only thing different between the emergency rooms at Hospital M and Hospital H was 
the presence of an EMR. 
I learned that Hospital H had begun the first phase of its EMR adoption process 
earlier that year.  On April 1, nurses began using EMRs to document both the care that 
they provided and medications that they administered to patients.  A nurse, J, 
commented, “The irony of introducing EMRs on April Fool’s Day was not lost on us.”  I 
discovered that the physicians still used paper charts for documenting their findings, but 
they had just begun learning how to use a computerized physician order entry system 
(CPOE) the month before, with full conversion to computer-based charting scheduled to 
take place that November.  The sheer number of computers in the space, was, as I wrote 
in my notebook, “overwhelming, with just one half of the emergency room boasting eight 
computers along an L-shaped counter with several mobile computers-on-wheels 
(COWs).”  Six more computers lined the trauma bay, and each designated physician 
workstation had at least two computers.  Dozens of paper notices were hung all over the 
emergency room noting temporary workarounds for the various EMR glitches that the 
information technology (IT) department was trying to resolve.  I noted within minutes of 
arriving that “the hum of the computers is very loud.”  Their humming, as well as the 
nurses’ grumblings about them, seemed constant.  Over the course of 3 hours, I logged 14 
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specific events or conversations about the computers: approximately a third of my 
handwritten notes were about the EMR. 
During my first visit to Hospital H, I had two conversations with providers about 
the new EMR.  A physician assistant, N, told me that he believed the EMR meant that all 
of the providers (nurses, midlevel providers, and physicians) spent less time engaging 
with patients at their bedside.  Interestingly, before our conversation, I had written in my 
fieldnotes that “the physician assistant, N, has been at the computer the whole time I’ve 
been here, 45 minutes and he doesn’t appear to be seeing patients; he’s just manning the 
computer.”  N also complained that the system was slow, difficult to use, and had 
affected negatively both patient length of stay and satisfaction.  As he remarked: 
We spend most of our time with the damn COWs, not with the patients.  The 
programs aren’t very good and they are not user-friendly, plus patients don’t like 
them.  They see us sitting here playing with computers when we should be in the 
exam room, doing our jobs.  I just want to throw the damn thing through the wall. 
 
Later, following a shift change, I recorded in my journal that “a nurse just spent 
over 10 minutes trying to get her COW up and running.”  The COW crashed and she 
began again.  The nurse, J, told me that the EMR often kept her “chained” to a desk––
even when using the COW, its bulky configuration made maneuvering it into 
examination rooms difficult.  J further explained that because the new EMR was “hard to 
use,” it was responsible for “gumming up the works when the ER [was] busy,” by 
reducing drastically “patient throughput” (the time that a patient spends in the emergency 
room from initial presentation to diagnosis and discharge).  As J elaborated:  
They force us to code everything as we go, which slows things way down.  On 
paper charts, we could write the meds down and go back and chart everything else 
later.  Especially if we were busy, we might have 20 or 30 patients; that way, we 
could see them, treat them, and get them out.  Now, we have to chart everything 
right as it happens, and things just get backed up. 
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Another nurse, A, chimed in, “Especially during codes, administration wants you to scan 
medicines right then and there.  We should be focused on patients during codes, not 
trying to get a scanner and computer to work!  It takes up way too much time.”  One of 
my final observations that day, as written in my journal, was, “So far, this nurse [J] has 
been here an hour and she has been engaged with the computer the whole time, save for 2 
minutes to administer some meds.”  J repeatedly “bitched about the EMR,” as I noted, 
although she did “fix her hair in the monitor’s reflection.” 
I visited Hospital H in suburban Louisiana several more times in the coming 
weeks and recorded similar observations each time.  Later, reflecting on those early 
notes, I saw that the computer’s presence dictated not just how work was done but also 
where it was done.  Paper charts, like those used at Hospital M, freed providers to sit 
anywhere while documenting, even at the patient’s bedside, but the EMRs used at 
Hospital H assigned specific, inflexible spaces where tasks had to be performed.  As I 
wrote in my journal, “Nurses cluster along the counter at eight stations, midlevels have a 
designated space on the other side of the counter, whereas physicians are housed in a 
small workstation with two computers (one for charts and another for viewing X-rays).”  
Even the mobile COWs, largely, were stationary, because many nurses found them to be 
too heavy and cumbersome to push around.  Each charting task and its dedicated EMR 
physically isolated workers, making face-to-face communication either less frequent or 
more difficult to initiate (particularly for nurses and physicians, who were not within 
visual sight of each other). 
My first visit to Hospital T took place on October 5, 2103.  Hospital T had 
installed its EMR 3 years earlier; consequently, providers, more or less, were accustomed 
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to using it.  Nonetheless, on that afternoon, several nurses were struggling to update a 
chart for a patient who had left against medical advice and whose departure was unseen 
by the emergency room staff.  The chart could not be closed without a “discharge time”; 
however, because the patient had not been discharged officially, and no time was 
recorded, the EMR registered the chart as “incomplete.”   Incomplete charts invite 
sanctions from administrators, leading providers to be keen to complete charts for all of 
their patients.  At 5:10 p.m., a nurse sitting at the EMR complained, “We still don’t know 
what time 2 left, do we?”  At 5:15 p.m., she beckoned, again, “Does anyone know what 
time 2 left earlier?”  When no reply was forthcoming, she asked, “Am I the only one here 
concerned about getting this right?”  Someone suggested that she make up a time, “Just 
type in 4:00 p.m.,” to which she responded, “It won’t let me type any new text and I can’t 
get it to go to the discharge page.”  Several nurses then argued about how to resolve the 
issue.  They took turns at the EMR, clicking various tabs and boxes as they attempted to 
access the appropriate page.  An hour later, they still had not resolved the problem and IT 
had not returned their phone calls.  These nurses did not engage in patient care whilst the 
incomplete chart issue lingered. 
Dr. C, and several of the other nurses, did see patients, but as I recorded in my 
fieldnotes, “despite seeing patients, they mostly sit at the computer typing up orders or 
test results.”  For instance, I noted that Dr. C went into a patient room at 4:55 p.m., and 2 
minutes later, he was back at the EMR.  He commented, “The cases aren’t medically 
difficult, just challenging to document with the computer system and how long it takes 
everything [tests and medication orders] to get put in.”  “Putting in orders” often created 
“logjams,” as a nurse, MJ, explained, “We have to wait for the doc to put in the orders.  
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We’re not allowed to put in orders for them, so we have to sit here and wait.  If they type 
slow, or can’t find the order set, well, we wait some more.” 
Whereas paper charts, like those used at Hospital M, guaranteed some face-to-
face communication between physicians and nurses regarding patients’ vital signs, 
diagnoses, and treatment plans, I noticed that the EMR at Hospital T reduced such 
interactions to a series of one-way instant messages.  As described by MJ, nurses sit at 
computer terminals “waiting for orders to pop up on the screen” and then they “go do 
what the computer says, such as ‘Give room 6 some pain meds’ or ‘Discharge room 8.’”  
Most of the orders, as I noted on that day, were carried out without any discussion 
between nurses and the attending physician.  MJ conceded that the lack of discussion, 
sometimes, could be problematic, but she emphasized that if nurses had questions or 
concerns, they “usually” approached the physician.  “All in all,” she concluded, “I still 
prefer the computers to the paper charts.  It was hard learning to use them though, but it’s 
better than the old way.  We don’t have to figure out the doc’s handwriting.” 
When I went back to Hospital M a few weeks later, I asked nurses about some of 
the potential benefits that EMRs might bring to their emergency room, such as not having 
to decipher physicians’ handwriting.  A few nurses conceded that EMRs might be 
advantageous in that respect, but a nurse practitioner, D, who worked both at Hospital M 
and another hospital that already was using EMRs said, “Yeah, maybe, but the computers 
destroy personal communication.  I’ve been at this other emergency room about 6 
months, and I don’t know if any of the other nurses have children.  We just don’t talk.”  
The other nurses appeared to mull this statement over, and one of the younger nurses 
asked if the EMRs increased the workload.  D responded, “Well, everything takes so 
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much longer, so, yeah, it is more work, plus it impacts the patients, too.  We don’t make 
eye contact because we’re looking at a computer screen.” 
Over the next few weeks, I rotated among the three hospitals and saw several 
scenes unfold consistently.  At Hospital M, nurses and physicians shared a common 
paper chart and frequently discussed, face-to-face, patients’ treatment plans and 
diagnoses.  When they were not busy with patients, nurses talked and joked a lot.  At 
Hospitals H and T, however, nurses waited for physicians to enter orders into the EMR 
and then carried out whatever appeared in the electronic record, from administering 
medications to taking vital signs to prepping patients for examinations.  In comparison to 
Hospital M, physicians at Hospitals H and T, routinely, were isolated physically in 
separate spaces (in offices or workstations that were away from nurses’ stations), and, 
accordingly, there appeared to be fewer face-to-face discussions between them and the 
nurses.  By this point in time, I had begun observing physicians other than Dr. C; hence, I 
was certain that the practice habits that I recorded in my fieldnotes were not idiosyncratic 
of just one physician or one group of nurses.  When not engaged in direct patient care, 
nurses at Hospitals H and T talked, but not nearly as much as did nurses at Hospital M, 
and the type of talk differed as well.  Providers at Hospitals H and T complained a lot 
about the EMRs, asked one another for help using certain EMR features, and expressed 
profound dissatisfaction with both the EMRs and their working environments.  Their 
“non-EMR talk,” such as the chitchat that I recorded at Hospital M, eventually, turned to 
spouses, children, and food, but those topics were discussed with less frequency than 
their talk about the EMR. 
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In late October 2013, I developed a questionnaire (see Appendix C), which, I 
hoped, would document statistically significant correlations among EMR use, 
communication patterns, and providers’ career satisfaction at each of the three hospitals. I 
believed that the questionnaire, in addition to observations and interviews, would further 
validate what I suspected: that the EMRs caused lasting changes to the type and 
frequency of interactions among providers.  I posted the questionnaire online and 
distributed paper copies at each of the three hospitals, but the response rate was abysmal, 
as only 11 providers completed the questionnaire.  I also posted the questionnaire to an 
online physician-only message board to look for similar trends in other hospitals (but 
only nine physicians completed the questionnaire).  Overall, although the findings lacked 
statistical significance, nonetheless, they were interesting, as there was evidence that I 
had intuited the situation, more or less, astutely.  Across the board, respondents reported a 
preference for paper charts, and for those using EMRs, they reported that they were 
dissatisfied with the EMRs and talked less with coworkers about everyday topics (e.g., 
movies, current events, and family).  Most of the respondents who reported using EMRs 
also reported feeling less satisfied with their careers, and many had considered quitting, 
retiring, or changing careers.  Again, the questionnaire findings were not statistically 
significant given the small sample sizes and lack of statistical power but the results 
confirmed my hunch––in some instances and in certain practice environments, EMRs 
appeared to erode aspects of face-to-face communication and contributed to providers’ 
dissatisfaction with their working environments and with their careers. 
I completed the seminar assignment in December 2013, and that report was 
recognized as a Top Student Paper by the Ethnography Division at the 2014 National 
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Communication Association convention. I subsequently decided to continue my 
fieldwork at Hospital H and to document its ongoing EMR adoption process for my 
dissertation.  As I conducted research on EMRs for what would become my literature 
review (see chapter 2), I realized that there had been no long-term observational studies 
conducted about an EMR adoption that were set in a community hospital-based 
emergency room, such as the project that I was proposing.  The study that was most 
similar to the one that I was planning was conducted by Park et al. (2012), which 
documented changes in workflow patterns before, during, and after an EMR adoption, 
but that study was set in an academic medical center.  Furthermore, all of the emergency 
room-specific EMR studies that I reviewed, largely, were numerical, researcher-driven 
studies, and virtually all of them also were set in academic medical centers.  As noted in 
chapter one, although there are more than 5,000 community hospitals in the United 
States, less than 10% (approximately 400) are designated academic medical centers 
(Dunn & Becker, 2013), yet few studies had been conducted in community hospitals, 
limiting the generalizability of their findings to a minority of U.S. hospital settings.  The 
study that I was proposing, therefore, could address a clear gap in the scholarly literature 
by documenting EMR-induced changes over time in a community hospital’s emergency 
room, with the findings, potentially, being applicable to a greater number of emergency 
room settings instead of being limited to a small subset of emergency rooms in academic 
medical centers. 
To review, I began preliminary research for this study as an academic exercise in 
ethnographic research methods.  In observing interactions among providers in three 
emergency room settings, I deduced that EMRs affected communication among and 
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between nurses, midlevel providers, and physicians; specifically, EMRs reduced face-to-
face interactions, influenced the nature of interactions (i.e., restricted opportunities for 
chitchat and, consequently, some aspects of relational development among providers), 
and narrowed the range of topics discussed.  Moreover, EMRs seemed to contribute to 
providers feeling dissatisfied with their careers and with their working environments.  
Results from the questionnaire that I created and distributed, albeit of limited statistical 
significance, suggested that my deductions were, more or less, astute.  Taken together 
with fieldnotes collected over a 3-month period and information that was gleaned from 
multiple interviews that I conducted with providers, the questionnaire’s findings were 
significant enough to justify additional inquiry into EMR-induced changes in emergency 
room communication patterns.  Given that Hospital H was partway through an adoption 
process and that its physicians just were beginning to use components of an EMR, I saw 
an opportunity to document EMR-induced changes over time.  Additionally, I could 
conduct research in a community hospital-based emergency room, which is a setting that, 
largely, has been underrepresented in both medical and communication literature.  I 
needed, however, a theoretical lens to frame my continuing research. 
In writing the initial ethnography on emergency room culture, many of my 
findings were framed using Goffman’s (1959) conceptions of “facework” and 
“performance.”  These concepts are described here because they shaped both early and 
ongoing research at Hospital H, and because Goffman’s work influenced Giddens (1984), 
whose structuration theory frames much of this study (see the discussion later about 
theoretical frameworks). 
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Facework, according to Goffman (1959), is a specific kind of social performance 
that is designed to engineer or maintain a certain impression during an interaction.  
Goffman (1959) proposed that all people are social performers who “act [when in] one 
another’s immediate physical presence” (p. 254).  For example, a physician is expected to 
be sympathetic and, similarly, a patient should be ill, such that each person performs 
accordingly during the medical examination.  These types of performances are infused 
with participants’ assessments about the interaction, one another, and themselves 
(Goffman, 1967).  Face, then, becomes “the positive social value a person effectively 
claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular [social] 
contact” (Goffman, 1967, p. 5).  Put more simply, face is the conception of “self” as seen 
by one’s self and by others; hence, face, essentially, is identity, and people are 
“concerned with maintaining the impression that they are living up to the many standards 
by which they . . . are judged” (Goffman, 1959, p. 251). 
Face concerns play out, largely, in frontstage scenarios, when social performers 
are engaged in expected, and role-appropriate, performances.  Frontstage demands can set 
the stage for “profane” performances, which Goffman (1961) attributed to “the obligatory 
world of social roles” (p. 152) requiring an actor to continually monitor and alter his or 
her performance to fit the “understanding and expectations of the society in which it is 
presented” (Goffman, 1959, p. 35).  Too many frontstage or profane performances, often, 
can “set the stage for a kind of information game––a potentially infinite cycle of 
concealment, discovery, false revelation, and rediscovery” (Goffman, 1959, p. 8).  
In contrast, when backstage, an actor may slip into a “sacred” performance, 
which, largely, unfolds in an unseen way by any frontstage audience; stripped of social 
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obligations, an individual can be “warm, spontaneous, and touched by humor” (Goffman, 
1961, p. 152).  Backstage, the performer no longer is preoccupied “with the amoral issue 
of engineering a convincing impression” (Goffman, 1959, p. 251).  Members of 
“performance” teams, such as physicians and nurses, who stage performances for their 
patients, can express and enjoy familiarity with one another “only when the audience 
[patient] is not present,” (Goffman, 1959, p. 128).  Goffman (1959) described the 
distinction further: 
Since back regions are typically out of bounds to members of the audience, it is 
here that we may expect reciprocal familiarity to determine the tone of social 
intercourse.  Similarly, it is the front region that we may expect a tone of 
formality to prevail.  (p. 128) 
 
Backstage, team members’ interactions, typically, are marked by reciprocal name-calling, 
jokes, profanity, and “elaborate griping” (Goffman, 1959, p. 128).  During my fieldwork, 
I witnessed many frontstage and backstage performances, both profane and sacred; 
hence, Goffman’s work gave me a useful vocabulary for describing social interactions 
that I saw play out in those emergency rooms. 
Goffman’s (1959, 1961) work was invaluable when analyzing the cultural 
practices that I observed in emergency rooms, especially those having to do with 
frontstage and backstage performances, but many of his theoretical propositions 
addressed individuals’ social roles and performances as opposed to the organizations in 
which those performances were carried out.  A system-wide study of Hospital H’s 
emergency room practices during and after its EMR adoption, in my estimation, required 
a theoretical lens that could encompass the organization, as well as its individual 
performers.  Although Goffman (1959, 1961) did address performance teams, his work 
did not dwell on the social institutions or structures that housed performance teams.  
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Accordingly, a member of my dissertation committee suggested that, instead, I consider 
using structuration theory to frame my study.  Proposed by Giddens (1984), structuration 
theory extended many of Goffman’s propositions, thus making it, from my perspective,  
both familiar and accessible.  Structuration theory and its offshoots, all of which inform 
this study, are detailed in the next section.  
Theoretical Frameworks Used to Analyze Effects of Electronic Medical Records 
Systems in Emergency Rooms  
 
Theory ensures that health communication research is “founded in established 
principles generated by systematic and cumulative knowledge,” but health 
communication research “often lacks theoretical underpinnings” (Nazione, Pace, Russell, 
& Silk, 2013, p. 225).  For example, only 38% of studies published in the Journal of 
Health Communication between 2000 and 2009 were theory-driven (Nazione et al. 2013). 
According to Nazione et al. (2013), most of the studies published in that journal 
described situations, interventions, and outcomes, but few studies explained or predicted 
phenomena.  The present study, therefore, is grounded in theory such that it may not only 
describe but also explain and, potentially, predict ramifications of EMR adoptions in 
community hospital-based emergency room settings.  Moreover, the study’s theoretical 
frameworks extend its usefulness by contributing to cumulative knowledge about EMR 
adoptions, technology-induced structural changes, and structurational divergence in 
healthcare contexts.  Because several concepts central to structuration theory were 
extensions of Goffman’s (1959) work, and because structuration theory explained 
system-wide social reproduction, I chose it to frame my analysis.  Described next are the 
central tenets of structuration theory, followed by a review of three derivatives that also  
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shaped the study: adaptive structuration theory, the modified adaptive structuration 
model, and structurational divergence theory.  
Structuration Theory 
Structuration theory is an ontological theory of social organization (Jones, 
Orlikowski, & Munir, 2004) that has been employed to explain many social contexts but 
has not been used often in empirical health communication research (Heracleous, 2013).  
Giddens (1984) developed structuration theory to explain how social systems are both 
produced and reproduced during social interaction.  “The basic domain of study,” 
according to Giddens, “is neither the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence 
of any form of societal totality, but social practices ordered across space and time” (p. 2). 
Social practices, according to Giddens (1984), are carried out by actors whose 
performances are “positioned” (p. 83).  With respect to social practices and 
performances, Giddens shared many of Goffman’s (1959) views, although the two 
scholars often used different terms.  For example, rather than using “role,” as had 
Goffman (1959, 1961, 1967), Giddens (1984) used “position” to describe expectations 
and limits that are imposed on social actors.  As Giddens wrote: 
Social positions are constructed structurally as specific intersections of 
signification, domination and legitimation which relates to the typification of 
agents [actors].  A social position involves the specification of a definite 
“identity” within a network of social relations, that identity, however, being a 
“category” to which a particular range of normative sanctions is relevant. (p. 83) 
 
In other words, social positions allow and, in many instances, require actors to “assign 
every act/utterance a signification, judge its appropriateness, and ascertain [their] place in 
a domination hierarchy” (Nicotera & Mahon, 2013, p. 95).  Nicotera, Mahon, and Zhao  
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(2010) described ways in which social positions and the signification/legitimation/ 
domination process can affect providers’ communication in a medical setting: 
The physician writes a medication order.  The nurse looks at the prescription and 
questions, “50 mg?” setting off a too-familiar conflicted interaction.  Imagine that 
the nurse’s meaning system centers on safety checks and the physician’s on an 
authority/compliance nurse-physician relationship.  For the nurse, that simple act 
(“50 mg?”) signifies a safety check, is legitimate because nurses must be 
constantly vigilant for medication errors, and presumes an egalitarian relationship 
in which all caregivers are equally responsible for safety (nondominant).  For the 
physician, the act signifies disrespect for authority, is not legitimate because a 
nurse must simply comply with physician orders, and presumes a 
dominant/submissive relationship. (p. 365) 
 
The dramaturgical metaphors that Goffman and Giddens used to describe social actors, 
positions, and interactions are similar, but in terms of frontstage and backstage 
performances, Giddens (1984) deviated from Goffman (1959).  
Both theorists acknowledged that there were frontstage and backstage regions that 
constrained social practices, but Giddens (1984) took exception to Goffman’s (1959) 
treatment of the backstage.  Giddens wrote that Goffman’s (1959) stance suggested that 
the “frontal aspects of [performance] are inherently inauthentic, and that whatever is real 
or substantial is hidden behind” (Giddens, p. 124).  Furthermore, as Giddens wrote:  
If agents [social actors] are only players on a stage, hiding their true selves behind 
the masks they assume for the occasion, the social world would indeed be largely 
empty of substance. . . .  The sustaining of ontological security could not be 
achieved if front regions were no more than façades. (p. 125) 
 
Rather, as Giddens proposed: 
The backstage may very well be “on stage” so far as the ordinary routines of 
social life, and the ordinary proprieties, go.  For these sorts of occasion do involve 
fixed performances for audiences, though there is no necessary implication that 
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Instead of housing “reciprocal familiarity” (Goffman, 1959, p. 128), such as joking and 
name-calling, Giddens’s notion of backstage does not involve necessarily “a ‘private 
sphere’,” especially when subordinates “move among their inferiors” (p. 127).  In some 
social settings, backstages can be “zones within which agents recover forms of autonomy 
which are compromised or treated in frontal contexts” (Giddens, p. 127), but most 
“front/back differentiations [occur ordinarily] in circumstances of marked imbalances of 
power” (p. 128). 
Giddens’s (1984) theoretical propositions extend beyond the dramaturgical model 
that he and Goffman (1959) used frequently to explain social interaction; structuration 
theory, as proposed by Giddens, encompasses much more than social practices, 
positioned performances, and frontstage/backstage region differentiations.  The theory 
describes social organization in terms of structure, agency, rules, resources, systems, 
routines, and unintended consequences. 
Structuration theory hinges on two key concepts, structure and agency, which 
should be understood as a mutually constitutive duality (Giddens, 1984).  Structure is 
defined as both the medium and outcome of social reproduction, and it consists of the 
“rules and resources, recursively implicated in the reproduction of social systems [and] 
exists only as memory traces, the organic basis of human knowledgeability, and is 
instantiated in action” (Giddens, 1984, p. 377).  Agency is defined as human activity.  
Structure has primacy over agency because structure, simultaneously, enables and 
constrains action (Giddens).  Structures can be thought of as being similar to 
organizations or institutions that, themselves, simultaneously, are produced and 
reproduced by human conduct.  For example, a hospital may house and constrain 
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interactions among physicians, nurses, patients, and tools; at the same time, the very 
presence of these people and things in the hospital give it purpose, and, thereby, 
simultaneously, maintain and reproduce it. 
Some of the terminology and concepts of structuration theory warrant further 
elaboration.  Structure, in addition to being the medium and outcome of social 
reproduction, assumes primacy over action because it encompasses “rules and resources 
[that are] implicated in the production and reproduction of social systems” (Giddens, 
1984, p. 169).  Rules are norms that govern social life. Resources are either allocative, 
material goods or objects with which agents work, such as stethoscopes, tongue 
depressors, and EMRs, or authoritative, intangible abilities and skills that agents use 
when they exhibit transformative power over people through either persuasion or 
coercion.  Many factors, such as gender, age, and/or group affiliation, can influence 
authoritative resources; for example, I observed that male physicians working at Hospital 
H influenced the behavior of female nurses far more than female nurses influenced male 
physicians.  Things and power, according to Giddens (1984), however, only become 
allocative and authoritative resources through human agency. 
 Systems are the observable, reproduced relations between agents (i.e., people or 
social actors), and they are organized as regular social practices or behaviors.  Social 
interaction refers to “encounters in which individuals engage in situations of co-presence, 
and hence to social integration as a level of the ‘building blocks’ whereby the institutions 
of social systems are articulated” (Giddens, 1984, p. 89).  Giddens (1984) defined 
structuration as the “structuring of social relations across time and space” (p. 376).  
Studying day-to-day life, situated in specific interactions and routines that are time–space 
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dependent, is integral for analyzing reproduced practices.  Settings and chronology allow 
agents “to sustain meaning in communicative acts,” and daily routines are “essential for 
curbing sources of unconscious tension” and they influence “the contours of institutional 
reproduction” (Giddens, p. xxv). 
Routines, however, can be disrupted during critical situations, “circumstances of 
radical disjuncture of unpredictable kind which affects substantial numbers of individuals 
(or) situations that threaten or destroy the certitudes of institutionalized routines” 
(Giddens, 1984, p. 61).  Hospital H, as I observed during my preliminary research, was 
experiencing a “critical situation” during its EMR implementation, which is an additional 
factor that makes structuration theory an attractive lens for viewing and analyzing that 
change. 
Agent, agency, and power also are important concepts to consider in relation to 
the current study.  People are knowledgeable agents who understand a lot when it comes 
to conditions and consequences of their social interactions.  They also do what they do 
for particular reasons, although, as Giddens (1984) cautioned, “we have to separate out 
the question of what an agent does from what is intended” (p. 14).  Agency, as defined 
previously, is action, but it also hinges on an agent’s capability “to ‘make a difference’ to 
a preexisting state of affairs or course of events” (Giddens, p. 14).  Agency and autonomy 
are intertwined, for without some measure of power, agency is not possible.  Power has 
two facets: it can be understood as the ability of agents to carry out decisions that they 
favor and as the capacity to resist those that they dislike.  Although subordinates may 
appear to be without power, Giddens suggested that “all forms of dependence offer some 
resources whereby those who are subordinate can influence the activities of their 
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superiors” (p. 16).  Giddens referred to subordinates’ ability to influence their superiors’ 
actions as the “dialectic of control” (p. 16).  However, identifying and utilizing sources of 
power amid organizational change often can be an insurmountable challenge for 
subordinates. 
Critics of structuration theory have claimed that structures limit agents’ choices 
far more than Giddens (1984) allowed (see, e.g., Jones et al., 2004); for example, workers 
without resources have only one option—to sell their labor.  The constraints of material 
resources “mean that at any moment not everything is possible” (Jones et al., 2004, p. 
311).  Stones (2005) decried this aspect of structuration theory as well, arguing that 
depending upon where the emphasis was placed, structure or agency, it could be 
presented as either an overly voluntaristic theory—one that overestimates the 
knowledge and power of agents and the consequent ability to “make a 
difference”—or an overly fatalistic and deterministic theory, where the structures 
make all the running. (p. 7) 
 
Giddens’s (1984) elucidation on bureaucracy addressed some of the issues raised 
by critics of structuration theory.  Bureaucracy and its disciplinary power are structural 
factors that impinge on agency, but the constraint is limited to prescribed periods of time 
and occurs usually with agents’ consent, such as when agents “go to work.”  Giddens 
wrote that “the journey to work probably indicates as much about the institutional 
character of modern societies as do carceral organizations” (p. 154).  The time–space 
separation of work and social life makes submitting to administrative discipline tolerable.  
“Work” is only part of an agent’s day, and although the agent must adhere to “a criteria 
of conduct not in accord with the enactment of activities in other spheres of life” 
(Giddens, p. 154), eventually, the workday ends and the agent reclaims lost agency.  
Emergency room workers, however, enjoy less time–space separation than do other 
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workers.  A typical emergency room shift is at least 12 hours, and, at work, agency or 
autonomy almost wholly is restricted.  As a physician at Hospital H commented, “We 
don’t get lunch breaks; you can’t just leave the ER and go the cafeteria.  What if someone 
has a heart attack while you’re eating a sandwich?”  Bathroom breaks also are governed 
largely by patient volume.  “We can go if it’s not too busy,” a nurse remarked, “but you 
better not be in the loo if a code or trauma rolls in.”  These descriptions of the emergency 
room make the hospital appear to be a “total institution,” in that “there is no exterior nor 
gap, it cannot be interrupted except when the task is totally complete” (Giddens, p. 153).  
Agents endure this type of discipline, according to Giddens, because “submitting is a 
trade-off for rewards that derive from being freed from such disciplines at other times” 
(p. 154). 
Another aspect of structuration theory that informs this study has to do with 
“unintended consequences” of EMR adoption.  As Giddens (1984) wrote, “Some of the 
most important tasks of social science are to be found in the investigation of . . . the 
significance of unintended consequences for system reproduction” (p. 282).  Unintended 
consequences are a regular feature of institutionalized practice in that “the flow of 
[human] action continually produces consequences which are unintended by actors” 
(Giddens, p. 27).  An unintended consequence, as Giddens explained (1984), is “the 
‘composition effect’ or an outcome of an aggregate of acts . . . each of which is 
intentionally carried out.  But the eventual outcome is neither intended nor desired by 
anyone.  It is, as it were, everyone’s doing and no one’s” (p. 10).  Unintended 
consequences also can “systemically feed back to be the unacknowledged conditions of 
further acts” (Giddens, p. 8), potentially creating an infinite cycle of unintended 
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consequences.  With respect to this study, there are many well-documented, unintended 
consequences that are associated with EMR adoption: increased waiting times, longer 
lengths of stays, decreased physician productivity, lower patient satisfaction scores, and 
employees’ reactance (see chapter two). 
A related concept is perverse consequences, which are consequences of intended 
but contradictory acts that “are perverse in such a way that the very activity of pursuing 
an objective diminishes the possibility of reaching it” (Giddens, 1984, p. 313).  As 
Giddens (1984) elaborated: 
Contradictory consequences ensue when every individual in an aggregate of 
individuals acts in a way which, while producing the intended effect if done in 
isolation, creates a perverse effect if done by everyone.  If all the audience in a 
lecture hall got to their feet to obtain a better view of the speaker, no one will in 
fact do so.  . . . These are outcomes not only that no one intends but also that run 
counter to what everyone in the situation wants; none the less, they derive from 
conduct that is intended to satisfy wants, and could do so for individuals, were it 
not for the fact that the conduct in question becomes generalized. (p. 311) 
 
Perverse outcomes are likely in “circumstances of structural contradiction” (Giddens, p. 
317), where agents feel at odds and/or are immobilized (see the discussion later about 
structurational divergence theory). 
Although structuration theory, generally, is underutilized in health communication 
research (Heracleous, 2013), it has guided research on technology adoption in medical 
contexts.  Barley (1986) used structuration theory for framing an analysis of effects that a 
new technology, a CT scanner, had on a radiology practice, and how that technology 
“altered the organizational and occupational structure of radiological work,” as well as 
ways in which “institutional roles and patterns of interaction changed” (p. 78).  Barley 
noted that engrained patterns of interaction and interpretation are subject to change when 
social systems encounter “exogenous shocks, such as the acquisition of new members or 
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the arrival of new technology” (p. 80).  With respect to studying technology and 
structure, Barley proposed three axioms: 
First, since structuring implies process, its temporal nature enjoins researchers to 
adopt longitudinal as well as cross-sectional perspectives on technological 
change.  Second, since the social context of actions and interpretations is 
important, it becomes unsound practice to lump together organizations with 
radically different institutional histories and ecological milieux.  Finally, since 
technologies exist as objects in the realm of action, one cannot hope to understand 
the technology’s implications for structuring without investigating how the 
technology is incorporated into the everyday life of an organization’s members. 
(p. 81) 
 
Barley posited that new technologies in organizations should be regarded as occasions 
that trigger social dynamics, which, in turn, modify or maintain an organization’s 
contours.  Because these dynamics are likely to be multifaceted, to “vary with time, and 
to reflect the situational context, it is quite likely that identical technologies used in 
similar contexts can occasion different structures in an orderly fashion” (Barley, p. 81).  
With these considerations established, Barley recommended that researchers “document 
traditional patterns of behavior, interaction, and interpretation before, during, and after 
the technology arrives” by relying on “participant observation to record who interacts 
with whom in what ways at what times and to elicit actor’s immediate interpretations of 
events” (p. 83). 
Although structuration theory is a useful theoretical lens for analyzing 
technology-induced system changes, as Barley (1986) demonstrated, Giddens (1984) did 
not address, specifically, technology and its role in system reproduction.  Other scholars, 
however, have extended Giddens’s work and adapted his theoretical axioms to better 
describe what happens when technology impacts structuration (i.e., the structuring of 
interactions across time and space).  As described in the next section, adaptive 
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structuration theory and the modified adaptive structuration model are useful extensions 
of Giddens’s original work, especially for studying how EMRs change emergency room 
structures. 
Adaptive Structuration Theory 
Although Giddens’s (1984) original formulation paid little attention to 
technology, structuration theory, clearly, is applicable when studying interactions 
between people and technology (Barley, 1986).  The effects of technology adoption on 
social systems have less to do with the actual technology itself and more to do with how 
people use it: people may adapt technology to suit their needs, resist it, or reject it 
altogether (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994).  DeSanctis and Poole (1994), subsequently, 
proposed adaptive structuration theory (AST) to study “the role of advanced information 
technologies in organization change . . . [and to consider] the mutual influence of 
technology and social processes” (pp. 121, 125).  In AST, structures (i.e., rules or 
resources that are entwined in system reproduction and that enable and constrain action) 
and structural change are examined from two vantage points: structures that technologies 
provide and structures that actually emerge as people interact with technologies 
(DeSanctis & Poole).  Two central concepts, “structuration” (i.e., structuring relations 
across time and space) and “appropriation” (i.e., ways that people use technology 
structures), highlight the interplay between technology and action; as these structures “are 
brought into interaction, they are instantiated in social life . . . there is a recursive 
relationship between technology and action, each iteratively shaping the other” 
(DeSanctis & Poole, p. 125). 
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Social structures that emerge from technology can be assessed according to 
structural features and spirit.  For instance, an EMR’s structural features, by definition, 
would consist of its inherent rules, resources, or capabilities; simply put, structural 
features establish what the EMR can do and its effects on human agency.  For example, 
an EMR may allow providers to access patients’ pharmacy records, but not their medical 
files from other hospitals.  The first feature enables providers’ agency, whereas the 
second feature constrains it.  With respect to spirit, DeSanctis and Poole (1994) defined it 
as the intention behind a technology.  DeSanctis and Poole likened spirit to what Giddens 
called “legitimation,” because spirit, similar to legitimation, “provides a normative frame 
with regard to behaviors that are appropriate in the context of the technology” (p. 126).  
With regard to EMRs, spirit can be analyzed by examining EMRs’ design metaphor (i.e., 
whether their interface resembles a paper medical chart or an accounting spreadsheet), 
the presentation and labeling of their features, training or support materials that 
accompany them, and their usability.  Well-designed technologies have a coherent spirit; 
an incoherent spirit exerts weaker influence over people and “may send contradictory 
signals, making use of the system more difficult” (DeSanctis & Poole, p. 127).  Structural 
features and spirit, taken together, make up a technology’s structural potential. 
Appropriation, the other central concept of AST, is defined as “the immediate, 
visible actions that evidence deeper structuration processes” (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994, p. 
128).  Examining the appropriation process allows researchers to uncover how rules 
and/or resources are brought into social action.  Consider the following explanation 
(“EMRs” can be substituted for “GDSS”): 
Appropriation of a GDSS’s [group decision support system] structures is 
evidenced as a group makes judgments about whether or not to use certain 
	   126 
structures, directly uses (reproduces) a GDSS structure, relates or blends a GDSS 
structure with another structure, or interprets the operation or meaning of an 
GDSS structure.  GDSS structures become stabilized in group interaction if the  
group appropriates them in a consistent way, reproducing them in similar form 
over time. (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994, p. 129) 
 
Adoption processes vary across groups and time, but how individual agents use a 
technology, if at all, can be assessed by examining their appropriation moves.  AST 
identifies four appropriation moves: agents may choose to (a) directly use the technology, 
(b) relate the technology’s structure to other structures in the environment (e.g., make 
conceptual linkages between the EMR and other tasks), (c) constrain or interpret the 
technology as it is in use, and/or (d) make judgments about the technology (e.g., praising 
or condemning its performance).  Appropriation moves can be either faithful, using the 
structure in accordance with its spirit, or unfaithful.  Unfaithful use is not inherently 
negative because it can speak to the ingenuity and attitudes of users.  Hence, an EMR’s 
structures may be appropriated differently across groups as a function of users’ attitude: 
users may be confident in the technology’s abilities, they may doubt its usefulness, or 
they may perceive themselves as lacking the necessary skills to use it effectively.  
DeSanctis and Poole (1994) cautioned that “if group interaction processes are 
inconsistent with the structural potential of the technology, then the outcomes of group 
use of the structures will be less predictable and, on the whole, less favorable” (p. 131). 
DeSanctis and Poole (1994) adapted Giddens’s (1984) theory to analyze 
technology adoption in any context, but others have modified AST to study new 
technologies in healthcare settings (e.g., Schwieger, Melcher, Ranganathan, & Wen 
2004).  The modified adaptive structuration model, described next, has been used to 
explain adoption processes that are associated with medical billing systems.  This 
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extension of Giddens’s work, as well as the work done by DeSanctis and Poole, sheds 
light on some of the EMR adoption issues facing Hospital H. 
Modified adaptive structuration model.  Combining AST with aspects of 
diffusion of innovation, Schwieger, Melcher, Ranganathan, and Wen (2006) framed an 
analysis of a newly introduced medical billing system in a family practice clinic.  The 
modified AST model (Schwieger et al., 2004, 2006) identifies three sources of structure; 
as with AST, there are structures embedded in technology and the environment, but the 
modified model divides the environment into external and internal sources of structure.  
External structures are outside influences, such as government policies and 
interorganizational relationships (e.g., vendors or insurance companies), that may 
influence if and how a technology is adopted and then used (Schwieger et al., 2006).  
According to Schwieger et al. (2006), internal structures include the diversity of workers 
inside an organization (e.g., their specific skill sets), the decision-making activity among 
groups, and cultural resources (e.g., agents’ education, experience, and interaction styles).  
Schwieger et al. (2006) concluded that communication to employees, “both implicit and 
explicit, plays a significant role” (p. 90) in the adoption and diffusion process. 
The most important aspect of the modified AST model, as it pertains to the 
present study, is the division of environmental structures into external and internal 
structures, and, in particular, the role that external structures play in Hospital H’s EMR 
adoption.  As discussed in chapter two, the Health Information Technology for Economic 
and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act requires nationwide EMR adoption; thus, the single 
greatest external structure affecting Hospital H is government policy.  Moreover, 
providers working at Hospital H had little say in which EMR was adopted, inasmuch 
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as external structures—namely, corporate policy makers working at Hospital H and for 
its parent company—made the decision. 
Although the modified AST model is a useful tool for examining certain aspects 
of the technology adoption process, there is an additional extension of Giddens’s (1984) 
original work that is helpful for examining agents and agency amid conflicting structures: 
structurational divergence theory.  Described next, that theory has been used frequently to 
explain discordant communication patterns among hospital-based nurses.  
Structurational Divergence Theory  
I discovered the work done on structurational divergence (SD) theory about 6 
months after beginning the second phase of my research at Hospital H.  SD theory 
extends and elaborates many of Giddens’s (1984) concepts, but more important, from my 
perspective, the theory addresses “what happens to agency under contradictory 
structures” (Nicotera & Mahon, 2013, p. 94), which Giddens did not address in his 
seminal work.  Giddens acknowledged that structural contradictions existed “between 
different groupings or categories of people” (p. 198), and that structural constraints 
limited “the range of options open to an actor, or plurality of actors, in a given 
circumstance” (p. 177), but such attestations did not explain adequately the phenomena 
that I was observing at Hospital H.  In inquiring about the EMR adoption process and 
how it affected healthcare delivery at Hospital H, providers used phrases, such as “I’m 
stuck between a rock and a hard place,” to explain the contradictory situations and 
obligations that they experienced, as using the EMR helped hospital administrators to 
meet certain Meaningful Use objectives (as described in chapter two), but using the EMR 
also delayed frequently timely healthcare delivery and increased costs, which was not in 
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patients’ best interests.  Providers struggled to meet the oftentimes-conflicting demands 
of administrators and patients.  Although I struggled to explain this contradiction as 
something other than just another unintended consequence, a member of my dissertation 
committee shared an article with me, entitled “Between Rocks and Hard Places: 
Exploring the Impact of Structurational Divergence in the Nursing Workplace” (Nicotera 
& Mahon, 2013), that, in combination with subsequent discussions with that article’s lead 
author, led me to apply SD theory to my study. 
SD theory is an extension of structuration theory, and, consequently, it describes 
social organization in terms of structure, agency, rules, resources, and systems, but SD 
theory introduces two additional components: the SD-nexus and the SD-cycle (Nicotera, 
Mahon, & Zhao, 2010).  According to the theory, the copresence of an SD-nexus with 
one or more SD-cycles creates SD, which “is an organizational phenomenon that 
manifests, in interaction, at the individual level” (Nicotera & Clinkscales, 2010, p. 34).  
The SD-nexus is the “intersection of incompatible rule systems,” and results in 
“unresolvable conflict” (Nicotera & Clinkscales, 2010, p. 32).  Agents caught at a nexus 
are compelled to “simultaneously fulfill obligations from multiple rule systems” 
(Nicotera & Clinkscales, 2010, p. 32); hence, they often report feeling stuck between a 
rock and a hard place.  Nonetheless, agents usually are compelled to act, especially in 
healthcare settings, where inaction could jeopardize patients’ health and safety; 
consequently, agents must choose “which structure to violate––setting off the normative 
sanctions of that structure” (Nicotera & Clinkscales, 2010, p. 34). 
The SD-cycle is a downward spiral of negative, ineffective, aggressive, or 
argumentative communication that self-perpetuates (Nicotera & Mahon, 2013; Nicotera 
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et al., 2010).  Nicotera and Mahon (2013) described an SD-cycle between nurses working 
in a geriatric care unit (GC) and nurses working in the emergency department (ED): 
ED staff complained GC staff was uncooperative with inpatient admissions.  GC 
staff complained that ED patients who should be admitted to intensive care (ICU) 
were transported to GC to await admission.  When these patients became 
unstable, requiring immediate care, GC staff provided it, acting from a patient-
centered ethic.  These patients were subsequently admitted to ICU.  Records 
reflected admission to ICU from ED with no way to document care given by GC.  
When performance reviews, cost calculations, and other such management 
reviews were conducted, GC care for those patients was credited to ED, but its 
negative impact (e.g., cost, time, and delayed care for other patients) resulted in 
poor performance sanctions for GC.  This deepened GC resentment for ED and 
perpetuated the conflict.  GC nurses became hesitant to provide care because of 
bureaucratic consequences—a severely immobilizing ethical dilemma. (p. 91) 
 
 Immobilization is the hallmark of SD.  The unresolved conflict that the SD-cycle 
perpetuates, according to Nicotera and Clinkscales (2010), causes the immobilization: 
Unresolved conflict immobilizes the individual as he or she is unable to locate, in 
his or her repository of skills, actions that satisfy both (or more) interpenetrating 
structures.  Immobilization prevents the individual from attaining goals or 
achieving positive progress, eroding organizational and individual development.  
Inability to develop spirals into more intractable conflict, and the cycle continues. 
(p. 32) 
 
Recurring cycles of conflict and immobilization stymy both individual and organizational 
development. 
SD manifests, primarily, as unresolved conflict, immobilization, and erosion of 
development (Nicotera & Clinkscales, 2010), but there are many surface-level 
manifestations and consequences that warrant discussion.  Role conflict, defined as 
incompatible role expectations, for instance, is a surface-level manifestation of SD that is 
associated with stress and burnout (Nicotera & Clinkscales, 2010).  Role conflict, 
according to Nicotera and Clinkscales (2010), is present in an SD-nexus and is part of the 
SD-cycle.  In conjunction with burnout and workplace bullying, SD-induced role conflict 
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is a predictor of job dissatisfaction among nurses (Nicotera et al., 2014).  Additionally, 
the role conflict, burnout, emotional exhaustion, and bullying that are present in SD-rich 
nursing environments have been linked positively with nurses’ intentions to quit their 
jobs (Nicotera & Mahon, 2013). 
SD, which takes “a deep emotional toll on people” (Nicotera et al. 2010, p. 369), 
also can manifest in actual (vs. intended) turnover, as well as in “verbal abuse, horizontal 
violence [bullying], adverse events, costs, and other professional and patient outcomes” 
(p. 381).  In healthcare settings, according to Nicotera et al. (2010), the SD-cycle can 
contribute to medical malpractice: 
The SD-cycle creates tenuous conditions for patient care wherein the potential for 
mistakes and missteps is quite high.  Staffing issues and difficult workplace 
environments increase the likelihood of adverse events, including compromised 
patient safety, medication errors and others.  SD seriously compromises the 
workplace environment, thereby increasing the likelihood of these adverse events.  
These include challenges within and between patient care units, as well as 
between staff nurses, managers, and administrators. (p. 369) 
 
Healthcare settings, according to Nicotera et al. are “especially susceptible to SD because 
of the intersection of multiple institutional, professional, community, and other cultural 
meaning systems” (p. 364). 
When SD is present in an organization, individual agency is limited.  According 
to Nicotera and Mahon (2013), “In a structurationally divergent interaction system, action 
cannot coherently re/produce or transform structure because the actor does not control 
resources . . .  and agency lacks force” (p. 94).  Although agency is “never zero,” it 
becomes “nonfunctional” in an SD-nexus:  
We always have action choices, but in SD none satisfy all structurational 
constraints in place.  This positioning is mystifying because the opposition is 
invisible or stultifying because the opposition is unsolvable.  If to avoid a kick 
from the mule, I must choose being run over by the cart, I may just not move.  I 
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have agency to decide not to act but no efficacy to impact either structure 
transformatively.  Acting on one structure subverts another, negating agency for 
the whole. (Nicotera & Mahon, 2013, p. 94)  
 
Nicotera and Mahon (2013) theorized that surface-level manifestations of SD, 
such as role conflict and burnout, actually represent loss of agency.  SD-entrenched 
systems foster what Nicotera and Mahon dubbed impotent agency, which is the inability 
to meet goals effectively because of conflicting structures in environments where 
performance and productivity are monitored closely.  Impotent agency feeds unhealthy 
communication patterns, and, in addition to immobilization, it can lead to developmental 
regression (Nicotera & Mahon, 2013).  The only way to reduce SD, according to 
Nicotera, Mahon, and Wright (2014), is for individual agents to regard those with whom 
they are engaged in an SD-cycle not as enemies but as colleagues with a common 
problem. 
In summary, structuration theory and three of its offshoots (AST, the modified 
adaptive structuration model, and SD theory) provide theoretical frameworks for this 
study.  Structuration theory explains how social systems (i.e., social interactions) are 
reproduced across time and space.  The theory assumes that people are knowledgeable 
agents who act with purpose and whose interactions are shaped by their social positions 
or roles.  Agents’ positions dictate the signification and legitimization that they assign to 
their interactions, and those positions allow them to ascertain their place in a domination 
hierarchy.  Structuration theory hinges on two main concepts: structures, which consist of  
unseen rules and resources shaping human action that, simultaneously, enable and 
constrain that action; and agency, which is both action and the ability of an agent to act, 
which is intertwined with the concept of autonomy.  Agency requires power, or the 
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capacity to act on and change structures.  Routines are an essential element of 
institutional reproduction, but change can introduce exogenous shocks and create critical 
situations that threaten social systems.  Actions have unintended consequences and are a 
regular feature of institutional practice, but not all unintended consequences are negative.  
Perverse consequences, however, are negative inasmuch as the very act of pursuing a 
goal diminishes the likelihood of reaching it; perverse consequences often are present in 
conditions of structurational contradiction.  AST was developed to explain how 
technology changes social systems and focuses on appropriation (i.e., how agents use or 
reject technology).  Structures that emerge as agents use a technology can be analyzed 
according to structural features (i.e., how that technology affects human agency) and 
spirit (i.e., the intention behind that technology).  The modified model combines elements 
of AST with diffusion of innovation theory.  In addition to structures that emanate from 
the technology and those that are agent/user-initiated, the modified model takes into 
account internal and external environmental structures.  Lastly, SD theory posits that in 
an environment ripe with contradictory structures, agents find themselves at a nexus of 
incompatible rule systems that lead to a cycle of ineffective communication and 
unresolved conflict.  The cycle immobilizes agents and, effectively, robs them of agency.  
SD also manifests in role conflict, burnout, emotional exhaustion, bullying, and turnover.  
Moreover, SD in healthcare settings threatens patients’ safety by increasing the likelihood 
of medical errors.  Collectively, these theoretical frameworks shaped this study, leading 
to the following research questions that were posed. 
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Research Questions 
This study extends previous work on EMR adoption by investigating how EMRs 
affect emergency medical providers’ day-to-day experiences; how their interactions with 
coworkers and patients are altered; how emergency room culture, itself, is changed by the 
presence of this technology; and unintended consequences that EMRs bring to emergency 
medicine practice.  Thus, my preliminary research, as described in this chapter, and my 
reading of structuration theory and its derivatives, led to the following research questions.  
First, how do EMRs influence social interactions among providers working in the 
emergency room at Hospital H?  Second, how does the EMR affect structures, agents, 
and systems in the emergency room at Hospital H?  Third, what, if any, unintended 
consequences emerge during and after EMR adoption at Hospital H?  Lastly, do 
providers working in the emergency room at Hospital H experience SD?  To answer these 
questions, as explained in the next chapter about research methods employed, I observed 
and documented providers’ interactions at Hospital H’s emergency room and conducted 
numerous interviews with them. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY 
This chapter begins with an overview of emergency room-based observational 
research, addressing, specifically, issues of rigor in those studies.  This brief review of 
that research informs an understanding of methodological concerns that are evidenced in 
the emergency room literature.  This study addresses a clear gap in that literature, not 
only because it is a long-term observational study about the adoption of an electronic 
medical records system (EMR) in a community hospital-based emergency room but also 
because it utilizes rigorous ethnographic techniques.  Following a brief discussion of 
ethnographic methods, the research sites, participants, and data-collection methods are 
described.  The methods that were employed in this study included (a) participant 
observation of emergency room operations and EMR training sessions; (b) interviews 
conducted with administrators and providers; (c) a questionnaire to assess providers’ 
perceptions of EMRs; and (d) document analysis of memoranda, patient satisfaction 
surveys, physicians’ metrics reports, and EMR training materials.  A discussion then 
follows of the subjectivity of my participation as a researcher and ethical concerns that I 
confronted.  Lastly, data-analytic procedures are described. 
Methodological Issues in Observational Emergency Room Studies 
Instead of simply describing emergency medical care, according to Paltved and 
Musaeus (2012), observational or naturalistic research can “help to unpack the processes 
surrounding emergency medical care and explain ‘how, why, and what’ is going on,” 
and, thereby, produce “a deeper understanding of emergency medicine as a social 
practice” (pp. 772, 773).  Paltved and Musaeus outlined three key reasons why more 
naturalistic research is needed about emergency medicine.  First, naturalistic methods 
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illuminate processes pertaining to staff members’ thinking, feeling, and acting as 
emergency medicine providers.  Second, naturalistic research captures organizational and 
team processes amid medical and social practices.  Third, naturalistic work may lead to 
theory development that has important clinical and/or organizational implications (see, 
e.g., Eisenberg et al., 2006). 
Too often, however, emergency room-based naturalistic studies lack 
methodological rigor.  Cooper and Endacott (2007) analyzed studies published in 
Emergency Medicine Journal between 2001 and 2006: 462 were conducted using 
researcher-drive methods (e.g., questionnaires), 8 were naturalistic studies, and 6 used 
mixed methods.  All of the naturalistic studies took “a generic approach and rarely 
conformed to established [so called] qualitative approaches such as phenomenology, 
ethnography, and grounded theory” (Cooper & Endacott, p. 816).  Cooper and Endacott 
found that these generic approaches often failed to incorporate procedures to increase the 
accuracy of the qualitative findings, such as triangulation (i.e., examining data from 
different sources to build sound justification for themes) and obtaining respondents’ 
feedback about written reports. 
More recently, however, Paltved and Musaeus (2012) conducted an extensive 
review of emergency room-based naturalistic studies published between 1971 and 2012.  
Using electronic databases and searching volumes of Academic Emergency Medicine and 
Emergency Medicine Journal, they identified 46 studies that employed observational 
methods, many of which did not use an amalgam of generic approaches but, instead, 
employed proven methods, such as ethnography, action research, grounded theory, 
phenomenology, discourse analysis, and critical incident analysis.  The authors concluded 
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that, despite having used valid and reliable methods, even more rigorous designs were 
needed in naturalistic research.  Ethnography, in particular, was identified as an important 
method for “developing understanding about complex social interactions because it 
allows the researchers through participant observation to study medical work in situ” 
(Paltved & Musaeus, p. 773).  Nugus and Forero (2011) also noted that because the main 
focus of ethnography is on language and social realities that languages construct, 
ethnography is especially “important in EDs [emergency departments] because of the 
unique patient management tasks that emergency doctors and nurses perform [through 
language]” (p. 69). 
This study addresses a clear gap in the literature, by conducting a long-term 
ethnographic study about an EMR adoption.  As explained next, ethnography 
encompasses several data-collection practices, including participant observation and 
interviews. 
Ethnographic Methods 
Ethnography, as defined in chapter three, is a “written representation of a culture” 
that is derived from fieldwork, which is the “investment of a researcher over a lengthy 
period of time . . . and consists mostly of ongoing interaction with the human targets of 
study on their home ground” (Van Maanen, 2011, pp. 1, 2).  According to Frey et al. 
(2000), “Ethnographers want to understand the explicit and implicit tacit assumptions that 
exist in particular cultural groups that simultaneously enable and constrain interaction 
among members” (p. 259).  In this study, ethnography was used to address ways in which 
EMRs enable and constrain structures that affect healthcare providers at Hospital H.  The  
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specific ethnographic techniques—participant observation and in-depth interviews—that 
were employed to address the goals of this study are explained below. 
Participant Observation 
“Observation is the central data collection method in ethnography” and is 
especially valuable because “observation overcomes the discrepancy between what 
people say they do and what they actually do” (Cooper & Endacott, 2007, pp. 816, 817).  
Observation in ethnography most often is accomplished through participant observation, 
which is the “craft of observing and recording events in social settings” (Lindlof & 
Taylor, 2011, p. 135).  Methodological practices associated with participant observation 
involve “one’s being in the presence of others on an ongoing basis . . .  [as] a co-
participant in a significant part of their lives” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011, p. 135).  By 
combining participant observation with other data-collection methods (e.g., interviews 
and/or document analysis), researchers can “discern how a social work appears to its 
participants––principally, by eliciting schema they use to construct and associate 
meaningful phenomena” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011, p. 136). 
Observations are recorded in fieldnotes, which are “intended to capture and 
represent the lived experiences of others” (Goodall, 2000, p. 90).  According to Lindlof 
and Taylor (2011), fieldnotes are “concerned with describing and interpreting (i.e., 
textual) qualities of communication in social action,” allowing researchers to “develop 
two important forms of intersubjectivity: (1) empathetic understanding of their 
participants’ experience and (2) successful representation of that understanding for 
others” (p. 159).  Moreover, fieldnotes should “contain extensive (if not exhaustive) 
descriptions of appearances and activities”; provide “rich, specific detail” about what was 
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observed; and “record participants’ remarks and conversations as close to verbatim as 
possible” (Lindlof & Taylor, p. 159).  Goodall (2000) prioritized capturing verbal 
interactions in fieldnotes because “verbal exchanges are the organizing focus of everyday 
experience” (p. 98). 
In-depth Interviewing 
In addition to participant observation, in-depth interviewing is an important 
ethnographic methodological technique (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011).  In-depth interviews 
are useful, among other things, for understanding social actors’ experiences and 
perspectives; gathering information about things, people, and processes that cannot be 
observed directly; inquiring about past events; verifying information that was obtained 
from other sources; clarifying processes or procedures; and eliciting language forms that 
are used by social actors in situ (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). 
Lindlof and Taylor (2011) identified five types of in-depth interviews: 
ethnographic, informant, respondent, narrative, and focus group.  Ethnographic 
interviews are informal, spontaneous interviews that, usually, occur “in a cultural scene, 
while the investigator is busy hanging out with the people being studied” (Lindlof & 
Taylor, p. 176), and they are particularly useful for soliciting participants’ immediate 
reactions to events or conversations.  Informant interviews solicit insiders’ perspectives 
on cultural or group practices.  Interviewees in this interview form are “called informants 
because they inform the researcher about the scene––the scene’s history, customs, and 
rituals; the local ‘lingo’; the identities and actions of key players; and so forth” (Lindlof 
& Taylor, p. 177).  Respondent interviews elicit open-ended responses from cultural 
members and are used to clarify interviewees’ meanings; elucidate their opinions, beliefs, 
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and attitudes; identify sources of influence that are tied to certain beliefs and behaviors of 
interviewees; classify complex attitude patterns; and understand people’s attributions 
about what motivates their beliefs and behaviors (Lindlof & Taylor).  Unlike informants 
who speak about the scene, respondents “speak only for, and about, themselves” (Lindlof 
& Taylor, p. 179).  Respondent interviews are “stand-alone procedures” (Lindlof & 
Taylor, p. 180); in the case of the present study, they would be conducted outside of the 
emergency room in a controlled setting and not combined with other methods of field 
study.  Narrative interviews seek entire stories from interviewees, which become the 
basis for analysis.  Finally, focus groups are interviews conducted with several people at 
once. 
As described below, I combined the techniques of participant observation and in-
depth ethnographic, informant, respondent, and focus group interviews with a 
questionnaire and document analysis to address the goals of this study.  A discussion of 
the research sites and study participants precedes an account of the data-collection 
procedures employed.  Discussions of the validity of the findings, subjectivity of the 
researcher, ethical concerns confronted in the study, and procedures that were used to 
analyze the collected data then follow. 
Research Sites 
Although Hospital H was described briefly in chapter three, a more 
comprehensive description of the site is warranted.  Below, I describe some of the 
external structural constraints that affect Hospital H’s emergency room and explain its 
patient documentation systems.  This information was gleaned from several online 
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sources,5 including Hospital H’s website and the website of its parent company.  Several 
informants, including nurses and hospital administrators, provided additional 
information.  That information is followed by a description of an additional site, Hospital 
W, where I observed and interviewed scribes who were employed, primarily, to alleviate 
some of the EMR-induced documentation burdens that plagued Hospital W’s providers.  
In studying that additional site, I also talked with physicians and a nurse about their 
perceptions of scribes’ contributions. 
My decision to incorporate a second research site into this study merits an 
explanation.  According to Wolcott (2010), “Ethnography is comparative [because] 
everything we do is based on comparison” (p. 90).  Studying three emergency rooms in 
the first phase of my research allowed me to draw important comparisons among rural, 
suburban, and urban emergency rooms.  Similarly, visiting Hospital W allowed me to 
compare an emergency room without scribes (Hospital H) with an emergency room that 
employed them (Hospital W).  Visiting Hospital W was necessary, in part, because 
providers at Hospital H discussed, at length, the possibility of scribe support, yet none of 
those providers had ever worked with a scribe nor knew anyone who had.  Moreover, my 
key informant, Dr. C., accepted a position at Hospital W and, for the first time, would 
work with scribes.  I accompanied him on his first few shifts and observed the process.  I 
returned to Hospital H with a newfound understanding of the role that scribes can play in 
a busy emergency room, which shaped both how I viewed documentation processes at 
Hospital H and how providers navigated those chores (see the findings in chapter five). 
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Although ethnography, potentially, is comparative, Wolcott (2010) cautioned that 
comparison sometimes can be a shortcoming, especially if it becomes a preoccupation, as 
comparison can “draw one’s attention away from what is being observed” (p. 97).  In line 
with that position, although Hospital W was a rich site with numerous structural 
influences at work, I focused my observations on provider–scribe interactions and the 
EMR.  
Hospital H 
Hospital H is a for-profit, short-term, acute care facility in southern Louisiana that 
is certified by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and is accredited by the 
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare.  It has approximately 140 in-patient 
beds and 20 emergency room beds.  A few years ago, Hospital H was sold to a 
corporation, G6, that specializes in small but growing healthcare markets.  Despite 
millions of dollars invested in infrastructure, technology, and advertising, the hospital has 
operated at a deficit for several years.  Since the change in ownership, Hospital H has 
undergone changes to its leadership structure: in the past few years, Hospital H has had 
two new chief operating officers, a new chief financial officer, a new vice president, and 
a new medical director.  Turnover in the information technology (IT) department has 
been high––in 2014, the staff was replaced en masse.  Turnover among nurses has been 
high as well; when nurses’ pay was cut to save the hospital money, many nurses found 
employment elsewhere. 
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The emergency room also was affected by the change in ownership.  Prior to the 
sale, Hospital H retained a company, S7, to manage emergency room operations.  
Company S hired emergency medicine trained and board certified physicians to staff 
Hospital H’s emergency room.  Company S also billed patients for the emergency 
medical care that they received, paid physicians’ salaries with the funds collected, and 
shared a portion of the remaining profits with Hospital H.  The average annual 
emergency room profit retained by Company S was more than $1 million.  After Hospital 
H was sold, the new administrators severed ties with Company S, with emergency room 
operations and billing handled in-house.  The physicians who stayed on after Company S 
lost the management contract became either full-time employees of Hospital H or part-
time independent contractors.  Since that change, revenue has fallen and the emergency 
room has operated at a loss, despite increases in patient volume; specifically, Hospital 
H’s emergency room sees more than 40 patients a day, an increase of about 50%, but 
revenue is approximately half to two-thirds of what it was when billing was managed by 
Company S. 
Before Hospital H was sold, physicians documented the care that patients 
received in the emergency room using a proprietary paper-based system, called 
“TSheets.”  There were more than 120 individually tailored TSheets that were 
customized for chief complaints that range from chest pain, to lower back pain, to 
trauma.  TSheets were two-sided forms with multiple boxes in which physicians 
documented the following for a patient: the patient’s history and physical examination, 
chief complaint, review of systems (neurological capacity, vision, hearing, respiration, 
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circulation, etc.), results of laboratory and radiological studies, progress notes, clinical 
impressions, and diagnosis (see Appendix D).  Physicians wrote instructions for patient 
care on separate paper order sets, checked boxes next to the desired laboratory and 
imaging tests, and then handed the forms to either nurses or technicians, who entered the 
orders into a computer that was connected to the hospital’s laboratory and radiology 
departments (see Appendix E).  Medication orders and in-patient admission instructions 
were carried out in similar fashion.  All of the completed paper forms for each patient 
were kept in a numbered folder that corresponded to the patient’s room number.  Both 
physicians and nurses shared this folder, adding to it as needed (e.g., inserting new order 
sets or test results). 
Nurses also documented patient care on paper forms before Hospital H was sold, 
but, unlike physicians, they used a documenting system that was designed in-house.  The 
nursing note was a 6-page, trifold form that was kept with the physician’s TSheets and 
order sets in the common patient folder.  The nurse’s note was similar to the TSheet, but 
it included additional space for documenting more detailed patient histories and physical 
examination findings, tasks and procedures performed, and medications administered 
(see Appendix F). 
Because Hospital H’s new administrators wanted to take advantage of the federal 
government’s Meaningful Use program, which provides financial incentives for hospitals 
and clinics that install EMRs (see chapter two), they were quick to adopt an EMR.  
Administrators chose an EMR that was made by McKesson Corporation, in part, because 
Corporation G had purchased McKesson EMRs for another of its hospitals.  Although 
McKesson is an inexpensive EMR by industry standards (it costs about $2 million, 
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according to one of Hospital H’s vice presidents, whereas similarly designed systems cost 
$7 million or more), it is “one of the worst-ranked ED information systems [and] scored 
at or near the bottom for many fields, including provider satisfaction, perceived workflow 
integration, and speed of charting” (Genes, 2014, p. 17). 
All of the nurses’ documentation chores were shifted from paper to the McKesson 
Paragon system on April 1, 2013.  Physicians continued documenting patient care using 
TSheets, but paper order sets were augmented by a McKesson computerized physician 
order entry system (CPOE) in August 2013, and the paper order sets were replaced 
altogether by the CPOE in October 2013.  At that juncture, physicians and nurses no 
longer shared a common chart; in fact, their respective computer programs, despite both 
being part of the same McKesson EMR, were not fully interoperable, meaning that nurses 
could not see everything that physicians typed into the CPOE, and physicians could not 
see nurses’ electronic notes.  Although nurses still had access to physicians’ paper 
TSheets, eventually, TSheets would be replaced by an electronic version.  Rather than 
purchasing the proprietary electronic TSheet system, which could have been integrated 
into the McKesson CPOE and EMR systems, for approximately $35,000, Hospital H’s 
administrators tasked the IT department with designing and building a generic version in-
house.  The first iteration of the generic, electronic TSheet was supposed to launch in 
November 2013, but that launch was rescheduled for June 2014, then August, and then 
December; as of May 2015, physicians still were using paper TSheets. 
Hospital W 
Unlike the hybrid paper–electronic system that Hospital H was using, Hospital W 
had been using a fully operational EMR for several years.  Hospital W is an acute care 
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center with 760 beds in Kansas, and it has a network of three emergency rooms with an 
annual patient volume of 65,000 (by comparison, Hospital H’s emergency room sees 
approximately 14,000 patients a year).  Hospital W is a major trauma center that is 
staffed by both emergency medicine physicians and trauma surgeons.  Because Hospital 
W also is an academic medical center, medical residents see and treat patients as well.  
The same large, national corporation that owns Hospital T (described in chapter three) 
also owns Hospital W, and both hospitals use the same EMR system, which is made by 
Medical Information Technology, Inc. (MEDITECH).  The MEDITECH system, 
although problematic in some respects, is ranked higher than the McKesson system 
(Genes, 2014). 
A company called Scribe America trains and supplies the scribes who work at 
Hospital W, most of whom are college students who are planning careers in healthcare.  
Hospital W contributes $10 an hour to cover a portion of scribes’ salary, and physicians 
who elect to have a scribe accompany them on their shifts have $10 an hour deducted 
from their salaries, which offsets the cost that Hospital W pays Scribe America.  
According to the Scribe America (2014) website: 
A Medical Scribe is a revolutionary concept in modern medicine.  Traditionally, a 
physician’s job has been focusing solely on direct patient contact and care.  
However, the advent of the Electronic Health Record (EHR) created an overload 
of documentation and clerical responsibilities that slows physicians down and 
pulls them away from actual patient care.  To relieve the documentation overload, 
physicians across the country are turning to Medical Scribe services.  A Medical 
Scribe is essentially a personal assistant to the physician; performing 
documentation in the EHR, gathering information for the patient's visit, and 
partnering with the physician to deliver the pinnacle of efficient patient care. 
(para. 1, 2) 
 
Typically, scribes at Hospital W are available 18 hours each day, but that schedule leaves 
many of the night shift providers at a disadvantage.  During gaps in scribe coverage, 
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providers input healthcare data into the EMR, often after their shifts are over and they no 
longer are seeing new patients. 
Although Hospitals H and W are very different (e.g., in size, academic affiliation, 
patient volume, and availability of scribe services), their patient throughput processes, 
essentially, are the same.  Furthermore, the EMRs enable and constrain providers’ agency 
in similar ways (see findings in chapter five).  These similarities, thus, made the  
comparison between Hospital H and W worthwhile.  Below, I explain how I gained entry 
to both of these research sites.  
Navigating Access to Sites 
I gained access initially to both of the research sites though Dr. C.  My 
arrangement with Hospital H was formal, marked by an affiliation agreement between it 
and Louisiana State University (LSU; see Appendix G).  The agreement gave me 
unlimited access to all emergency room common and private areas, barring patients’ 
rooms, and it allowed me to observe and interact with emergency room staff for the 
duration of this study.  In exchange, I agreed to follow the hospital’s rules and to observe 
patient privacy mandates.  After the agreement was signed, the emergency room nurse 
manager became my sponsor, which, according to Lindlof and Taylor (2011), is 
“someone who goes around and personally introduces you, vouches for your study, and 
helps you gain access” (p. 101).  The nurse manager, Q, asked that I let her know in 
advance when I planned to visit the emergency room, so that she could notify staff 
members and remind them of my study’s parameters.  She advocated on my behalf and 
facilitated arranging interviews with several administrators and physicians. 
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I did not have a formal sponsor at Hospital W; however, Dr. C facilitated my 
access in several ways.  Specifically, he approached the emergency room director and 
explained my study.  After providing the director with a copy of my Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) exemption, she granted me access to Hospital W’s main emergency room, 
but she requested that I limit my interactions to Dr. C and his scribe, although I was free 
to speak with other providers if they initiated conversation with me.  Next, I describe the 
participants who I interviewed and/or observed throughout the study. 
Participants 
The participants recruited for this study represented a purposive sample because I 
made “informed judgments about . . .  who to interview” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011, p. 
110).  Over the course of this study, I observed and/or interviewed 2 scribes, 4 
technicians, 15 nurses, 3 midlevel providers, 9 physicians, 2 hospital administrators, and 
2 EMR trainers.  Most of these people worked at Hospital H, some were affiliated with 
Hospital W (two scribes, one nurse, and one physician), and one of the participants, Dr. 
C, had worked at both hospitals.  The majority of the participants were male and White.  
Female participants included the technicians, half of the nurses, two physicians, a 
hospital administrator, and the EMR trainers.  Three African American physicians 
represented the only nonWhite participants.  The nurses and physicians, who comprised 
the bulk of the sample, ranged in age from early 30s to mid-60s. 
Sampling of participants proceeded “in a serial fashion” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011, 
p. 117), with new participants added based on what I learned and as I learned it; that 
iterative process supported the analysis, reflection, and theorizing about the principal site 
(Hospital H) and its agents.  Hospital H’s emergency room regularly employs 4 to 5 
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technicians, 26 nurses, 3 midlevel providers, and 10 physicians.  I observed and/or 
interviewed all of the technicians, almost half of the nurses, all of the midlevel providers, 
and all but one of the physicians.  Thus, the sample size reflected sufficiently the types of 
providers working in Hospital H’s emergency room.  Moreover, the sampling process, 
according to Lindlof and Taylor (2011), usually ends “when new data no longer add 
much of significance to the concepts that have been developed” (p. 117).  Therefore, 
having achieved saturation with this sample (i.e., no new information was seen or heard), 
I stopped enlisting new participants. 
In addition to participants recruited from Hospitals H and W, I interviewed 
leading emergency medicine physician-scholars.  I did so when attending medical 
conferences, to tap into broader trends surrounding EMRs and emergency medicine 
practice.  Dr. Ken Milne, Chief of Staff at South Huron Hospital, and Dr. Peter Viccellio, 
Clinical Professor and Vice Chair of Emergency Medicine at Stony Brook School of 
Medicine, described their experiences with EMRs and drew comparisons between forced 
and free EMR adoption scenarios (see the findings in chapter five).  At one medical 
conference, I spoke with numerous physicians and midlevel providers whose experiences 
and expertise informed my understanding of EMR adoption processes.  I also exchanged 
e-mails with Dr. Rick Bukata, editor and founder of Emergency Medical Abstracts, on the 
subject of EMRs.  Lastly, I consulted with Dr. Anne Nicotera (George Mason 
University), whose structurational divergence (SD) theory framed this study. 
In presenting the data, participants’ names are withheld and pseudonym initials 
are used to protect their confidentiality; the only exceptions are those scholars named 
above who are not affiliated with either Hospital H or W, and who consented to having 
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their names appear in this study.  Additional considerations with respect to participants’ 
confidentiality and data security, as required by the LSU’s IRB, are described next. 
Institutional Review Board Approval 
The first phase of this study (see chapter three) received exemption from full 
institutional oversight by LSU’s IRB on October 7, 2013 (see Appendix A).  The study 
was amended in December 2014 to include a revised questionnaire (see Appendix H), 
and the modifications were approved by that IRB on January 9, 2015 (see Appendix I).  
My sponsor distributed copies of the informed consent release (see Appendix A) to 
employees at Hospital H, and all of the participants agreed verbally to its terms.  I 
provided copies of the consent form to participants I recruited from Hospital W, as well 
as those I approached at medical conferences.  Participants’ verbal consent was obtained 
before interviews commenced. 
In accordance with LSU’s policy on security of data, handwritten fieldnotes were 
locked in a safe, and electronic copies were stored on a password-protected computer.  
Backup versions of electronic data, including fieldnotes, e-mail correspondence, and 
other documents containing identifying information, were stored on an external hard 
drive, which was locked in a safe when it was not in use.  All of the documents appearing 
in the appendices that contain identifying information have been redacted. 
To review, I observed and interviewed healthcare providers working at Hospital H 
in southern Louisiana.  Hospital H was acquired by Corporation G a few years ago and 
has undergone numerous changes.  In addition to new emergency room management, 
there were several changes made to the hospital’s executive team, and there was high 
turnover in the IT and nursing departments.  The hospital was operating at a deficit, and 
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adopting EMRs meant that it might recoup some lost revenue—namely, in the form of 
Meaningful Use incentive payments.  Portions of a McKesson EMR system were 
installed, which nurses began using in April 2013.  Physicians began using the McKesson 
CPOE component in August, but they continued to use paper charts as well.  As of May 
2015, the last component of the EMR system, the electronic TSheet, had not been 
installed.  Although Hospital H’s EMR adoption was delayed, I did observe a fully 
functioning EMR at Hospital W, an urban academic medical center in Kansas.  At 
Hospital W, I interviewed scribes and spoke with physicians about their perceptions of 
the scribe program.  I also interviewed several physicians attending medical conferences 
to gain a more complete understanding of EMR adoption processes and implications.  
Participants’ confidentiality was preserved through the use of pseudonyms, and the data 
were safeguarded in accordance with LSU policies.  The methods that I employed to 
collect data are described in the next section. 
Data Collection 
To address the goals of this study and to understand how structures and agents 
were affected by Hospital H’s EMR adoption, four methodological practices were used to 
obtain data: (a) participant observation of Hospital H’s emergency room operations and 
EMR training sessions was conducted, augmented by observation of Hospital W’s scribe 
program; (b) interviews were conducted with Hospital H’s administrators and emergency 
room employees, with Hospital W’s scribes and providers, and with leading emergency 
medicine scholars; (c) a questionnaire was designed and administered to Hospital H’s 
emergency room employees to assess their perceptions of the EMR, diagnose SD, and 
measure burnout; and (d) analysis of documents, including Hospital H’s emergency room 
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memoranda, patient satisfaction surveys, physicians’ metrics reports, and McKesson 
EMR/CPOE training materials.  Each practice is explained below. 
Participant Observation 
Spending time in Hospital H’s emergency room allowed me to observe 
interactions among providers and to witness how they engaged with and talked about the 
EMR.  My participant observation, which included emergency room operations and two 
stand-alone EMR training sessions, spanned from December 2013 to May 2015.  In 
addition to the 42 hours of fieldwork that I conducted in Fall 2013 (see the preliminary 
research study in chapter three), I spent another 145 hours at Hospital H’s emergency 
room and recorded my observations in 162 handwritten pages.  Similar to Eisenberg et al. 
(2006), I followed commonly accepted observational procedures by visiting the hospital 
at various times of the day, observing on weekdays and on weekends, following 
numerous individuals who had varied roles, and taking detailed fieldnotes.  I also 
positioned myself in specific places (see, e.g., Nugus et al., 2011) and regularly observed 
activity near the electronic whiteboard, at the nurses’ station, at the physicians’ work 
space, by the midlevel providers’ desk, near the triage room, and by the breakroom.  As 
patterns and themes emerged from the collected data, I revisited certain shifts, locations, 
and providers to confirm or revise them. 
“The goal of fieldwork,” according to Wolcott (2010), “is to recognize patterns, 
[which is] the precursor to finding themes”; however, “there is no reason not to be 
thinking of ‘themes’ from the beginning of your story and trying to test hunches” (pp. 8, 
40).  I developed several hunches during the preliminary fieldwork (described in chapter 
three) and from researching literature about EMRs and emergency medicine.  In the 
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parlance of Tracy and Geist-Martin (2014), these hunches became sensitizing concepts,  
“interpretive devices––almost like magnifying glasses––that offer frameworks through 
which researchers see, organize, and experience the data” (p. 246).  Certain sensitizing 
concepts, described next, led me to focus on particular behaviors, discussions, and 
interactions. 
Sensitizing concepts that shaped my participant observation.  Several 
sensitizing concepts informed my observations at Hospital H; primarily, concepts that 
were rooted in structuration theory and its derivatives framed my observations.  For 
instance, I was attentive to how agency was enabled or constrained in certain situations, 
where structural contradictions seemed apparent, if and how appropriation moves were 
executed, and if negative communication spirals emerged.  Additionally, the literature on 
EMR adoptions shaped my perceptions.  For example, Park et al. (2013) found that 
physicians-in-training rarely initiated talk with nurses; consequently, I was attentive to 
who initiated conversation (i.e., physician or nurse) and what was discussed (i.e., patient 
care, the EMR, or something else).  Moreover, because Callen et al. (2013) found that 
physicians spent less time with patients after, as compared to before, an EMR installation, 
I noted the amount of time that providers spent at EMR stations and inside patients’ 
rooms.  My preliminary research and literature review also sensitized me to the following 
concepts: how physicians and nurses framed their talk about EMRs; role, group 
affiliation, and hierarchical relationships, which, sometimes, manifested in divergent 
interaction patterns; how providers discussed feeling either satisfied or dissatisfied with 
the working environment at Hospital H and with their careers; providers’ communication 
patterns when out of sight of patients (i.e., backstage interactions); the number of mouse 
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clicks that were required to perform certain operations, such as ordering medications, and 
the length of time involved; reactance amid forced EMR adoption situations; and 
dissonance that was caused by role reversal during EMR training episodes.  Reactance 
and dissonance, as described next, shaped many of my observations. 
Reactance, as defined in chapter two, is the motivational state following a threat 
to or elimination of freedom that aims to restore that freedom and/or to subvert and resist 
the endorsed behavior (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981).  Because reactance usually 
triggers hostile and aggressive feelings (Brehm, 1966), I was attentive to situations where 
I believed that reactance would be expressed, such as when Hospital H’s administrators 
required physicians to use the CPOE exclusively, and when generic, electronic TSheet 
prototypes were tested in the training sessions.  Reactance cannot be measured directly 
(Quick et al., 2013), and scales devised to detect reactance are “psychometrically 
unsound with poor reliabilities, unstable factor structures, and poor convergent and 
discriminant validities” (Nesterkin, 2013, p. 588).  Reactance, therefore, is better viewed 
as a situational outcome with observable characteristics (Nesterkin, 2013).  Extending the 
view articulated by Brehm (1966), that reactance triggers hostile or aggressive feelings, I 
looked for any hostile or aggressive communication (or other behavior) relating to 
EMRs/EMR use.  Moreover, because subverting the mechanics of power (i.e., resisting 
constraining structural forces) with disruptive talk or behaviors targeting EMRs is 
“asserting autonomy of action” (Giddens, 1984, p. 292), when providers disparaged the 
EMR, refused to use it, or circumvented order-entry processes, I noted that reactance 
might have been a factor, and I followed up by conducting ethnographic interviews for 
confirmation (see the discussion of interviews in the next section). 
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Dissonance is “the existence of nonfitting relations among cognitions” (Festinger 
1957, p. 3).  For example, physicians’ lack of knowledge about how to use EMRs often 
leads them “to view themselves as novices . . . [and] the juxtaposition between concurrent 
roles of (medical) ‘expert’ and ‘novice’ creates a high degree of cognitive dissonance” 
(Nambisan et al., 2013, p. 4).  Although Sweeney, Hausknecht, and Soutar (2000) argued 
that there is “no well established scale to measure dissonance” (p. 369), they developed a 
22-item scale that boasted strong evidence of discriminant validity and reliability.  
Although the scale was designed to measure consumers’ postpurchase dissonance, 
several of the scale’s emotional dimension items certainly are applicable to providers in 
forced EMR compliance situations: resentment, fear, anger, unease, annoyance, and 
frustration (Sweeney et al.).  Nadeem (2007) adapted Sweeney et al.’s model for 
observational research; instead of administering a questionnaire, Nadeem asked 
participants about their feelings in accordance with the scale’s emotional dimension 
items.  I adapted Sweeny et al.’s model in a similar way, noting behaviors and 
conversations that suggested providers might have felt resentment, fear, anger, or unease 
regarding the EMR.  For example, if a provider sighed loudly or mumbled profanities 
when using an EMR, I attended to the occasion as an example of frustration and, 
possibly, dissonance.  My hunches, then, were either confirmed or denied in ethnographic 
interviews, with those interview procedures described next. 
Interviews  
Individual interviews were conducted to ascertain providers’ experiences both 
practicing emergency medicine and using EMRs at Hospital H.  I also questioned 
participants about their perceptions of EMR adoption processes, EMR training, 
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communication among providers and between providers and administrators, working 
conditions, and career satisfaction.  Interview questions were derived from the 
questionnaire that was developed during preliminary research (see Appendix C).  Most of 
the interviews that I conducted in the field were ethnographic and/or informant 
interviews.  Because interviews often took place on the fly and in a busy emergency 
room, they were not audio recorded; instead, I took copious notes during interviews and 
shared frequently what I had written with informants to make certain that I had captured 
conversations accurately. 
In addition to ethnographic and informant interviews, I conducted several in-
person respondent interviews with three physicians, a nurse manager, and a nurse.  Those 
in-person interviews were audio recorded, producing 5 hours and 46 minutes of material, 
which I transcribed (giving verbal content only).  I conducted telephone interviews with a 
physician and the head of Hospital H’s IT department, recording detailed notes during 
and immediately following those interviews.  I also conducted e-mail interviews with a 
physician and an administrator that consisted of open-ended questions asking about EMR 
adoptions, implications, and limitations. 
All of the ethnographic and informant interviews were conducted with 
participants who seemed eager to explain the scene and share their perspectives.  Nurses, 
technicians, and scribes were especially glad that I valued their opinions, but some 
physicians, initially, seemed hesitant to speak with me.  In time, and with prodding from 
my sponsor, most of the physicians accepted my presence in the emergency room and 
answered willingly my questions.  Hospital H’s administrators, however, were more 
difficult to reach and phone calls requesting interviews were not returned.  After multiple 
	   157 
e-mailed requests, one administrator consented to an interview.  Rather than meeting in 
person, as requested, I was instructed to e-mail my questions, and the administrator 
addressed most of the questions in her e-mail reply.  The head of the hospital’s IT 
department called me in response to an e-mailed request and addressed a series of open-
ended questions about the adoption process, the in-house TSheet design process, and 
EMR training.  I also conducted ethnographic interviews with two EMR trainers, and 
although one of the trainers consented to a follow-up respondent interview, she later 
canceled the interview and did not return my e-mails. 
The ethnographic and informant interviews were shaped, largely, by what was 
happening in the emergency room that I observed.  My questions, therefore, were 
improvised and sought clarifications and/or explanations of behaviors, interactions, 
phrases, and processes observed.  Sensitizing concepts, as described previously, led me to 
focus on particular occurrences; specific questions that I posed about certain events, such 
as forced EMR compliance or EMR training episodes, were shaped by the literature on 
reactance and dissonance, as described next. 
Sensitizing concepts that shaped interviews conducted.  Reactance often 
manifests in a preference for the prohibited object or process (Brehm, 1966), and, at 
Hospital H, providers’ reactance was expressed in statements that both praised paper 
charts and condemned EMRs.  When providers disparaged the EMR, refused to use it, or 
circumvented order-entry processes, I followed up with ethnographic interviews to 
ascertain why that was the case.  For example, because a common occurrence involved 
physicians asking nurses to enter orders into the CPOE, usually, I asked physicians why 
they had made the request.  Moreover, I was careful not to jump to conclusions, because 
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context (e.g., whether physicians otherwise were busy with tasks that prohibited entering 
orders), nonverbal behaviors (including paralinguistic cues, such as tone of voice), and 
apparent affective state needed to be taken into account when deciding if physicians 
asking others to enter orders qualified as reactance.  Additionally, I considered carefully 
whether negatively framed talk (e.g., griping) about the EMR might have signaled 
reactance or was intended to bolster belonging by reinforcing group membership.  For 
example, a nurse who, generally, was enthusiastic about some aspects of the EMR 
complained frequently alongside other nurses about its many shortcomings.  When I 
asked why she changed her mind about the EMR, she said that she enjoyed “letting off 
steam” with her coworkers, and that “complaining together,” even though she thought 
that “the EMR [wasn’t] so bad,” helped her to “feel connected to them.”  Asking about 
speakers’ intentions, thus, was important for validating or refuting initial assumptions 
that I made about participants’ reactance in many situations (see findings in chapter five). 
With respect to dissonance, thought listing—which requires people to list their 
thoughts before, during, and/or after a task; inferences about dissonance then can be 
made by analyzing data obtained across various occasions or groups (Cacioppo, von 
Hippel, & Ernst, 1997)—has been used to measure consonant and dissonant cognitions.  
This approach has been incorporated into questionnaires, with respondents reporting the 
frequency and intensity of thoughts from among a list of cognitions that they are given 
(Cacioppo, 1997).  Rather than asking providers to write their thoughts, I elicited think-
aloud statements, which involve participants verbalizing their cognitions and/or emotions 
during and after completing EMR-related tasks.  The think-aloud approach has been 
found to produce twice as many thoughts as does thought listing (Blackwell, J. Galassi, 
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M. Galassi, & Watson, 1985).  Moreover, given the busy nature of this research site, the 
think-aloud approach was faster and more practical to administer than was thought 
listing.  I engaged providers in think-aloud exercises during and after EMR training 
episodes, defined as situations where physicians solicited or received help using the EMR 
from nurses or mid-level providers.  I focused on hierarchically imbalanced situations 
that were more apt to create role reversal and/or dissonance, as opposed to nurse-to-nurse 
or physician-to-physician training episodes.  In addition to think-aloud statements, I 
asked providers to indicate if they experienced any of the emotions listed in the shortened 
version of the Sweeney et al. (2000) questionnaire (resentment, fear, anger, unease, 
annoyance, frustration, and/or discomfort). 
Questionnaire 
I administered a questionnaire (see Appendix H) that providers completed 
anonymously about effects of the EMR on their experiences working in Hospital H’s 
emergency room.  Questionnaires were completed by 30 of the 42 full and part-time 
employees (71% response rate); respondents included 4 technicians, 17 nurses, 3 
midlevel providers, 5 physicians, and 1 respondent who identified as “other.” 
The questionnaire was intended to supplement observational and interview data 
with a numerical account of providers’ experiences with and perceptions of the EMR.  
The questionnaire asked participants about a variety of topics, including their job titles, 
how long they had worked in emergency rooms, if the administration solicited their 
opinions about the EMR before it was chosen and installed, how they believed the EMR 
affected communication between themselves and other providers, if they were satisfied 
with the EMR, and if they had considered changing jobs or careers.  Additionally, the 
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questionnaire included items to measure structurational divergence and burnout, which 
are described next. 
Structuration divergence (SD) was measured via a 17-item scale.  Nicotera et al. 
(2010) constructed the scale items from interview data that they collected, which “were 
specified to be driven by three first-level factors: immobilization/individual-development, 
unresolved conflict, and managerial/organizational-development” (p. 376).  The scale in 
Nicotera et al.’s (2010) study displayed a clear factor structure that was validated across 
several subsamples, and it showed strong internal consistency.  According to Nicotera et 
al. (2010), the model “resulted in the following fit indices: χ² (113, N = 142) = 179.73, p 
< .001, CFI = .95, RMSEA = 06, 95% CI of RMSEA = .05 to .08 [and] values indicated 
that the modified model provided reasonable fit to the data” (p. 377).  The reliability 
coefficient was .94 (Nicotera et al., 2010). 
Because the original SD self-report instrument was intended for nurses and nurse 
administrators (Nicotera et al., 2010), I adapted several items to administer it to 
physicians, midlevel providers, and technicians (see Appendix H, prompt 7).  For 
example, the item “I can’t go to my nurse manager for help resolving conflicts because 
s/he won’t do anything to help” became “I can’t go to administration for help resolving 
conflicts because they [sic] won’t do anything to help.”  Modifying some of the items 
was necessary because physicians working in the emergency room do not have managers 
or supervisors per se.  There is an emergency department director at Hospital H, a 
physician, but he does not provide direct oversight of physicians’ daily work.  Physicians, 
thus, largely, work unobserved, but because many people equate administrators with 
managers, each occurrence of “manager” or “supervisor” in the original scale was 
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changed to “administrator” or “administration.”  Dr. Nicotera approved these changes, as 
well as the addition of the following item: “Medical staff and administration view 
patients differently, and this causes conflict.”  The original scale, as well as my modified 
version, “can be used to diagnose whether SD may be at the root of morale or 
productivity problems” (Nicotera et al., 2010, p. 381). 
Several scales have been used to measure burnout.  The Maslach Burnout 
Inventory (MBI) has been used in 90% of all empirical burnout studies (Kristensen, 
Borritz, Villadsen, & Christensen, 2005); consequently, according to Kristensen et al. 
(2005), the questionnaire and the Maslach definition of burnout have “become two sides 
of the same coin: burnout is what the MBI measures, and the MBI measures what burnout 
is” (p. 193).  There are, however, concerns that the operationalization of burnout in this 
instrument is unclear, because it is characterized by the simultaneous occurrence of three 
dimensions, but, according to the MBI, those dimensions should be measured 
independently because they have been confirmed by factor analyses as three distinct 
dimensions (Kristensen et al.).  Nonetheless, and despite its length (22 items), researchers 
continue to use the MBI because it has been validated by studies (Fortney et al., 2013; 
Kuhn et al., 2008). 
McManus, Smithers, Partridge, Keeling, and Fleming (2003) proposed an 
abbreviated 13-item MBI to measure burnout in physicians.  The abbreviated scale has 
been used in several studies (see, e.g., Opoki, 2013; Rehder, Cheifetz, Markovitz, Turner, 
2014), and it has demonstrated strong validity and reliability (McManus et al.).  West, 
Drybye, Sloan, and Shanafelt (2009), however, found that two single-item measures 
exhibited the highest factor loadings within their respective burnout domains.  On the 
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emotional exhaustion item (“I feel burned out from my work”), Spearman correlations 
between the single item and the full emotional exhaustion domain score minus that 
question ranged from .76 to .83 across four large samples; the depersonalization item (“I 
have become more callous”) ranged from .61 to .72 (West et al.).  West et al., thus, 
concluded that “the results of our study indicate that results on these two questions can 
serve as useful surrogates for the MBI in settings where it is not possible to administer 
the full 22 item instrument” (p. 1320).  Although it is not yet used widely, the two-item 
scale recently was employed to measure burnout in medical students (A. Cook et al., 
2014).  To keep the questionnaire short, I also used the two-item scale (see Appendix H, 
items 11 and 12). 
Document Analysis 
Finally, I reviewed many of Hospital H’s emergency room memoranda, patient 
satisfaction surveys, physicians’ metrics reports, and McKesson EMR/CPOE training 
materials.  I also examined notices from the IT department that described several EMR 
technical glitches and temporary workarounds.  Taken together, those documents helped 
me to understand more the EMR installation process and its ramifications for both 
providers and patients (see the findings in chapter five).  Moreover, as described next, 
this approach triangulated the findings to enhance their validity. 
Validity of Findings 
In naturalistic research, conventional notions of validity derived from positivistic 
and postpositivistic research (e.g., predictive validity) do not hold much relevance 
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2011), but descriptive validity––“the factual accuracy of the reportage 
of events” (Lindloff & Taylor, 2011, p. 276)––can be assessed by triangulating multiple 
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sources and methods (Frey et al., 2000; Lindlof & Taylor, 2011).  Triangulation includes 
“comparison of two or more forms of evidence [and] if data from two or more methods 
point toward the same conclusion, then validation is enhanced” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011, 
p. 274).  For example, self-reports may have little relationship between what people say 
they do and what they actually do, but employing self-reports with others’ reports and 
observations create a triangulated measurement.  “Triangulation can be done with 
multiple methods,” as I have done, whereby “the researcher looks for convergent data in 
fieldnotes, interviews, documents, or other qualitative evidence” (Lindlof & Taylor, 
2011, p. 274).  Moreover, the questionnaire that I developed and administered was used 
to further triangulate data obtained from observations, interviews, and documents.  
Additionally, I conducted regular member checks, which involve “taking findings back to 
the field and determining whether the participants recognize them as true or accurate” 
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2011, p. 279).   
Although I took steps to ensure the descriptive validity of findings (e.g., 
triangulation), there was a potential threat to this study’s internal validity: the Hawthorne 
effect, whereby people behave differently when they know that they are being observed.  
As Wolcott (2010) noted, however, “No one can keep up appearances forever so the 
ethnographer eventually sees things as they are” (p. 92).  How the ethnographer sees 
things, though, as explained below, is shaped, largely, by his or her subjectivity. 
Researcher Subjectivity 
As Wolcott (2010) wrote, “Make no mistake, the observer-researcher always has 
a perspective, always offers a point of view” (p. 23), and because “facts are personal 
interpretations” (Goodall, 2000, p. 95), researchers need to “carefully consider how their 
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(and any co-participant’s) subjectivity impacts the research and writing” (Tracy & Geist-
Martin, 2014, p. 248).  Moreover, according to Madison (2012), because “our subjectivity 
is an inherent part of research,” researchers should “contextualize our own positionality, 
thereby making it accessible, transparent, and vulnerable to judgment and evaluation” 
(pp. 10, 9).  For these reasons, it is important to address my subjectivity, and, specifically, 
how Dr. C., as my husband and as an informant, influenced me. 
Dr. C’s perceptions, certainly, shaped my view of physician–nurse relationships 
and interactions between them.  Traditionally, the physician–nurse relationship “has been 
an unequal one characterized by the dominance of the doctor, with the nurse assuming a 
position of lower status” (Johnson & Kring, 2012, p. 343).  Although some physicians 
enjoy “a higher standing in the social pecking order of the hospital” (Haddad, 2003, p. 
28), many emergency room physicians, including Dr. C., believe that they are near the 
bottom of the hospital hierarchy; as independent contractors without tenure or union 
protection, they see themselves as disposable and beholden increasingly to “nurse packs” 
(i.e., groups consisting of nurses).  In conducting preliminary fieldwork (see chapter 
three), I saw evidence of a hierarchical shift that favored nurses’ preferences and working 
conditions over those of physicians.  Here, I describe two such instances and my 
reactions, but it is important to note that my relationship with Dr. C influenced how I 
recorded and interpreted those events. 
In conducting fieldwork in 2013, I noted that every emergency room shift that I 
observed involved a single physician and a “nurse pack.”  A nurse practitioner at Hospital 
M joked about “nurse packs,” saying, “We’re like a wolf pack: We can gang up on a doc 
and drive him out.”  She also commented, “Twenty years ago, if a doc walked in, you 
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were expected to give him your seat and say, ‘How would you like your coffee?’  A lot’s 
changed since then.”  In response, a physician replied, “Yeah, now we’re the one’s 
getting you the coffee.”  Although he was joking, another physician, most assuredly, was 
not joking about “nurse packs” when he later shared the following story: 
I had started working at a small town ER and the nurses just didn’t warm to me.   
It came to a head when an asymptomatic high blood pressure showed up.  Tests 
came back fine, so I discharged him home with a ‘scrip.  The nurses thought I was 
incompetent.  They said they admitted everybody with high blood pressure, no 
matter what.  I showed them the Joint National Commission’s recommendations, 
“send ‘em home with a ‘scrip.”  They went behind my back, called an internist, 
and had the guy admitted.  He ended up leaving a few days later with the same $4 
‘scrip I had given him, and an $80,000 hospital bill.  I tried to talk to 
administration about it, but those nurses got me fired because I didn’t do things 
their way. 
 
I sympathized with the physician because Dr. C had had similar experiences with 
hostile nurses, with some nurses even going so far as to hide his medical charts and throw 
away his order sets.  Such petty ploys could have endangered patients, as Dr. C. pointed 
out.  Moreover, the physician who lost his job had difficulty getting credentialed at other 
hospitals.  Without admitting privileges, he would, in effect, have been unemployable, 
which would have been disastrous, for, like Dr. C, this physician owed more than 
$200,000 in student loan debt and he needed a job.  I now concede that there probably 
was more to the story, and that the nurses may have acted out of ignorance (of then 
current best practices) instead of malice or spite.  When I was told the story, however, I 
blamed hostile nurse packs wholeheartedly for the physician’s predicament. 
On October 6, 2013, I observed the following scene at Hospital T that, I believe, 
alludes to the changing hierarchy of nurse–physician relationships that Dr. C and other 
physicians described.  That day, all of the nurses talked about, negotiated, and, 
eventually, took lunch breaks, whereas the physician, Dr. C., went without a break.  The 
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six nurses on shift timed and orchestrated carefully the particulars of their lunch breaks, 
each one taking 30 minutes.  It was a busy day, and Dr. C moved quickly from one 
patient’s room to the next.  He returned to the counter and sat at the EMR, typing up 
patient histories, orders, and preliminary findings.  As Dr. C typed, he reached into a bag 
beneath the counter and pulled out a beaten-up, squished-flat Subway sandwich.  He said 
that he had picked it up a few days before but that he had not had time to eat it during his 
previous two shifts.  Even though I already knew the answer, I asked if he, like the 
nurses, took lunch breaks.  I posed the question hoping that the nurses sitting nearby 
would overhear his reply.  As Dr. C said: 
Almost never.  Well, certainly never on a day shift.  Maybe a night shift.  If it’s 
not too busy, I might have time to eat.  I can eat only if I have food right here at 
the desk in front of me.  I can’t leave the emergency room and go the cafeteria.  
Basically, you get to eat only if things are under control, which means that you 
[physicians] don’t generally get a lunch break.   
 
As he unwrapped the soggy sandwich, he elaborated: 
What if you were the patient?  What if you saw the doc get up and leave, and take 
a 1-hour lunch break to eat a sandwich?  You can’t do that!  You would get your 
butt sued off!  Ya know, if ya don’t [get sued], then all the patients complain.  Ah, 
geez, you cannot possibly do that! 
 
Dr. C paused his two-fingered typing at 1:05 pm and tore into the sandwich.  An 
impatient nurse sat behind him, rapping her fingers on the countertop.  She huffed and 
rolled her eyes, and, finally, said, “Hey, Doc, did you finish charting on room 2?”  “I’m 
doing it now,” Dr. C replied, pecking at the keyboard between mouthfuls.  His “tap, tap, 
tapping” was punctuated by her “rap, rap, rapping.”  At 1:10 pm, he downed the last of 
the mangled sandwich.  I inquired, again, about lunch-break policies, hoping that the 
impatient nurse would take notice of the inequities.  I asked him, “So, docs don’t get  
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lunch breaks but the nurses do?”  He looked at me and shrugged.  From around the 
corner, another nurse announced that she was back from lunch. 
Although I was quick to judge the nurses that day (it was, after all, my husband 
who was hungry), it is worth noting that most nurses are employees who have every 
reason to expect lunch breaks during their 12-hour shifts.  In contrast, emergency 
medicine physicians usually are “hired guns,” who, like Dr. C., have no benefits, health 
insurance, sick days, retirement funds, or lunch breaks.  A nurse with whom I spoke was 
quick to point out, “Yeah, but they [physicians] make a pile of money, so it evens out.”  
Physicians feel differently; as one said, “we make more money, sure, but we carry all of 
the malpractice risk, and we do more work.”  When I asked that physician to clarify, he 
explained that emergency medicine physicians are sued much more often than are nurses, 
and that physicians see every patient in the emergency room, whereas nurses are 
responsible only for three or four at a time.  These “tit-for-tat” comparisons positioned 
me between two divergent perspectives; although I often sympathized with nurses, 
usually, I identified with physicians. 
Like the emerging nurse packs, access to food may signal that power dynamics 
and hierarchical nurse–physician relationships are changing in some emergency rooms, 
and, certainly, Dr. C thought as much.  Hence, these early episodes tainted my view of 
vindictive and well-fed nurse packs preying on innocent and hungry physicians; namely, 
my husband, whom I very much wanted to protect.  As I shifted my focus away from Dr. 
C, started observing other physicians, and spent more time with nurses at Hospital H, I 
started to see nurses in a different light.  Nurses at Hospital H were nice to me from the 
start, whereas the physicians, especially those I had not met previously in social settings, 
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were slow to warm to me.  Although being introduced as “Dr. C’s wife” signaled that I 
was “okay” (i.e., I could be trusted), many physicians seemed reserved during our 
interactions.  In time, I found that I was more comfortable sitting with the nurses rather 
than near the physicians’ workstation.  I even started wearing blue scrubs, as opposed to 
the green scrubs that physicians usually wore.  The nurses offered their snacks to me and 
I brought Goldfish crackers along on every visit.  When I was practically force-fed 
birthday cake by one of the nurses who insisted I eat instead of count calories, I knew that 
I was “one of the gang.” 
Although Dr. C arranged my entry into the site, the nurses ensured that my time 
there was fruitful.  My sponsor, Q, was my biggest ally.  She responded to all of my e-
mails, always in a prompt and courteous manner, and she seemed genuinely enthusiastic 
about my research.  Several nurses became trusted advisors and friends.  One of my 
nurse-informants, B, acted as my “spy” by sending text messages that alerted me to 
important EMR issues and personnel changes that, otherwise, may have gone 
undiscovered for weeks.  B also e-mailed me regular updates and consented to several 
respondent interviews that I conducted with him.  Without Q and B, my research would 
have been less productive.  They, along with the other nurses, helped me to see that 
emergency medicine practice is hard for everyone––nurses work as hard as do physicians, 
and, in many ways, nurses’ EMR burdens are more cumbersome (see the findings in 
chapter five).  Although these experiences and insights do not guarantee that this report is 
“objective,” I tried to approach my research and these participants with an open mind.  
Moreover, given that my view of nurses changed during the time that I was in the field, I 
made every effort not to favor the perspectives of physicians over nurses when writing 
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this report.  Nonetheless, as Goodall (2000) cautioned, “Every text, every story, 
privileges someone’s point of view” (p. 160). 
Ethical Concerns 
According to Frey et al. (2000), there are at least four moral principles that shape 
the ethical guidelines for how researchers should treat study participants: “(a) provide the 
people being studied with free choice; (b) protect their right to privacy; (c) benefit, not 
harm them; and (d) treat people with respect” (p. 148).  I obtained permission and/or 
informed consent from all participants; I used pseudonyms to protect their identities and, 
thereby, mitigated potential harm; and I treated them with respect.  Moreover, my report 
is true to my experience.  There were, however, two ethical issues that I addressed but did 
not resolve fully: (a) my husband’s role as informant, and, consequently, his free choice 
in this research; and (b) how I could benefit the study’s participants. 
On the matter of intimacy between researchers and participants, Wolcott (2010) 
wrote that “one wonders whether intimacy itself is ever desirable when the threat of 
possible discovery or betrayal lurks in every ethnographic report, revealing things told in 
confidence, or inadvertently reporting something that embarrasses the teller” (p. 117).  
My husband’s voice was peppered throughout the ethnography that I wrote in Fall 2013 
(see chapter three), and when I shared that report with him, he said, “I would have left 
some things out, but you saw what you saw and heard what you heard.”  I do not think 
that I coerced my husband; he participated freely and signed consent forms attesting as 
much.  He, generally, welcomed my inquiries.  He also introduced me to gatekeepers and 
allowed me to shadow him.  I absorbed his ethos and was received better by emergency 
room personnel for it.  He also, however, was defensive at times and did not always like 
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the mirror that I held up to his profession.  We argued about a number of things, but in 
the end, we made peace, because, as he said, I saw what I saw and I heard what I heard.  
For this study, however, I limited his participation because it could have affected 
adversely my subjectivity and threatened his privacy.  There were two exceptions when 
his perspective was invaluable and necessary for this report: submitting to formal EMR 
training and working with scribes.  Apart from these instances, I did not observe him 
during my fieldwork. 
Frey at al. (2000) maintained that, if there is any way possible, research 
participants should benefit from research, and Goodall (2000) asked, “What should you 
be expected to give back to those whom you lived with and studied?” (p. 154).  After 
more than a year with the emergency room staff members at Hospital H, I felt obliged to 
repay their kindness and honesty.  That feeling was cemented on October 10, 2014, when 
I conducted a joint interview with a physician and the nurse manager, Q.  They were very 
forthcoming about their strained interactions with administrators, and they seemed 
despondent as they pondered the EMR installation.  Q paused and said, “I’m telling you 
all of this because you’re here to help us.  You’re like one of us.”  Later, I wrote in my 
journal, “Q’s admission triggered a strong reaction.  I need to give back.  I’m taking for 
the sake of my dissertation, but other than Goldfish crackers and a sympathetic ear, I’ve 
not given much.” 
I spoke with Dr. Eric Eisenberg (University of South Florida) about what I could 
or should do for the providers at Hospital H, because he has used his work in emergency 
rooms to improve communication among providers and between providers and 
administrators (see, e.g., Eisenberg et al., 2005, 2006).  Dr. Eisenberg suggested that I 
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start by preparing a summary of my findings for Hospital H’s administrators, being 
certain to incorporate providers’ concerns and suggestions into that report.  I will 
complete and present that document during Summer 2015. 
Lastly, as Van Maanen (2011) noted, “Ethnography irrevocably influences the 
interests and lives of the people represented in them––individually and collectively, for 
better or worse” (p. 5).  I hope that this ethnography influences people for the better, but 
“there is no way of seeing, hearing, or representing the world of others that is absolutely, 
universally valid or correct” (Van Maanen, p. 35).  In conclusion, I refer to Wolcott’s 
(2010) sentiments on ethics, which I have taken to heart: 
I am not so sure that ours is an ethical line of work––in the course of finding out 
everything we want to know, we can’t help finding out things we do not want, or 
need, to know.  . . . I have told the truth.  But I have not told everything, even 
about my self.  I am silent about some things, but what I have told is true.  I am 
guided by an old proverb that reminds us that if you tell the truth you don’t have 
to try to remember what you told them the last time!  For me, that is about as 
close as I can come to defining the real lesson of ethics” (pp. 123, 124). 
 
In summary, I conducted 145 hours of participant observation and numerous 
ethnographic, informant, and respondent interviews that were shaped by sensitizing 
concepts that were derived from structuration theory, adaptive structuration theory, and 
SD theory.  Findings from my preliminary research and literature review also guided 
observations and interviews.  I administered a questionnaire, which assessed providers’ 
perceptions of emergency medicine work, EMR adoption, and career satisfaction, as well 
as measured SD and burnout.  I also analyzed several documents, including memoranda 
and training manuals, to better understand Hospital H’s EMR adoption.  To address 
validity concerns, I triangulated findings by comparing information gleaned from 
participant observation, interviews, and questionnaires.  I addressed subjectivity by 
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acknowledging ways in which my husband and key informant, Dr. C., influenced my 
perspective and preliminary research.  To limit his influence and to treat him ethically 
(providing free choice and protecting his privacy), I restricted his role in this study.  I 
behaved as ethically as I could by offering participants freedom of choice, protecting 
their privacy, shielding them from harm, and treating them with respect.   Moreover, I 
have presented the findings honestly.  Although my research has not yet benefited 
participants, I am committed to trying to improve their working conditions and their 
communication with administrators.  I now explain how the collected data were analyzed. 
Data Analysis 
Analyzing fieldnotes and other textual data involved three steps: data 
management, data reduction, and conceptual development (Lindlof & Tylor, 2011).  Data 
management involves categorizing and sorting, data reduction “means that the use value 
of evidence is prioritized according to emerging schemes of interpretation,” and 
conceptual development involves recognizing the links between themes, which become 
“more dense and elaborate” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011, p. 243) throughout the analysis 
process.  I managed the data that I gleaned from participant observations and interviews, 
first and foremost, by “identifying patterns of behavior,” which are the “precursor to 
finding themes” (Wolcott, 2010, p. 39). 
I began with open coding the data, which is “the initial, unrestricted coding” 
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2011, p. 250) of data to generate categories.  During a second round 
of open coding, I incorporated in vivo coding, which involves “coding the terms used by 
social actors to characterize their own scene” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011, p. 251).  For 
example, routinely, providers mentioned “gaming the system,” which included 
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techniques and EMR workarounds for avoiding poor metrics reports.  Sensitizing 
concepts guided the sorting process and determined inclusion or exclusion of categories 
for further analysis.  For example, I recorded many instances of food politics playing out 
in the emergency room, but those instances were excluded from analysis, because, 
although food politics are an important aspect of emergency room culture, they bear little 
relevance on EMR adoption processes.  Thus, in sorting data, I also reduced those data to 
the most salient and applicable categories from which I could derive themes. 
I used Owen’s (1984) three criteria for identifying and classifying categories and 
themes.  According to Owen, a theme emerges when there are (a) recurring descriptions, 
phrases, or utterances with the same meaning, irrespective of wording; (b) repeated use of 
the same wording; and (c) forcefulness of expression, as evidenced in vocal pitch and/or 
volume.  In reviewing my fieldnotes, interview data, and other data-collection 
procedures, I identified and refined 15 themes that were evident in talk and/or action that 
was connected to the EMR: (a) assessment, use, and/or rejection of the EMR and its 
features, including reactance; (b) interactions with or about patients; (c) orders and order 
entry; (d) chitchat and/or griping about the EMR, which supported relational growth 
and/or support; (e) EMR workaround strategies; (f) EMR avoidance strategies; (g) 
communication with or about administrators; (h) personal and/or career satisfaction; (i) 
role hierarchy in the emergency room; (j) “us” versus “them” language, with “them” 
being agents outside the emergency room, including administrators, specialists and 
consulting physicians, nurses from other departments, and IT staff; (k) EMR training 
issues, including role reversal and dissonance; (l) conflicting structures; (m) metrics and  
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surveillance; (n) providers’ diminished agency; and (o) unintended consequences.  Each 
of these themes are discussed in further detail in chapter five. 
During conceptual development, I reexamined the themes, reviewed the data 
again, and revisited the theoretical frameworks.  Some of the themes that I identified (i.e., 
g, h, k, m, and n) could be grouped together under a single theme of “structurational 
divergence”; still others (i.e., a and c) could be folded into a broader theme that 
encompassed “appropriation moves.”  According to DeSanctis and Poole (1994), an 
appropriation study should begin with a microlevel analysis of technology structures that 
emerge in everyday talk, because “it is in specific instances of discourse that the 
formation of new social structures begin” (p. 133).  A global appropriation analysis then 
follows, which examines whole conversations instead of isolated speech acts (DeSanctis 
& Poole, 1994).  Lastly, institutional-level appropriation involves a longitudinal analysis 
that identifies persistent patterns across units (e.g., day and night shift) and users (e.g., 
physicians and nurses).  I revisited the concept of “appropriation” by first reviewing my 
fieldnotes and transcriptions for recurring adjectives that were used to describe EMRs; I, 
then, looked for whole conversations about EMRs; and, finally, I linked those 
conversations to day or night shifts, and to specific user types (e.g., physicians or nurses).  
This conceptual development prompted me to recategorize and to expand the 
appropriation theme and add several subthemes.  I also regrouped, collapsed, and/or 
expanded several other themes (see Table 4.1). 
Analysis of the questionnaire data involved, primarily, tabulating frequencies and 
percentages.  Given the small sample size (N = 30), there were too few data points to 
warrant more advanced statistical analysis (e.g., analysis of variance procedures) because 
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Table 4.1 
Themes and Subthemes for Identifying Structural Changes Amid an Electronic Medical 
Records System Adoption 
a.) role reversal 
1.) Training b.) dissonance and reactance 
c.) peer-to-peer (e.g., nurse-to-nurse) 
a.) direct use (implicit or explicit) 
b.) relating the EMR to another structure (using and 
     then comparing the EMR with another structure) 
c.) constraining the EMR (how the EMR is used and 
2.) Appropriation Moves      interpreted; inlcudes asking questions about it, 
     offering advice, and commenting on its   
     performance)
d.) judging the EMR (praising or condemning) 
a.) conflicting structures 
b.) personal/career satisfaction (includes 
3.) Structurational Divergence      intention to quit and burnout) 
c.) “us” versus “them” interactions 
d.) communication with/about administrators 
e.) diminished agency/autonomy 
a.) workarounds (includes “order dumping” and 
4.) Strategies      using scribes) 
b.) avoidance 
a.) topics and frequency of talk 
5.) Communication b.) relational support/growth (includes chitchat and 
     between Providers      griping) 
a.) interactions with patients 
6.) Patients b.) patients’ perceptions/satisfaction 
a.) patients’ stories/truncated narratives 
b.) billing 
7.) Unintended Consequences c.) metrics and surveillance (includes “gaming the 
     system”) 
d.) providers’ ages and EMR use 
e.) malpractice 
f.) wage theft  
Note: The appropriation moves and subthemes are adapted from DeSanctis and Poole, 
1994. 
176 
the tests would have lacked statistical power.  Responses to the 17 SD items were  
summed.  The responses of “rarely,” “sometimes,” “moderately often,” “usually,” and 
“very frequently” were coded 1 through 5, respectively, with items 4, 7, and 17,  
appearing beneath prompt 7, reverse coded (see Appendix H).   According to Dr. 
Nicotera (personal communication, February 4, 2015), “A diagnosis of high SD is a score 
(or group’s average score) above 51.”  Responses to the burnout items (11 and 12) were 
summed as well.  The responses (“never,” “a few times a year or less,” “once a month or 
less,” “a few times a month,” “once a week,” “a few times a week,” and “daily”) were 
coded 0–6, with scores above 3 suggesting burnout (McManus et al., 2003). 
In conclusion, data analysis was an iterative process that involved sorting, 
classifying, reducing, and conceptually linking themes.  From 15 initial themes, I arrived 
at 7 major themes and several subthemes that reflected providers’ EMR systems-related 
actions and talk.  Most of the responses to the questionnaire items were tabulated and 
reported in frequencies or percentages, with responses to SD and burnout items summed.  
The results of the data analysis are presented in the next chapter.	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CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS 
This chapter presents data derived from fieldwork, in-depth interviews, document 
analysis, and the questionnaire that indicated providers experienced structural changes in 
the emergency room at Hospital H during and after portions of an electronic medical 
records system (EMR) installation.  Findings, described next, are grouped into seven 
major themes: (a) EMR training for providers; (b) providers’ appropriation moves, which 
include direct use, relating, constraining, and judging moves; (c) structurational 
divergence, which include immobilization and negative communication spirals; (d) 
providers’ strategies for coping with the EMR; (e) changes to providers’ communication 
patterns; (f) how the EMR affects provider–patient interactions and patients’ experiences; 
and (g) unintended consequences associated with the EMR. 
Electronic Medical Records System Training for Providers 
Key factors known to inhibit physicians’ learning, in general, include role-
reversal tensions arising from hierarchically imbalanced relationships; cognitive 
dissonance, which often is compounded by role-reversal tensions; and forced learning, 
which invites reactance.  My observations of physicians’ formal EMR training sessions 
and informal EMR training episodes at Hospital H were planned with these factors in 
mind.  I also observed and recorded peer-to-peer EMR training episodes that occurred 
among nurses and among midlevel providers.  The findings from those observations are 
discussed below.  First, I describe role-reversal tensions, dissonance, and reactance that 
was demonstrated in formal training sessions; next, I explore these considerations in the 
context of informal training episodes; lastly, I discuss peer-to-peer training episodes and 
implications for patient care.  
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Role-reversal Tensions, Dissonance, and Reactance in Electronic Medical Records 
Formal Training Sessions  
 
As discussed in chapter two, lasting change happens only if people regard a 
change as compatible with their other tasks and behaviors, are willing to learn a new 
process, and feel safe in the learning environment (Lewin, 1947).  Nesterkin (2013), 
however, pointed out that forced learning amid change invites reactance, defined, in 
chapter two, as the motivational state following a threat to or elimination of freedom that 
aims to restore that freedom and/or to resist the endorsed behavior (Brehm, 1966; Brehm 
& Brehm, 1981).  Reactance, typically, triggers hostile and aggressive feelings (Brehm, 
1966) and is based on the premise that individuals value choice and that threats to 
autonomy invite resistance (Nesterkin).  Forced learning “requires a certain degree of 
deviation from one’s existing preconceived ideas which is often seen as inherently 
undermining one’s autonomy” (Nesterkin, p. 573).  Moreover, in the context of EMR 
adoption in emergency rooms, “many physicians find order entry is a task better 
performed by others, reducing their motivation for learning” (Lærum et al., 2005, p. 9). 
Another factor that inhibits physicians’ willingness to learn, in general, is 
dissonance (Barley, 1985; Nambisan et al., 2013), defined, in chapter two, as “the 
existence of nonfitting relations among cognitions” (Festinger, 1957, p. 3).  Physicians’ 
lack of knowledge about how to use an EMR often leads them “to view themselves as 
novices . . . [and] the juxtaposition between concurrent roles of (medical) ‘expert’ and 
‘novice’ creates a high degree of cognitive dissonance” (Nambisan et al., 2013, p. 4).  
Reversing hierarchical structures of physician–nurse or physician–technician 
relationships during training further increases physicians’ cognitive dissonance, which, in 
turn, increases “physician resistance toward learning and sharing knowledge” (Nambisan 
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et al., 2013, p. 5).  This type of cognitive dissonance can “lead to emotional tension and 
avoidance of learning” (Robinson et al., 2003, p. 432), especially as physicians grapple 
with new technology. 
Reactance and dissonance were sensitizing concepts that shaped my observations 
of two formal training sessions at Hospital H, which I defined as planned meetings that 
occur outside of the emergency room between medical providers and designated trainers 
for the purpose of EMR and/or computerized physician order entry (CPOE) system 
education.  Early in the EMR adoption process, formal training sessions were mandatory 
for physicians, which, predictably, triggered reactance.  Moreover, physicians were not 
paid for the many 2–3-hour sessions that they attended, which further exacerbated their 
frustrations.  Even more infuriating, from the perspective of many physicians, were 
ongoing EMR upgrades, which meant that lessons learned in prior training sessions were 
not applicable to new and evolving EMR features. 
In June 2014, Hospital H’s chief executive officer (CEO) sent an e-mail to all of 
the physicians that acknowledged their frustrations with the EMR adoption process.  
Reading the e-mail aloud, Dr. C said, “Administration understands implementation of the 
McKesson EMR did not go as smoothly as expected, and recent experience has been less 
than gratifying; however, the administrative team has been working to fix it and we are 
ready to relaunch.”  The relaunch would require additional mandatory training.  Dr. C 
continued reading aloud, “Physicians must complete training prior to June 30 and, while 
we recognize the burden of another training event, we want to assure you of the necessity 
and usefulness of this training program.”  Two 2-hour sessions, which would be led by a 
former McKesson Corporation employee, were compulsory for all physicians and 
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midlevel providers.  As Dr. C lamented, “I have 3 days off for the rest of the month and I 
have to spend two of them at the hospital, not getting paid, so I can learn how to use a 
piece of crap EMR that doesn’t work.”  His reaction to the decree suggested that the 
formal training session would elicit reactance from providers. 
I observed the formal EMR training sessions attended by Dr. C the following 
week.  The trainer, PJ, showed up in surgical scrubs despite having no medical 
background––she had been a computer programmer with McKesson and, later, she joined 
Hospital H’s information technology (IT) department.  Dr. C regarded her attire with 
suspicion and asked her where she had completed her medical training.  PJ did not 
respond and, instead, opened the session by stating, “McKesson will make changes [to 
the EMR] if patient safety is impacted, but they [sic] typically don’t prioritize user-
friendly suggestions.”  Dr. C’s response was curt, “Well, okay then, so you’re saying 
keep my opinions to myself.  My opinions and experience don’t count?” 
Later, as Dr. C sat in front of the EMR, he clicked through a series of boxes and 
commented that the multiple “confirm” screens following each medication order that he 
entered into the CPOE slowed charting.  PJ said, in response to Dr. C’s comment, “It [the 
confirm screen] helps you make better clinical decisions.  It makes you think about what 
you just ordered and if it was the right decision.”  Dr. C’s response was the first example 
of dissonance that I observed in the session (which I confirmed when he reported, in a 
think-aloud session that followed the training, feeling both anger and frustration).  He 
turned to PJ and asked, “Did the computer go to medical school?  What about the 
computer programmer who designed it; did that person go to medical school?”  PJ did not 
acknowledge his statements but, instead, redirected the conversation to another topic. 
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Throughout the 2-hour training session, there were several terse exchanges in 
which Dr. C verbalized his frustrations with the EMR, with PJ, largely, ignoring or 
negating his observations.  For example, when Dr. C asked if the EMR could be modified 
to allow more space for free text to type detailed accounts of patients’ complaints and 
symptoms, PJ responded, “We don’t like free text because it’s hard for the system to 
recognize it.  Try to select from the checkboxes because they’ve been coded and already 
are in the database.”  Dr. C replied, “So stick with check boxes because it’s easier for the 
billing department?”  He paused, and then continued, “What about what’s easier for the 
physician?”  PJ, who looked exacerbated at that point, sighed and retorted, “Look, every 
part of our documentation system is moving toward electronic.  It will happen.”  Dr. C 
replied, “I hope I’m not working here when it does.  These things [EMRs] are not ready 
for prime time and it impacts patient care.” 
In addition to dissonance, physicians’ reactance also was evident throughout the 
session.  As described in chapter two, psychological reactance theory (Brehm, 1966) 
proposes relationships among freedoms, threats, reactance, and (attempted) restoration of 
freedoms.  Direct restoration involves performing the forbidden act (in this case, using 
paper charts), but freedom may be restored, symbolically, by increasing liking for the 
forbidden choice, by disparaging the source of the threat, or by exercising other freedoms 
to maximize feelings of control (Quick et al., 2013).  Dr. C expressed repeatedly his 
preference for paper charts with statements such as, “Paper is so much faster,” “I can find 
everything in one chart, instead of clicking through a bunch of screens,” and “Paper 
charts have room to write, not just a bunch of check boxes.”  Reactance and symbolic  
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restoration of freedoms are described later in more detail (see the discussion on 
structurational divergence and loss of autonomy). 
After the training session came to an uneasy end, I asked Dr. C about his 
exchanges with PJ.  He acknowledged that he was angry at being forced to sit through 
another training session for which he was not paid.  Moreover, he was upset that his 
concerns were either minimized or ignored.  As Dr. C elaborated: 
I don’t know anything about this woman.  She wears scrubs, but she’s obviously 
not a physician.  She hasn’t practiced medicine.  She had no idea what I was 
talking about in terms of patient care issues.  I didn’t mean to seem like a jerk but 
she doesn’t understand the repercussions.  She just keeps saying, “We’re going 
electronic,” but what she showed me today isn’t ready.  I can’t function in a busy 
emergency room with a system that slows me down and can lead to mistakes.  It 
pisses me off that they make us use these stupid EMRs instead of TSheets.  If I 
was a jerk, then I’m sorry, but no one seems to be listening to us, the end users. 
 
Dr. C’s description of the encounter contains allusions to role-reversal tensions, 
dissonance, and reactance.  The trainer’s nonmedical background meant that, in Dr. C’s 
estimation, she should have deferred to his acumen on matters pertaining to patients’ 
safety.  Instead, as he implied, she directed the exchange and disregarded his status as a 
medical expert by insisting that “we’re going electronic,” which triggered Dr. C’s anger, 
annoyance, and frustration (i.e., dissonance).  Dr. C’s reference to forced adoption was 
followed by his stated preference for paper charts (which demonstrated a symbolic 
restoration of freedom).  
Because dissonance and reactance can hinder learning, as noted above, I asked 
Dr. C if he learned anything about the EMR during his training session.  He said, “No, 
not really.  It might save me a few clicks, but I don’t think I learned anything new today.”  
I asked four other physicians what they learned after their respective training sessions, 
and all of them said, more or less, “Nothing new.”  All of them commented that the EMR 
	   183 
training would have been more productive had they been given user manuals or handouts.  
I asked if they would have preferred handouts in lieu of their mandatory sessions with PJ, 
to which three responded, “Yeah.”  I asked several physicians if they, like Dr. C, found 
their training sessions with PJ difficult, and the consensus was that their sessions, largely, 
were unproductive.  I scheduled an interview with PJ to discuss her thoughts on the 
physicians’ training sessions, but she later canceled the interview and did not respond to 
subsequent e-mailed requests. 
A second trainer I later observed, K, did consent to a follow-up EMR training 
interview in March 2015.  During that interview, K confessed that training physicians 
was difficult, particularly if they regarded her as an outsider; consequently, she made a 
point of highlighting her past work as a physical and occupational therapist.  “I know 
that’s not the same as being a doctor or nurse,” she explained, “but I’m not a complete 
outsider either.  I’ve done charting, so I know what it’s like.”  Nonetheless, she admitted 
that some of the physicians at Hospital H were difficult to deal with, and she attributed 
their frustrations to the forced adoption.  As K elaborated: 
They’re being made to learn something that’s very different.  There are different 
cognitive processes involved [than when using paper charts], and that means it’s 
going to be a strain for the physicians for a while.  We have to honor that, let them 
complain, and blow off steam.  It’s natural, but some trainers take it personally 
and get nasty right back.   
 
I asked if she was referring to PJ, whose reaction to Dr. C’s criticism of the EMR, in my 
opinion, bordered on “nasty.”  K shrugged and said: 
I’m just saying you can’t do that.  You can’t disrespect them [physicians].  Give 
them their space and let them gripe.  They need to vent.  If I nod and listen to their 
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K’s strategy seemed to produce better results than did PJ’s approach.  Following Dr. C’s 
session with K, I asked him to describe it, and he said, “I liked her.  She wrote down 
some of my suggestions.  I have more confidence that it [the EMR] will get improved.”  I 
asked if he learned anything new, and he replied, “Yeah, I did learn some new things.  I 
learned some shortcuts that should help save time when I’m charting.” 
Whereas K was forthcoming, PJ declined to discuss her experiences, but I 
learned, secondhand, how PJ felt about training physicians.  In a phone interview that I 
conducted in October 2014 with SR, the head of the IT department, he explained that PJ 
was “beyond frustrated” with the physicians.  I asked SR if role-reversal tensions affected 
the training, and he lamented that the hierarchical imbalance was problematic.  He 
blamed physicians, stating, “Opportunities have been available in a controlled 
environment, but they’ve been rebuffed.”  When I asked him to elaborate, he shared the 
following story: 
PJ has a set curriculum, one-on-one training, but it was optional training and the 
ED [emergency department] staff was resistant to commit to the additional time 
needed for training.  Trust me, they [sic] need the training.  For example, some 
CPOE items are not being signed off by the physicians.  They need to 
acknowledge certain medication orders and click the boxes, but they’re not doing 
it.  The physicians think they know it all and they don’t want training from an 
outsider.  They wouldn’t come to us, so PJ ended up going to the ED, which is not 
a neutral space, because there are lots of distractions.  She tried to do training, but 
the doc didn’t want to engage her.  He left and went to the cafeteria.  He didn’t 
have the respect to come back and finish the training. 
 
I pointed out that training was mandatory, not optional, as SR indicated, and I noted that I 
observed two training sessions and interviewed several physicians who had attended one-
on-one sessions, to which he replied, “I don’t know who has done what and with whom.  
There’s no consistency with the providers.”  I wrote in my notes, “His reply suggests  
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there is no consistency among administrators either, certainly not with respect to 
communication, especially if he doesn’t know the CEO mandated training.” 
I asked the emergency room director, Dr. F, and my sponsor, Q, about SR’s story.  
Dr. F was not aware of the incident that SR described but he shared his experience of an 
impromptu training session: 
I’m here one morning and the place is hopping; we have two chest pains and 
another on the way.  PJ shows up, unannounced, and says, “I’m here for your 
training.”  Are you kidding me?  I’m treating patients.  I don’t have time for this.  
No heads up, nothing. 
Q noted that she and Dr. F had twice scheduled formal training sessions for 
nurses, only to have training canceled at the last minute, without explanation, by IT staff.  
Additionally, Q was adamant that she would not schedule additional training sessions 
until all of the remaining EMR components (e.g., the generic, electronic TSheets) were 
developed fully and ready for launch, saying: 
I’m not going to schedule any more training until they bring us all of the TSheets; 
otherwise, it’s a waste of time to schedule physicians and nurses to show up, and 
there’s nothing to show them.  I scheduled training last December, but we had to 
cancel because IT [staff members] didn’t have anything ready.  They didn’t have 
a single TSheet. 
Q noted that she and the nursing staff actually had coordinated most of the EMR and 
CPOE training, informally, for themselves.  As she said, “We taught ourselves how to use 
it.  We went over it together, figured out how to use it, and we did it without 
administration getting involved.”  Informal training episodes, such as those described by 
Q, are discussed next. 
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Role-reversal Tensions, Dissonance, and Reactance in Electronic Medical Records 
Informal Training Episodes  
 
I defined an informal EMR training episode as any situation that occurs in the 
emergency room when a provider (typically, a physician) solicits or receives help using 
the EMR or CPOE from another provider; typically, a nurse or mid-level provider 
(special consideration is given in the next section to training episodes between 
hierarchically matched providers).  As discussed in chapter two, because physicians, 
generally, “do not want to spend time learning new computer systems” (Brooks & Grotz, 
2010, p. 81), nurses, midlevel providers, and/or technicians are trained to use EMRs and 
then tasked with training physicians.  Although this approach reverses the hierarchical 
structure of providers’ relationships, it is not without problems but, as described above, 
the tactic remains commonplace.  In an e-mail exchange with one of Hospital H’s vice 
presidents, she explained that Hospital H’s approach to training and support included 
reliance on super-users, defined as designated nurses and midlevel provides with 
advanced training on EMR and CPOE features who have been appointed to facilitate 
physicians’ proper utilization of the technology.  Super-users are supposed to be available 
to answer questions, assist with order entry, and troubleshoot. 
Nurse B, one of my key informants, explained that the super-user designation at 
Hospital H was confusing because no two super-users were skilled equally in using the 
EMR’s various components.  For example, nurses’ notes and the CPOE were separate 
programs, and, eventually, the electronic TSheet would represent a third program, and 
none of the super-users could navigate expertly all three facets of the EMR.  Furthermore, 
because many physicians had no way of differentiating among the super-users, physicians  
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tended to direct their inquiries to whoever was closest physically.  B, who is not a super-
user, recalled being asked repeatedly by a physician for help using the CPOE:  
I just kept saying, “I don’t know how to use the CPOE,” but the doc got frustrated 
because he was having trouble putting in an order.  Finally, a midlevel helped him 
out.  It puts us [nurses] in an awkward position, because we don’t have to use the 
CPOE to do our jobs, so why would we know how to use it? 
 
Recognizing that super-user variability was a problem, an administrator decided 
that all of the nurses should receive special training on how to use the electronic TSheets 
to facilitate electronic TSheet implementation by assisting physicians during the 
transition.  B complained that although nurses would not use the TSheets to document 
patient care, they would be required to sit through additional training nonetheless.8  
Several nurses remarked that they were dreading the additional stress of training 
physicians.  I asked if their reticence was because they anticipated role-reversal tensions, 
which, as described above, often elicit physicians’ dissonance and reactance.  One of the 
nurses replied, “It’ll be more work for us, but we won’t get paid more to do it.  It adds to 
our job stress.”  Another nurse, A, remarked, “I’m not comfortable telling the docs what 
to do.  They’re [physicians] fine; they’ve never been mean about it, but I just don’t want 
to be in that position.” 
Nurse A’s admission prompted me to review my fieldnotes.  I had recorded 
dozens of informal EMR training episodes between physicians and super-users, and I had 
described repeatedly those episodes as “friendly exchanges between coworkers.”  Think-
aloud sessions conducted with physicians that followed these episodes had not produced 
evidence of dissonance (e.g., fear, anger, unease, discomfort, annoyance, or frustration).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8The training was delayed several times, and, as of May 2015, training had not been 
rescheduled. 
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Most physicians were very forthcoming about their inability to navigate the EMR, and 
they asked for help gladly.  Although many physicians expressed reactance in these 
episodes—namely, by expressing their preference for the forbidden choice (i.e., paper 
charts)—their hostility was not directed at the super-users who assisted them; more often 
than not, physicians and super-users cursed the EMR together.  I asked Dr. C why he 
believed that role-reversal considerations and dissonance did not appear to be factors in 
informal training episodes, and he explained, “These guys are my coworkers; we all sink 
or swim together.  The trainers, I don’t know them from Adam, and they could care less 
if I sink.” 
I had not considered previously that nurses and midlevel providers would 
experience role-reversal tensions during EMR training episodes, let alone dissonance, but 
I began soliciting think-aloud statements from them following such episodes.  N, a 
midlevel provider, said, “I have some angst about being a super-user, whatever that 
means.  I know the system better than they [physicians] do, but, at the same time, I’m not 
on par with them.  It’s awkward.”  Another midlevel provider later echoed N’s assertion: 
It really changes the dynamic of the relationship, and I’m not sure I’m 
comfortable with it.  I’m not trying to one up the doc but here’s this guy who 
knows way more than me and I’m the one telling him what to do?  I don’t want 
the doc thinking that I think I’m better or know more than him. 
 
I asked nurses and midlevel providers how they interpreted physicians’ behavior 
and comments during informal training episodes.  With the exception of two physicians, 
who, as nurses described them, were “hierarchically minded,” most physicians were 
polite and expressed their appreciation for the help that nurses offered.  Nonetheless, no 
one with whom I spoke welcomed the prospect of being designated a super-user.   
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Peer-to-peer training issues.  Among the designated super-users, several nurses 
expressed their frustrations at having to engage in peer-to-peer EMR training episodes, 
defined as hierarchically matched informal EMR training episodes that occur in the 
emergency room among nurses or among midlevel providers.  Nurse super-users 
complained that they often were tasked with training temporary nurses who were called 
in to cover staffing shortages.  Although many of these temporary nurses “worked the 
floor” at Hospital H (i.e., the intensive care unit), the EMR interface that they were 
accustomed to using was very different from the version that was used in the emergency 
room.  One of the super-users I observed, M, spent more than 30 minutes helping an 
“upstairs nurse” to insert a battery into the computer-on-wheels (COW), boot up the 
system, and then sign onto the EMR.  He remarked, “They send these nurses down who 
have no idea what to do, no training, nothing.  It’s up to me.  This just takes time away 
from me being able to see patients.” 
Nurses bemoaning time spent training others instead of engaging in direct patient 
care also was a recurring theme.  M explained that new users who arrived in the 
emergency room did not solve staffing shortages but, instead, intensified them: 
Say we’re short a nurse and the floor sends someone down.  If that person hasn’t 
used our EMR before, I have to show her everything.  Guess what?  That means 
that instead of an extra nurse, you’re actually down by two.  I’m teaching the new 
nurse and neither one of us is seeing patients.  That leaves 2 nurses to cover 20 
beds, which is a nightmare.  Without that extra help [the floor nurse], we’d at least 
have three nurses working. 
 
Situations such as the one that M described have far-reaching consequences: patients do 
not receive medications in a timely fashion; procedures that require nurses’ assistance, 
such as suturing lacerations or performing pelvic exams, are delayed; and metrics that 
track patients’ lengths of stay go up, causing providers’ performance reviews to go down. 
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Group affiliation (i.e., floor nurses vs. emergency room nurses) appeared to 
influence nurses’ perceptions of peer-to-peer EMR training episodes.  Compared to 
emergency room nurses, upstairs or floor nurses enjoy lower nurse–patient ratios and 
they care for patients who, generally, are more stable medically (Eisenberg et al., 2005).  
Additionally, floor nurses often grapple with the emergency room staff during patient 
admissions (Eisenberg et al., 2005; Nicotera et al., 2010).  The perceived imbalance in 
workloads and floor nurses’ tendency to resist patient admissions leads many emergency 
room nurses to regard floor nurses with disdain (Eisenberg et al., 2005).  M alluded to 
this perception that floor nurses are not well liked by emergency room staff when he said, 
“I don’t mind helping my crew but the upstairs nurses get on my nerves.”  Nurse J echoed 
M’s assertions, saying that floor nurses “just show up and expect us to stop what we’re 
doing and do everything for them.  It’s ridiculous.  Now, if you’re new and you’re ER, 
that’s different.  We take care of our own.”  Floor nurses, thus, are cast as “them” in a 
continual “us” versus “them” divide (see the discussion later on structurational 
divergence). 
Peer-to-peer EMR training between midlevel providers, generally, was more 
pleasant than exchanges that I witnessed between emergency room nurses and floor 
nurses.  Because only midlevel providers work in the emergency room, “us” versus 
“them” dynamics were not an issue.  Along with their nurse coworkers, midlevel 
providers expressed concern that time spent teaching one another to use the EMR was 
time taken away from patients.  They cited frequent EMR updates for necessitating 
regular peer-to-peer training.  As N explained:  
Every time they do an update, all of our templates get wiped out.  Someone has to 
go back in and set them up again, but not everyone knows how to set up a 
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favorites list or set up shortcuts.  I’m happy to help out and teach people, but it 
takes time and the patients wait longer.  In a lot of ways, it’s wasted time, because 
the hospital’s not making money if I’m not seeing patients. 
 
I observed N show another midlevel provider how to alphabetize the list of medication 
orders: N spent 16 minutes completing that task and another 5 minutes explaining how he 
had done it, 21 minutes that could have been spent providing patient care but, instead, 
was wasted time (because it was unbillable). 
Peer-to-peer training, despite its shortcomings, was necessary because there were 
not enough trainers to train and support emergency room users adequately on an ongoing 
basis.  Moreover, Hospital H’s trainers were not well regarded by the emergency room 
staff, and forced learning scenarios, likely, would have generated reactance akin to what 
physicians experienced in their formal training sessions.  Nurses bemoaned regularly the 
mandatory electronic TSheet training, complained that it would prove “a pointless waste 
of time,” and they rejoiced when it was postponed indefinitely. 
As described previously, Q praised the emergency room staff members for 
teaching themselves how to use the EMR “without administration getting involved,” but 
IT staff members found fault with emergency room staff members’ approach.  The trainer 
I interviewed, K, informed me that many of the nurses and midlevel providers were not 
using EMR features correctly: 
Bad habits were passed from one person to the next, and, now, no one is using the 
system the way it was intended.  Basically, no one voiced any concerns or issues, 
no one asked questions.  I could have addressed some of the problems they were 
encountering, which were tied to user error and were not necessarily flaws with 
the system, but now it’s too late.  They’ve already formed habits. 
 
According to K, the staff’s maladaptive training strategies complicated ordering 
procedures, compromised efficient charting, and eroded users’ satisfaction with the EMR. 
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In sum, formal EMR training sessions, as expected, triggered dissonance and 
reactance in physicians.  Hierarchically imbalanced relationships exacerbated role-
reversal tensions for physicians during formal training sessions, but not during informal 
training episodes.  Instead, nurses and midlevel providers reported that they experienced 
feelings associated with dissonance (e.g., unease and discomfort) when they trained 
physicians in the emergency room.  Peer-to-peer training delayed patient care and 
aggravated tensions between emergency room nurses and floor nurses.  Additionally, 
poor practice habits were passed on in peer-to-peer sessions, which diminished users’ 
satisfaction with many of the EMR’s features.  Next, I describe findings associated with 
EMR users’ appropriation moves. 
Appropriation Moves 
According to DeSanctis and Poole (1994), appropriation moves describe the 
interplay between technology structures and action (i.e., how people use technology).  As 
explained in chapter three, adaptive structuration theory (AST) identifies four 
appropriation moves: agents may choose to (a) directly use the technology, (b) relate the 
technology’s structure to other structures in the environment (e.g., make conceptual 
linkages between an EMR and other tasks, or compare it with other structures), (c) 
constrain or interpret the technology while it is in use, and/or (d) make judgments about 
the technology (e.g., praising or condemning its performance).  Appropriation moves can 
vary across groups as a function of users’ attitudes: users may be confident in the 
technology’s abilities, they may doubt its usefulness, or they may believe that they lack 
the necessary skills to use it effectively (DeSanctis & Poole). 
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An appropriation study, according to DeSanctis and Poole (1994), should begin 
with a microlevel analysis of technology structures that emerge in everyday talk (e.g., 
recurring words or phrases describing the technology), followed by a global appropriation 
analysis of whole conversations, and conclude with an institutional-level, longitudinal 
analysis of patterns across units (e.g., day and night shift) and users (e.g., physicians and 
nurses).  As described in chapter four, I reviewed the data for recurring words and 
phrases that providers used to describe the EMR; I studied whole conversations about the 
EMR; and, lastly, I linked those conversations to day or night shifts, and to specific user 
types.  Below, I present findings from each phase of analysis.  I begin by sharing briefly 
the microanalysis results, and, then, I focus on the global and institutional analyses for 
each of the four appropriation moves (i.e., direct use, relating, constraining, and judging). 
Microanalysis 
DeSanctis and Poole (1994) argued that “written or spoken discussion about the 
technology is particularly important since this is evidence of people bringing the 
technology into the social context” (p. 133).  Studying the process of technology 
introduction begins with a microanalysis, which “examines the appropriation of 
technology structures as it occurs in sentences, turns of speech, or other specific speech 
acts” (DeSanctis & Poole, p. 133).  As a participant observer at Hospital H, I produced 
162 pages of fieldnotes that contained references to over 500 exchanges about the EMR.  
During data analysis, I compiled a list of the 12 most common words and phrases that 
providers used to describe the EMR.  “Frustrating” appeared most often, followed by 
“slow,” “hard to use,” and “difficult.”  Using the list of recurring words and phrases (see 
Table 5.1), and “as a method of showing an innovative way to textually analyze data”  
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Table 5.1            
 
Microanalysis of Providers’ Talk: The 12 Words and Phrases Used Most Frequently to 
Describe the Electronic Medical Records System 
             
 
                     Word or Phrase         No. of Occurrences        
             
   
  Frustrating     450 
  Slow      307 
  Hard to use     267 
  Difficult     250 
  Confusing     212 
  Not user-friendly    201 
  I hate them!     167 
  Waste of money    80 
  Patients don’t like them   72 
  Okay      68 
  They’re better than paper charts  52 
  Have potential     47 
             
 
(Tracy & Geist-Martin, 2014, p. 255), I developed a word cloud to highlight the 
comparative dominance of each word or phrase (see Figure 5.1), with the size of the font 
paralleling the number of times that the word or phrase appeared. 
As discussed in chapter two, how people talk about an innovation or new 
technology influences its adoption (Leonardi, 2009; Vishwanath, 2009).  My 
microanalysis of providers’ speech acts at Hospital H revealed that talk about the EMR, 
largely, was negative.  Of the 12 most common words or phrases that were used to 
describe the EMR, 9 were negative, 2 were neutral (“Okay” and “Have potential”), and  















Figure 5.1.  Word Cloud Illustrating the Words and Phrases Used Most by Providers to 
Describe the Electronic Medical Record System 
 
 
only a single phrase (“They’re better than paper charts”) was positive.  Most of the 
neutral and positive comments were made by nurses, which is in line with research 
showing that nurses, compared to physicians, generally, have been more accepting of 
EMRs (Lærum et al., 2004; Likourezos et al., 2004, Otieno et al., 2007; Weiner et al., 
1999).  Overall, though, providers’ attitudes about the EMR, reflected in the words and 
phrases that they used to describe it, were negative. 
Noor et al. (2012) cautioned that the most “important step towards implementing 
[technology] adoption is to change the psyche of a user from ‘reluctant’ to ‘willing’” (p. 
19); however, the results of my microanalysis suggest that users at Hospital H, generally, 
were “reluctant” and, thus, not willing to embrace the EMR.  Although the microanalysis 
examined only isolated speech acts, global and institutional analyses explored whole 
conversations, and over an 18-month period, the results suggest that the majority of  
providers remained reluctant about the EMR throughout the entirety of the study.  Next, I 
describe the global and institutional analyses of each of the four appropriation moves. 
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Global and Institutional Analyses of Direct Use 
DeSanctis and Poole (1994) described scenarios in which would-be users could 
choose to interact with or ignore new technologies.  Under such conditions, individuals 
who choose to use a new technology do so through direct use, which, according to 
DeSanctis and Poole, is either implicit (i.e., agents use the technology but do not refer to 
it) or explicit (i.e., agents use and refer to the technology).  Expanding the definition of 
explicit use, it is technology use accompanied by neutral commentary that references or 
describes the technology in action (DeSanctis & Poole).  Additionally, explicit use does 
not compare or relate the technology to other structures.  Negatively framed talk that 
disparages the technology and, simultaneously, compares it to another structure (e.g., 
“Paper charts are better than poorly designed EMRs”) would not be considered explicit 
use but, instead, would be considered a constraining move, whereas condemnation 
without comparison (e.g., “EMRs are a waste of money”) would be classified as a 
judging move. 
Given these parameters, and because the EMR adoption at Hospital H was forced 
(i.e., providers could not ignore the EMR), I did not record instances of freely chosen 
direct use; nearly all of the appropriation moves that I documented were relating, 
constraining, or judging moves.  Moreover, neutral commentary was rare.  Nonetheless, 
examples of what would be considered implicit use or explicit use in other contexts (i.e., 
situations where providers could choose to use or ignore an EMR, respectively) merit 
mention. 
What would be considered implicit use in free-choice scenarios was observed 
during all of my visits to Hospital H.  Day shifts (from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m.) produced more 
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examples of implicit use when compared with night shifts, because patient volumes, 
generally, peaked during day shift hours, which meant that providers who worked during 
day shifts often were too occupied with tasks to refer to or discuss the EMR.  The EMR’s 
introduction, ironically, compounded providers’ workloads, further reducing their 
available time for discussion or commentary (see the section below on communication 
between providers).  Implicit use, typically, consisted of a provider sitting at an EMR or 
standing at a COW, clicking a computer mouse, and typing on a keyboard.  Nurses used 
an additional component, a scanner, to scan and record barcoded medication labels and 
patients’ barcoded wristbands. 
Examples of what would be considered explicit use in free-choice scenarios were 
recorded across both day and night shifts; however, it was more common at night.  
Explicit use was observed among all user types (i.e., physicians, midlevel providers, and 
nurses).  Commentary included phrases such as, “The EMR’s flashing; that must mean 
labs [laboratory test results] are back,” “The [electronic] whiteboard just updated the 
patient list,” and “New medication orders are highlighted in red.”  Despite these 
examples, explicit use was uncommon.  Discussions that compared the EMR with other 
structures (i.e., relating) or commented on its performance (e.g., constraining or judging) 
were more common.  
To review, examples of what would have been implicit use in free-choice 
scenarios were commonplace, especially during day shifts when providers were too busy 
for conversation.  Examples of what would have been explicit use in free-choice 
scenarios occurred frequently at night.  Because the EMR adoption was forced, evidence  
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of direct use was limited compared with examples of relating, constraining, and judging 
moves, which are described in the following sections. 
Global and Institutional Analyses of Relating Moves 
Relating a new technology to other structures is a measure of how well that 
technology has been integrated into the system.  Providers at Hospital H related the EMR 
to other structures in two ways: first, by using the EMR in conjunction with other 
structures; and, second, by comparing the EMR with other structures and then discussing 
the comparison.  I observed the first mode of relating when providers used the EMR 
frequently in conjunction with paper charts.  During each of my visits, physicians and 
midlevel providers combined paper TSheets and paper order sets with the EMR and 
CPOE to complete documentation tasks and to admit or discharge patients.  Nurses often 
reviewed physicians’ completed TSheets for information that they then used to augment 
their electronic notes.  Providers also used the EMR in combination with the X-ray 
display system, the medication-dispensing system, printers, and fax machines.  The EMR, 
as evidenced by these examples of relating, appeared well integrated into Hospital H’s 
emergency room operations; however, the EMR was not well liked, which affected my 
observations of the second mode of relating. 
The second mode of relating involves comparing a new technology with another 
structure and then discussing the comparison using neutral phrases (DeSanctis & Poole, 
1994), fact-based phrases that do not convey judgment or attribute value to the EMR.  
For example, “The EMR produces the same amount of paper as do paper-based charting 
systems,” conveys a fact and does not impart judgment.  Given that many of Hospital H’s 
providers disliked the EMR (57% of respondents who completed the questionnaire 
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reported being dissatisfied with it), and given that my microanalysis of providers’ speech 
acts revealed that the nine most common words used to describe the EMR were negative, 
neutral phrases about the EMR were infrequent. 
Despite providers’ negative talk about their EMR, there were enough occurrences 
of providers comparing the EMR with other structures and then discussing the 
comparison, in neutral terms, for themes to emerge.  Reviewing my fieldnotes for 
evidence of relating revealed four themes that characterized providers’ talk about the 
EMR: (a) how the EMR changed their workflow patterns (e.g., how much time it took 
providers to complete charting, duplication of work, and perceived cognitive disruptions 
to task management), (b) the completeness of (or amount of data in) the medical record, 
(c) the EMR’s spirit (i.e., the EMR’s design and features), and (d) the EMR’s 
performance.  Findings for each theme are reported below. 
Workflow changes.  As discussed in chapter two, EMRs change how work is 
done in emergency rooms.  For instance, Park et al. (2012) observed a four- to fivefold 
increase in documentation time after an EMR installation.  Because the transition from 
paper-based charting to an all-electronic system for the physicians at Hospital H was 
postponed and, later, stalled, I was unable to measure changes in documentation time 
with exact precision, but providers’ comments suggested that documentation time 
increased.  For instance, the nurses, who had transitioned from paper charts to the EMR 
in April 2013, often remarked that documentation took longer.  As Nurse B explained, 
“Triage with paper usually took about 5 minutes; with the EMR, it takes 15 minutes.”  
Midlevel providers made similar comments about the EMR’s CPOE component; as N 
observed, “Versus paper order sets, the CPOE takes longer.” 
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In addition to lengthened documentation time, EMRs affected workflow in other 
ways.  For example, Park et al. (2012) observed that prior to an EMR installation, 
physicians completed their documentation tasks during or immediately after seeing each 
patient, but after the EMR was installed, physicians began seeing several patients before 
retreating to the charting room and then entering all of the patients’ data into their 
respective electronic records.  Park el al. also found that physicians recorded important 
information on scraps of paper that they later referred to when they updated patients’ 
electronic health records.  This EMR-induced change to workflow patterns resulted in 
duplication of work, with physicians documenting care twice: first on paper and then later 
on the EMR. 
I observed similar changes at Hospital H.  For instance, as Nurse L explained: 
 
Bringing the COW into the patient room isn’t feasible because the physician is 
performing a procedure in the room, or I have to see several patients in a row and 
pushing the COW around from room to room is a hassle, [so] I take an old 
nursing note in and write everything down, so I don’t have to try and remember 
things like vitals.  I have to put it in the EMR later, so, I suppose, I’m doing the 
work twice. 
 
 Dr. G, an older physician who worked day shifts at Hospital H, approached order-
entry tasks by first writing medication orders for several patients at once, and then typing 
the orders into the CPOE.  He conceded that the practice doubled his workload: “I still 
write orders using the old order sets, because that’s how my mind works; then I go to the 
CPOE.  Doing it that way means doing it twice.” 
Dr. G’s comment also referenced perceived disruptions to cognitive processes.  K, 
the EMR trainer, acknowledged the perceived disruption, saying, “There are different 
cognitive processes involved . . . [because EMR’s] do not trigger the same mental 
processes as paper charts.”  Several physicians explained that paper TSheets organized 
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how they approached patient care.  As Dr. F, the emergency room medical director, 
explained: 
The paper sheet is laid out with everything visible to you all at once, and so it 
reminds you to do the ROS [review of systems], for example.  With the computer, 
you don’t see the prompt, so, maybe, you’re not thinking, “Oh, there’s the ROS 
box; I need to do that.”  It’s a different mental approach.  You have to adjust how 
you think about practicing medicine. 
Dr. O, a young physician who recently had completed her residency training, described 
having experienced a similar shift in her cognitive processes: 
I think because the electronic chart is zoomed into small sections, it forces you to 
think differently.  The cues and reminders that you had on paper charts aren’t 
visible.  You’re not seeing the whole thing on the EMR, so it changes the thought 
process.  I find that I think differently on paper and on the EMR. 
In sum, many providers at Hospital H reported that they experienced workflow 
changes after the EMR was installed.  I recorded references to four workflow changes.  
First, providers believed that documenting healthcare took longer.  Second, providers 
began seeing several patients before documenting the care that each patient had received, 
whereas before the EMR was installed, most documentation was completed at each 
patient’s bedside.  Third, because documentation took place often after––not during––
patients’ examinations, some providers reported taking notes to facilitate their recall of 
patients’ data, but this practice resulted in additional work.  Fourth, some providers 
believed that the EMR changed how they processed cognitive tasks associated with 
practicing emergency medicine.  Next, I describe providers’ beliefs about the contents of 
electronic health records and ramifications for healthcare delivery. 
Perceived completeness of the medical record.  The amount of information 
contained in the electronic health record affected how providers at Hospital H thought 
about patient care.  Many providers acknowledged that there was a difference between 
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paper charts and the EMR.  N, a midlevel provider, said, “There’s less information in the 
electronic chart.”  When I asked him to elaborate, he explained: 
It isn’t necessarily better or worse but it changes how I might approach a patient.  
If I see something in the chart from a past visit, it might make me think differently 
or consider a different diagnosis.  If I don’t have that information, then I might 
order different tests or more tests.  Generally, I find the paper charts have more 
information. 
 
Other providers noted that, when compared with paper charts, there was more 
information in the electronic record.  As Nurse L commented: 
There’s a lot of data in here.  The EMR has a good bit, from past labs [laboratory 
test results] to medication orders.  I think there’s more here than in the paper 
charts, at least on the nursing side.  It may be different for the docs.  Having more 
information lets me know what to look out for and how I might approach 
managing certain patients. 
 
In addition to the perceived volume of data contained in electronic records varying 
according to user type, the EMR’s spirit, described next, also was a factor that many 
providers referenced when they discussed the relative completeness of the medical chart. 
Spirit.  DeSanctis and Poole (1994) defined spirit as the intention behind a 
technology.  As discussed in chapter four, well-designed technologies have a coherent 
spirit; an incoherent spirit exerts weaker influence over people and “may send 
contradictory signals, making use of the system more difficult” (DeSanctis & Poole, p. 
127).  An EMR’s spirit can be analyzed by examining its design metaphor (e.g., whether 
its interface resembles a paper medical chart or an accounting spreadsheet), the 
presentation and labeling of its features, training or support materials that accompany it, 
and its usability. 
Providers at Hospital H compared regularly the EMR’s spirit (i.e., its design and 
features) with paper charts.  Most comments had to do with checkbox-based charting 
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versus free-text charting; examples included phrases such as, “There’s more space to 
write on paper” and “The EMR is more clicking boxes versus writing.”  Many 
providers—namely, physicians and midlevel providers—attributed the perceived shortage 
of information in the electronic record to the EMR’s checkbox-based design.  Other 
providers compared the EMR’s interface with a spreadsheet.  A nurse super-user 
commented, “It looks like an Excel spreadsheet.”  N echoed that assertion, adding, “It has 
to look like a spreadsheet because it’s designed to go to the billing department.  The 
checkboxes correspond to billing codes.”  Comparing paper charts with EMRs also led, 
inevitably, as described below, to discussions about the EMR’s performance. 
Performance.  Neutral observations about the EMR’s performance were rare, but 
among the few that I recorded, providers’ comments had to do with the dependability of 
technology structures (e.g., the EMR’s performance during power outages or system 
upgrades), potential threats posed by computer viruses, and the perceived permanence of 
the medical record.  For example, a nurse commented, “The system [EMR] goes down 
for upgrades about once a month, which didn’t happen with paper charts.”  A midlevel 
provider asked, “I know security is a concern for both paper charts and electronic charts, 
but how safe are computer files from viruses?  What keeps charts from disappearing if 
there is a glitch?” 
To review, relating moves (i.e., using the EMR in conjunction with other 
structures) signaled that the EMR was well integrated into emergency room operations at 
Hospital H.  Discussions in which providers compared the EMR with other structures 
revealed that the EMR changed workflow patterns, lengthened documentation time, 
doubled work for some providers, and changed how providers thought about and/or 
204 
planned patient care.  Physicians and midlevel providers believed that the EMR contained 
less data than did paper charts.  The EMR’s design was compared to a spreadsheet, and 
its performance capabilities were questioned.  Although I, along with many providers, 
regarded these events negatively, providers’ neutral statements showed that comparison 
without condemnation occurred on several occasions.  I recorded more instances of 
neutral commentary as the study progressed, which seemed to signal many providers’ 
resignation that using the EMR was unavoidable.  Thus, in reviewing providers’ 
comments, I concluded that providers’ feelings about the EMR appeared to soften 
somewhat over the 18-month-long study.  Next, I describe providers’ constraining moves. 
Global and Institutional Analyses of Constraining Moves 
As discussed in chapter three, an EMR’s structural features (i.e., its inherent rules, 
resources, and capabilities) establish what the EMR can do and its effects on human 
agency.  For example, an EMR may allow providers to access patients’ pharmacy 
records, but not their medical files from other hospitals.  The first feature enables 
providers’ agency, whereas the second feature constrains it.  Constraining moves 
compare technology structures and include observations about how structures affect 
human agency in positive and/or negative ways (i.e., enabling or constraining agency).  
Although not observed in this study, constraining moves also encompass how users 
enable or constrain a technology’s structural features (e.g., by using an EMR in ways that 
are consistent or are inconsistent with its spirit). 
Providers often compared the EMR at Hospital H with EMR systems that they 
had seen or used in other healthcare facilities.  An EMR made by Epic was the system 
referenced most frequently because it was used widely in hospitals throughout 
205 
southeastern Louisiana.  Nurse L compared Epic with Hospital H’s Paragon system, 
which was made by the McKesson Corporation, saying, “Epic isn’t perfect, but it’s better 
than Paragon.  It [Epic] lets me customize all of the templates to my liking.  Paragon isn’t 
as customizable.”  Dr. A, a typical “floater” who worked at several emergency rooms in 
the region, also explained why he preferred Epic: 
I like Epic better for one reason: not as many warnings.  With Paragon, all of 
these warnings pop up when you’re trying to order something.  Some of them 
make sense, like reminding us about patients’ drug allergies, but there are some 
that are annoying. “Interacts with grapefruit juice.”  Well, I didn’t order grapefruit 
juice!  But it adds extra steps because I have to click through all those boxes. 
Dr. A elaborated: 
You have to acknowledge the warning by clicking on it.  There’s a 3-second delay 
every time you click “okay.”  All those clicks add up.  Thirty checkboxes, and 
that adds a minute and a half to each patient every time you put in an order.  With 
Epic, there’s no delay, but that system costs more. 
Several other physicians and all of the midlevel providers drew similar conclusions: 
When compared with Epic, Paragon made documenting patient care more time-
consuming and difficult.  Because they acknowledged frequent warning boxes that they 
deemed to be “annoying” or “unnecessary,” they were unable to engage in other aspects 
of patient care; thus, constraining their agency. 
Dr. E, who also was a floater (i.e., he worked at several different emergency 
rooms) described another way that ordering medication differed between Epic and 
Paragon: 
Epic controls how meds are put into the system better, which makes ordering 
easier.  It [Epic] limits how medicine formulations are called up, restricted to 
what’s available and common versus every imaginable, possible formulation.  
That saves me wasted time scrolling through endless lists of options.   
206 
Dr. E added, “With Epic, you can do voice dictation.  Paragon doesn’t have that.  It’s 
better to work with vocal cords than fingertips.  Have you seen how slow some docs 
type?”  Dr. E’s comments suggested that the Paragon system constrained his agency 
because the time that he could have spent on other tasks was “wasted” when he was 
forced to scroll through long lists of medications or type orders. 
Many of the nurses’ comments also suggested that Hospital H’s EMR constrained 
their agency.  Several of Hospital H’s part-time nurses worked at other facilities where 
they used a system made by Medical Information Technology, Inc. (MEDITECH).  
Similar to the physicians and midlevel providers, most of the nurses there preferred the 
other system to Paragon.  One nurse, in particular, Nurse R, to the consternation of his 
coworkers, compared regularly the two systems.  As two nurses tried, with difficulty, to 
access a patient’s medical history, Nurse R remarked that MEDITECH made accessing 
medical histories “easy” and, moreover, that MEDITECH could pull data from a regional 
network of interconnected hospitals.  As he concluded, “A bunch of retarded third 
graders could figure out MEDITECH it’s so easy.”  One of the nurses mired in the 
history-retrieval task mused that MEDITECH would be as asset in Hospital H’s 
emergency room, but lamented, “You have to pay to play with the good toys.”  The other 
nurse quipped to R, “Just shut up about MEDITECH.  I’m sick of hearing how awesome 
it is.”  All of the comments from nurses that compared Paragon with other EMRs 
centered on ways that Paragon limited their agency by impinging on their ability to 
deliver timely care to patients. 
In addition to comparing Hospital H’s EMR with other EMR systems, providers’ 
constraining moves included interpreting the EMR’s features and/or performance, asking 
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questions about or offering advice on how to use it, and discussing its effects on 
workflow.  As described below, as with relating (described in the previous section), the 
same four themes surfaced in providers’ constraining moves and subsequent talk: how the 
EMR changed workflow patterns, the perceived completeness of the medical record, the 
EMR’s spirit, and the EMR’s performance. 
Workflow changes.  Whereas workflow changes were conceded in providers’ 
neutral relating moves (described previously), providers’ constraining moves addressed 
specific ways that the EMR affected workflow negatively.  Providers complained that 
Hospital H’s EMR introduced longer documentation times, duplicated effort, delayed 
work, and interrupted their “train of thought.”  These changes affected the amount of time 
that providers spent with patients, and, in some instances, they threatened patients’ safety.  
Each perceived change is described below. 
Longer documentation times.  Providers, overwhelmingly, attributed longer 
documentation times to the EMR’s medication ordering and administering processes.  A 
physician explained the difference between ordering medications using paper order sets 
and using the EMR’s CPOE component: 
When medications orders were on paper, you would write for the same drugs a 
lot, the same doses, and always the same way.  In the computer, they have 100 
different ways to prescribe a medicine, some, I’ve never even heard of.  I have to 
scroll through all of that to find the one I want, and it adds time.  In a code 
situation, that’s valuable time that could make a difference in the patient’s 
outcome. 
I observed the same physician ordering pain medication for a patient with sciatica––the 
process involved 22 mouse clicks and took more than 3 minutes.  Ordering a steroid shot 
for another patient required 23 mouse clicks and took 5 minutes.  Both orders were 
hampered by multiple “confirm screens.”  As the physician complained: 
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I put the order in and up pops a screen, “Do you want to order this medication?” 
Yes, I want to order this, so click.  Then there’s another screen.  Yes, I still want 
to order this.  Click.  I have to click four more times: submit the order, confirm it, 
then confirm it again, and then once more.  One screen, maybe two, I can see 
being useful for patient safety reasons, so you don’t accidently order the wrong 
thing, but this is ridiculous. 
To ascertain whether the slow medication-ordering process that I observed was 
unique to Hospital H, its McKesson-made Paragon EMR, and/or its providers, I asked 
five physicians who I met at a medical conference about their respective medication 
ordering experiences.  All of them agreed that ordering medications––irrespective of the 
EMR––took longer when using EMRs than when using paper order sets.  As Dr. Peter 
Viccellio, Clinical Professor and Vice Chair of Emergency Medicine at Stony Brook 
School of Medicine, explained: 
I log on and that takes about 15 seconds.  I find the patient’s name, that’s another 
few seconds.  I have to make sure I have the right patient, and then I click on it to 
open the chart.  Most of the time, it opens within 5 seconds.  Sometimes, it takes 
up to 2 minutes to open.  Up to 2 minutes to open a chart is an extraordinarily 
long time to wait when you’re experiencing it.  Once the chart is open, you have 
to click on “add order,” then under “orders,” you have find the medicine, click on 
it, sign it, and close the chart.  The whole process, if you’re very efficient and 
quick, you might get in and out in a minute and a half or it may take you 4 or 5 
minutes to do it. 
The physicians all perceived that medication ordering was the single most time-
consuming task associated with EMR use and that it limited the time they spent with 
patients. 
At Hospital H, I observed that changing medication orders also was problematic 
and time-consuming.  Routinely, nurses approached physicians and indicated that 
incorrect doses had been ordered because physicians “clicked on the wrong option.”  On 
one occasion, I noted that it took a physician 17 mouse clicks and 6 minutes to correct a 
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medication error.  As the nurse waited, she remarked, “On paper, it would take the doc 3 
seconds.  Cross out the old dose, write ‘300,’ and initial.  Done.” 
I asked most of the nurses how the additional minutes that physicians spent at the 
EMR ordering medications and/or correcting orders, compared with using paper order 
sets, changed their perceptions of nursing workflow.  All of them agreed that the EMR’s 
medication order process prohibited them from giving care in a timely fashion.  As Nurse 
L explained: 
When they [physicians] type, we wait, and the patients wait.  Nothing happens 
until the doc clicks “submit.”  I can’t do my job until the order is submitted.  If 
it’s you with a broken bone or migraine headache, that’s another 10 minutes that 
you’re not getting your pain medicines.  That’s just ordering, but actually giving 
the medicine takes time, too. 
When asked to describe the medication administration process, Nurse L explained that 
after a physician or a midlevel provider submitted a medication order, the EMR 
registered and processed the order, which allowed nurses to retrieve the medication from 
a locked cabinet (i.e., the Pyxis).  As L noted, “We can’t physically get the medicine 
unless the doc puts in the order.”  She explained that because the EMR controlled the 
Pyxis, without a valid medication order, “the Pyxis can’t be unlocked or opened.”  Nurse 
B elaborated on the steps involved to administer medications: 
It typically takes 8–10 clicks to give one medication; before, it was writing down 
one line in the chart.  It takes too long now, and that’s just on the nurse’s side of 
it.  It can take me 15 minutes to give one medication, because I get the order, go 
to the Pyxis, get the med, scan the med, go to the patient, confirm the patient, scan 
the patient, explain the med, click the screen, scan the med and patient again, give 
the medicine, then click the box that says I gave the medicine.  When the scanner 
doesn’t work, I have to type up those little barcoded numbers!  There are a lot of 
steps, and while I’m doing this, I’m not taking care of anyone else.  There are 
other patients in pain, but they have to wait. 
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In explaining the medication administration process, Nurse B also referred to duplicated 
effort, which is described next. 
Duplicated effort.  Providers who took notes during patients’ medical 
examinations and, later, entered the data into the health record acknowledged that the 
practice doubled their workload, but the EMR also duplicated providers’ efforts in other 
ways.  As Nurse B explained, “There’s a lot of redundancy because when the doc notates 
something, the nurse is compelled to add to the nursing record.  The doc writes discharge 
summaries, so the nurse types them into the computer.”  Nurse B’s comment revealed 
that work was replicated regularly because the patient record consisted of separate 
physicians’ notes and nurses’ notes.  Nurse M, a super-user, said that the EMR “doesn’t 
make positive changes, from the nurse’s point of view.  There’s so much duplication.  
Why do you have to have three people doing the same thing?”  When asked to elaborate, 
M said: 
Take for example, consultations.  Consults with floor docs are written on paper 
first and then we type them in the nursing note.  If a patient is admitted, then 
someone has to type the consult in the progress notes, which is a separate chart.  
Usually, an upstairs nurse will do that, but it could be one of us.  Then, if there are 
orders, someone puts that in the emergency room record.  If the consulting doc 
doesn’t enter the orders, then the tech passes them to a midlevel to put in.  The 
emergency room doc has to document all of this, too.  So you have five or six 
people basically documenting the same thing in three or four different places.  It’s 
stupid.  How is that efficient?   
Although the duplicated effort annoyed many providers, some providers, like 
Nurse L, acknowledged that the redundancy could serve as a “checks and balance to 
ensure patient safety.”  Duplicated effort, which increased providers’ workloads, led, 
frequently, as discussed next, to delayed work. 
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Delayed work.  Many providers noted that the EMR added additional work, and 
that the time needed to complete it could pose risks to patients, because providers often 
delayed documenting certain tasks until “things slowed down” and “patients cleared out.”  
Dr. A explained that when physicians and nurses shared a common paper-based chart, 
certain documentation tasks, such as updating patients’ vital signs, were completed 
regularly by the nurses.  Although he lamented having to read nurses’ handwriting 
(“Nurses have crappy handwriting, too”), he told me that because writing vital signs was 
“quick and easy,” he knew that the medical chart would remain current throughout a 
patient’s emergency room stay.  Because entering vital signs into the EMR took longer 
than writing them in a paper chart, many nurses put off updating the electronic record 
until the emergency room was no longer busy or until they had completed their other 
documentation tasks.  Nurses’ tendency to delay charting had consequences, as Dr. A 
revealed: 
A while back, there was a patient I discharged home, and a few hours later, the 
nurse puts in the vitals.  That patient left with a heart rate of 170!  Nobody told 
me!  We had to call him and bring him back to the hospital.  That could have 
ended badly for everyone.  The patient could have had a bad outcome and it could 
have led to a malpractice suit. 
Physicians and midlevel providers also delayed completing documentation tasks, 
especially when the emergency room experienced a surge in patient volume.  Drs. E and 
G both explained that the practice, although necessary “to stay on top of critical patients,” 
could affect negatively continuity of care.  As Dr. E noted, “For admitted patients, it can 
be a problem, because the admitting [physician] isn’t seeing everything in the chart that 
we did.”  Dr. G expressed frustration when he complained that “our hands are tied, but 
we can’t do two things at once.”  He concluded, “We can either be at the bedside and take 
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care of patients or we can sit at a computer and click boxes, but we can’t do both.”  Next, 
I discuss the final workflow change that I observed: interrupted train of thought. 
Interrupted train of thought.  A lot of providers’ constraining moves centered 
on beliefs that the EMR interrupted their train of thought.  Dr. Viccellio explained that 
EMRs, when compared with paper charts, exposed physicians to more cognitive 
disruptions: 
For example, a patient needs pain medicine.  With paper, you could simply write 
the order and go back to what you were doing with minimal interruption.  With 
the EMR, you have to go to the computer, log on, get to the patient’s chart, find 
the medication, order the medication, and sign off on the medication, and now 
your chain of thought has been completely and totally interrupted.  You have to 
mentally reboot. 
Interrupted train of thought was cited frequently at Hospital H, but several 
physicians explained that using paper TSheets minimized disruptions.9  For example, 
many physicians spread all of their patients’ paper TSheets along a counter and alternated 
quickly between them, documenting laboratory test results or updating findings as they 
became available (see Figure 5.2).  When they used the CPOE component of the EMR, 
however, moving between patients’ charts involved, according to Dr. F, “clicking back 
and forth between multiple tabs and waiting for screens to refresh.”  As Dr. G explained, 
“With TSheets on the counter, I don’t lose my train of thought.  I can move from chart to 
chart.  I write something in one chart, then go back to what I was doing in the other one.”  
Dr. A described how using the CPOE sometimes interrupted his train of thought: 
With the CPOE, I have to completely switch gears.  I get out of one chart, look for 
another one, open it up, and click through multiple tabs.  You can have three or 
four patient charts up and running at the same time, and it’s easy to click on the 
wrong chart.  I’ve done it, and I type all this stuff and realize, “Oh, wrong 
patient.”  I have to delete it and start all over again, and, by then, I’ve completely 
9This advantage will disappear when Hospital H installs, finally, electronic TSheets. 
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lost focus on what I’m doing.  I have to mentally go back and ask myself, “What 
am I doing and which patient is it for?”  Is this safe medicine?  No, because 
mistakes can happen.  If my thinking isn’t 100% on the task at hand, if I’m 








































Figure 5.2.  Physician Workflow When Using Paper TSheets.  Physician accessing 
quickly several charts spread along a counter.  Most physicians believed that this work 
habit reduced cognitive disruptions.  
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As he concluded, “I’ve seen more wrong orders on electronic charts in the last few years 
than I’ve ever seen on paper charts.  Wrong orders put on the wrong patient’s chart, 
wrong medicines, you name it.”  In addition to the perceived cognitive disruptions that 
providers described, as explained below, many providers believed that the contents of 
medical records and their ability to access patients’ data affected patient safety 
negatively. 
Perceived completeness of the medical record.  Whereas relating moves 
indicated that the perceived completeness of medical records changed how providers 
thought about healthcare delivery, constraining moves revealed that providers believed 
that the EMR restricted their access to data, which limited their ability to make informed 
judgments.  Perceptions varied according to user type: nurses, generally, found the 
medical records adequate, whereas physicians and midlevel providers bemoaned both the 
quantity and quality of the medical records. 
N, a midlevel provider, explained that although most hospitals’ EMRs displayed 
patients’ medical histories from all of their previous hospital and emergency room visits, 
the version of Paragon that Hospital H purchased limited search functions to the last 120 
days.  Moreover, according to PJ, the EMR trainer, the Paragon system could not display 
patients’ past cardiology test results.  As she explained, “If you want to see old [EKGs], 
you have to purchase that option.  We don’t have it yet, but we’re looking into it.”  Citing 
the Paragon EMR’s limited search function, Dr. G declared, “If all I have is a 4-month 
window, how is this useful for identifying patterns or diagnosing a recurring problem?  If 
I can’t see the chart, I may not even know that the patient is having a recurring problem.”  
Several physicians commented that inadequate patient records led them frequently to 
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order laboratory and diagnostic tests that they would not have ordered otherwise, which, 
ultimately, increased healthcare costs. 
N explained that although a patient’s past medical record was not crucial for 
delivering emergency medical care, accessing the record, in many situations, could 
expedite some aspects of healthcare delivery.  He shared the following example: 
We had a patient who came in over the weekend and she was discharged home.  
She wound up back in the emergency room a few days later on an overdose.  She 
was unconscious, so I can’t ask her anything, like height or weight.  That’s 
important for calculating certain medications.  You would think I could pull up 
her chart, her visit from 3 days ago, and see it [her height and weight], but no, I 
can’t.  The new chart didn’t auto-populate any of her past information. 
 
In addition to N grumbling that the EMR did not “auto-populate” the patient’s 
height and weight, several physicians complained that, in their estimation, the EMR 
generated too much automatic text.  Dr. A commented that he rarely looked at past 
records because they often contained “gobbledygook,” which he described as long lists of 
numbers, irrelevant laboratory test results, copied and pasted text, and checkboxes that 
lacked cohesive narratives and/or context.  As he said, “A lot of old charts are full of 
garbage, stuff that’s automatically generated.  It’s too much of a hassle to sort through.”  
Dr. Viccellio shared with me that one of his emergency room patients had been admitted 
and, when discharged 2 weeks later, the patient’s medical record contained over 8,000 
pages of “garbage [and] about 10 pages of useful data.” 
Given the volume of data contained in the medical records, most physicians 
bypassed the medical records and gathered information directly from patients and/or 
patients’ families.  As Dr. E explained, “It takes lots of clicks to go digging around, 
looking for relevant information.  It’s not worth the time, so I just see the patient and go 
from there.”  Similarly, Christensen and Grimsmo (2008) found that physicians rarely 
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spent time searching EMRs for patients’ histories, but, instead, asked patients about their 
previous visits and medical histories.  Most of the physicians at Hospital H agreed with 
Dr. E’s assessment of the medical record’s utility. Upon reviewing my fieldnotes, I found 
that I recorded only three instances of physicians attempting to access past records. 
Difficulty accessing data in electronic health records was not unique to the 
providers at Hospital H.  As Dr. Viccellio explained: 
One of the biggest disadvantages to EMRs is that these remain data systems, not 
information systems.  In other words, it doesn’t display information to me in an 
intelligent way.  I have to hunt and hunt and hunt.  New critical information may 
be in there, but there’s no signal to me that it’s there.  I have to be lucky enough 
to find it. 
Several providers also cautioned that information in active medical records, not just data 
in past records, was unavailable or concealed regularly.  N stated that “sometimes, it’s a 
matter of hitting the refresh button and, suddenly, you see labs results or new orders.  
You have to make an effort to look for these things when it should be automatic.” 
Another midlevel provider commented, “It’s funny because EMRs are supposed to help 
you find stuff.  With paper, you pick up the chart, and, ‘Oh, hey, here’s a new order.’ 
Instead, it takes multiple steps to find orders now.”  Nurse B added, “If I’m spending 
time refreshing the screen every few minutes, then when am I free to leave the COW and 
take care of patients?” 
Although Hospital H’s EMR appeared to enable providers’ agency by using the 
EMR’s search functions to access limited data (e.g., records dating back 120 days), 
providers believed that the restricted search capability, coupled with the dearth of useful 
information in the record, hindered their agency.  Moreover, oftentimes, accessing data in 
active records was difficult and/or time-consuming, further restraining providers’ abilities 
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to deliver timely care to their patients.  The relative completeness and value of the 
medical record was due, in large part, to the EMR’s structural spirit, which is described 
next. 
Spirit.  As explained previously, the spirit of an EMR can be assessed according 
to its design, features, and usability (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994).  I recorded more than 
100 constraining moves condemning aspects of the EMR’s incoherent spirit (i.e., poor 
design).  Many such moves included providers asking questions or making statements 
about the EMR’s interface.  For example, Nurse J had trouble adjusting the display such 
that patients’ names appeared across the top of the screen.  She often sought help from 
super-users to customize, temporarily, the interface in a way that maximized her 
productivity.  As she commented:  
I need the names at the top, instead of going down the side of the screen.  For me, 
it’s easier to click between tabs that way.  It takes less mental effort if I can look 
at the screen and say, “Oh, that’s what tabs in my web browser look like,” so 
moving between them is a little more intuitive.  I don’t know why they didn’t 
design it that way in the first place. 
 
Many providers believed that, in addition to the spatial orientation of the tabs (i.e., 
vertical versus horizontal), the number of tabs also was problematic.  As Dr. G, who 
described the CPOE component of the EMR, explained, “Most of the tabs I don’t use.  I 
don’t even know what this other stuff is.  I have not been given any orientation on it.  
You’ve got 30 or 40 things up here.”  I observed that the CPOE interface actually 
consisted of about 95 tabs, information fields, and/or icons.  Along the top of the screen, 
there were seven information fields and a refresh icon; beneath that, there were three 
other information fields and eight icons.  A drop-down menu, 4 icons, and 13 information 
fields occupied the next row.  Below that, there were three additional rows containing 21, 
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17, and 4 tabs, respectively.  The first tab in the third row contained an extra 11 tabs and 
a refresh icon.  I asked a midlevel provider, who also was a super-user, to explain the 
significance of the tabs and icons, and he commented, “I don’t know what half of those 
are for.” 
Most providers complained that the tabs and icons, in addition to being too 
numerous, were too small.  As Nurse Y remarked, “The EMR is killing my eyes.  I can’t 
read this tiny shit and I can’t make it bigger.”  When asked if the text could be enlarged, a 
super-user replied, “Not that I’m aware of.  You just squint and lean into the screen.”  As 
Dr. G noted, “You can’t read any of this stuff.  It could say the patient’s coding for all I 
know.  I simply can’t see the text.” 
Other providers complained that medication lists were not displayed 
alphabetically.  According to X, a midlevel provider, “Because the drug list doesn’t 
default to alphabetical, we have to do it.  Every single time we have to search for a drug, 
we have extra clicks just to get it in an alphabetical list.”  I observed N alphabetize the 
medication list one afternoon for a physician who had given up trying to do it himself.  N 
assured the physician, “It’s not an intuitive process.”  N began the task at 5:24 p.m.  The 
physician, unable to enter orders with N sitting at the CPOE, complained, “Why can’t 
this be a default setting?  If I have a chest pain to work up, I don’t have time for this 
crap.”  At 5:41 p.m., nearly 16 minutes later, N finished alphabetizing the medication list 
and showed the physician how he had done it. 
In addition to providers’ complaints that multiple tabs and small text marred the 
EMR’s interface, many providers complained that there were too many log-on screens 
and password prompts; hence, for providers who worked at several facilities, they had the 
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added task of remembering multiple sets of usernames and passwords.  Providers’ 
comments about “pointless and unnecessary” tasks, such as logging on repeatedly and 
alphabetizing lists, indicated that they believed aspects of the EMR’s design impinged on 
their agency because the EMR limited how they spent their time.  For example, a nurse 
said, “Every log on and mouse click is time away from treating patients.”   
Some of the EMR’s other design features, besides being incoherent, were 
believed by providers to threaten patients’ safety.  For example, Hospital H’s EMR and 
CPOE components, although part of the same McKesson-made Paragon system, were not 
integrated, meaning that emergency medicine physicians could not access nurses’ notes, 
and nurses could not see physicians’ electronic notes.  EMRs with separate sets of 
providers’ notes were not uncommon; as Dr. Viccellio explained: 
When we rolled out our EMR [at Stony Brook], we couldn’t see the nurses’ 
documentation, so if a nurse writes, “Patient’s complaining of much more pain, 
their blood pressure dropped, they look ashen, and I think they’re going to die,” I 
would not even see that.  EMRs, as they are now, are not designed to facilitate 
data exchange between providers. 
 
 Several nurses at Hospital H explained that although not seeing what physicians 
documented was not detrimental, necessarily, to their practice, they believed that 
physicians being unable to see what nurses had documented could have disastrous 
effects.  Nurse B alluded to the Dallas Ebola patient, Thomas Duncan, whose travel 
history, although recorded in nurses’ notes, was unseen by emergency room physicians, 
when he said: “If the doc had seen that this man [Duncan] had been in West Africa, that 
he had a fever, etcetera, he [the physician] may have put two and two together.  Instead, 
an Ebola patient gets sent home.”  Nurse Y added, “Dallas was a wake-up call.  We can’t  
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depend on EMRs to communicate.  I need to [say], ‘The doc can’t see what I type,’ and 
so if it’s really important, then I have to go tell him [the physician].”   
Several physicians agreed that the EMR could not take the place of face-to-face 
communication.  As Dr. A commented, “I’ve tried to look up the nurses’ notes, but I 
couldn’t figure out how to do it.  I have to trust the nurses will find me if there’s 
something I should know.”  Another physician said, “The problem is that nurses are 
nurses.  They may not know when something needs to be brought to your attention.”  
When asked to elaborate, he explained, “They don’t know what they don’t know, 
medically.  They’re not doctors.  The new ones [nurses] think, ‘It’s in the EMR,’ so 
they’ve done their job.” 
Providers at Hospital H believed that their EMR was flawed, not only because of 
the separate sets of notes for physicians and nurses but also because, according to Nurse 
L, “anyone, anywhere in the hospital” could alter emergency room patients’ medical 
records.  L explained that anyone “with a username and password [could] add orders, put 
in meds, you name it.”  She then elaborated: 
We’ve had upstairs nurses click our patients by mistake, and we start seeing 
orders show up that don’t make any sense.  A lot of meds are put in for the wrong 
patient; it happens a lot.  So, if the chest pain protocol shows up for a headache, 
you have to ask, “Is this the right patient?”  Usually, someone clicked the wrong 
chart.  Usually, it’s someone upstairs.  Why they even have access is a mystery.  I 
think the system isn’t designed to prevent these kinds of mistakes. 
During the second training session that I attended with Dr. C, I observed the 
trainer, K, accessing the charts of active patients and entering orders.  Although she 
deleted immediately the “dummy orders” after she demonstrated the order-entry 
processes, I saw that L was right—that “anyone, anywhere in the hospital [with] a 
username and password” could manipulate charts.   
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Although the constraining moves described here highlight the EMR’s role in 
diminishing agency, several providers—mainly, nurses—acknowledged that some 
aspects of the EMR’s spirit enhanced their agency.  For example, a nurse commented that 
the EMR’s flashing icons alerted him to laboratory test results in a timely fashion: 
There are these little icons next to the patient’s name; one is for med orders, one 
is for labs, and another one is for radiology.  They flash red when the doc puts 
them in and green when [results are] back.  I can see as soon as the tests are back, 
and I can address them right away, without constantly having to go around 
looking for the paper chart.  There’s no waiting with the EMR.  
 
Another nurse explained that the flashing icons helped nurses to “keep an eye on each 
other’s patients better.”  As he said: 
I can look over at your screen and see you have orders pending or tests back.  I 
can let you know, “Hey, room 2’s labs are ready.”  If you’re busy, maybe I pitch 
in and give meds for one of your patients.  With the old [paper] charts, we 
wouldn’t necessarily see that an order is pending, because it’s a piece of paper in 
the back of the chart.  With the EMR, anybody who looks at the screen knows 
what’s going on. 
 
Nurse B, who conceded that the flashing icons were “a nice feature,” said, “with time, 
EMRs will be great.  I see the potential.”  Dr. Viccellio also appeared hopeful when he 
said, “These things [EMRs] can be absolutely fantastic, if they’re properly designed, and 
if they’re designed as information systems instead of data repositories.  I wish we 
[physicians] could have designed them.  Maybe someday.”  
To review, although providers working in the emergency room at Hospital H 
believed that EMRs, generally, had potential, an incoherent spirit tainted Hospital H’s 
Paragon system.  Providers complained that multiple tabs, information fields, and icons, 
in conjunction with small text and numerous log-on screens, complicated the EMR’s 
interface and impinged their agency.  Separate sets of physicians’ notes and nurses’ notes 
were thought to be detrimental to patients’ safety.  Moreover, anyone with a user name 
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and password could manipulate patients’ records, which contributed to an increased risk 
of medication errors.  However, some providers found some of the EMR’s features 
helpful, like flashing icons that announced laboratory test results or pending orders.  
Next, constraining moves associated with the EMR’s performance are discussed. 
Performance.  I grouped the constraining moves that involved the EMR’s 
performance into two categories: hardware performance and software performance.  The 
constraining moves, largely, were negative.  Providers believed that poor performance 
contributed to longer documentation times, which, consequently, meant less time spent at 
patients’ bedsides.  Thus, the EMR’s poor performance affected negatively providers’ 
agency, because they believed that they were forced to use a structure that robbed them of 
their freedom to practice medicine how and where they wished, which was with paper 
charts at patients’ bedsides instead of at computer terminals.  A discussion of each 
category of performance constraining moves follows. 
Hardware performance.  Early in my fieldwork, I noted that “numerous paper 
notices hang all around the emergency room, alerting users to various glitches and battery 
issues.”  Some of the notices contained “workarounds” that instructed users to reboot 
and/or replace COW batteries at regular intervals.  Nurse J complained that the prescribed 
workarounds were ineffective: 
This is the fifth COW battery I’ve put in today, and it’s already about to die.  
Every time I do this, I have to completely sign back on.  Do you know how long 
that takes?  Plus, the last time I rebooted, the patients’ names weren’t even 
showing up!  I couldn’t administer meds because nothing showed up!  We need 
new batteries, or new COWs. 
 
J then directed my attention to the nurse manager’s office door, which was covered in 
handwritten post-it notes that called attention to the poor battery performance.  One note 
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read: “Battery life is getting worse.  Can we please, please, please do something about it?  
We need to buy new ones.  Please tell them [administrators] to fix this!” 
Over the course of a year, the number of notes plastered on the nurse manager’s 
door grew.  In that time, I recorded dozens of episodes of battery failure, followed by 
rebooting procedures that, sometimes, took more than 10 minutes.  As Nurse M 
complained, “This is bullshit.  I do this multiple times every shift.  If they 
[administrators] are going to make us use this crap [the EMR], at least make sure the 
damn batteries work.”  When asked why replacement batteries had not been procured, Q, 
the nurse manager, explained that she had requested repeatedly that new batteries be 
provided but had been told that funds were not available. 
I asked the nurses how the deteriorating battery life affected their work.  Aside 
from the time spent replacing batteries, rebooting COWs, and signing back onto the 
system, providers complained that the process interrupted their train of thought.  As 
Nurse B remarked, “It just takes you out of whatever you were doing and then you have 
to mentally reboot yourself.”  Nurses also stated that the delay associated with replacing 
batteries and rebooting COWs added to patients’ lengths of stay.  As Nurse L said, “If 
you’re the patient, that’s another 10 minutes you’re stuck here when you’d rather go 
home, plus, it makes our times look bad.”  She explained that nurses’ performance 
reviews were based, among other things, on metrics that tracked patients’ lengths of stay. 
Several physicians complained that although they did not use the COWs (they 
used exclusively computers that were housed in a small workroom adjacent to the 
emergency room’s common work area), they depended on nurses receiving orders 
through the COWs.  For example, Dr. A explained that earlier that day, he had ordered a 
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suture tray, which contained a scalpel, needles, sutures, and numbing medications, but 
when he entered the patient’s room a short time later, ready to begin suturing the patient’s 
laceration, he found that a suture tray had not been set up—the nurse was busy rebooting 
her COW after replacing its battery, and, therefore, she had neither seen nor addressed 
any of her pending orders.  Dr. A’s frustration was apparent when he said: 
So now, the whole emergency room comes grinding to a halt.  I can’t suture the 
patient.  I can’t get the meds out of the Pyxis.10  I can’t do anything but move onto 
the next patient.  Meanwhile, this guy [patient] is sitting here with a nasty head 
wound and I can’t close it until the nurse gets her COW working.  What if I have 
several procedures waiting?  Multiple lacerations?  Pelvic exams?  All of those 
require nurses setting up and assisting.  If they’re preoccupied with COWS, 
everything stops. 
In late 2014, several surgical nurses and floor nurses complained to administrators 
that their COW’s batteries were performing poorly.  In December 2014, a battery 
malfunctioned in an unused surgical suite and caught fire.  Only after this incident did the 
emergency room receive, finally, the replacement batteries that Q had been requesting for 
over a year.  A nurse commented, “All it takes is for the upstairs nurses to complain and 
everybody gets new batteries.  We’ve been begging for a year and nothing.”  Q added, 
“Good thing no one was in there when it [the COW] caught on fire.  This could have 
been prevented if administration would have taken our complaints seriously last year.” 
In addition to the COW’s faulty batteries, compatibility issues between the EMR 
and other technology structures were viewed as problematic.  For instance, the 
connection between the EMR and the printer failed frequently.  On one occasion, 
technicians complained that because they could not print admission orders, they were 
unable to transfer patients from the emergency room to the floor.  One of the technicians 
10At Hospital H, and most other hospitals, only nurses can access the Pyxis machine. 
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explained, “The floor nurses won’t take patients without printouts, so we have to babysit 
them [patients] down here.  They [floor nurses] can see the orders on their EMR, but they 
still won’t take the patients.”  On another occasion, nurses were unable to print discharge 
summaries, which meant that they had to copy, by hand, the entirety of the discharge 
summaries as they appeared in the EMR, to give to patients before patients were allowed 
to leave the emergency room.  A repairperson was dispatched, but he arrived 3 hours and 
several discharges later. 
Software performance.  Providers’ constraining moves that focused on the 
EMR’s software also were commonplace.  Providers referred to most performance issues 
as “glitches,” and there were two major types of glitches: those that stemmed from 
programming errors, which providers were made aware of through McKesson 
Corporation memoranda; and glitches that were experienced by providers firsthand.  
Below, I discuss briefly each type of glitch. 
Programming errors.  McKesson sent numerous “alerts” to Hospital H over the 
course of this study that documented programming errors and temporary workarounds.  
Many of the notices described issues that affected billing.  For instance, a coding error 
meant that the cost of electrocardiograms (EKGs) could be billed only to patients or their 
insurance companies if the EKGs were ordered in a very specific way.  Other notices, 
however, detailed problems that threatened patients’ safety.  One such notice was posted 
in the emergency room in August 2014.  In part, the memorandum, which was titled 
“Random patient context issue” read: 
When the user changes patients by selecting a patient from the dropdown in the 
Work List, the lower portion of the screen may not refresh leaving information 
from the prior patient displayed. . . .  While the occurrence of this issue is 
infrequent, it appears to be related to the user quickly changing tabs and patients 
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without waiting for the screen to refresh. . . .  If this situation occurs, selecting any 
other tab will refresh the lower portion of the screen and will ensure that all of the 
data displayed is for the same patient.  Until this issue is resolved, users should 
visually confirm the screen display changes as expected when changing patient 
information displays.  
I asked several physicians and midlevel providers what they knew about this 
programming error, and one of the midlevel providers mentioned, “Oh, we get these 
notices all the time.”  Dr. G called my attention to the phrase “related to the user,” which 
appeared in the memorandum, and said, “They’re blaming us for the problem.  See that?  
It’s always ‘so-called’ user error.”  Another midlevel provider pointed out the numerous 
notices that were posted inside the physicians’ workroom; most of those notices were 
taped onto the wall, behind the CPOE monitor––when a user sat at the computer, as I did, 
the notices were not visible.  
One of the physicians told me that, in addition to the “random patient context 
issue” error, there was another programming error that put patients at risk.  This 
additional glitch, although infrequent, meant that not all patients’ allergies were stored in 
their electronic health records and that some allergies were attributed erroneously to the 
wrong patients.  He rummaged through a pile of notices that he had printed out, but was 
unable to locate the memorandum in question.  He recalled that the memorandum 
instructed physicians to “double check allergies with every patient.”  He then said: 
I check anyway, but, sometimes, people forget.  You think it’s in the chart, you 
look, it says, “No allergies,” so you write the prescription.  Especially if you work 
in a busy emergency room, you take for granted that the tools you’ve been given 
work, so you do your job as quickly as you can.  You might not ask every single 
patient about allergies.  You should, but all it takes is one lapse.  You would think 
something like that, that kind of mistake, wouldn’t have made it out of the testing 
phase.  How does a company release a product that can kill people? 
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A nurse, who had been listening in, answered the physician’s question, “Because they 
don’t get sued; you do.” 
Although these kinds of glitches (i.e., programming errors) occurred regularly, 
glitches experienced firsthand were more common.  Next, I describe providers’ 
constraining moves specific to this type of glitch, as well as several instances where 
glitches affected providers’ agency. 
Glitches experienced firsthand.  A number of minor, “inconvenient glitches” 
occurred during every shift that I observed, but on several occasions, the glitches were 
more bothersome to providers.  Minor and major glitches alike disrupted emergency 
room operations regularly.  I defined minor glitch as a temporary inconvenience caused 
by a malfunction in the EMR’s software, whereas a major glitch created significant 
disruptions to providers’ workflow, increased patients’ length of stay, and/or posed risks 
to patients’ safety.  Described below are examples of minor and major glitches that I 
recorded. 
I observed three nurses confront a standard minor glitch connected to the EMR’s 
refresh function: J, M, and B tried to close a dialogue box that appeared in J’s EMR 
monitor.  J noted that she “clicked on it three times” but that the window did not close.  
M noted that because the emergency room was “full of patients, the system [was] running 
slow.”  He then explained, “There’s too much information running through the system, so 
it’s overwhelmed.  It’s not refreshing.”  B resorted to rebooting the system, noting, “This 
is the kind of inconvenient glitch that happens when we get more than a dozen patients.  
For some reason, it just seizes up sometimes.”  It is worth noting that although the 
emergency room was “full of patients,” three nurses who, otherwise, could have been 
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caring for patients, instead, were addressing a computer glitch.  Other minor glitches, 
according to providers, included regular system updates that erased individual users’  
customizations, and free-text entries that disappeared “magically” from patients’ medical 
records. 
Among the major glitches that I witnessed, one had to do with the electronic 
whiteboard component of the EMR, which displayed several columns of data for each 
patient that included the patient’s name, room number, length of stay and the name of the 
nurse assigned to care for the patient.  I overheard a heated exchange between two nurses 
who, unbeknownst to them, had been caring for the same patient for at least an hour.  A 
major glitch meant that although the large electronic whiteboard, which was mounted 
near the ceiling, displayed correctly names of patients alongside names of the nurses 
caring for them, the data contained in the miniature version of the whiteboard visible on 
each nurse’s COW, unfortunately, were incorrect.  When looking at their COWs, both R 
and Y saw their names next to the name of the patient in room 3.  Both nurses proceeded 
to perform and, then, document physical examinations of the patient.  Although this 
glitch resulted only in duplicated effort and wasted time for the nurses, it could have 
proven disastrous had the nurses not discovered the error before they administered 
medications to the patient.  As R noted, “What if we gave the patient a double dose of 
something?  That might not have ended well.  That’s why we have checks and balance, 
but the damn EMR screwed up.”  As Y pointed out:  
We can’t see the whiteboard from the nurses’ station, so we look at our screens 
instead.  You would think they’d match.  Now, I have to walk all the way around 
to the other side, look up at the ceiling, and double check that my patient is really 
my patient. 
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Another major glitch that I observed on several occasions had to do with 
“dropped” orders.  For example, one evening, the physician on duty, Dr. A, kept checking 
the radiology reporting system for the results of a computerized tomography (CT) scan 
that he had ordered several hours before.  I asked how long it took, generally, for the 
radiologist to read the CT scan and then send a report to the emergency medicine 
physician.  Dr. A replied that the entire process, from the time the patient was scanned 
until the report was generated, took, usually, 3 or more hours.  Tired of waiting, Dr. A 
asked the technician to follow up with the radiology department, to which the technician 
replied, “What CT scan?  We didn’t send anyone to CT.”  The patient, apparently, had 
been left waiting for several hours, with the physician believing, erroneously, that the 
requested procedure had been performed.  The midlevel provider on duty remarked, “The 
EMR drops orders all the time.  Computer glitches steal them.  ‘I swear, I just put those 
orders in and they’re gone.’” 
The glitches, both minor and major, disrupted providers’ workflow patterns and 
annoyed them.  Taken together, suboptimal performance with respect to the EMR’s 
hardware and software components constrained providers’ agency by not allowing them 
to allocate their time on a shift.  Poor EMR performance meant that providers spent a 
disproportionate amount of time changing batteries, rebooting computers, and noting 
programming errors and workarounds, instead of engaging in direct patient care. 
In sum, the constraining moves that I documented, overwhelmingly, were 
negative––providers’ constraining action and talk underscored many ways that they 
believed the EMR hindered their agency and, in some cases, threatened patients’ safety.  
Providers compared routinely Hospital H’s Paragon EMR with other EMR systems, and 
	   230 
they concluded that the Paragon system increased documentation time and, generally, 
was harder to use.  In addition to longer documentation times, Hospital H’s EMR 
changed workflow in other ways: When compared with providers’ perceptions of using 
paper charts, they believed that the EMR led to duplicated effort, delayed work during 
periods of peak patient volume, interrupted train of thought, and increased the risk of 
medication errors.  Physicians and midlevel providers complained that EMR-generated 
medical records contained little useful data and, moreover, that searching the medical 
records for valuable information was difficult and time-consuming.  Providers found the 
EMR’s spirit incoherent, with poorly designed features (e.g., multiple tabs, small text, 
and numerous password prompts) limiting the EMR’s usability.  Additionally, separate 
sets of physicians’ notes and nurses’ notes hindered physicians’ practice and put patients 
at risk.  Hardware and software that performed poorly affected providers’ agency and 
prolonged patients’ lengths of stay.  In the next section, I discuss appropriation moves 
involving judgment. 
Global and Institutional Analyses of Judging Moves 
Users’ judging moves, according to DeSanctis and Poole (1994), praise or 
condemn a technology’s performance, but unlike relating and constraining moves, 
judging moves do not compare the technology with other structures.  Judging moves 
indicate whether users accept, negate, or ignore a technology structure. 
At Hospital H, most of the providers’ judging moves that I documented 
condemned EMRs (e.g., “I hate these things,” “EMRs suck,” and “EMRs are not very 
good”).  Although the majority of judging moves criticized EMRs generally, some moves 
critiqued, specifically, Hospital H’s Paragon system.  For example, in late 2014, Dr. G 
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stated, “I hate Paragon.  It’s a crappy EMR.  It’s basically the DOS 1.0 of medical 
information systems.”  All of the physicians and midlevel providers I interviewed shared 
Dr. G’s sentiments.  X, a midlevel provider, said, “I’m quitting my job before the rest of 
this godforsaken system is installed.  That’s how much I hate Paragon.”  Another 
midlevel provider added, “Paragon is especially bad and a total waste of money.” 
Nurses’ feelings about the Paragon system, however, varied and ranged from 
revulsion to excitement.  One nurse claimed repeatedly that he was so upset by the EMR 
that he would “rather shovel shit for a living than use the damn thing [the EMR] another 
day.”  In contrast, another nurse remarked, “I think our EMR is a good thing because it 
makes our jobs a lot easier.”  Another nurse commented, “I love Paragon because we can 
read everything now.  There’s no more figuring out people’s sloppy handwriting.” 
Nurses praising the EMR were in the minority (i.e., 5 of the 15 nurses I 
interviewed), and although they lauded enthusiastically its structural potential, they 
acknowledged that the EMR made work more difficult for physicians and midlevel 
providers.  As a nurse explained, “I see that it’s [EMR] harder for the docs and midlevels.  
They struggle with it.  Paragon makes my job easier, but it definitely makes things worse 
for them.”  Providers’ judging moves that I recorded supported research that found 
nurses, usually, were more accepting of EMRs than were physicians (Lærum et al., 2004; 
Likourezos et al., 2004, Otieno et al., 2007; Weiner et al., 1999). 
Results from the questionnaire that I administered supported my reading of 
providers’ judging moves, as providers, largely, condemned the EMR, although minor 
differences existed between user types, with more nurses than physicians reporting being 
somewhat satisfied with the EMR (see Table 5.2).  Only 43% of respondents (N = 30)  
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Table 5.2            
 
Responses to the Questionnaire Item, “Overall, how satisfied are you with the EMR that 
your emergency room uses?” 
             
 
                                   User Type      
 
 Response        MD            MLP            RN             Tech          Other              Total 
       (n = 5)        (n = 3)       (n = 17)        (n = 4)         (n = 1)          (N = 30) 
             
   
Very  
satisfied     0% (0)         0% (0)         0% (0)        25% (1)       0% (0)           3% (1) 
 
Satisfied     0% (0)         0% (0)         0% (0)        0% (0)         0% (0)           0% (0) 
 
Somewhat      20% (1)       67% (2)       29% (5)      25% (1)       100% (1)       40% (12) 
satisfied  
 
Somewhat     20% (1)       0% (0)         12% (2)      0% (0)         0% (0)           10% (3) 
dissatisfied 
 
Dissatisfied     20% (1)       33% (1)       18% (3)      0% (0)         0% (0)           17% (5) 
 
Very 
dissatisfied     40% (2)       0% (0)         35% (6)      25% (1)       0% (0)           30% (9) 
             
 
Note. MD = physician; MLP = midlevel provider; RN = nurse; Tech = technician. 
 
reported being somewhat satisfied, satisfied, or very satisfied with the EMR.  Among 
physicians (n = 5), 80% condemned the EMR and reported being somewhat dissatisfied, 
dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the EMR, compared to 65% of nurses (n = 17) who 
were somewhat dissatisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the EMR. 
Three midlevel providers completed the questionnaire and two of them reported 
being somewhat satisfied with the EMR, whereas the third midlevel provider reported 
being dissatisfied.  Results from the questionnaire, which was administered in January 
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and February 2015, suggested that midlevel providers’ attitudes changed over the course 
of the study.  Midlevel providers’ comments that I recorded throughout 2013 and 2014, 
mainly, were negative, but their questionnaire responses, mostly, were positive.  When 
asked how he interpreted the discrepancy between my fieldnotes and the questionnaire 
results, N replied: 
Well, I guess that means we’ve finally surrendered.  At some point, you just give 
up and make the best of it, or try to.  I know that X is still planning to quit, but 
even he’s quit his bitching about EMRs.  Personally, I feel defeated, but the EMR 
is here to stay.  I still don’t like it [the EMR] but I have to suck it up. 
 
Similar to midlevel providers, nurses also appeared to adjust their positions on the EMRs 
(e.g., see the previous discussion on relating moves), softening somewhat over the course 
of the study, but the questionnaire results suggested that their opinions remained, mostly, 
negative.  Physicians’ attitudes, however, remained negative throughout the course of this 
study. 
I asked physicians working at Hospital H and physicians I met at medical 
conferences why they believed that physicians, generally, appeared so steadfast in their 
disdain for EMRs.  As Dr. F explained, “It’s because EMRs have been around for 20 
years, but they are not very advanced.  The programs were not designed by medical 
people, and that’s why we hate them [EMRs].”  Dr. Bukata, the editor of Emergency 
Medical Abstracts, indicated that although some types of physicians—namely, those with 
office-based practices, such as generalists and pediatricians—appeared to be embracing 
EMRs, he believed resolutely that most emergency medicine physicians would not 
change their views on EMRs.  He explained his position in an e-mail that he sent to me: 
It’s very important to make a distinction between EMRs in physicians’ offices and 
EMRs in the emergency room: doctor’s offices don’t see an average of 2.5 new 
patients per hour, have all new patients per CMS [Centers for Medicare Medicaid 
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and Services] charting criteria, and need ROS [review of systems], FH [family 
history], SH [social history], etc.  Plus, with 20% of patients admitted, there is a 
lot of interval progress notes and decision making that needs to be documented by 
emergency physicians. . . .  We are having EMRs driven down our throats by a 
government providing hospitals with financial incentives to install these 
inventions of the devil. (R. Bukata, personal communication, February 3, 2014)  
  
Dr. Milne, Chief of Staff at South Huron Hospital in Ontario, Canada, stopped short of 
calling EMRs “inventions of the devil,” but he condemned them because “computers 
cannot read facial expressions, talk to patients, meet the family, or provide care.”  He 
explained that because EMRs were not mandated in Canada, he could decide if his 
emergency department would adopt an EMR: 
In my situation, EMRs vendors are always coming to my institution and I say to 
them, “Prove to me that it improves patients’ outcomes.  Show me the literature.” 
They don’t have the data because EMRs don’t improve outcomes!  So, I say, 
“Thank you very much, but no thanks.”  Physicians, not computers, improve 
patient outcomes. 
 
In sum, the majority of providers’ judging moves condemned EMRs, generally, 
and Hospital H’s EMR, specifically.  Although midlevel providers’ moves were negative, 
questionnaire results indicated that their opinions shifted over this 18-month study.  
Nurses’ moves were varied, but physicians condemned unanimously the EMR.  In the 
next section, I discuss findings related to structurational divergence and their implications 
for providers at Hospital H. 
Structurational Divergence 
As explained in chapter three, structurational divergence (SD) theory proposes 
that recurring, intractable conflict cycles are based in oppositional meaning structures that 
impede effective communication and goal attainment (Nicotera & Clinkscales, 2010).  
The theory hinges on two concepts: SD-nexus, the unresolvable conflict that arises from 
the intersection of incompatible structures (Nicotera & Clinkscales, 2010); and SD-cycle, 
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a self-perpetuating downward spiral of negative, ineffective, or aggressive 
communication that is rooted in unresolved conflict (Nicotera & Mahon, 2013).  
According to Nicotera and Mahon (2013), immobilization, interrupted goal attainment, 
and stymied individual and organizational development characterize the SD-cycle, which 
predicts negative outcomes among nurses (e.g., burnout, bullying, poor job satisfaction, 
and turnover).  What pushes an SD-nexus into an SD-cycle, however, has not been 
established empirically (A. Nicotera, personal communication, April 7, 2015), but Dr. 
Nicotera and I agreed that my findings, discussed next, suggest that loss of agency 
characterizes the SD-nexus to SD-cycle escalation. 
Observational findings that pointed to the presence of SD in Hospital H’s 
emergency room were assembled from fieldnotes and interview transcripts, and, then, 
grouped into five themes: (a) conflicting structures, (b) providers’ satisfaction and 
burnout, (c) “us” versus “them” language, (d) negative communication spirals between 
providers and administrators, and (e) providers’ diminished agency.  Moreover, results 
from the questionnaire items were summed and revealed varying degrees of SD and 
burnout among providers.  These findings are described in the sections that follow. 
Conflicting Structures 
Federal mandates, hospital policies, physicians’ goals, and patients’ needs collide 
in the emergency room at Hospital H every day; thus, the emergency room, inherently, is 
an SD-nexus.  Providers identified three examples of “federal interference” that they 
believed placed them at the intersection of conflicting structures: the Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), the Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH), and the Centers for Medicare and  
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Medicaid Services (CMS).  These three external structures, according to Dr. O, 
“intertwine and create unrealistic demands on emergency rooms.”  As she elaborated: 
Because of EMTALA, HITECH, and CMS, we [physicians] have to comply with 
tons of mandates.  It all trickles down, from the government and from the 
hospital, and we’re stuck in the middle.  If we order a test to meet a mandate, then 
the bill goes up and the patient is upset.  We skip the test, save the patient some 
money, then the CEO clamors, “You didn’t meet metrics.”  We can appease either 
the policy makers or the patients.  Which is it going to be? 
 
Dr. O and most of the physicians at Hospital H likened their predicament (i.e., appeasing 
policy makers or patients) to being “stuck between a rock and a hard place.” 
The first external structure, EMTALA, passed by the U.S. Congress in 1986, 
requires that “all hospitals participating in the Medicare program must provide 
emergency department screening evaluation and stabilization” (Zink, 2006, p. 270), 
regardless of patients’ ability to pay.  The unfunded mandate was intended to curb patient 
dumping, a practice whereby “some hospitals refused to accept, or inappropriately 
transferred indigent or uninsured patients to other hospitals” (Zink, 2006, p. 270).  
EMTALA, thus, ensured that patients with medical emergencies who sought care in 
emergency rooms would receive emergency medical care. 
Over the years, however, EMTALA has been reinterrupted as guaranteeing free 
care irrespective of the seriousness of patients’ medical problems.  As a result, 
increasingly, emergency rooms provide primary care for uninsured and publically insured 
patients without healthcare homes, and patients seeking care after hours and on weekends 
(Overton, in press-b).  Consequently, nearly half of all emergency room visits are for 
“nonurgent” conditions that are treatable in primary care settings; thus, EMTALA 
contributed, albeit inadvertently, to emergency room overcrowding (Overton, in press-b).   
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Dr. E explained that emergency rooms are the only part of the healthcare system 
required by federal law to provide free care to “anyone who shows up, no matter the 
reason.”  As he said, “Primary care docs don’t have to take patients.  If a patient doesn’t 
have insurance, private practice docs can say, ‘No.’ You’ve seen those signs: ‘We have 
the right to refuse service.’  It’s like that.”  Dr. E lamented: 
Because of EMTALA, patient volume has gotten out of hand.  Got a toothache?  
Come to the emergency room!  It’s free!  Need aspirin for your headache?  Why 
bother going to the drugstore and paying two bucks for it when you can get it here 
for free?  The problem is that EMTALA doesn’t distinguish between medical 
emergencies and primary care issues.  Most toothaches and headaches don’t 
constitute medical emergencies but I have to treat them as if they were 
emergencies, and, meanwhile, we have heart attacks, strokes, gunshots, you name 
it, piling up in overcrowded emergency rooms.  Turn a patient away?  That’s an 
automatic $25,000 fine.  These patients need care, absolutely, but not emergency 
care at the expense of the truly sick and dying. 
Nurse L also discussed the role that EMTALA played in emergency room 
overcrowding: 
We need to be more proactive with public health initiatives and teach people 
where and how to access appropriate care.  Because of EMTALA, they’ll come to 
us in the emergency room with acute care issues.  The emergency room isn’t the 
most appropriate place for these issues.  We’re getting overwhelmed, but where 
are you going to tell these people to go?  You have to treat them or risk an 
EMTALA violation, which can get you fired or cost you your [medical] license. 
Providers, thus, decried EMTALA, largely, because they believed that it stripped them of 
agency.  For example, Dr. F commented, “Let me direct the nonurgent cases somewhere 
else, especially if we’re busy with critical patients, but EMTALA says I can’t be trusted 
to do what’s medically or ethically right for my patients.” 
The second external structure, the HITECH Act, was described in chapter two.  
HITECH was passed in 2009 as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
and its major goals included reducing healthcare costs, improving healthcare quality and 
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coordination, reducing medical errors, improving IT infrastructure, and creating a 
national electronic health information exchange (Pipersburgh, 2011).  Providers at 
Hospital H cited the HITECH Act, frequently, in their complaints about EMRs and 
forced adoption.  For example, Dr. G shared the following diatribe: 
The government forced EMRs down everyone’s throat.  These are broken 
systems, but do you know who is benefiting?  The companies that make them.  
They now have zero motivation to make EMRs any better because they have a 
captive audience of forced adopters.  I’m dumbfounded by HITECH.  There had 
to be dirty money involved or lobbyists somewhere who made that happen.  This 
legislation is going to kill patients. 
 
Although not all providers believed that the legislation was funded by “dirty 
money,” there was a consensus among physicians that the HITECH Act, in conjunction 
with CMS policies, created unresolvable conflicts.  For example, Dr. E said: 
I do things that I know are not in the patient’s best interest because of the EMRs, 
the mandates, et cetera. . . .  I’m running up huge bills; I’m doing things that 
won’t help, won’t improve anything, and won’t change outcomes [because] of 
hospital policy and CMS mandates.  I feel like I’m a cog in a horrible, broken 
machine. 
 
Dr. E explained that the “CMS mandates” he referenced were the time-based 
performance metrics that CMS devised to reduce emergency room overcrowding, which 
was caused, in part, by EMTALA. 
The last external structure, metrics, are recorded by EMRs and tracked closely by 
CMS.  The most important metrics, according to providers at Hospital H, measure 
patients’ length of stay and “door-to-doc times.”  Dr. O explained that door-to-doc refers 
either to the time that it takes a provider to “lay eyes on the patient and do a quick 
assessment, such as ‘the patient’s not going to die this minute’ or ‘the patient needs 
immediate attention’” or to the time that it takes for a provider “to order some sort of 
diagnostic test, like blood sugar or CBC [complete blood count].”  She added, “Ordering 
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tests is easier and faster, especially if we have a lot of patients.  It drives up the bill, but if 
you don’t meet metrics, CMS doesn’t pay the hospital.”  When asked if metrics could 
incentivize faster care and, possibly, alleviate overcrowding, Dr. O replied: 
The problem with metrics is that acuity isn’t factored in.  There’s a difference 
between someone with a stroke or a toothache.  If you have a choice between 
seeing the stroke or the toothache, are you going to leave the stroke so that you 
can be sure to say “hello” to the toothache within 10 minutes of arrival?  I don’t 
think so.  What if you’re busy with a heart attack or car accident?  The metrics 
don’t distinguish.  The EMR says that this patient, the toothache, waited an hour 
to be seen, but the EMR doesn’t explain that you were busy saving lives down the 
hall.  So, you’re going to order a bogus test on the toothache just so you can click 
the box and stop the clock, “Yup, seen the patient.” 
 
Complicating matters for providers is that many of the metrics conflict with each 
other, “making it impossible to meet all of them simultaneously and adding to the 
unrealistic demands placed on emergency departments” (“Metric Madness,” 2014, p. 22).  
During an interview conducted with Dr. P, he opined: 
The thinking behind metrics is a “move the meat” mentality.  Get the patients in 
and out as fast as possible, and then you won’t have overcrowding.  If a hospital is 
too slow, then it loses some of its Medicare and Medicaid money.  But guess 
what?  We still have overcrowding.  Metrics don’t work.  They just run up bills 
and add to our stress.  I have to pick which metric I’m going to satisfy and hope 
that the one I don’t pick isn’t the one that will get me fired. 
 
All three external structures––EMTALA, HITECH, and CMS––intersect and 
leave emergency medicine providers feeling as if they are at an impasse: patients’ health 
and financial interests are pitted against federally mandated EMR use and “fast-care” 
metrics that, oftentimes, subject patients to unnecessary tests, and, when unmet, 
jeopardize physicians’ employment and carry fines.  The impasse left many providers at 
Hospital H feeling both immobilized and dissatisfied with their careers, which are 
hallmarks of an SD-cycle. 
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In addition to the external structures just named, there were contradictory internal 
structures that contributed to SD-nexus conditions at Hospital H.  For example, because 
revenue at Hospital H had fallen, administrators decided to advertise heavily the 
hospitals’ emergency medical services.  Billboards, print advertisements, and radio 
advertisements described “short wait times,” but Q, the nurse manage, worried that the 
EMR, which resulted in slower care delivery and increased lengths of stay, would 
prohibit providers from delivering the timely care that the advertisements promised.  As 
Q commented, “We’re getting a lot busier because the CEO is pushing marketing, but 
they don’t understand that we’re not equipped to meet the demand.  The EMRs slow us 
down and we’re short staffed.”  She went on to explain: 
Patient volume went from 19,000 to around 33,000 this past year, but 
administration hasn’t funded nurse positions to keep pace.  I was allowed to hire 
temporary nurses, but I wanted to offer permanent positions.  Administration 
balked at the $2 an hour raise requested by at least one potential hire, so he left.  
Three other nurses have also left for various reasons, so now we have a real 
shortage.  That means that existing nurses have to work overtime and now 
administration is complaining about paying them time and a half.  They could 
have given this guy his $2 an hour raise, but, instead, they’re paying twice that in 
overtime pay.  They wonder why we can’t meet their time quotas?  There are too 
few nurses doing too much work!  Of course, the patients are going to wait!  With 
slow docs on the EMRs, they [patients] wait even longer! 
Most of the nurses also complained that the advertisements added to their work-
related stress.  Nurse B bemoaned the advertisements because not only did they promise 
short wait times but they recast patients from “people seeking medical care to customers 
calling the shots.”  He described the patient/customer dilemma: 
The CEO’s motto is “Make the patients happy,” but we [nurses and physicians] 
are in the “make people well” business, which doesn’t always make them happy.  
There’s a difference between good customer service and good medical care.  
Good customer service is more expensive.  Ever heard of therapeutic radiation?  
Patients insist on the X-ray because they’re sure they have a broken leg.  The  
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doctor assures them, but nope, only an X-ray will do.  The X-ray costs more, but 
without it, the doctors get complaints.  The customer is always right, even when 
he’s not. 
Nurse B and several other nurses complained about the untenable situation that 
they believed they were put in by administrators’ customer service mandates.  As Nurse 
Y said: 
How do I defend practicing “so-called medicine” when I know in my heart that 
this isn’t right?  Your kid doesn’t need a CT scan because he bumped his head, 
but you demanded it.  Now I’m the one wheeling your kid down to radiology to 
get his head zapped for no good reason and I know he’ll lose IQ points because of 
it.  Is it right?  No.  Is it what I have to do to keep my job?  Yes. 
Physicians also complained about hospital policies that left them immobilized and 
angry.  Dr. E believed that his hands were tied by “policies that increasingly marginalized 
physicians.”  He admitted to writing prescriptions that he knew patients did not need, to 
avoid violating customer service directives: 
Yeah, you write for the antibiotics and the narcotics just to stave off the patient 
complaints, because those can get you fired if the CEO gets bad patient surveys 
that say, “The doctor didn’t give me antibiotics” or “The doctor didn’t give me 
pain meds.”  That almost happened to me.  A patient complained that I didn’t give 
her kid antibiotics for his virus.  A virus!  You don’t give antibiotics for a virus.  
She wrote a letter and I had to answer to the CEO.  So, now I give the antibiotics.  
I don’t feel like I have a choice. 
Dr. P expressed similar sentiments: 
I hate what medicine is becoming: Give patients a door prize [a prescription] and 
send them off with a smile on their face.  Be sure to give them every test they ask 
for, whether they need it or not.  I’m starting to think the MD after my name 
means “Mustn’t Deny.”  I feel bad about it, especially when it comes to the cost 
of everything, and what I know they charge for what we do, the grossly inflated 
charges, I feel terrible.  People, the public, think I have a voice in this.  I don’t.  
They think greedy docs made it this way.  It’s the hospital and I don’t have the 
power to change it.  I feel guilty that I’m a part of a broken healthcare system, but 
what can I do? 
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I observed that these external structures (EMTALA, HITECH, and CMS), 
together with internal structures (e.g., Hospital H’s customer service policies), collided 
regularly with patients’ best interests and providers’ goals.  Despite what patients wanted 
(e.g., “therapeutic radiation”), what was best for them––namely, affordable care and 
better health––could not be delivered by providers who were constrained by 
contradictory structures that restricted and, oftentimes, penalized them.  According to Dr. 
F., providers wanted to “first and foremost, do no harm and, second, keep their jobs.”  
Conflicting structures meant that providers were immobilized, mired in unresolvable 
conflict, and experienced erosion of development (e.g., patient complaints and/or poor 
performance reviews), which, taken together, suggested an SD-nexus in the emergency 
room at Hospital H (see Figure 5.3).  Additional evidence that pointed to SD at Hospital 
H is described next. 
 


















Figure 5.3.  The Interpenetration of Contradictory Structures and the Resulting Negative 
Spiral 
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Providers’ Satisfaction and Burnout 
Because many of the providers at Hospital H felt “stuck,” given the conflicting 
structures, they also felt dissatisfied.  Nurse A told me, “We’re kind of damned if we do 
and damned if we don’t; no matter what we do, we piss somebody off.  Would you be 
happy working in a place like this?”  She added, “Since the EMRs, my work satisfaction 
has gone way down.”   An older nurse volunteered, “I was a nurse for 33 years before 
they put these computers in.  I almost quit.  I would [quit] if I could get a job doing 
something else.”  X, a midlevel provider, revealed that he planned to resign from 
Hospital H and open an urgent care clinic.  He spent his weekends renovating a rented 
space and preparing to open his practice.  As he explained: 
My goal is to be out of here before the electronic TSheets are put in.  And you 
know what?  I’m not putting an EMR in my clinic.  I’ll take the hit from CMS.  
I’ll save more [money] by not buying an EMR than CMS would pay me in 
Medicare money anyway.  Plus, and I know this sounds crazy, but I might 
actually like my job again.  It’ll be nice looking patients in the eye and having 
conversations again.11  
Over the course of this study, several nurses resigned from Hospital H and a 
physician left.  The most shocking, from my perspective, was the resignation by Q, the 
emergency room nurse manager and my sponsor.  Q, who had worked for Company S, 
stayed behind after Corporation G bought Hospital H, because she believed strongly in 
the hospital’s potential.  As she explained, “I believed in what the administrators wanted 
to do.  I had faith in the nurses and docs, and knew that they, we, could accomplish a lot.  
11X, eventually, did open his clinic, but because he was unable to generate enough 
income to resign from Hospital H, he continued working part-time in the emergency 
room. 
244 
I wanted to be a part of that, so I stayed.”  A few years later, on August 1, 2014, she 
announced her resignation.  The next day, she told me: 
Sixty percent of the reason I’m leaving is the EMR.  They’re going live with 
electronic TSheet any day and I don’t want to be here.  Unlike the CPOE, the 
nurses don’t know how to use the TSheets, so they cannot help the docs, plus 
patients will be impacted and length of stay will go way up.  I would have been 
held accountable despite administrators’ claims to understand that there will be 
some hiccups.  Past experience tells me that they are not understanding and will 
come down on me when things don’t go well, plus the docs and nurses complain 
to me as well.  I’m caught in the middle. 
She also implied that several physicians who were unhappy with the impending changes 
had started looking for jobs elsewhere, “When the docs jump ship, I don’t want to be the 
one left holding the bag.  It’s time to go.”  Q agreed to remain in her position as the nurse 
manager until Hospital H found someone to replace her.12  
Because so many providers at Hospital H complained that they were unhappy and 
wanted to quit their jobs, I speculated that some of them suffered burnout, a surface-level 
manifestation of SD (Nicotera & Mahon, 2012).  I asked providers if they experienced 
symptoms of depersonalization or emotional exhaustion, the dimensions that are used 
most commonly to measure burnout in medical providers (Rehder et al., 2014).  For 
example, I asked, “Do you ever feel callous toward other people?” and “Do you ever feel 
burned out from you work?”  Nurse B said, “I’m more cynical than I’ve ever been.  I still 
enjoy looking after patients, but the system frustrates me.  Maybe I am a little [burned 
out], but not as much as I could be.” 
12When the administrators at Hospital H were unable to find a qualified candidate to 
replace her, Q agreed to remain the nurse manager, but she lobbied actively to delay the 
electronic TSheet implementation.  In February 2015, she withdrew her resignation.  As 
of May 2015, providers still were using paper TSheets.   
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Nurse J believed, emphatically, that most of her fellow nurses experienced 
symptoms associated with burnout, regularly, and, sometimes, daily.  As she explained, 
“A lot of people are getting more and more burned out.  I see it every day.  Some people 
are just there for the money, honestly.  The passion, the care, is gone.”  Several of the 
physicians admitted that they experienced burnout frequently.  As Dr. E said: 
Yeah, I think a lot of us are burned out.  I can tell because some of us just go 
through the motions sometimes.  It’s frustrating, because these days, you don’t get 
to practice clinical medicine; you have to practice totally defensive medicine 
based on covering your ass.  You have EMRs, metrics, and pissed off patients 
threatening to sue you at every turn.  Cynical?  Callous?  Yeah, I guess I am.  I 
think the system [and] the policies have to change before it’s going to improve for 
any of us. 
In January and February 2015, I administered a questionnaire that solicited 
providers’ perceptions about their career and/or workplace satisfaction and burnout.  In 
response to the prompt, “Since I’ve begun using EMRs . . .,” a third of the respondents (n 
= 10) reported that they had considered quitting their jobs, another third reported that 
they had considered changing jobs, and 10% (n = 3) had considered retiring.  Twenty 
percent (n = 6) reported that they had considered changing careers altogether since 
Hospital H installed the EMR.  Thirty percent (n = 9), however, reported that they were 
more satisfied with their jobs following the EMR adoption; of those respondents, five 
were nurses, three were technicians, and one identified as “other.”  Eighty percent of 
respondents reported being very satisfied, satisfied, or somewhat satisfied with their 
careers in emergency medicine, but only 63% would choose a career in emergency 
medicine if they had it to do over again.  Among physicians (n = 5), two were satisfied 
with their careers, two were dissatisfied, and one was not sure.  Fifteen out of 17 nurses  
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were satisfied with their careers, and all three midlevel providers were satisfied with their 
careers. 
Despite observational evidence accrued over the previous year that indicated 
many providers were unhappy with their careers in emergency medicine, results from the 
questionnaire, which was administered near the end of the study, suggested that the 
majority of providers, generally, were satisfied with their careers.  Physicians who 
completed the questionnaire were split on career satisfaction, which, according to Dr. F, 
was because “physicians shoulder a disproportionate share of the EMR burden, so you 
would expect them to be more unhappy compared with nurses.”  He added, “I’m 
surprised that two docs actually said they were satisfied.”  
When asked how he interpreted the discrepancy between my fieldnotes and the 
questionnaire results, Dr. A replied: 
It’s important to distinguish between how much I hate the EMR and how I view 
my career as a whole.  Before the EMR, I really liked my job.  The last few years? 
Not so much.  If I have to choose “satisfied” or “dissatisfied,” overall, I’d have to 
say I’ve been satisfied.  It’s been a good career.  Until the EMR, that is.  Am I 
looking around?  Sure.  If I can find a hospital with a better EMR, then I’ll go.   
Dr. G gave a similar response: 
I like being a physician because I enjoy taking care of people, but I hate the EMR. 
I’m dissatisfied with the EMR, not my career choice.  If I feel burned out, it’s 
because of EMRs, not patients.  Trust me, I rarely felt burned out before these 
things [EMRs] showed up in the emergency room. 
Several of the questionnaire respondents reported experiencing emotional 
exhaustion (see Table 5.3) and depersonalization (see Table 5.4), which are indicators of 
burnout in medical providers.  On the emotional exhaustion item (“I feel burned out from 
my work”), the most common response was “once a month or less” (n = 10), followed by 
“a few times a year or less” (n = 6) and “never” (n = 6).  On the depersonalization item  
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Table 5.3 
Responses to the Questionnaire Item, “I feel burned out from my work.”
    User Type 
 Response        MD            MLP            RN             Tech.          Other              Total 
     (n = 5)        (n = 3)       (n = 17)        (n = 4)         (n = 1)          (N = 30) 
Never     40% (2)       0% (0)         6% (1)         75% (3)       0% (0)          20% (6) 
Few times     0% (0)         67% (2)       18% (3)       0% (0)         100% (1)      20% (6) 
a year or less 
Once a      40% (2)       67% (2)       41% (7)       0% (0)         0% (0)          33% (10) 
month or less 
A few times     0% (0)         33% (1)       12% (2)       0% (0)         0% (0)          7% (2) 
a month
Once a week     0% (0)         0% (0)         6% (1)         0% (0)         0% (0)          3% (1) 
A few times     20% (1)       0% (0)         12% (2)       25% (1)       0% (0)          13% (4) 
a week 
Daily     0% (0)         0% (0)         6% (1)         0% (0)         0% (0)          3% (1) 
Note. MD = physician; MLP = midlevel provider; RN = nurse. 
(“I have become more callous toward people since I took this job”), “never” was the 
most common response (n = 11), followed by “a few times a year or less” (n = 6) and 
“few times a month” (n = 6).  For both items, responses were coded 0 (“never”) through 6 
(“daily”), and then summed.  Respondents’ scores ranged from 0 to 12, with a mean score 
of 3.8; scores above 3, according to McManus et al. (2003), suggest burnout.  Individual 
scores (see Table 5.5) indicated that 23% of providers experienced burnout (n = 7): one 
physician, five nurses, and one technician scored 3 or above on the burnout scale. 
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Table 5.4 
Responses to the Questionnaire Item, “I have become more callous toward people since  I 
took this job.” 
    User Type 
 Response        MD            MLP            RN             Tech.          Other              Total 
     (n = 5)        (n = 3)       (n = 17)        (n = 4)         (n = 1)          (N = 30) 
Never     20% (1)       67% (2)       29% (5)       75% (3)       0% (0)          37% (11) 
Few times     20% (1)       0% (0)         24% (4)       0% (0)         100% (1)      20% (6) 
a year or less 
Once a      0% (0)         33% (1)       12% (2)         0% (0)         0% (0)        10% (3) 
month or less 
A few times     40% (2)       0% (0)         24% (4)       0% (0)         0% (0)          20% (6) 
a month
Once a week     0% (0)         0% (0)         0% (0)         25% (1)       0% (0)          3% (1) 
A few times     20% (1)       0% (0)         6% (1)         0% (0)         0% (0)          7% (2) 
a week 
Daily     0% (0)         0% (0)         6% (1)         0% (0)         0% (0)          3% (1) 
Note. MD = physician; MLP = midlevel provider; RN = nurse. 
To review, providers at Hospital H verbalized frequently their unhappiness and 
dissatisfaction over the course of this study, with many providers citing the EMR and 
conflicting structures as the primary sources of their grief, frustration, and displeasure. 
Several dissatisfied providers resigned their positions and/or indicated that they were 
looking for new jobs.  Most of the questionnaire respondents, however, reported that they 
were satisfied with their careers.  Several providers explained the discrepancy between 
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Table 5.5 
Individual Burnout Scores. 
     ID    Σ           x̄              role          ID             Σ           x̄              role 
     1    7          3.5*     RN          16             8    4*         RN 
     2    3          1.5     RN 17   1           .5             MLP        
     3    3          1.5     MD 18              2          1               RN 
     4    3          1.5 MLP  19              9          4.5*           tech 
     5           10         5*            MD 20              2          1               RN    
     6           0           0     RN 21              10        5*             RN 
     7           1          .5     RN 22              0          0               tech 
     8      3          1.5     other 23              12         6*             RN 
     9               0          0     tech 24              3          1.5            RN 
    10           4          2     MD 25              2          1               RN 
    11           6          3*     RN 26              4          2               RN 
    12           0          0 tech 27              0          0               MD   
    13           2          1 RN 28              2          1               MLP 
    14           4          2 RN 29              5          2.5            RN 
    15           3          1.5     RN 30              5          2.5            MD 
Note. ID = respondent; MD = physician; MLP = midlevel provider; RN = nurse. 
* Indicates burnout.
what they said in interviews and what they reported on the questionnaire: They were 
satisfied with their careers, especially in the years before EMRs were adopted, but they 
were dissatisfied with EMRs, which impacted, marginally, their overall career 
satisfaction.  Providers complained that they experienced emotional exhaustion and 
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depersonalization regularly, and questionnaire results revealed that 23% of providers 
suffered burnout.  Next, I describe findings associated with “us” versus “them” language, 
which contributed to providers’ dissatisfaction and workplace stress. 
 “Us” versus “Them” Language 
Most of the “us” versus “them” encounters that I witnessed were between floor 
nurses and emergency room nurses, and although not all of those exchanges were about 
the EMR, such exchanges contributed to SD-nexus conditions.  As described previously, 
the perceived imbalance in workloads between floor nurses and emergency room nurses, 
coupled with floor nurses’ tendency to resist patient admissions, leads many emergency 
room nurses to dislike floor nurses (Eisenberg et al., 2005; Nicotera et al., 2010).  
Additionally, Nicotera and Mahon (2012) found that discordant interactions between 
floor nurses and emergency room nurses contributed to SD-cycle development at the 
hospital that they studied.  Discordant interactions also may lead to workplace bullying, 
which is a surface-level manifestation of SD (Nicotera et al., 2014).  I observed many 
instances of discordant interactions that contained “us” versus “them” language between 
floor nurses and emergency room nurses, with many of discordant interactions being 
exacerbated regularly by the EMR.  Interactions, such as those described below, 
contributed to SD conditions at Hospital H. 
I observed Nurse A on the phone one afternoon, and, judging from her facial 
expression (e.g., furrowed brow and pursed lips), I surmised that she was upset.  My 
suspicion was confirmed when she slammed down the phone a few minutes later and 
proclaimed, “I hate upstairs nurses!”  She explained that the floor nurse she had been 
speaking with on the phone “called down demanding an update on an admitted patient,” 
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but, as A pointed out, “she can look on the EMR just as well as I can and see the status.  
It’s just a power play.” 
Nurse J and Nurse Y told me that upstairs nurses engage in “turf work” frequently 
to avoid using the EMR.  For example, J told me: 
The upstairs nurses have a problem with direct admits because they don’t want to 
do the [patient’s medical] history.  It takes too long to do in the EMR, so they just 
turf it to us.  They dump their work on us while we’re busy with patients, and it 
pisses me off. 
Y further explained: 
A direct admit bypasses the emergency room and goes straight to the floor, so if 
you are at your doctor’s office and he says, “I think you should be admitted for a 
few days,” you show up at the main entrance [to the hospital] and get sent up to 
the floor.  Well, the nurses up there don’t want to do the work so they send the 
patients down here and now we have to triage them, do all the paperwork, and 
then the patients get sent up.  That ties up things down here and adds to our 
workload.  
On another occasion, I observed a technician returning from a trip to “the floor” 
(i.e., the intensive care unit), pushing a patient on gurney who was supposed to have been 
admitted.  When a nurse asked why the technician had returned with the patient, the 
technician responded that the “floor nurse refused to take him because they were busy.”  
The technician added, “They had three patients.  Poor babies are getting slammed up 
there.”  The nurse replied, “So?  We have 12 [patients].  We’re busier.”  The nurse 
immediately picked up the phone and dialed the floor nurse’s extension, but no one 
answered the phone.  Thirty minutes later, the technician told me that a floor nurse 
“called down and consented,” finally, to the admission. 
The “power plays” described above were commonplace.  Typically, power plays 
involved floor nurses refusing or delaying admissions, which meant that emergency room 
nurses had to continue providing care for the admitted patients and, simultaneously, 
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treating new emergency room patients.  One afternoon, I heard Nurse J explain to Nurse 
M that a floor nurse had refused an admission because “she was on her lunch break and 
didn’t want to be disturbed.”  J rolled her eyes and said, “Must be nice.”  M asked, “She 
actually wants us to hold a patient so she can finish her lunch?”  J nodded.  M waved a 
technician over and instructed her to take the patient immediately to that floor.  J laughed 
and said, “You’re so evil,” to which M replied, “Fuck that bitch.  We’ve got MVAs 
[motor vehicle accidents] and chest pains rolling in.” 
I asked Nurse B if he had experienced incidents such as those I had witnessed.  
He told me that confrontations between floor nurses and emergency room nurses 
happened routinely and “on almost every shift.”  Moreover, the incidents that I described, 
from B’s perspective, were “rather civil.”  He commented: 
Nursing, as a profession, can be evil.  I think some nurses are undermining. 
Nurses can be conniving.  They’re bullies.  They’re often not very supportive of 
one another.  I speak from experience.  I don’t think nursing is the profession it 
could, or should, be.    
 
When asked if he thought the interactions between floor nurses and emergency room 
nurses could be characterized as downward spirals of negative, ineffective, or aggressive 
communication, B replied: 
Absolutely.  The problem is that you got two sets of nurses who are at odds and 
there’s no satisfying anyone.  We talk past each other all the time.  For a lot of 
nurses, here and on the floor, there’s no getting past the “us” versus “them” 
mentality.  It’s even worse between the doctors. 
 
Although several physicians complained to me about their encounters with 
“upstairs doctors,” I did not observe discordant interactions between emergency medicine 
physicians and consulting or admitting physicians at Hospital H.  Dr. E assured me that 
“just because you didn’t see it doesn’t mean it doesn’t happen.”  I told him that in the 2 
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decades that Dr. C and I had been a couple, I had witnessed enough discordant 
interactions between emergency medicine physicians and specialists to know that the 
phenomenon was real.  Dr. E conveyed that, typically, his “problem exchanges” were 
rooted in “ego concerns,” explaining that 
most of the time it’s specialists on call who don’t want to be bothered with an 
admission.  They don’t trust our medical judgment, so they put us off by asking 
for every test in the book.  For example, I had a patient with appendicitis.  It was a 
clear-cut case.  The surgeon wanted a CT scan, because, I guess, the MD behind 
my name isn’t as good as the MD behind his name.  So, we go through this 
rigmarole, back and forth, for a few hours.  Finally, the patient gets admitted with, 
you guessed it, appendicitis!  Now it’s a surgical emergency and we’ve wasted 
time because this jerk doesn’t want to get out of bed and come in. . . .  People 
seem to forget the fact that emergency medicine is a specialty.  I’m boarded.  I did 
a residency.  I know my shit.  Respect that and when I say “appendicitis,” you can 
bet it’s not my first appendicitis.  I know what I’m talking about. 
Three other physicians shared similar stories and complained that specialists’ 
antics (e.g., ordering tests to avoid or delay patients’ admissions) added to both 
healthcare costs and patients’ length of stay.  As Dr. O said: 
We’re already clicking on tests just to stop the clock because we don’t have a 
choice, and, on top of that, now you want a CT scan?  A blood test might add 
$100 to the bill, but a CT scan?  Now we’re talking thousands of dollars!  Plus, 
what do you think that does to [patient] length of stay [metrics]?  Now I’m really 
getting screwed, because this patient is going to be here all night and the hospital 
is pushing to get him or her out in under 4 hours. 
In sum, tensions between floor nurses and emergency room nurses were 
exacerbated by the EMRs, because floor nurses shifted regular documentation chores that 
involved the EMR onto emergency room nurses (e.g., refusing direct admissions).  
Negative communication spirals and bullying among nurses were present, suggesting an 
SD-cycle at Hospital H.  Emergency medicine physicians also experienced discordant 
interactions with other physicians, which intensified SD-nexus conditions, albeit 
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indirectly, by violating metrics and adding to patients’ length of stay.  Discordant 
interactions between providers and administrators are described next. 
Negative Communication Spirals between Providers and Administrators 
I observed that relationships and communication between the emergency 
medicine providers and administrators at Hospital H were strained, which contributed to 
SD conditions and resulted in negative communication spirals between providers and 
administrators.  As explained below, three themes emerged as I reviewed my fieldnotes 
and interview transcripts: (a) there was a lack of collegiality because providers, generally, 
viewed administrators negatively; (b) providers believed that administrators 
communicated too little information about the electronic TSheet installation; and (c) 
providers and administrators had different, often contrasting, recollections of their 
interactions with each other. 
Lack of collegiality.  Providers, like Dr. F, defined administrators as hospital 
executives and officers working in “the C-suite” (i.e., corporate office suite), as well as 
members of the IT department.  Although I would not have categorized IT staff as 
administrators, Dr. F explained that “they’re not ‘us’; they’re not emergency room, so 
they’re C-suite.  They have offices upstairs and they try to tell us what to do, so they’re 
administration as far as I’m concerned.”  As explained below, providers, generally, did 
not regard administrators favorably for two main reasons: providers thought that 
administrators neither listened to them nor supported them in their work. 
Providers did not view administrators as listening to them.  Nearly all of the 
providers I interviewed believed that administrators did not listen to them because, 
mainly, administrators did not solicit providers’ opinions during the EMR selection 
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process.  Eighty-three percent of questionnaire respondents reported that none of them 
had been asked by administrators for input on the EMR systems being considered for 
adoption; the remaining 17% of respondents reported that the EMR already had been 
installed before they began working at Hospital H, and, thus, the point was moot.  Many 
providers had offered administrators unsolicited feedback about the EMR, but 88% of 
questionnaire respondents believed that administrators ignored providers’ concerns.  Dr. 
E said that he advised members of the IT department not to design the generic, electronic 
TSheets with “pick boxes, because boxes slow everything down.”  He advocated for a 
free-text charting platform with voice recognition capability, which would have been 
“more user friendly.”  Later, during an EMR training session, he saw an electronic 
TSheet template and, afterward, he told me, “They obviously didn’t take my advice.  It’s 
all pick boxes.” 
One of Hospital H’s vice presidents consented to an e-mail interview, and, when 
asked whose input was taken into account when deciding to purchase the McKesson-
made Paragon system, she replied, “We all agreed with input from the emergency room 
physicians.”  The head of the IT department, however, later contradicted the vice 
president when he said, “Corporate made the decision . . . .  Providers had no choice 
regarding the selection of EMR.”  Dr. F described, from his perspective, providers’ 
involvement in the EMR adoption process: 
We [providers] made recommendations, but their minds were made up.  They 
[administrators] said, “No, we’re sticking with Paragon.”  It’s a horrible system!  I 
am less than happy with Paragon.  We made suggestions.  We tried to talk to 
them, they nodded their heads, pretended to listen, but they [administrators] don’t 
care about us.  We told them Paragon was bad, but they didn’t listen. 
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Q admitted that one of the many reasons that she resigned was “not being listened 
to” by administrators: 
I can’t be an effective manager when my input isn’t taken into account, especially 
when I could have fixed some of the problems.  They’re pushing generic TSheets 
on us, but I could have gotten the real thing for a song.  The actual TSheet system 
is around $55,000, but I talked them [leaders of Company S] down to $35,000.  I 
brought this up in several meetings and no one said anything.  I sent e-mails and 
reports [to administrators], and there was no response.  No one responded!  That 
was the last nail in the coffin.  My nurse director told me basically to drop it.  I 
handed in my resignation the next day. 
Nurse B admitted that he believed Q was ineffective as the emergency room nurse 
manager because of administrators: 
She’s run up against too many barriers.  She can’t achieve any more.  She’s tried 
and she’s been denied.  They [administrators] stopped listening to her a long time 
ago.  At this point, they are waiting for the consultant’s report to decide what to 
do next. 
B explained that Hospital H’s administrators hired a consulting firm to review emergency 
room operations and make recommendations: 
This firm was hired to tell administration what Q, in essence, is paid to do: assess 
patient flow and determine appropriate nursing coverage.  They [administrators] 
are paying upwards of $25,000 for this report.  That money would have gone a 
long way toward fixing some of the problems in the emergency room.  No wonder 
Q resigned. 
I told B that the actual, proprietary TSheet system could have been acquired for $35,000, 
to which he responded, “I’m guessing no one listened, huh?  That alone would have 
saved us all a lot of heartache.” 
Other nurses also believed that administrators rendered Q ineffective and that 
emergency room nurses, consequently, were denied a voice in hospital politics.  Nurse Y 
commented: 
Since they [administrators] cut Q off at the knees, I don’t feel that there’s anyone 
I can approach with issues.  There’s the head of nursing for the whole hospital, 
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but you can talk to her and it’s like it never happened.  She just doesn’t hear, or 
remember, or seem to care.  She’s off on another planet.  She’s a great politician, 
but she’s not a great communicator.  We’re kind of on our own down here. 
Nurse J added, “A lot of these administrators used to be nurses.  What happened?  Have 
they forgotten what it’s like to be in the trenches?  Don’t they care?  Why else don’t they 
listen?”  Nurse A responded, “The CEO makes $450,000 a year and he just got a raise.  
Where is our raise?  Oh, wait, we just got a pay cut.  Hell no, they don’t care about us.” 
Providers did not feel supported by administrators.  The other reason that 
providers disliked administrators, generally, was because providers did not feel supported 
in their work.  Not feeling supported by administrators, although not connected directly 
to the EMR adoption process, contributed to SD-nexus conditions by creating an 
unpleasant work environment for providers.  Additionally, many providers saw 
administrators as sabotaging them by making providers’ work more difficult.  For 
example, B explained that the C-suite decided, as a cost-cutting measure, that the 
registration office would close each evening at 8:00 p.m., but as B pointed out, “the 
emergency room still admits patients after 8:00 p.m.”  Moreover, “all of the registration 
paperwork that we have to send up with the patients prints out in the registration office.”  
As he explained further: 
We can’t get to the papers to give to the floor nurses because the department is 
locked.  I figured out a way in, though: I have to walk out of the ER, down the 
hall, then climb over one of the registration desks, shimmy under a glass partition, 
get in the back way, get to the printer, and pull out our paper work.  It’s 
ridiculous, but that’s how I do it.  
When asked if anyone had requested a key or an additional printer for the emergency 
room, he replied: 
Well, administration [sic], in their great wisdom, decided to close up the 
registration office, but no, it never occurred to them to give us a key.  It’s been 
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brought to their attention and it still hasn’t been fixed.  The process is broken.  
Locking the registration department?  Not sure why.  Does it save money?  I 
doubt it, but it makes our jobs harder.  If I gain any weight, I won’t fit under the 
partition! 
I asked other night shift nurses how they retrieved the registration papers from the 
locked office.  Nurse M replied that he simply stopped collecting the paperwork, and 
when floor nurses inquired about the missing documentation, he told them where they 
could find it.  He added, “I bet they got keys to the office, but not us.  As far as I’m 
concerned, it’s not my problem anymore.” 
Several nurses complained that they had been “singled out for bad treatment” by 
administrators’ policies.  For instance, because the hospital’s cafeteria was closed at 
night, sometimes, night shift nurses would visit the physicians’ lounge for bottled water 
or soft drinks.  Nurse Y was caught “sneaking into the lounge” one evening and 
reprimanded by a nurse manager from the floor.  Soon thereafter, a security camera was 
mounted above the entrance to the physicians’ lounge.  When the nurses were thirsty, 
they implored a midlevel provider or physician to “fetch drinks” for them.  Y volunteered 
that access to the physicians’ lounge was “only half of the story,” adding, “there’s a 
paramedic buffet that we’re not allowed to touch.” 
Nurse B informed me that in addition to the physicians’ lounge, there was a 
separate lounge reserved for ambulance crews.  That lounge was adjacent to the 
emergency room and accessible only with a five-digit alarm code, but nurses were not 
given the code.  B said that the paramedics’ lounge was stocked fully with drinks, 
sandwiches, and snacks.  When asked why there was a lounge for ambulance crews but 
not a lounge for nurses, B replied: 
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The lounge is a ploy to attract ambulance traffic.  More patients mean more 
money.  If the ambulance driver bypasses another hospital to come here because 
he knows he’ll get a free meal, then the hospital just made money, and all it cost 
them [sic] was a sandwich.  We [nurses] don’t count, apparently. 
Another nurse commented, “They can eat here for free three times a day, but we can’t,” 
and another replied, “Yeah, at night, the cafeteria’s closed.  We’ve got no options, except 
what we bring ourselves.  They don’t even have vending machines we can hit up.” 
Nearly all of the 15 nurses I interviewed complained that the paramedics’ lounge 
left them feeling unappreciated and unsupported by administrators.  As Nurse A 
lamented, “It’s just not fair.  Don’t we work hard enough around here?  It’s a slap in the 
face.”  Administrators’ policies that excluded nurses from the physicians’ lounge and 
from the paramedics’ lounge contributed to nurses’ workplace dissatisfaction and eroded 
organizational identity.  As Nurse M said, “We’re not a team.  There’s no pride here.  
Hospital H is a terrible place to work.” 
To review, providers believed that administrators did not listen to their concerns 
about the EMR and did not support them in their work; consequently, many providers 
disliked the administrators.  Furthermore, providers believed that administrators rendered 
the nurse manager ineffective, which left them without a voice in hospital politics.  
Nurses, in particular, felt singled out and victimized by policies that barred them from the 
physicians’ lounge and the paramedics’ lounge.  Collectively, these factors contributed to 
providers’ workplace dissatisfaction and SD-nexus conditions, which resulted in a cycle 
of ineffective communication between providers and administrators. 
Administrators’ communication about the electronic medical records system 
installation.  When I began fieldwork at Hospital H in September 2013, I was told that 
the electronic TSheet component of the EMR was scheduled to launch on November 1, 
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but on that day, nothing happened.  I asked when and how the launch would be executed, 
but no one seemed to know.  The midlevel provider on duty that day said, “They 
[administrators] don’t tell us anything.”  I asked, again, in December, when the system 
would launch, and was told by Dr. F., “End of the year, supposedly.  At least that’s the 
rumor.”  I asked when he had last received an official update from administrators about 
the electronic TSheet component, and he replied, “Never.  I hear stuff in hallways and in 
meetings, but there’s been no ‘official’ word about anything.” 
When, in January 2014, the electronic TSheet still had not been installed, 
providers told me that the “go live” date was “not being communicated.”  Nurse Y heard 
that there were compatibility problems between the electronic TSheet and the billing 
department, which was why the installation was delayed.  Nurse B claimed he heard that 
administrators had decided to “scrap the whole thing.”  The only official communication 
from administrators about the EMR installation was an e-mail sent to physicians in June 
2014, in which the CEO required physicians to complete mandatory training in 
anticipation of the EMR relaunch (see the earlier discussion in this chapter about EMR 
training).  The EMR, however, was not relaunched or “changed in any perceptible way,” 
according to providers, and the electronic TSheets were not installed. 
By August 2014, providers complained regularly that the uncertainty about the 
electronic TSheet installation added to their work-related stress.  Dr. P lamented, “They 
[administrators] say it’s coming and then nothing happens.  I have no idea what to expect.  
Will there be training?  Will we at least get some kind of warning?”  Dr. G said he 
worried that he would come to work one day to find “electronic TSheets already installed  
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and no one here to explain how to work them.”  He added, “I have nightmares about it.  I 
just wish somebody would say something.  Let us know what’s going on!” 
Many of the providers at Hospital H were experiencing technostress, which is 
stress experienced by technology users in organizations that is “associated with decreased 
job satisfaction and organizational commitment” (Rice & Leonardi, 2014, p. 433).  
Technostress, especially in technology-adoption scenarios, can be mitigated by frequent 
updates from managers, “practice sessions and early trials to create psychological safety 
and encourage new behavior” for end users (Rice & Leonardi, 2014, p. 433), and by 
feedback sessions that allow end users to express their opinions and/or concerns, but none 
of these things happened at Hospital H.  According to Moore (2014), change in 
emergency room settings is difficult and requires the understanding and commitment of 
staff, “which in turn requires the development of an open communication culture” (p. 29).   
Strong internal communication leads to organizational effectiveness (Moore, 2014), but 
Hospital H, seemingly, lacked an internal communication network: information about the 
TSheet implementation was circulated secondhand or not at all. 
On September 20, 2014, Nurse B sent me a text message proclaiming that the “go 
live date” was imminent.  He wrote, “They recently installed extra monitors at the MD 
and MLP [midlevel provider] desks for the new EMR, so I guess it’s happening soon.”  I 
went to the emergency room that night and asked the midlevel provider, X, what he had 
been told about the new computer monitors.  X replied, “I have no idea.  No one’s told us 
anything.  They [the computer monitors] just showed up today.”  When asked if he 
believed that the monitors were related to the electronic TSheet component of the EMR, 
he replied, “Probably, but I hope my clinic will be up and running by then so I can quit.”  
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He added, “There’s been absolute silence about this.  We’ve heard nothing from 
administration [and] nothing from IT.” 
A few weeks later, when I saw that providers still were using paper TSheets and 
the new computer monitors sat unused, I asked Dr. F what he had been told about the 
electronic TSheet installation.  He said:  
I heard someone say the end of the year, but they [administrators] said that this 
time last year.  IT doesn’t know how to make this happen.  In fact, I have no faith 
in our IT department.  We’ve wanted to see 10 TSheets before any kind of launch 
and they’ve not even come up with one.  Wait, they did make one.  It’s taken 
them 6 months to build one template.  I have negative 50% faith in their ability to 
get this done. 
 
Dr. F, then, reviewed with me the timeline of promised launch dates and missed 
deadlines, explaining: 
Back in June [2014], they [administrators] told me it would take 30 days to make 
10 TSheets.  It’s October and I haven’t seen anything yet.  You have to consider 
that there are new core measures13 coming out and that means updates all the 
time.  How are they going to stay on top of updates?  They can’t.  You’re just 
chasing your tail.  We’re never going to stay current.  Look at Ebola.  You need 
those updates done today, right now. 
 
In April 2015, I asked the providers, again, when the electronic TSheets would be 
installed, and, again, I was told by almost everyone, “I don’t know” or “We haven’t 
heard.”  Nurse B said, “The night and weekend crew is kept in the dark.  We’re never 
told anything.  The last I heard was that Q and Dr. F were trying to squash it [electronic 
TSheets].”  Dr. G claimed, “All I know is that they [IT administrators] pass through every 
once in a while and claim they’re almost finished.  It’s been almost 2 years.  We haven’t 
heard a peep from administration.  Nothing.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13The Joint Commission issues common performance standards (i.e., core measures) 
several times a year that hospitals are required to meet to receive Medicare and Medicaid 
funding. 
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Providers’ and administrators’ contrasting accounts of their shared 
interactions.  Although I conducted only two interviews with administrators––one 
interview was conducted over the phone and the other interview evolved as a series of e-
mail exchanges––I noted that there were many discrepancies in what administrators 
claimed and what providers said about the EMR adoption process.  In some instances, as 
described in a previous section, administrators contradicted one another, such as the vice 
president claiming that the emergency medicine physicians participated in the EMR 
selection process, and SR, head of the IT department, saying that “providers had no 
choice regarding the selection of EMR.”  Administrators, however, did agree on one 
important fact: Providers were pleased with the EMR.  The vice president acknowledged 
that “the transition was painful in the beginning,” but by October 2014, she was confident 
that providers had accepted the EMR because “comments are more positive the longer we 
use the EMR.”  SR claimed that “75% of the physicians are pleased with our EMR.” 
I asked Dr. F and Q if they believed that 75% of physicians were pleased with the 
EMR.  Dr. F exclaimed, “Absolutely not.  We hate this piece of garbage.  We’ve told 
them [administrators] so.  Where did they get that we were happy?”  Q seemed genuinely 
shocked, staring at me, with her eyes wide and mouth agape, and saying, “Really?  They 
[administrators] actually told you that?  Don’t they know that you’re down here with us?  
You see it for yourself.  You tell me who here is happy with the EMR.”  Q laughed 
loudly and then asked the nurses working at a nearby counter who among them liked the 
EMR: “Come on, show of hands, who likes the computer?”  There were stifled laughs 
and a few groans, to which Q replied, “See, nobody likes it.” 
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SR explained that although physicians wanted, initially, to use the actual, 
proprietary TSheet system, he believed that physicians would be happier with the generic 
version of the TSheets that were crafted in-house, because Dr. F and Q were involved 
heavily in the design process.  As he claimed, “The physicians will like the TSheets 
better this way because it’s been customized for them.”  Both Dr. F and Q, however, 
denied participating in the design process.  Q reminded me that she had lobbied for the 
proprietary TSheet system and had negotiated a discounted rate with Company S.  SR 
told me that the proprietary TSheet system would have cost $300,000, but Q said that the 
discounted rate was $35,000.  When I asked SR about the discrepancy, he said, “That’s 
not true.  Paragon, as an entire system, is much less expensive.”  Q’s response to SR’s 
comment was, “See, they [administrators] don’t listen.  I sent them the actual quote from 
[Company] S and nobody looked at it.” 
Although I did not witness, directly, interactions between the emergency room 
staff and the IT staff outside of the formal training sessions that were described 
previously, the secondhand accounts of interactions that were shared with me suggested 
that many of the exchanges were tense and unproductive; consequently, relationships 
between the emergency room staff and IT staff were strained as well.  SR told me that he 
was “extremely frustrated with the physicians” because he believed that they were 
difficult to work with and were belligerent.  He told me that the physicians complained 
routinely about the CPOE order sets and, yet, from his perspective, physicians were not 
using the order sets properly.  Hence, the difficulty that physicians experienced, SR 
claimed, “was their own doing.”  As SR explained: 
They skipped the training for starters, but we [IT staff members] need to ask 
ourselves how can we enable them to do their jobs better.  The decision support 
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and the order sets, if used properly, can help. . . .  The average physician will say, 
“I went to school for 12 years and I don’t need a computer telling me what to do.  
I don’t want to practice cookie-cutter medicine.”  Yet, at the same time, they click 
on order sets and don’t add or remove any tests to personalize it for the patient. 
 
Dr. F countered, “Adding or removing tests takes longer, and then we get dinged on 
length of stay metrics.  What’s he [SR] expect us to do?” 
Several other Corporation G-owned hospitals used the Paragon EMR because, as 
SR explained, “research shows that Paragon meets the need at small hospitals.”  He 
added, “We’re using it at other facilities and it works really well.  We’ve had no 
problems anywhere else, just here.”  SR tried repeatedly to facilitate conversations 
between Dr. F and providers working at the other Corporation G-owned hospitals, 
because SR believed that the conversations would help Dr. F to appreciate Paragon’s 
potential.  However, SR lamented, “Dr. F has refused to talk with facility directors.  I 
don’t understand that.  Why wouldn’t you want to collaborate?”  Dr. F explained his 
position to me, which he claimed to have also explained to SR: 
What are they going to tell me?  Their version of Paragon is different.  Each 
facility has its own customized version, so what’s the director out there going to 
tell me that I can use here?  Nothing.  He’s a busy doc, I’m a busy doc, so let’s 
not waste each other’s time. 
 
Dr. F and SR disagreed on many points, including the topics of their past 
conversations with one another, but one of the more contentious points between them 
centered on how busy each thought the emergency room was.  Dr. F pointed out that 
patient volumes were increasing steadily, which he attributed to Hospital H’s advertising 
campaign, yet SR claimed that the emergency room was “pretty quiet.”  On October 9, 
2014, SR told me, “I just walked through the emergency room and there were two 
patients, with six full-time nurses standing around.  They have a lot of free time.  It’s an 
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easy job.”  The following day, I asked Dr. F about SR’s comments, and Dr. F became 
livid.  He slammed the chart that he was holding onto the countertop and said, “Easy?  
Really?  We may have had two patients at that exact moment he casually strolled 
through, but we had over 40 patients yesterday!  Trust me, we’re busy!”  Q added: 
We don’t have six nurses; we have three or four, tops.  He’s confused.  Maybe he 
saw a tech and assumed it was a nurse.  How would he know the difference?  He 
doesn’t work down here.  He doesn’t know how an emergency room operates, so 
he needs to quit jumping to conclusions and running his mouth. 
 
 Q also was angry because SR made what she believed were disparaging 
comments about the emergency room staff.  As Q explained: 
He has no idea who you are.  You call on the phone, he’s never met you, and he’s 
going to tell you that we’re not busy [and] that we’re “standing around?”  He 
undermines me and he makes the emergency room staff members look less 
efficient and hardworking than they really are.  We’re busting our asses down 
here.  Who else is he saying this to?  I’m begging for additional staff and he’s 
running around telling everyone that we’re overstaffed. 
 
Dr. F just shook his head and said, “It’s not warm and fuzzy between us and IT.  I think 
you can see why.” 
To review, communication between providers and administrators at Hospital H 
was ineffective because they appeared to draw conflicting conclusions regularly.  As Q 
explained, “It’s like we’re speaking different languages altogether.  I don’t know how 
they [administrators] don’t understand us.”  This communication impasse was indicative 
of an SD-cycle.  There, thus, was clear evidence of an SD-cycle (i.e., negative 
communication spiral) at Hospital H.  First, there was a lack of collegiality between 
providers and administrators that affected their communication negatively: Providers did 
not view administrators as listening to them because they believed that their opinions 
about the EMR were not taken under consideration by administrators, and, furthermore, 
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they believed that administrators did not support their work.  Second, administrators 
communicated very little information to providers about the electronic TSheet installation 
process, which added to providers’ uncertainty and technostress.  Lastly, providers and 
administrators had different, often contrasting, recollections of their interactions with 
each other, which exacerbated SD-nexus conditions and led to an SD-cycle.  Providers’ 
diminished agency, a key component of SD-nexus to SD-cycle escalation at Hospital H, 
is described next. 
Providers’ Diminished Agency 
As defined in chapter three, agency is human activity, which is enabled or 
constrained by structures (Giddens, 1984).  Agency hinges on an agent’s ability “to 
‘make a difference’ to a preexisting state of affairs” (Giddens, 1984, p. 14); hence, 
without some measure of power, agency is not possible.  When SD is present in an 
organization, individual agency is limited (Nicotera & Mahon, 2012).  SD-entrenched 
systems often lead to impotent agency, the inability to meet goals effectively because of 
conflicting structures in environments where performance and productivity are monitored 
closely.  Impotent agency feeds unhealthy communication patterns, and, in addition to 
immobilization, it can lead to developmental regression (Nicotera & Mahon, 2012).   
Providers at Hospital H suffered both limited agency and impotent agency.  
Providers, essentially, were unable to change the EMR––they were unable “to ‘make a 
difference’ to a preexisting state” (Giddens, 1984, p. 14)––consequently, they had limited 
agency.  As noted above, providers were excluded from the EMR selection process, and 
administrators, largely, ignored providers’ concerns and suggestions about the EMR.  
Whereas nurses were involved in customizing some aspects of the EMR display, 
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physicians had no involvement either in the CPOE customization or in the electronic 
TSheet design.  Because the EMR exacerbated SD-nexus conditions (i.e., conflicting 
external and internal structures), many providers suffered impotent agency, which further 
fueled SD-cycle development (i.e., negative communication spirals). 
Most of the providers’ quotations presented in the previous section can be seen as 
communicating not only their immobilization and frustration but also their lack of power 
and agency.  When asked if he believed that his comments conveyed a lack of power 
and/or agency, Dr. F, upon reviewing an early draft of this section, replied, “Yes, I would 
say I have very little power.  When I read what I said, that’s what comes to mind: ‘This 
guy has no power.’” 
As described in chapter two, forced organizational change (e.g., the EMR 
adoption at Hospital H) robs individuals of their freedom and agency, and it activates 
reactance (Nesterkin, 2013), which, in turn, triggers hostile or aggressive feelings 
(Brehm, 1966).  Freedoms may be restored, symbolically, by disparaging the source of 
the threat or by exercising other freedoms to maximize feelings of control (Quick et al., 
2013).  When providers at Hospital H disparaged the EMR or circumvented order-entry 
processes, they also subverted the mechanics of power (i.e., they resisted constraining 
structural forces).  Through disruptive talk and behaviors that targeted EMRs, providers 
also asserted “autonomy of action” (Giddens, 1984, p. 292) and attempted to regain lost 
agency. 
Many providers adopted two strategies to regain agency: providers implored 
others to perform data entry and order-entry tasks for them, and/or providers searched for 
employment at hospitals that used EMRs that they believed were superior to the 
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McKesson-made Paragon system (i.e., providers then could choose which EMR to use, 
and, thereby, restore, indirectly, a measure of control).  Both strategies allowed providers 
to maximize their feelings of control; however, imploring others to perform data and 
order-entry tasks exacerbated hierarchical differences at Hospital H, especially between 
physicians and nurses, which, in turn, fed recurring SD-cycles.  For example, Nurse A 
criticized a physician who “dumped orders” routinely: 
Dr. W used to make us put in orders all the time, even though we weren’t 
supposed to use the CPOE.  He could never figure how to do it, so he would bark 
orders at us, literally.  He would say stuff like, “I’m the doctor, so do as I 
command.”  He was horrible. 
 
All of the nurses complained that most of the providers “pulled rank and dumped orders” 
regularly, which created tension between them and physicians (see the discussion in the 
next section about providers’ strategies for coping with the EMR).  Moreover, nurses had 
fewer opportunities, when compared with physicians, to dump orders, and, therefore, 
nurses’ symbolic restorations of freedom and agency were limited mainly to disparaging 
the EMR. 
I observed many terse exchanges between physicians and midlevel providers, and 
between physicians and nurses; most of the exchanges involved dumped orders or 
dropped orders (see the previous discussion about technical glitches).  These exchanges, 
typically, spiraled into increasingly negative diatribes (i.e., SD-cycles).  For instance, I 
observed a quarrel between Dr. A and V, a midlevel provider, in which Dr. A told V to 
complete an order set for a patient, and V asked, “Do you want an EKG with that, too?”  
Dr. A sighed loudly, threw his hands up, and said, “Sure, why not?  EKG, EEG, whatever 
you want.  You go right ahead.”  V replied, “Well, don’t let me pressure you or anything.  
Just trying to help you do your job.”  Dr. A retorted, “How about you just do your job and 
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put in the orders, okay?  If I wanted an EKG, I would have asked for one.”  After Dr. A 
retreated into an examination room, V told me, “Shit like that is why doctors have a bad 
rap.”  Nurse M attempted to diffuse the tension by telling a joke, “What’s the difference 
between God and a surgeon?  God doesn’t think he’s a surgeon!”  V laughed and nodded 
in the direction of Dr. A, and said, “Yup, that asshole thinks he’s God alright.”  I heard 
someone behind me call out, “Amen, brother.” 
Although the emergency room at Hospital H was an SD-nexus, I observed that 
SD-cycles were not always present: Certain physicians’ efforts to regain lost agency 
appeared to incite or enflame SD-cycles, which led Dr. Nicotera to speculate that lost 
agency and resulting restoration attempts may explain the SD-nexus to SD-cycle 
escalation.  I noted that Dr. A and Dr. W became embroiled in negative communication 
spirals more than the other physicians did.  I shared my hunches with Nurse B—namely, 
that order dumping was a symbolic restoration of freedom that heightened hierarchical 
differences and led frequently to divergent communication—and he agreed: “With certain 
docs, like Dr. A and Dr. W, absolutely, I think you’re right, although, in my opinion, it 
happens with every doc to some degree.  For some [physicians], it is a real problem.” 
To review, observational findings pointed to the presence of SD in Hospital H’s 
emergency room.  The evidence consisted of conflicting structures, which established 
that Hospital H’s emergency room was an SD-nexus; providers’ dissatisfaction and 
burnout; “us” versus “them” language, which intensified ineffective and hostile 
communication patterns between emergency room nurses and floor nurses; negative 
communication spirals between providers and administrators; and providers’ diminished 
agency, which led frequently to discordant interactions between providers, which, in turn, 
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contributed to SD-nexus to SD-cycle escalation.  Next, I present findings derived from 
the SD scale items that were included in the questionnaire that was administered to 
providers at Hospital H. 
Structurational Divergence Scale Item Scores 
The SD scale consists of 17 items and 3 subscales that measure 
immobilization/individual development, unresolved conflict, and organizational 
development (Nicotera et al., 2010).  Summing scores across all subscales (range 17–85) 
determines the degree of SD present in an organization: below 20, SD is absent; a score 
between 21 and 35 indicates low SD conditions; a score between 36 and 50 suggests 
moderate SD conditions; and a score above 51 signals high SD conditions.   The average 
SD score for respondents at Hospital H (N = 30) was 36, indicating that the group, as a 
whole, experienced moderate SD.  Individual SD scores (see Table 5.6) revealed that one 
respondent experienced no SD, 50% of respondents (n = 15) experienced low SD, 37% of 
respondents (n = 11) experienced moderate SD, and 10% respondents (n = 3) experienced 
high SD.  As expected, given that burnout is a surface-level manifestation of SD, 
respondents who experienced high SD also suffered from burnout. 
Together, with the observations reported above, these data support the presence of 
SD at Hospital H and that SD affected providers negatively.  Many providers described 
feeling immobilized, feeling dissatisfied with their jobs, and experiencing symptoms of 
burnout regularly.  “Us” versus “them” interactions between emergency room nurses and 
floor nurses aggravated SD-nexus conditions and led to ineffective communication 
patterns and bullying.  Providers’ interactions with administrators also were strained, 
leading to recurring negative communication spirals (i.e., SD- cycle).  The SD-nexus to  
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Table 5.6            
 
Individual Structurational Divergence Scores. 
             
 
     ID    Σ            SD            role          ID             Σ           SD              role  
             
 
     1    42          mod       RN*          16              43     mod            RN*  
     2    42          mod       RN                      17    26         low             MLP         
     3    28          low       MD                     18              28         low             RN 
     4     27          low            MLP              19              39         mod            tech* 
     5           56          high           MD*                    20              32         low             RN     
     6           37          mod       RN                      21              47         mod            RN* 
     7           39          mod       RN                      22              18         none           tech 
     8           22          low       other                   23               68         high           RN* 
     9               31          low       tech                     24              40         mod            RN 
    10           37          mod       MD                     25              27         low             RN 
    11           59          high       RN*                     26              28         low             RN 
    12           25          low            tech                     27              30         low             MD    
    13           26          low            RN                      28              29         low             MLP 
    14           27          low            RN                      29              35         low             RN 
    15           46          mod       RN                      30              44         mod            MD 
             
 
Note. ID = respondent; mod = moderate; MD = physician; MLP = midlevel provider;  
RN = nurse. 
 
* Indicates respondent also experienced burnout. 
 
 
SD-cycle escalation was due, in part, to providers’ efforts to regain lost agency.  In 
response, many providers’ adopted maladaptive strategies to cope with their lost agency, 
which, as described next, amplified hierarchical tensions between physicians and nurses. 
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Providers’ Strategies for Coping with Electronic Medical Records Systems 
Providers at Hospital H developed several strategies for coping with the forced 
EMR adoption.  Most providers developed workarounds––tactics for circumventing the 
EMR or avoiding the EMR altogether––with the most common workaround being order 
dumping, asking and/or requiring other providers to enter data and/or orders into the 
EMR and/or CPOE.  Gaming the system, which included ordering inconsequential and, 
oftentimes, unnecessary laboratory tests to stop the clock on “door-to-doc” time (see the 
discussion below on unintended consequences), was another common workaround that 
providers adopted to satisfy metrics, which were tracked by the EMR. Another 
workaround that was adopted widely involved employing scribes to enter data into the 
EMR, which left physicians more time for direct patient care.  Although Hospital H did 
not employ scribes, providers there expressed interest in hiring scribes; consequently, I 
observed as Dr. C worked with a scribe at Hospital W and, later, as he recounted the 
experience for the providers at Hospital H.  A final strategy that was adopted by some 
providers, which they dubbed “avoidance,” involved organized resistance that was meant 
to thwart the electronic TSheet implementation.  The following discussions examine 
these coping strategies of order dumping, scribes, and avoidance. 
Order Dumping 
As described in the previous section, order dumping at Hospital H, generally, 
involved a physician asking or demanding a midlevel provider or nurse to enter orders for 
laboratory tests and/or procedures into the CPOE component of the EMR.  I observed 
situations in which nurses asked or demanded that other nurses update patient notes in the 
EMR, but such occurrences were infrequent.  As Nurse A commented, order dumping  
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was regarded widely as a “doc-on-nurse crime.”  She explained the order dumping 
process, from a nurse’s perspective: 
Docs are supposed to do most of the entering of tests and meds, but, often, that 
gets put off on nurses.  Nurses have to go in through the med-ordering system 
under the doc’s name and put the orders in as “verbal orders.”  It shows up under 
the doc’s action list, which they have to sign off on at some point, saying they 
approved the order; that it was the correct medicine, or whatever.  Docs are 
allowed to dump a certain percentage on the nurses, but Q encourages us to push 
the docs to do more of the entering.  They resist, especially the older ones.  
 
When asked if order dumping added to her workload or contributed to her 
workplace stress, A replied:  
Yeah, it doubles my workload.  The EMR is easy for me to use, except when they 
[physicians] ask me to put in orders because I don’t really know the CPOE very 
well.  I don’t use it [CPOE] as part of my regular job.  It’s only when I get orders 
dumped on me that I have to go in and try to remember how to do it [use the 
CPOE].  If the doc is busy, genuinely busy with a code or something, then no 
problem, I’m happy to help.  If it’s because he’s just being an asshole or doesn’t 
want to enter his own orders, well, that pisses me off. 
 
Nurse M remarked that physicians “just got a $30 an hour raise.  They [physicians] do 
less, we do more.  Why should we put their orders in for them when they’re getting paid 
more?” 
As Nurse B mentioned, order dumping happened “with every doc to some 
degree,” but Nurse L commented that some physicians “abused the privilege” more than 
others: 
Having nurses enter orders was a privilege that was available on a limited basis.  
That was explained to them [physicians] from the start, but some physicians 
demanded that nurses enter orders for them all of the time.  One of those 
physicians is no longer here. 
 
I learned that L was referring to Dr. W.  Nurse Y told me, “Yeah, we canned Dr. W 
because he dumped all his orders on nurses.”   
 
275 
When asked about physicians’ order-dumping habits, N, a midlevel provider, said, 
“They all do it and I have to admit, a lot of the time it’s because they’re busy with 
multiple patients.”  N volunteered that although he believed that a lot of order dumping 
was motivated likely by physicians’ reactance, he thought that order dumping was an 
unavoidable workaround because of metrics, claiming:  
It’s important for all of us to help out to keep the numbers up, like “how long 
before seen” and “door-to-doc.”  Most of the docs take a while to put in orders 
and then we all take the hit for slow times.  They [physicians] have to dump 
orders or administration comes down on all of us. 
Nurse B pointed out that he and several other nurses had avoided the CPOE 
training sessions to not be targets of physicians’ order dumping.  As B explained, “It was 
a calculated move because I saw what was happening to nurses who had gone to the 
training.  I could honestly say, ‘I don’t know how to use the CPOE.’”  Nurse B’s strategy 
generated ill will and affected negatively working relationships among some of the 
nurses.  As Nurse A lamented, “Just because they skipped training they get to slack off, 
and now I get twice as many orders dumped on me.” 
I asked physicians how they viewed order dumping and, like N, most believed 
that it was a necessary workaround because of metrics.  Dr. E said, “I don’t have a 
choice.  If I’ve got two patients at once and I’ve got a nurse sitting here, then, yes, I’m 
going to ask her to put something in for me.”  When asked if they believed that order 
dumping was an attempt to restore their lost agency, three out of six physicians agreed.  
Dr. G commented, “I hadn’t thought of it that way but I can see that that might have been 
my motivation.  ‘I hate the damn thing [the EMR], so I’ll make them put orders in for 
me.’”  Dr. A said: 
	   276 
Maybe, but you have to understand that I’m the only physician here in the 
emergency room for all of those patients and I have midlevels and nurses whose 
job is supporting me.  Yes, I hate the EMR, but do your job when I ask you to do 
it.  Just put in the orders. 
 
The order dumping that I witnessed was split evenly between that which was 
justified (e.g., physicians were busy and their requests were appropriate given the 
context) and that which was reactance inspired, such as the exchange between Dr. A and 
V described previously.  I identified instances of reactance-inspired order dumping based 
on providers’ nonverbal behaviors (including paralinguistic cues, such as tone of voice), 
and their apparent affective state.  Using profanity, raised voices, loud sighing, and/or 
aggressive gestures (e.g., slamming charts onto the counter) accompanied most 
physicians’ reactance-inspired order dumping.  Additionally, reactance-inspired order 
dumping occurred, typically, when patient volume was low, which suggested that the 
context did not support justified order dumping and, hence, it was triggered by reactance.  
Such episodes fueled hierarchical tensions between physicians and nurses, and between 
physicians and midlevel providers, and, as described previously, resulted in negative 
communication spirals. 
Scribes 
Early during the EMR adoption process at Hospital H, physicians expressed 
interest in hiring scribes to alleviate documentation burdens that they were experiencing.  
According to Foppe (2014), scribes have the potential to alleviate 80% of documentation 
burden that falls to emergency medicine physicians, inasmuch as scribes document 
patients’ medical histories and findings.  Scribes are seen as necessary “workarounds for 
systems that fundamentally do not value physician time” (R. Bukata, personal 
communication, February 3, 2014), but scribes also are “a mixed bag,” according to Dr. 
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C.  Dr. C worked part-time at Hospital H, but partway through my study, he accepted 
another part-time position at a hospital that employed scribes.  Dr. C agreed to share his 
views on scribes with the providers at Hospital H, none of whom had worked with scribes 
previously, to enable them to make an informed decision about pursuing scribe support at 
Hospital H. 
I accompanied Dr. C on his first shift at Hospital W, where I observed his 
interactions with a scribe.  The scribe, Z, pushed a COW and followed Dr. C around the 
emergency room.  As Dr. C conducted physical examinations, he verbalized patients’ 
histories and findings, which Z entered into the EMR.  In addition to maintaining 
patients’ electronic medical records, Z kept detailed notes about interactions that Dr. C 
had with specialists that he consulted, when telephone calls to consultants were returned, 
and consultants’ recommendations.  Z could amend or add to medical records only when 
he was in Dr. C’s physical presence.  Although Z assumed responsibility for charting 
patients’ medical histories and findings, he was not allowed to enter orders; only licensed 
medical providers can enter orders using CPOE systems, and, consequently, despite using 
a scribe, Dr. C still spent a lot of time at the computer. 
Because Dr. C had to review, eventually, medical records for accuracy, he, too, 
kept notes about patients’ histories, complaints, and findings, as well as consultants’ 
recommendations.  As he explained, “I don’t really know how much of what I’m saying 
is getting typed up, so I may need these notes later on when I look over the files.”  
Checking the medical records for accuracy during the shift was “impossible,” because, as 
Dr. C explained, “this place is busy, there are too many patients to manage, and if I stop 
to review charts, then length of stay goes up.  My metrics would look horrible.”  When 
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asked if the duplicated effort of both of them keeping detailed notes rendered the scribe 
redundant, Dr. C replied: 
Not necessarily, but it does seem silly.  I’m documenting on paper just as much as 
I did at [Hospital H] and I’m still using the CPOE, but at least when I go in the 
patient room, I’m having conversations.  I’m looking the patient in the eye.  The 
real advantage, so far, is that the scribe keeps up on pages [to consultants], who 
has called back, and who we’re waiting to hear from.  
 
The medical director at Hospital W’s emergency room, overhearing our 
conversation, agreed and said that scribes, “keep on top of consults, so that’s one less 
thing you have to keep straight,  plus I can talk freely to the patient without looking at a 
computer screen.”  She added: 
Before the scribes, we were pushing COWs into the exam room or taking notes on 
scraps of paper to add [to the EMR] later.  That meant that after an 8–12 hour 
shift, you usually spent an extra 3 hours on charting, unpaid, and away from your 
family.  So the scribes help a lot.  I don’t stay nearly as long now.   
 
A nurse chimed in, “The scribes make our docs a lot happier.  Happier docs make happier 
nurses.”  When asked if the physicians at Hospital W dumped orders, the nurse replied, 
“Not as much as they used to!  The scribes definitely helped out there.” 
I asked Z to describe his experience as a scribe working at Hospital W.  At the 
time of our interview, he had been a scribe only for 4 months.  He said that because he 
planned to become a physician assistant, the scribe program gave him “valuable 
experience working alongside doctors, learning medical terminology.”  Despite the on-
the-job learning that Z valued, he complained that the work was difficult in many ways 
because he worked with a different physician every shift, and because many physicians 
with whom he worked were difficult.  As he explained: 
It is a real challenge because every doctor does things differently.  Some docs will 
go slow, some hate questions, some like to teach, some try to trip you up, [and]  
some talk really fast just to deliberately screw with you.  It would be nice if one 
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scribe worked with one doc.  We [scribes] constantly have to adjust.  The 
advantage for me is that I get to spend time with the doctor and watch the patient 
interactions.  I’ve learned a lot. 
 
I was told that Hospital W split the cost of the scribes’ salaries with the hospital’s 
physicians.  Scribe America, the company that employed Z, charged $20 an hour for 
scribe services, but Z was paid only $8 an hour.   Z said, “The pay really sucks, but you 
can’t beat the experience.  I’m kind of held hostage.  It’s like I’m paying for this 
exposure by accepting less money, but it will help my career later.”  Dr. C, however, was 
upset that Z was paid so little, exclaiming, “At least give the kid the whole $10 an hour 
you’re taking out of my paycheck.”  The emergency room medical director at Hospital W 
explained that hospital administrators determined scribes’ pay, but she wondered if the 
hospital actually contributed anything to offset the cost of the scribes or if the cost was 
absorbed solely by physicians.  She asked, “Administrators told us it cost $20 an hour, 
but where’s the other $12 going?” 
At the end of Dr. C’s shift, he spent an hour reviewing Z’s documentation and 
found that the medical records were complete and accurate.  When asked about his first 
day working with a scribe, Dr. C said: 
I’d always heard scribes were good to work with and could allow you to function 
more efficiently in the emergency room.  It went well.  It saved me a lot of time 
today, especially in this situation, [as] I’m working in a new emergency room.  
Although the EMR is a system I’ve used before, of course, it’s always different in 
another emergency room.  This one has all sorts of variations.  Almost everything 
was different in terms of how it was organized.  While I sorted things out, it was 
great having someone else put in the history and physical. 
 
He added, “I’m hoping it’s not just the scribe I worked with today; that this is the 
experience I’ll have, more or less, with any scribe in the emergency room.” 
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At the end of the week, after Dr. C had worked with several other scribes, I asked 
him to reflect on his experiences.  He lamented, “Not all scribes are created equal, I can 
tell you that,” and said: 
Z was thorough and conscientious.  His charting looked good.  I didn’t have to 
make many corrections.  The last few days, these scribes aren’t getting it.  [There 
were] omissions, mistakes, poor grammar, [and] misspellings.  If one of those 
charts ever goes to court, it makes me look like an idiot.  I was reviewing a chart 
and saw that the “unincarcerated hernia” I found was actually charted as 
“incarcerated hernia.”  The difference is that one goes home and the other is a 
surgical emergency!  Imagine if I hadn’t caught that and someone reviewed the 
chart?  “That guy sent home an incarcerated hernia!  Fire him!”  Then, I had a 
patient with bronchiolitis and the scribe wrote down that the patient had a broken 
leg!  How do you get a broken leg out of bronchiolitis? 
 
I asked for Dr. C’s final assessment of whether scribes were a viable EMR workaround 
for the physicians at Hospital H, and he replied: 
I’ve spent about 2–3 hours after each shift just fixing what they [scribes] got 
wrong.  The scribes can make the work go faster while I’m on shift, but I’m still 
staying late to clean up.  It’s kind of a wash at this point for me.  I would have to 
say, “No.  Don’t get scribes there [Hospital H].”  
 
Scribes, from Dr. C’s perspective, facilitated some aspects of his work but they 
also constrained him in many ways, and, consequently, he did not advocate using scribes 
at Hospital H.  Upon hearing about Dr. C’s experiences at Hospital W, Hospital H’s 
providers agreed that scribes would not be a worthwhile workaround, and they dismissed 
the idea.  Dr. F and Q noted that administrators, likely, would not have approved using 
scribes anyway, given the added cost that scribes would have posed and Hospital H’s 
falling revenue. 
Avoidance 
Dr. F and Q believed that avoidance was the best strategy for coping with certain 
aspects of the EMR; namely, the generic, electronic TSheets that were being designed by 
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members of the IT department and that, eventually, would be installed.  Q explained that 
avoidance involved calculated moves that were meant to slow the TSheet design and 
installation process: 
In the beginning of this whole process, I was proactive.  I lobbied to get things 
done.  I was calling IT every day asking, “Where are the TSheets?  Let me see 
them.  Let me make suggestions.”  But now, I’m not pushing for the [electronic] 
TSheets.  I have given up on making anything happen.  I realized that if I don’t do 
my job, then they won’t do theirs.  If I don’t push, then it won’t happen, and that 
makes the docs happy.  IT can’t get it done, so why should I try?  This way, I’m 
protecting the docs. 
 
Dr. F explained how avoidance was a matter of “calculated inactivity”: 
One of our nurses is a super-user and has some computer experience, but when IT 
asked him to help out [with the TSheet design process], I told him to go real slow.  
“Take your time, no rush.”  I’ve seen what IT is designing and it’s a terrible 
system.  I’m not happy, so I’m not going to press them to get this done.  
 
Later, he elaborated: 
They [IT staff members] haven’t listened to any of our suggestions.  Even with 
one of our guys helping out, they still don’t take our advice.  They claim that 
whatever the real TSheets can do, they can do it better.  They can’t.  Excuse me if 
I’m underwhelmed, but I’m not going to help facilitate this process that I know 
for a fact will slow down charting even more and cost this hospital revenue. 
 
When asked how the electronic TSheets would affect revenue, Dr. F clarified that 
because the electronic templates lacked visual reminders for such things as review of 
systems and social history, providers might not perform the associated billable 
procedures. 
Both Dr. F and Q took inspiration from “upstairs docs” who had thwarted 
successfully installation of the EMR’s consulting notes component.  As Q told me, “They 
didn’t like doing their consults on the computer, so they all quit using it one day and the 
hospital had to go back to paper.”  She noted that, eventually, the consulting physicians 
“gave in” and resumed using the EMR, but only after a 6-month delay and several 
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revisions to the consulting notes component.  “If our avoidance can buy a couple of 
months, then that’s fine by me,” she noted.  “In the meantime, maybe I can get 
administration to reconsider buying the real TSheets.” 
Dr. F also believed that the IT staff’s inability to design and implement the 
generic, electronic TSheets in a timely manner would give administrators reason to 
reconsider their decision to go with an in-house design over the proprietary system.  As 
Dr. F claimed: 
 I’m building my case against IT.  This is all ammunition.  Taking almost a year to 
design one TSheet?  Well, not even one.  I haven’t seen it yet.  What have they 
been doing all this time?  We’ve been hearing since last November [2013], “Any 
day now.”  What do we have to show for a year’s worth of work?  Nothing.  
Wasted money.  This is all ammunition that I’m taking to the CEO [chief 
executive officer].  
 
When asked if he believed administrators would elect to purchase the proprietary system, 
Dr. F responded, “It might be false hope, but we’re not using their generic version yet, 
are we?  Because they haven’t built it.  Someone might wise up one day and get us the 
real thing.” 
Although most of the other providers acknowledged that they were aware of the 
avoidance strategy, only Dr. F. and Q employed this strategy to cope with aspects of the 
EMR installation.  Because Dr. F, the emergency room director, and Q, the emergency 
room nurse manager, were the only providers with direct ties to the hospital’s 
administration, they had some measure of power and, therefore, some agency.  Together, 
they tried to “regulate system reproduction . . . to keep things as they are” (Giddens, 
1984, p. 27). 
In sum, providers at Hospital H developed workarounds to augment their EMR-
based documentation tasks.  Order dumping, the workaround used most frequently, 
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aggravated hierarchical tensions among providers and fueled SD-cycle development.  
Although providers considered employing scribes, a common workaround that has been 
adopted in other hospitals, providers at Hospital H took Dr. C’s firsthand experience of 
working with scribes into account and abandoned the plan.  Avoidance tactics were 
exercised by the emergency room management, which delayed installation of the 
electronic TSheet component of the EMR.  Next, I describe ways in which the EMR 
changed communication among providers. 
How the Electronic Medical Records System Affected Communication Patterns 
among Providers 
 
The EMR installation at Hospital H, according to providers there, changed the 
communication that they had with other providers in several ways: the EMR reduced the 
number of face-to-face exchanges between them and the nature and topics of their 
conversations.  These changes in communication patterns, in turn, affected providers’ 
relational growth and/or maintenance.  Here, I describe those changes using examples 
culled from fieldnotes, interview transcripts, and the questionnaire administered to 
providers. 
All of the providers I spoke with––15 nurses, 9 physicians, 4 technicians, and 3 
midlevel providers––said that face-to-face interactions with other providers declined after 
the EMR was installed.  In response to the questionnaire item, “How has the EMR 
impacted communication between you and your coworkers,” 40% (n = 12) of 
respondents reported that they spoke with their coworkers less and 53% (n = 16) spent 
less time discussing patient care with their coworkers face-to-face (see Table 5.7).  Nurse 
Y said that the EMR “changes how we interact with the docs.  I might not even see the 
doc face-to-face on any of my patients now.  Before, we at least discussed game plans  
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Table 5.7            
 
Responses to the Questionnaire Item, “How has the EMR system impacted 
communication between you and your coworkers?” 
             
 
  Response               Percentage    Total 
             
 
  I talk with my coworkers more.       3%     (n = 1) 
  I haven’t noticed a difference.       7%    (n = 2) 
  I talk with my coworkers less.       40%    (n = 12) 
  We talk about fewer topics.        13%    (n = 4) 
  We don’t spend as much time chitchatting.      7%     (n = 2) 
  I spend more time clarifying/asking about      47%    (n = 14) 
  orders. 
  We spend more time discussing patient      3%     (n = 1) 
  care face-to-face. 
  We spend less time discussing patient      53%    (n = 16) 
  care face-to-face.  
  We spend time complaining about        70 %    (n = 21) 
  the EMR. 
  We spend time teaching each other how      83%    (n = 25) 
  to use the EMR. 
             
 
[and] treatments.”  Nurse B added, “Because people are clustered around machines, we  
talk less.  It’s to be expected.”  Dr. G lamented the change, noting that when providers 
used a common paper chart, they interacted frequently: 
We’re not a team anymore, really.  We [providers] work independently of one 
another.  With paper charts, there was more collaboration [and] more bringing 
things to each other’s attention, but not now.  Do we talk less?  Absolutely.  The 
only time we talk is when things aren’t working or something goes wrong.  





When asked which topics related to face-to-face patient care were rarely or no 
longer discussed face-to-face, providers indicated that pending orders and patients’ status 
updates were verbalized less frequently after the EMR installation compared with when 
providers used paper charts.  Excluding order dumping, which involved face-to-face 
communication, nurses complained that physicians and midlevel providers discussed 
orders only intermittently.  For example, Nurse B complained, “I hate it when a doc puts 
in orders and doesn’t tell anyone.”  He stressed that he and the other nurses wanted to be 
told––face-to-face––that orders were pending, because, as B explained, they preferred 
“verbal exchanges over flashing icons on a computer screen.”  Nurse A expressed 
sentiments similar to B’s when she said: 
There is a lot of aggravation because we [nurses] can’t keep up with the doc in 
terms of where he is and where he’s going next.  Is he in a patient room?  Is he 
doing a procedure?  He isn’t interacting with us, so we’re not aware that he might 
have put orders in.  The EMR times how long it takes for us to carry out orders 
once they’re put in, so I’d like to be told that the doc has done something or is 
going to do something; otherwise, my numbers [metrics] look bad.  . . . I have to 
keep checking the EMR, but I would prefer a courtesy heads-up, “Hey, I’m 
putting orders in on your patient.” 
Dr. E complained that he, too, “would like to be told things” more consistently, 
exclaiming that the nurses: 
should give verbal updates, but it doesn’t always happen, especially if it’s busy.  
Just now, a new patient was brought back from triage, but no one told me.  I just 
happened to notice a new name on the tracking board, but, by then, my door-to-
doc time was already shot.  It doesn’t take long to say, “We’re putting a patient in 
[room] 2.” 
When asked if physicians gave nurses “verbal updates,” alerting them that new orders 
were pending, Dr. E replied, “I try to, but I’ll admit, when it’s busy, I don’t always do it.” 
Providers believed that fewer face-to-face interactions took place among them 
because they no longer shared a common paper chart, which, previously, ensured that 
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they completed documentation tasks in a communal work area, usually along the counter 
that divided public space (i.e., hallways and patient rooms) from the space reserved for 
providers.  When sharing paper charts, providers, naturally, would communicate with 
each other.  After the EMR was installed, however, nurses tended to work exclusively at 
computer terminals that lined the left half of the emergency room’s L-shaped counter; 
physicians and midlevel providers worked along the right half of the counter and in a 
small office, out of view of the nurses.  Dr. O noted that many nurses gave her “verbal 
histories and updates” only when she stood near the bend of the L-shaped counter, 
adding, “I never get updates if they don’t see me or if they have to look for me.  If I’m in 
the office on the CPOE, they don’t interact as much.”  Nurse Y explained that nurses 
“don’t really bother docs if they’re in the office.  If the doc’s out here [at the counter], I 
take that as a sign that he’s willing to talk or shoot the shit.”  Dr. A complained that he 
wanted patient updates, regardless of his location (e.g., whether he was in the office at the 
CPOE or standing along the counter): 
If something happens, find me and tell me.  There isn’t a door to the office; you 
can walk around the corner and see if I’m sitting here.  Not talking is problematic 
in a lot ways.  We need to be on the same page because when we’re not, things 
get missed. 
 
I observed a situation in which “things got missed” because providers did not 
communicate face-to-face.  On March 15, 2014, I watched the dayshift physician leave, 
but as I recorded in my fieldnotes, “He did not handover his patients.  There was no 
turnover communication between the physicians, so there was not an appropriate transfer 
of care.  He simply left.”  Nurse M told the nightshift physician, Dr. A, that although the 
dayshift physician had not “completed discharge summaries,” M believed that the patient 
in room 4 was ready to be sent home.  A few hours later, Dr. A reviewed the EMR 
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belonging to the patient who had been in room 4 earlier.  The dayshift physician had 
written on the paper TSheet that the patient received “a full cardiac workup,” but Dr. A 
could not find EKG results in the electronic record.  Additionally, none of the nurses 
recalled having received orders to perform an EKG that day.  Nurse M volunteered that 
the dayshift physician may have clicked “submit” versus “transmit” after he selected the 
cardiac order set in the CPOE.  As M explained, “There’s been some confusion over 
which one to click, so we’ve had some dropped orders.”  Nurse Y suggested that if the 
dayshift physician “had told somebody the plan, maybe they [sic] would have been on the 
lookout for an EKG [order] to come through and could have said something when it 
didn’t show up.”  Dr. A agreed and added, “There’s always the possibility that the test 
was done, but the results were lost.  There isn’t a medication list in here [the electronic 
record] either, but I know the nurse would have gotten it in triage.”  I asked, “What 
happens now?”  Dr. A replied, “Well, first, we call the patient and get him back here for 
the EKG, and, second, we get our asses chewed out.” 
I later asked Nurse M and Nurse Y about the dropped EKG order and how the 
situation might have been prevented.  M said, “Simple: talk.  Tell someone the game 
plan.”  Y added: 
We’re not mind readers, so we don’t know [the physician] is ordering a cardiac 
workup.  Sure, it would make sense that a patient with chest pain would get a 
cardiac workup, but if we’re busy with other patients, [then] we might not think to 
ask, “Hey, did you put in those cardiac orders?”  We should be talking to each 
other for every single patient.  The doc needs to take 2 minutes to say, “Here’s 
what I think is going on, here are the tests I want to run, and here are the meds I 
want.”  If I know the plan, then I can help execute it. 
 
M told me that many of the “seasoned nurses” asked regularly for physicians to 
communicate to them care plans for patients, but that patient volume determined 
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workload, and, oftentimes, limited the time that was available for such conversations.  As 
M said, “When we’re busy, forget it.  You just don’t have the time to talk sometimes.” 
I observed that although the physicians and nurses spoke infrequently, especially 
during busy weekday shifts, nurses did initiate discussions with physicians and asked 
them questions.  Most nurse-initiated conversations that I observed were about orders that 
physicians placed using the CPOE that the nurses did not understand fully and/or 
questioned.  Among nurses who completed the questionnaire, 65% (n = 11) reported that 
they spent more time clarifying/asking about orders following the EMR installation than 
when providers used paper charts.  When asked if time spent clarifying/asking about 
orders was indicative of providers engaging in more––not less––face-to-face 
communication, Nurse B replied: 
Well, not really because most of the time, that’s the only talking we do.  So, we 
are, in fact, talking less and when we do talk, it’s because we don’t understand 
why the doc has ordered a certain medication.  Usually, the doc clicked the wrong 
dosage, the wrong preparation, or the wrong patient.  That becomes a problem, in 
my opinion, because instead of working at the bedside, tending the patient, I’m 
looking for the doc to get clarification on what is essentially an EMR issue. 
 
 Providers said that many of the face-to-face conversations that did take place with 
other providers were not driven directly by patient care concerns but, instead, were driven 
by EMR-related issues (e.g., asking how to use the EMR or complaining about the EMR).  
Apart from spending time clarifying orders, which most providers regarded as a patient 
care issue, providers, like Dr. E, indicated that they spent “a ridiculous amount of time 
talking about the EMR.”  Eighty-three percent of questionnaire respondents (n = 25) 
reported that they spent time teaching each other how to use the EMR, and 70% (n = 21) 
spent time complaining about the EMR.  Complaining, or griping, about the EMR 
appeared to be important for building and/or maintaining rapport among providers, 
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especially because providers, according to Dr. F, “had very little time for chitchat” after 
the EMR was installed. 
Chitchat is considered everyday talk, which, according to Schrodt, Soliz, and 
Braithwaite (2008), also includes gossip, small talk, joking around, planning, and 
decision making.  Relationships are created, enacted, and maintained through everyday 
talk; moreover, Schrodt et al. found that people who engaged regularly in everyday talk 
were more likely to report that they were satisfied in their relationships.  Dr. G lamented 
that the EMR, in his opinion, limited the time that was available for everyday talk and, 
consequently, relationship development: 
The more of a conversation you have, the more comradely there is.  There’s more 
of a mutual investment in the whole emergency room environment and culture.  
When you’re individuals silently ticking away on computer systems, you don’t 
have small talk, like “I heard your kid was in a play” or “I heard you went on 
vacation.”  Those little connections can make you all feel like you’re in it 
together.  There’s a lot more watching each other’s backs when that happens, 
whereas right now, you’re sort of isolated; you’re just data-entry clerks sitting at 
computers and have far less of a connection with each other. 
 
Although the range of topics that providers discussed was limited, which affected 
some providers’ perceptions of their relationships with each other, as per Dr. G’s account, 
I saw providers’ excessive complaining about the EMR as a form of everyday talk that 
reinforced relational bonds.  Griping, profanity, substandard speech, and kidding, 
according to Giddens (1984), “reinforce the basic trust in the presence of intimates . . . 
[and] is a dissipation of tensions derived from the demands of tight bodily and gestural 
control in other settings of day-to-day life” (p. 129).  For instance, I observed frequently 
providers complaining about and disparaging the EMR in, oftentimes, exaggerated and 
vulgar ways.  The resulting laughter reinforced providers’ bonds and was “a dissipation  
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of tensions” (Giddens, p. 129) that the providers accrued during earlier constrained 
interactions with patients and their families. 
For example, one evening I observed a nurse approach a physician and say, “The 
computer told me to tell you the patient is on Coumadin,14” to which he replied, “Yeah, I 
know.  I saw it in the chart.”  She said, “Well, the computer said to tell you.”  The 
physician asked, “Did the computer tell you to do pregnancy test on him, too?”  She 
stared at him, eyes wide, and asked, “It does that?” The physician explained, “Yeah, I’ve 
seen it happen.  In fact, I was doing a pelvic [examination] on a patient once, because the 
computer said to, when I found a prostate [gland]!  I thought, ‘Hey, this man’s not 
pregnant!’”  Another nurse added, “But he already delivered the trunk . . . of a baby 
elephant!”  The group howled with laughter.  When asked later about the purpose of such 
EMR stories, the physician said, “It blows off steam.  It lets us connect a little as people.” 
I observed that negatively framed talk about the EMR bolstered providers’ sense 
of belonging by reinforcing group membership.  As documented in chapter four, a nurse 
who, generally, was enthusiastic about the EMR complained frequently alongside other 
nurses about its shortcomings.  When asked why she changed her mind about the EMR, 
she said that she enjoyed “letting off steam” with her coworkers, and that “complaining 
together” helped her to “feel connected to them.”  Dr. E also believed that complaining 
about the EMR reinforced relational bonds, explaining that providers’ “small talk shifted 
from movies and family to the EMR.  Mainly, we bitch about it, but that gives us 
something in common.  For me, I feel like it [complaining about the EMR] brings us  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14Coumadin is the generic version of the blood thinner Warfarin. 
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closer.”  Dr. O added, “I don’t feel like I know people very well here [Hospital H], but I 
think we’ve bonded over how much we hate this damn thing [EMR].” 
In sum, providers at Hospital H reported that, following the EMR installation, as 
compared to before, they talked with their coworkers less, spent less time discussing 
patient care face-to-face, and, generally, talked about fewer topics.  Providers revealed 
that although they talked less, overall, they spent more time clarifying CPOE-generated 
orders compared with when providers used paper order sets.  Providers interacted when 
sharing common paper charts because of their physical proximity, but after the EMR was 
installed, nurses worked in one area, whereas physicians and midlevel providers worked 
in another area; that physical separation meant that fewer verbal orders and updates were 
shared among providers who were out of sight of one another.  Providers did, however, 
report that they spent time complaining about the EMR, which strengthened their 
relational bonds.  Hence, although less time for chitchat after the EMR installation meant 
that the breadth and depth of providers’ exchanges were limited, griping about the EMR 
established commonalities and reinforced group membership.  The EMR’s addition to the 
emergency room at Hospital H, thus, changed how providers interacted with each other, 
but, as described next, the EMR also changed how providers interacted with patients. 
How the Electronic Medical Records System Affected Provider–Patient Interactions 
and Patients’ Satisfaction 
 
The EMR’s introduction at Hospital H changed providers’ workflow and 
interaction habits, but the EMR also changed patients’ emergency room experiences.  
Although I was not present to witness pre-EMR provider–patient interactions, I did 
observe several providers—namely, nurses—using paper charts to expedite triage 
processes, which mimicked pre-EMR workflow patterns.  Because I also observed nurses 
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using COWs when triaging patients, I compared the two processes––paper- versus COW-
facilitated triage––and drew conclusions.  Coupled with information obtained during in-
depth interviews conducted with nurses, my observations revealed that the EMR affected 
negatively provider–patient interactions during triage by reducing eye contact between 
them and restricting their conversation to a prescribed range and sequence of topics.  
Moreover, because physicians and midlevel providers did not see nurses’ triage notes 
before they examined patients, physicians and midlevel providers repeated questions that 
nurses already had asked patients, and, thereby, forced patients to recount their 
complaints, medications, and medical histories.  Additionally, results from Hospital H’s 
patient satisfaction questionnaires indicated that patients, generally, were displeased with 
providers’ communication.  These issues are described below. 
Triage is the brief interview and examination that is conducted by a healthcare 
provider—typically, a nurse—to determine the degree of urgency of a patient’s illness or 
injury.  Given that triage is the first point of contact between providers and patients, 
triage sets the tone for patients’ emergency room experiences (Eisenberg et al., 2005).  At 
Hospital H, nurses are responsible for triaging patients.  After a patient signs in at the 
registration desk, he or she is brought into a small room that is adjacent to the emergency 
room, where a nurse, oftentimes with a COW (see Figure 5.4), begins the triage process 
by taking the patient’s temperature and vital signs.  The nurse asks the patient questions, 
in a prescribed order, about the patient’s symptoms, medical history, and medications.  If 
the nurse deems the patient’s condition to be “urgent,” the patient is brought into the 
emergency room.  If the emergency room is busy and/or the patient is labeled as 
“nonurgent,” he or she is sent back to the waiting room until a bed becomes available. 




































Figure 5.4.  Computer on Wheels.  Nurses pushed computers on wheels (COWs) into the 
patient triage suite and, oftentimes, positioned the COW between themselves and 
patients, which impeded communication and limited eye contact. 
 
I observed the triage process several times, and each time, I stood in the hall and 
watched through an open door as providers interacted with patients.  Because I oftentimes 
could hear the patients, but I could not see them, my observations are limited to 
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providers’ behaviors.15  On one occasion, I watched Nurse B push a COW into the triage 
room and position it between himself and the patient such that, from the patient’s point of 
view, he or she would have seen the back of the COW.  B asked about the patient’s 
symptoms and typed the patient’s answers, slowly, into the EMR.  Although B nodded 
occasionally, his gaze remained fixed on the COW.  Throughout the 5-minute encounter, 
I observed that B looked up and made eye contact, presumably, with the patient only 11  
times.  At one point, I heard the patient remark, “Oh, I forgot to tell you that I have 
asthma.”  B replied, “Wait, wait, wait.  I have to go back to the history screen.  Hold on.”  
B clicked through a series of screens and returned to the medical history page, where he 
amended the patient’s list of ailments.  B then asked, “Did you forget anything else 
before we move on?”  The patient said, “I’ve been taking prescription pain pills,” to 
which B responded, “Nope, that’s on a different page.  We’re not there yet, so hold on.” 
On another occasion, I observed an ambulance crew push a patient with chest pain 
into the triage room, where two nurses with COWs greeted the patient: one nurse began 
the triage process and the second nurse began chest pain protocols (e.g., administering 
aspirin and/or setting up for an EKG).  As before, when I observed B triage a patient, 
both nurses positioned their COWs between themselves and the patient.  The nurses spent 
most of their time engaged with or looking at their COWs.  A short while later, the 
physician entered with his paper TSheet and asked the patient many of the same 
questions that the triage nurse had asked the patient a few minutes prior.  The patient 
said, “I already told the nurse,” to which the physician replied, “Well, I don’t see the 
nurse’s notes, so I need you to tell me what your symptoms are.”  After the physician left, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15To preserve patients’ privacy, I did not record patients’ names or symptoms in my 
fieldnotes. 
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a registration clerk wheeled her COW into the room and, like the nurses, she positioned it 
between herself and the patient.  Within 10 minutes of arriving, the patient had seen the 
backs of three COWs and repeated his symptoms and medical history twice.  I asked the 
triage nurse how she believed the patient regarded his emergency room stay up to that 
point, and she said, “Well, it is rude rolling in with a computer, typing and talking 
without even looking at the patient.  Then, on top of that, he [the patient] has to repeat 
himself.  He’s probably not too happy.” 
All of the providers that I interviewed agreed that the EMR interfered with 
provider–patient relationships.  Dr. F said, “Computers slow us down and put a barrier 
between us and the patients.”  As Nurse B explained: 
I feel that I’m not as connected to patients as I used to be.  I can’t type without 
looking at the keyboard, and so it puts a barrier between me and the patient.  I like 
to talk to people, eye-to-eye.  Because I tend to use my COW all the time, there 
isn’t eye contact, and, to me, I find it’s rude.  I’m busy looking at the little boxes I 
have to fill in, whereas if I were writing it down, it would be easy to look at them 
[patients].  It [the EMRs] limits the communication with patients. 
 
During an interview at a medical conference, Dr. Ken Milne, Chief of Staff at 
South Huron Hospital in Ontario, Canada, said: 
The EMR interferes with the doctor–patient relationship, certainly in the history 
and physical taking.  We don’t do histories and physicals with our backs to the 
patient typing at a computer screen.  If we do, we’re saying the computer screen is 
the most important thing.  You make eye contact, you look up.  If I have to 
actually remove myself to find a computer terminal to enter the data and then 
return to the patient, it creates breaks in the personal relationship and the 
therapeutic contact that would normally be there. 
 
Nurse L concurred with Dr. Milne’s assessment of computers in examination rooms and 
explained that “the break in the personal relationship” with patients was why she stopped 
taking her COW into triage: 
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Instead of standing with my back to the patient and looking at the COW, I leave 
the COW outside.  I walk in with the old paper triage form and I sit down.  I look 
at the patient, at the patient’s eye level, and we talk.  Yes, it doubles my work, 
because I have to type up everything that I write, but I actually find that it makes 
triage go faster and the patient feels listened to.  It sets the tone for a better overall 
experience.  
 
When asked how using old paper forms expedited triage, especially given her admission 
that the paper forms doubled her workload, L replied: 
Patients don’t tell their stories organized according to the EMR screen.  They 
bounce around, they add stuff, [and] they forget things.  They’re all over the 
place.  With the paper, I can bounce around with them; with the computer, no.  It 
took me longer having to stop the patient, click on another tab, wait for the page 
to load, and then resume documenting.  I was constantly interrupting patients and 
asking them to wait.   It was aggravating for me, and it took longer.  When I’m 
frustrated, the patients can tell and they get frustrated, too. 
 
 I observed Nurse L, from the hallway, as she triaged a patient using paper forms.  
She maintained eye contact with the patient for most of the encounter, and compared with 
Nurse B’s COW-facilitated triage, described previously, Nurse L completed triage more 
quickly.  Several other nurses also reported that they found using the paper forms allowed 
them to make eye contact with patients and shortened the triage process.  Nurse A said, 
“If I’m the patient, do I want to look at a computer or a person?  I think patients feel 
cared about when it’s just us, without the COWs.”  She added: “Plus, because the COW 
takes so much longer to use, I find that the longer I’m in the room, the more the patients 
say, and that means there’s more for me to type.  With paper, I get in and get out.” 
Several nurses mentioned that patients did not connect providers’ use of COWs to 
healthcare delivery.  For instance, as Nurse Y mentioned, “Patients think we’re playing 
games or surfing the web.  They think we’re not working, so I try to show them the 
screen and say, ‘No, that’s your chart here, not some website.’”  Patients’ perceptions that 
COW use was not meaningful work, meant, oftentimes, that patients became upset during 
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triage, especially when they experienced long wait times.  Nurse L explained that to 
combat the illusion “that we’re playing with computers,” she rarely sat down at work: 
I stand up at the COW.  I only sit with the patient, at the bedside.  If we’re sitting 
in front of a computer, then we have time to check on patients, or that’s how they 
[patients] see it.  They get upset because they look out here and see a bunch of 
nurses sitting down in front of computers.  No wonder they think we’re not 
working!  Unfortunately, they complain and our satisfaction numbers end up 
looking pretty bad. 
 
Nurse J added that nurses’ performance reviews are based on patient satisfaction 
questionnaires, and that scores had deteriorated consistently since the EMR was installed: 
“Patients get frustrated because everything takes so much longer now.  They can tell 
we’re frustrated with the EMRs, and it just feeds back on itself.  Everybody’s frustrated.”  
Nurse B told J, “Well, don’t give surveys to pissed off patients!  That’s your problem.  I 
only give surveys to the happy ones.” 
I reviewed a summary analysis of results from all of the patient satisfaction 
questionnaires that were administered in 2014, and the report indicated that patient 
satisfaction, overall, had declined over the course of that year.  Although previous years’ 
summaries were unavailable to me, and, thus, I could not make comparisons or draw 
conclusions, Q assured me that “scores fell sharply after the EMR.”  She pointed to 
length of stay metrics, which increased steadily over 2014, as the main reason that 
patients were dissatisfied. 
As Nurse J pointed out, “Everything takes so much longer,” and, consequently, it 
appeared that patients were displeased.  The average length of stay in January 2014 was 
153 minutes, but, by December 2014, the average length of stay climbed to 186 minutes.  
In the same period, average “door-to-doc” times climbed from 17 minutes to 31 minutes, 
and patients’ satisfaction fell.  Although the decline in patient satisfaction was slight, 
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from an overall satisfaction score of 84.6% to 78.5%, two key dimensions that measured 
patients’ perceptions of providers’ emotional support received “failing” scores.  For the 
item, “If you had any anxieties or fears about your condition or treatment, did a doctor 
discuss them with you?” the average score was 60.8%.  The same item measuring nurses’ 
emotional support garnered a score of 56.3%.  When asked how the scores affected 
providers, Q replied, “We don’t like that patients aren’t happy, plus, we catch shit from 
administration over it, and some people might be let go if scores don’t improve.” 
In sum, COWs limited eye contact between nurses and patients during triage, and 
it forced their discussions to unfold in a prescribed order; patients who deviated from the 
prescribed order lengthened the triage process and frustrated providers.  Providers who 
used paper triage forms instead of COWs doubled their workload, but shortened the 
triage process and increased their eye contact with patients.  Physicians and midlevel 
providers repeated regularly questions that nurses had asked, which forced patients to 
recount their complaints, medications, and medical histories, which nurses believed 
contributed to patients’ poor perceptions of emergency room communication.  Results 
from Hospital H’s patient satisfaction questionnaires indicated that patients’ satisfaction 
declined from 84.6% to 78.5%.  The EMR installation, as described in the next section, 
also led to other unexpected changes in provider–patient interactions. 
Unintended and Perverse Consequences of Electronic Medical Records Systems  
 
As discussed in chapter three, an unintended consequence, is “an outcome of an 
aggregate of acts . . . each of which is intentionally carried out.  But the eventual outcome 
is neither intended nor desired by anyone” (Giddens, 1984, p. 10).  Unintended 
consequences are a regular feature of institutionalized practice because “action 
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continually produces consequences which are unintended by actors” (Giddens, 1984, p. 
27).  Unintended consequences can “systemically feed back to be the unacknowledged 
conditions of further acts” (Giddens, 1984, p. 8), potentially creating an infinite cycle of 
unintended consequences.  Many well-documented, unintended consequences that are 
associated with EMR adoptions include: increased waiting times, longer lengths of stays, 
decreased provider productivity, lower patient satisfaction scores, and employees’ 
reactance (see chapter two).  Hospital H experienced these and other intended 
consequences. 
The administrators and providers at Hospital H knew that their EMR adoption 
would trigger certain unintended consequences, such as those described above and in 
chapter two, but I observed that there were additional unintended––and unexpected–– 
consequences associated with Hospital H’s EMR adoption, as well as perverse 
consequences, intended but contradictory acts that “are perverse in such a way that the 
very activity of pursuing an objective diminishes the possibility of reaching it” (Giddens, 
1984, p. 313).  For instance, metrics were intended to alleviate emergency room 
overcrowding by making patient care more efficient, but, instead, providers’ maladaptive 
strategies for coping with metrics (e.g., “gaming the system”) cheated the clock and 
added to healthcare costs, but they did not reduce overcrowding or patients’ lengths of 
stay (see the discussion of conflicting structures above and metrics below).  Perverse 
outcomes are likely when agents are immobilized in “circumstances of structural 
contradiction” (Giddens, 1984, p. 317) and/or SD.  Below, I describe six unintended 
consequences and/or perverse consequences related to EMR use that I observed at 
Hospital H: (a) patients’ truncated narratives, (b) billing issues that contributed to 
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declining revenue and staff redundancies, (c) EMR-enabled metrics tracking and 
surveillance, (d) older providers’ difficulties adapting to EMR-induced workflow 
changes, (e) increased malpractice risk, and (f) wage theft. 
Patients’ Truncated Narratives 
As described in chapter two, EMRs have affected how information is solicited 
from patients in such a way as to almost eliminate their illness stories altogether.  For 
patients, “Stories are a way of making sense of an uncertain or chaotic set of 
circumstances and . . . enable control in the face of disorder” (Sharf et al., 2011, p. 38), 
but truncated storytelling increases patients’ uncertainty and feelings of helplessness.  
Even before EMRs were used widely, Eisenberg et al. (2005) found that emergency room 
providers reduced patients’ stories to “actionable lists” (p. 390) that prioritized 
physicians’ goals, but that such lists, generally, “fail to capture the whole meaning” (Real 
& Poole, 2011, p. 110).  EMRs in emergency rooms compounded the problem of 
truncated stories by limiting the amount of free text available for generating either lists or 
stories. 
Eight of the nine physicians at Hospital H I interviewed believed that the EMR 
removed patients’ narratives from electronic records, leaving, according to Dr. G., 
“numbers that, without a story or a timeline, don’t mean diddly squat.”  During an 
interview, Dr. Viccellio, Clinical Professor and Vice Chair of Emergency Medicine at 
Stony Brook School of Medicine, explained how “context-lacking records” were 
emblematic of EMR-using hospitals: 
If a patient complained about their [sic] care in the days of the paper charts, when 
we recorded what happened as a time sequence, you could pull the chart and there 
was a rich story of what happened, “The patient came in, there was the history 
and physical.”  Then you’d look at the nursing notes and it may say, “The patient 
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was angry, blah, blah, blah.”  You would actually get a story.  Now, we’re so busy 
checking boxes, there’s no more story associated with the patient.  It’s very hard 
to reconstruct the sequence of events that happened with the patient.  Chart 
reviewers incessantly complain about the difficulty of extracting information 
because you can’t recreate a story from boxes and numbers.  You would think that 
an electronic medical record would make that a given, but, instead, it has created, 
sometimes, insurmountable obstacles. 
 
Dr. F said that the lack of patients’ stories in electronic health records contributed 
to providers’ perceptions of those records being incomplete (see the earlier discussion in 
this chapter on appropriation moves), which, in turn, led providers to regard the records 
as “useless for anything but checking past lab results.”  “Even then,” he added, “we 
usually can’t make much of the labs.”  As Dr. F explained: 
There won’t be a story explaining why the doc ordered the test, what he 
suspected, or how the patient responded to treatment.  There isn’t a story, not 
even a paragraph that sums up what happened during the visit.  Nothing.  
Numbers without a story can’t tell me anything.  I’m just going to start from 
scratch and make sense of the story the patient is telling me today, right now, and 
what I click in the EMR won’t tell that story for the doc who sees the patient next 
week or next month. 
 
Dr. Milne said that a patient’s “evolving narrative” was an important 
“communication tool” on which physicians in Canada relied: 
When we hand off care from one physician to another, how do we handoff that 
care?  We tell the narrative.  “Here’s a 45-year-old-man who presents with a one-
week history of upper respiratory track-like infections and symptoms that has 
been associated with exertional chest pain.  I’m a bit concerned, so I got an ECG 
and a cardiac workup.”  As opposed to, “Here’s the click box list.”  A patient isn’t 
a checkbox.  In America, you don’t have a choice.  How well do those 
checkboxes tell the story?  They don’t. 
 
Q noted that the EMR-induced shift in the medical record from mostly narrative 
data to mostly numerical data was somewhat unexpected: “I knew the record would 
change, but not this much.”  When asked how that change affected patient care at 
Hospital H, she replied: 
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It just means that every visit is new.  The docs are going to repeat tests that might 
have been run last week or even last night, because they’re not going to look at 
the record.  They can’t take the chance that they’ll miss something and get sued, 
so they start fresh. 
 
Q added that the providers’ “start fresh” approach increased healthcare costs, but noted 
that Hospital H’s billing department was unlikely to capture those increased charges. 
Billing Issues 
As noted in chapter two, one of the most common economic consequences 
associated with EMRs is higher healthcare costs (Fernando et al., 2009; Georgiou et al., 
2013; Hoffmann, 2009; Kellermann & Jones, 2013; Ward et al., 2013).  Increased 
laboratory and radiology tests, which are a result of predetermined CPOE order sets (see 
Ward et al., 2013), lead to increased healthcare costs, in part, because of better charge 
capture associated with EMRs: the recording, and later billing, of the full range of 
medical services, medical supplies used, and medications administered during patients’ 
emergency room visits (Bukata, 2011, 2014).  Dr. Viccellio, Clinical Professor and Vice 
Chair of Emergency Medicine at Stony Brook School of Medicine, told me that the point 
of EMRs was never “to improve documentation but to improve billing.”  As he said: 
The first EMRs were designed strictly for financial reasons.  The original message 
was: “These things improve billing, improve billing, improve billing.”  We’ve [at 
Stony Brook] increased our billing by 20%.  That’s what EMRs are designed for.  
They were clearly not designed for medical reasons. 
 
As Q explained, administrators at Hospital H expected that billing would increase 
after they installed the EMR, but much to everyone’s surprise, revenue fell sharply.  The 
unexpected decline in revenue was blamed, in part, on incompatible software systems 
(e.g., the EMR did not generate billing codes in a format that the billing department’s 
computers could read easily).  Lost charges also were blamed on providers, who, 
	   303 
according to administrators, failed to capture adequately the breadth of services that they 
offered to patients.  Nurse M told me that nurses received, routinely, memoranda that 
reminded them to record “billable procedures.”  As he explained: 
Things like urine tests can be billed for much more than it costs to perform, so 
urine tests are kind of encouraged.  Checking patients’ vitals at least three times 
means the emergency room can bill for a higher level of care.  These sorts of 
things get casually mentioned in memos or meetings.  The problem is that a lot of 
the billables [billable items and procedures] aren’t getting billed because people 
[nurses] forget to click on the right box because they’re tired or in a rush. 
 
Nurse Y explained that capturing charges were easier when nurses used paper charts: 
 
It was easier to capture charges on paper because there was a visual reminder 
right in front of you to check the box if you did the exam.  It’s not as obvious with 
the computer; you have to click through multiple screens and sometimes things or 
procedures get missed or overlooked.  It might have been done, but it didn’t get 
documented. 
 
As described in chapter three, Hospital H’s falling revenue was associated with 
administrators’ decision to sever ties with Company S and to manage billing and 
collections in-house.  The EMR exacerbated what Q described as “sloppy billing by 
people who don’t know what they’re doing.”  Q volunteered to meet with the billing 
department and to share what she knew about Company S’s billing strategies, but she was 
rebuked.  She said, “Under [Company] S, we billed $600,000 a month.  I could get us 
close to that, but no one listens.  The EMR, unless they [administrators] fix it, won’t let 
us get back to that but we could get close.”  In late 2014, upon hearing rumors that the 
electronic TSheets would worsen the EMR–billing department incompatibility issues, Q 
claimed that she “kicked avoidance [strategy] into high gear” to escape additional “staff 
cuts and layoffs.”  She added, “If we lose any more money, I’m not sure how we’ll 
manage.  I heard the hospital might even close.” 
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In January 2015, Q lamented that, despite increased patient volume, a result of 
television, radio, and print advertisements that were meant to stimulate the emergency 
room’s revenue, the emergency room, in fact, was “still hemorrhaging money.”  Monthly 
revenue had fallen below $100,000, which did not cover physicians’ salaries.   Q met 
with administrators several times to address the EMR–billing department incompatibility, 
but she told me that she was admonished by administrators, who decided the problem 
“was with lazy nurses and docs who didn’t chart thoroughly enough.”  Administrators’ 
solutions included cutting nurses’ pay further, eliminating Christmas bonuses, scaling 
back paid time off, limiting overtime pay, capping salaries, cutting technicians’ hours, 
and reducing nursing coverage at night.  Nurse B, who worked night shifts, described the 
cuts: 
They [administrators] scaled back at night to save money, so that puts even more 
work on the nurses.  Since they cut the techs’ hours, now, in addition to patient 
care, nurses are answering phones, taking patients to X-ray, and up to the floor.  
We should have four nurses, but usually it’s just three.  We’re already 
understaffed and they reduce nursing on top of that?  It doesn’t make sense.  If it 
slows us down, then we can’t move patients quickly.  That means patients are 
sitting in the waiting room and some of them, eventually, decide to go somewhere 
else.  Then we’ve just lost a customer, so efforts to save money end up costing us 
money. 
 
The EMR also led to staff redundancies (e.g., physicians entered orders using the CPOE, 
whereas, previously, unit secretaries and technicians processed paper order sets), and 
because of falling revenue, which triggered cost-cutting measures, unit secretaries and 
technicians became dispensable.  When asked about unit secretaries’ duties after the 
EMR installation, a physician replied, “I’m not really sure since we do the orders 
ourselves now.  I think maybe they page the consulting docs.” 
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Unit secretaries’ hours were reduced and, increasingly, technicians absorbed 
many of the unit secretaries’ duties.  As of May 2015, only technicians remained.  When 
asked about staff reductions, Nurse B commented that he and the other “senior nurses” 
were worried: 
They [administrators] are always going to need nurses, but I am concerned 
because I’m at salary cap.  I am one of the more experienced and expensive 
nurses.  If they can find a way to get rid of the more expensive nurses and bring in 
two new graduates, who are a lot cheaper than I am, then I think that may be their 
next move.  I’m seriously questioning my long-term future here. 
 
Physicians and midlevel providers also were “gently reminded” in memoranda to 
document thoroughly billable tests and procedures that they performed.  Administrators 
decided that a profit-sharing plan might improve physicians’ and midlevel providers’ 
compliance with billing strategies.  As Q explained, “I wouldn’t call it a commission but 
they [physicians and midlevel providers] are incentivized to run the bill up.”  Dr. E, 
however, said that profit-sharing was irrelevant because physicians 
do our jobs regardless and we have no idea how much a certain test costs.  I’m not 
changing how I practice medicine because I might now suddenly get a $5 
commission on that urine pregnancy test.  It’s a little offensive to me that 
administrators think I’ll chase that carrot. 
 
Dr. O further explained that emergency medicine physicians “don’t chase carrots; they  
run from sticks”; in other words, physicians ordered additional tests to avoid metrics-
related reprimands, which are described next. 
Metrics and Surveillance 
Described previously (see the discussion on SD), metrics are time-based 
performance measures that are instituted and monitored by CMS.  The EMR at Hospital 
H tracked metrics on every physician, midlevel provider, and nurse, which, according to 
Dr. O, meant that “we get watched every second of our shifts.”  According to Giddens 
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(1984), surveillance is common when “superordinates have an interest in harnessing the 
activities of those subject to their authority to the enactment of designated tasks” (p. 157).  
Because CMS could cut Hospital H’s Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement if providers 
did not meet metrics goals, Hospital H’s administrators attempted “to coax a certain level 
of performance from workers” (Giddens, p. 157), by instituting surveillance tactics that 
recorded metrics violations each day.  As Dr. O explained: 
We get an e-mail every day that shows your numbers.  At the end of the month, if 
your numbers are out of whack or too far from the average, you get called on it.  
They’re really hot on door-to-doc times.  The goal is 30 minutes, but, for January 
[2015], our average was 43 [minutes].  All I know is one day, the average was 67 
minutes and that guy’s not on the February schedule.  My advice: don’t go to the 
bathroom, because if a new patient shows up, you won’t be there to click on it.   
Gaming the system (e.g., ordering inconsequential and/or unnecessary laboratory 
tests) enabled providers to meet metrics goals by stopping artificially the clock on door-
to-doc times.  Q encouraged physicians to “get creative” and game the system by “seeing 
patients in triage and in the waiting room.”  A midlevel provider, V, explained that 
gaming the system was “institutional practice”: 
We’re all playing the system and the real focus gets lost.  We should be focused 
on patients’ well-being; instead, we’re strategizing which test to order so that 
administration doesn’t catch on.  Come on, do they [administrators] really think 
all those patients needed their blood sugar checked?  Not everybody needs a UPT 
[urine pregnancy test].  At what point does it cross over from gaming the system 
to committing fraud?  CMS set this up, but if we don’t comply, we lose CMS 
money.  We’re playing along, but, someday, someone is going to get accused of 
frauding CMS.  It’s a vicious cycle. 
Dr. F commented that both providers and patients were “better off” before the use 
of metrics that were intended to ensure faster and more efficient healthcare.  He added, 
“EMRs just make it worse; without EMRs, metrics wouldn’t be an issue.”  Moreover, 
providers believed that metrics, which failed to improve patient outcomes, contributed to 
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providers’ dissatisfaction, burnout, and impotent agency.  Thus, EMR-enabled metrics 
led to a perverse outcome, which, according to Giddens (1984), “ are likely to generate 
resentment . . . and things are worse than they were before in circumstances in which all 
or the majority of those involved could expect them to be better” (p. 317). 
Following the EMR adoption at Hospital H, administrators instituted strict metrics 
surveillance and enforcement policies, which, for providers, were unexpected.  This 
unintended, and, seemingly, perverse consequence of the EMR adoption contributed to 
providers’ dissatisfaction and immobilization, and it worsened SD-nexus conditions (see 
the SD discussion earlier  in this chapter).  Moreover, as described next, the EMR 
adoption also affected some providers’ employment at Hospital H. 
Providers’ Ages and Implications for Electronic Medical Records Systems Use 
After the EMR installation at Hospital H, Nurse M told me that the nurses started 
a betting pool on “which of the old docs would go or be let go.”  Nurses also bet on 
physicians’ metrics, and, according to Nurse Y, “the older docs always have the worst 
numbers.”  Nurse J explained that poor metrics, primarily, was “an older doc problem, 
[because] younger docs grew up using computers, but the old ones can’t even see the tabs 
or type very well.”  Dr. O, who, at age 30, was the youngest physician at Hospital H, 
agreed with Nurse J’s assessment and replied, “All of those old docs are all paper, all the 
way.”  Several nurses pointed out that, in addition to poor metrics, older physicians 
dumped orders regularly and played up hierarchical differences, but as Nurse M 
observed, those physicians “will age out in 5–10 years, and then we won’t have to worry 
about it.”  Nurse Y added, “Or they’ll get canned, like Dr. W.” 
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Although the nurses assumed that Dr. W was “canned” because he dumped orders 
on them, one of the physicians explained to me that Dr. W’s firing was because he was 
too old to work the EMR.  The physician, who asked not to be identified, said that Dr. W 
was an old-fashioned emergency physician and he had a preset way of doing 
things.  He was pushing 70 [years of age] and trained when docs had dictation and 
secretaries.  The man didn’t know how to type.  He didn’t even have e-mail!  He 
was horrible with the EMR, truly horrible.  Nurses had to put all his orders in for 
him because he literally couldn’t do it.  His metrics were crap, because he didn’t 
know how to game it.  If we had had electronic TSheets back then, he would have  
fallen apart.  I hate to say it, but he was asked to leave because he was basically 
too old to function.  Medically, he was spot on, but he couldn’t work the 
computer. 
 
The physician lamented that, oftentimes, he, too, saw himself as becoming outdated in an 
emergency room that, increasingly, was reliant on “doodads and gizmos.”  As he 
explained: 
I’m almost 60 years old and I have no idea what these nurses and residents are 
talking about.  They go on Twitter, they’re texting people on their phones, or they 
have apps to look up doses and side effects.  I still look stuff up in books and they 
laugh at me.  I guess I’ll be the next one let go. 
 
Most of the physicians in their 50s expressed similar concerns that they would become 
outdated, but the physicians in their 40s were secure in their ability to adapt to new 
technologies.  As Dr. F, one of those 40 year olds, explained, “I’m young enough to cope, 
but the older docs do struggle a bit.” 
I reached out to Dr. W and asked him why he no longer worked at Hospital H.  He 
said that although he was not fired, the decision to leave was not entirely his.  When 
asked if the EMR factored into the decision, he replied, “Well, the EMR wasn’t my 
choice.  I’d still be there if they didn’t have it.”  When asked if he believed that his age 
was a contributing factor that led to the dissolution of his professional affiliation with 
Hospital H, he replied, “Officially, no, but I’m sure it was a factor.  I was the oldest doc 
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there.”  He mentioned that he still worked in a handful of emergency rooms and urgent 
care centers that used paper charts to document patient care. 
Dr. Milne said that the trend in Canada was for older physicians to gravitate away 
from EMR-using facilities and to urgent care centers: 
As urban centers are adopting EMRs, the physicians in those centers seem to have 
the lowest satisfaction.  Unfortunately, it seems the older physicians are suffering 
the most in this transition.  They’re being shifted into lower acuity facilities or 
urgent care clinics.  There is clearly a generational divide with regards to 
adaptation to this technology. 
 
In sum, an older physician’s inability to adapt to EMR-induced changes in 
workflow and documentation patterns led to his departure from Hospital H.  Other older 
physicians questioned their longevity and ability to adapt to new technologies, whereas 
younger physicians were confident that they would adapt their practice habits as new 
technologies dictated.  Next, I describe an unintended consequence of EMR adoption that 
affected all providers, irrespective of their ages: increased malpractice risk. 
Increased Malpractice Risk 
In 2003, a malpractice case, Breeden v. Anesthesia West, found that physicians 
were responsible for information contained in electronic health records, regardless of who 
entered the data, and, moreover, that nurses were not culpable for damages if they 
documented, but did not verbalize, pertinent findings in cases that resulted in medical 
malpractice (Reyes, 2014).  In the Breeden case, according to Reyes (2014), a nurse 
documented that a patient’s condition had deteriorated in the hours after a preoperative 
medical screening examination, but the anesthesiologist did not read the nurse’s update.  
Relying on results from the earlier preoperative examination, the anesthesiologist 
proceeded with the scheduled procedure and the patient died from complications. 
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Five of the physicians at Hospital H cited the Breeden case and pointed to a 
similarity in the Dallas Ebola case involving Thomas Duncan: nurses documented––but 
did not verbalize––Mr. Duncan’s travel history.  Additionally, nurses’ electronic notes 
were part of an EMR component that physicians could not access.  As Dr. E noted: 
In both cases, you have a nurse entering something in the record but not telling 
the physician.  In Breeden, the physician was liable.  Mark my words, the same 
thing is going to happen in Dallas.  That doctor is getting sued by somebody.  I 
wouldn’t be surprised if it happens here, eventually. 
 
 Dr. Viccellio explained that EMRs were “a field day for plaintiffs’ lawyers” for 
several reasons: 
The biggest part of it is because of the checkbox thing.  You come in because of a 
sprained ankle and I go “check, check, check” and now the lawyer is saying, 
“Why did you do a pelvic exam on this patient?  Why did you do a fundoscopic 
exam16 for a sprained ankle?”  “Well, you know, I checked those boxes by 
accident.”  “Well if you did that by accident, is the rest of the chart an accident?   
What’s real here and what’s not?”  It’s very easy for lawyers to demonstrate to a 
jury that a lot of what’s in that record is garbage.  “If some of it’s garbage, then 
how am I to believe anything else that you write there?  You claim that this is 
normal, but you also claim that this pelvic exam is normal and you didn’t even do 
a pelvic exam.” 
 
Dr. Viccellio noted that boxes “checked by accident” were commonplace:  
If I look at any record in my department, I can easily identify stuff that’s in that 
chart that clearly nobody did, but they checked off.  Maybe by mistake, someone 
was in a hurry.  This is where medically, legally, I think we’re digging a deep 
hole for ourselves. 
 
Several physicians at Hospital H complained that they were liable not only for 
nurses’ additions to electronic health records and boxes “checked by accident” but also 
for EMR design errors that resulted in medical malpractice.  For example, Dr. A showed 
me a tip sheet distributed by his malpractice insurance carrier that read, in part, “The  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16A fundoscopic exam is an eye exam that gauges the integrity of the retina and iris. 
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provider is the covered entity responsible for maintaining the integrity of the patient’s 
electronic record, not the [EMR] vendor.”  Dr. A said: 
The bottom line is that if one of these glitches or bugs that mixes up which patient 
is allergic to which medication leads me to administer medication to a patient who 
then has an allergic reaction, I’ll be sued, but not the company that made the 
faulty product. 
When asked if there had been any malpractice claims made against any of the providers 
at Hospital H that, in any way, were connected to the EMR, Dr. A replied, “Not yet but 
it’s a real worry.  It adds to my stress level and I know a lot of the other physicians worry 
about it, too.”  All of the physicians agreed that the EMRs increased malpractice risk and, 
subsequently, their fear of being sued.  As Dr. G noted, “I don’t think EMRs were 
designed for the benefit of lawyers but it’s turned out that way.  I don’t think anyone 
envisioned that these [EMRs] would become doctor traps.” 
Wage Theft 
The last unintended consequence that resulted from Hospital H’s EMR 
installation was wage theft, uncompensated work and/or documentation completed by 
providers before and/or after their scheduled shifts.  I first observed instances of what 
providers dubbed wage theft in late 2013, when nurses arrived several minutes before 
their scheduled shifts to set up their COWs.  When asked if nurses were paid for their 
time, Nurse A replied: 
No, we don’t get paid until the shift actually starts but we have to be ready to see 
patients the minute the shift starts, or we get written up for slow times or taking 
too long, so we have to set up early.  I wish we were paid extra because this 
[setting up the COW] is a necessary component of our jobs. 
Whereas nurses came early, physicians, generally, stayed late.  Seven of the nine 
physicians interviewed reported that they stayed, on average, 1–2 hours after each shift to 
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finish documenting patient care that they were unable to complete during their shifts.  Dr. 
E explained that physicians had little choice because “incomplete charts” could result in 
physicians having their salaries withheld “until all their charts were current.”  Dr. A 
added that wage theft may not happen every shift but it happens often enough that I do 
feel cheated.  Keep in mind that I’m already working a 12-hour shift and I don’t get any 
breaks, so, after a half-hour drive to get here, a 12-hour workday, an extra hour, unpaid, 
and a half-hour commute home, I’m looking at a 14-hour day.  It’s exhausting.  Would I 
like to be paid for that extra hour?  Why not?  I did the work! 
Midlevel providers, usually, dedicated the last hour of their shifts to completing 
documentation, and, thus, they avoided wage theft.  X, a midlevel provider, explained 
that midlevel providers’ shifts overlapped with physicians’ shifts, and, as he noted, that 
meant “midlevels are not the only ones seeing patients, so we can hand off care.”  He 
added: 
  We usually work noon to midnight, and there’s always a doc here, so we 
[midlevel providers] can stop seeing patients and start catching up on charting.  
The docs can’t really do that, especially the night doc, because there is no one else 
here to see patients when his shift winds down.  He sees patients right up to 7:00 
a.m.  He can’t stop and catch up until the day-time doc comes on.   
 
As the EMR adoption process wore on and physicians’ documentation burdens 
grew, in part, because of increased patient volume that was fueled by advertisements, 
physicians became more incensed at the wage theft that they experienced.  Dr. A 
complained that once the electronic TSheet was installed, their documentation times 
would fall ever further, meaning that physicians would spend “even more unpaid time 
catching up.”  Dr. F and Q acknowledged that the electronic TSheets would add to  
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documentation times, which was one of the reasons that they were fighting actively 
against electronic TSheets. 
In September 2014, a physician from Hospital H emailed me an article that he 
read in The New York Times, entitled “More Workers are Claiming ‘Wage Theft,’” in 
which Greenhouse (2014) described a lawsuit in California “that accused employers of 
violating minimum wage and overtime laws, erasing work hours and wrongfully taking 
employees’ tips” (para. 4).  Greenhouse also wrote about an appeals court ruling that 
found “FedEx had in effect committed wage theft by insisting that its drivers were 
independent contractors rather than employees . . . [but] did not pay them overtime, 
which is required only for employees” (para. 7). 
I shared the article with the other physicians at Hospital H and asked for their 
feedback.  Dr. G and Dr. A pointed out that they, like the FedEx drivers mentioned in the 
article, were independent contractors, and, consequently, they were not entitled to 
overtime pay, paid leave, or benefits.  Dr. E wrote a note and left it for me in the 
emergency room.  In part, the note read: 
I have personally been a victim of this [wage theft].  With these crappy EMRs, 
along with greater expectations of patients seen per hour, the “move the flesh 
policies” or you lose your job, I, and many others, have spent many countless 
hours doing charting after the shift (and reimbursement) have ended.  The only 
way these corporations can bill on this is with the extensive, nonmedical “pencil- 
pushing” physicians must now put in the charts, and it can no longer be completed 
in a normal 12-hour shift.  I’m all for an EMR that facilitates my work.  I use 
them at other facilities, but Paragon is not a good EMR.  This is a bad system that 
is bad for patients and bad for providers. 
In sum, the EMR adoption at Hospital H resulted in several unintended 
consequences.  Patients’ narratives were truncated by a checkbox-laden system that 
diminished context in electronic records, which contributed to providers’ perceptions that 
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electronic records were incomplete and of limited value.  Hospital H experienced a 
decline in revenue, in part, because the EMR was not compatible with the billing 
department’s computer system, and, consequently, charges were not captured 
consistently.  The decline in billing set off a series of events, each with a series of 
consequences: to stimulate patient volume and revenue, an advertising campaign 
promised short wait times, which contributed to increased patient volume, but prior 
staffing reductions, necessary because of poor revenue, contributed to increased patients’ 
lengths of stay and longer door-to-doc times, which, in turn, led to violations in 
providers’ metrics and patients’ dissatisfaction.  Metrics and EMR-enabled surveillance 
policies, consequently, led to sanctions and contributed to providers’ dissatisfaction and 
immobilization, which worsened SD-nexus conditions.  An older physician left Hospital 
H because he was unable to adapt to EMR-induced workflow and documentation 
changes.  EMR use increased providers’ perceptions of their malpractice risk, which 
added to their workplace stress.  Increased documentation time after the EMR installation 
meant that many providers completed documentation tasks after their shifts ended, which 
led them to complain of wage theft.  Although some consequences, such as changes in 
billing and metrics-induced surveillance, were not altogether unexpected by providers, 
for many providers, the ramifications of the EMR (discussed in the next chapter) were 
more dire than anticipated.  
Conclusion 
This chapter presented data derived from fieldwork, in-depth interviews, and 
document analysis, as well as questionnaire data, that attested to structural changes 
experienced by providers who worked in the emergency room at Hospital H during and 
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after the installation of an electronic medical records system.  Findings were grouped into 
seven major themes: (a) electronic medical records system training for providers, (b) 
appropriation moves, (c) structurational divergence, (d) providers’ strategies for coping 
with the electronic medical records system, (e) communication between providers, (f) 
how electronic medical records system affected patients’ experiences, and (g) unintended 
consequences. 
Formal electronic medical records system training sessions triggered dissonance 
and reactance in physicians.  Hierarchically imbalanced relationships exacerbated role-
reversal tensions for physicians during formal training sessions, but not during informal 
training episodes; instead, nurses and midlevel providers reported that they experienced 
feelings associated with dissonance when they trained physicians in the emergency room.  
Peer-to-peer training delayed patient care and aggravated tensions among providers.  
Moreover, poor practice habits were passed on in peer-to-peer sessions, which 
diminished users’ satisfaction with many of the electronic medical records system’s 
features. 
A microanalysis of speech acts that accompanied providers’ appropriation moves 
indicated that providers’ attitudes about the electronic medical records system were 
negative.  Providers’ relating moves, which compared the electronic medical records 
system with other structures, revealed that the electronic medical records system changed 
workflow patterns, lengthened documentation time, doubled work for some providers, 
and changed how providers thought about and/or planned patient care.  Four themes 
surfaced in providers’ constraining and judging moves: (a) the electronic medical records 
system changed workflow patterns (e.g., longer documentation times, duplicated effort, 
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delayed work, and interrupted train of thought); (b) providers viewed the medical record 
as being incomplete; (c) the electronic medical records system’s spirit, largely, was 
incoherent because of poorly designed features (e.g., multiple tabs, small text, and 
numerous password prompts); and (d) the electronic medical records system’s 
performance was problematic because of hardware and software issues that, in some 
instances, increased the risk of medication errors. 
Structurational divergence existed in Hospital H’s emergency room as evidenced 
by the presence of conflicting external and internal structures (i.e., government policies, 
mandates, and legislation, as well as hospital policies), which contributed to providers’ 
immobilization; providers’ dissatisfaction and burnout; “us” versus “them” language, 
which intensified ineffective and hostile communication patterns among providers; 
negative communication spirals between providers and administrators; and providers’ 
diminished agency.  Providers’ attempts at regaining lost agency contributed to the 
structurational divergence nexus–cycle escalation. 
Providers developed and/or employed several strategies to cope with workflow 
changes that were brought on by the electronic medical records system.  Order dumping 
aggravated hierarchical tensions among providers and fueled structurational divergence 
cycle development.  Providers considered employing scribes, a common workaround 
adopted in other hospitals, but they abandoned that plan because of reported difficulties 
(e.g., documentation errors) associated with scribe support.  Avoidance tactics were 
employed by the emergency room management, which delayed installation of the 
electronic TSheet component of the electronic medical records system. 
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The electronic medical records system also changed providers’ communication 
patterns.  Providers reported that they talked with their coworkers less, spent less time 
discussing patient care face-to-face, and, generally, talked about fewer topics, compared 
to the time before the system was employed.  Providers revealed that although they talked 
less, overall, they spent more time clarifying orders compared with when they used paper 
order sets.  After the electronic medical records system was installed, nurses worked in 
one area, whereas physicians and midlevel providers worked in another area; the physical 
separation meant that fewer verbal orders and updates were shared among providers, who 
were out of sight of one another.  Providers reported that they spent time complaining 
about the electronic medical records system, which strengthened their relational bonds. 
Patients were affected substantially by electronic medical records system as well.  
Computers on wheels limited eye contact between nurses and patients during triage, 
which, from nurses’ perspectives, affected negatively patient–nurse relationships.  
Physicians and midlevel providers repeated regularly questions that nurses had asked, 
which forced patients to repeat their answers.  Results from Hospital H’s questionnaires 
indicated that patients’ satisfaction declined in the first full year following the electronic 
medical records system installation, and, during the same period, that patients’ length of 
stay and time spent waiting to see physicians increased. 
Six unintended consequences and/or perverse consequences related to electronic 
medical records system use were observed at Hospital H: (a) patients’ truncated 
narratives, (b) billing issues that contributed to declining revenue and staff redundancies, 
(c) EMR-enabled metrics tracking and surveillance, (d) older providers’ difficulties 
adapting to EMR-induced workflow changes, (e) increased malpractice risk, and (f) wage 
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theft.  Patients’ stories were condensed or eliminated by the electronic medical records 
system, which contributed to providers’ perceptions that electronic records were 
incomplete.  The electronic medical records system contributed to a decline in revenue at 
Hospital H, which led to staffing and salary cuts.  Metrics and EMR-enabled surveillance 
policies contributed to providers’ dissatisfaction.  An older physician left Hospital H 
because he was unable to adapt to electronic medical records system-induced workflow 
changes.  The electronic medical records system increased providers’ perceptions of their 
malpractice risk.  Increased documentation time linked to the electronic medical records  
system forced many providers to complete documentation tasks after their shifts ended, 
which led to complaints of wage theft. 
In closing, as the results presented in this chapter show, there were important 
effects that resulted from the introduction of an electronic medical records system into 
this hospital.  The more general conceptual/theoretical and application implications of 
these findings are discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the research goals for this study, 
followed by a review of the research questions that were posed, the major findings that 
addressed those research questions, and a discussion detailing how the findings contribute 
to the scholarly literature about electronic medical records systems (EMRs) and 
emergency rooms.  The implications of the study then are addressed, starting with a 
discussion of the study’s conceptual/theoretical implications for structuration theory, 
adaptive structuration theory (AST), and structurational divergence (SD) theory.  The 
chapter concludes by identifying some methodological and practical implications of the 
findings, followed by a discussion of some limitations that characterized this study and 
directions for future research. 
Research Goals 
The purpose of this research was to extend communication scholarship conducted 
on the effects of EMRs on healthcare providers working in a community hospital-based 
emergency room.  More specifically, this study sought to accomplish three goals.  First, 
the study sought to enhance scholarly understanding of communication in emergency 
rooms by examining the effects of EMRs on providers’ social interactions and system 
reproduction.  Second, the study employed ethnographic methods in an understudied 
environment (i.e., a community hospital’s emergency room), because, “despite its 
applicability and value,” there has been “little [such] research in the emergency medicine 
care field” (Cooper & Endacott, 2007, p. 818).  Ethnographic methods, in particular, 
which are “designed to account for action and interaction in real contexts,” are uniquely 
situated “to explain how emergency clinicians manage workflow” (Nugus et al., 2011, p. 
	   320 
1046), and, therefore, those methods can, in comparison to large-scale survey methods, 
produce “deeper understanding of emergency medicine as a social practice” (Paltved & 
Musaeus, 2012, p. 773).  Third, because health communication research “often lacks 
theoretical underpinnings” (Nazione et al., 2013, p. 22), this study tested the relevance of 
structuration theory and its derivatives for explaining an EMR’s influence on providers in 
an emergency room setting. 
To accomplish these aims, I spent 162 hours over 18 months in a community 
hospital (Hospital H) emergency room, collecting data through participant observation, 
in-depth interviews, document analysis, and a questionnaire.  The study was conducted in 
line with Giddens’s (1984) three guidelines for social-scientific research.  Giddens’s first 
caveat was that “social science research has a necessary cultural, ethnographic or 
‘anthropological’ aspect to it,” which requires researchers “getting to know what actors 
already know, and have to know, to ‘go on’ in the daily activities of social life” and, then, 
describing “the frames of meaning within which actors orient their conduct” (p. 284).  
Resulting social analysis should be “written with the aim of describing a given cultural 
milieu to others who are unfamiliar with it,” and it should make use of thick description, 
especially in “research . . . of a more ethnographic kind” (Giddens, p. 285); hence, this 
analysis provided ample thick description of the structuration processes enacted at the 
hospital that was studied.  Second, because Giddens believed that social research should 
“be sensitive to the complex skills which actors have in co-ordinating the contexts of 
their day-to-day behavior” (p. 285), I was attentive to providers’ authoritative resources 
and power.  Third, researchers, according to Giddens, should be “sensitive to the time–
space constitution of social life,” which means studying not only actors’ social 
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interactions but also “the contextual features of locales through which actors move in 
their daily path” (p. 286), which is why participant observation was employed “to study 
medical work in situ” (Paltved & Musaeus, 2012, p. 773), in addition to other data-
collection methods. 
Barley (1986) extended Giddens’s (1984) axioms and recommended that 
researchers studying technology adoption should conduct longitudinal analyses of ways 
in which users incorporate technology into their daily lives, but he cautioned that “it 
becomes unsound practice to lump together organizations with radically different 
institutional histories and ecological milieu” (p. 81).  Because technology adoption, 
inevitably, “reflects the situational context, it is quite likely that identical technologies 
used in similar contexts can occasion different structures” (Barley, p. 81).  Although 
numerous studies have examined communication technology adoption in academic 
medical center-based emergency rooms (e.g., Callen et al., 2013; Eisenberg et al., 2005; 
Farhan et al., 2012; Hill et al., 2013; Kessler et al., 2012; McCarthy et al., 2012, 2013; 
Morgan et al., 2011; Park et al., 2012; Rhodes et al., 2003; Stephens et al., 2012; Ward et 
al., 2013; Wei at al., 2012), those findings are not generalizable to community hospital 
emergency rooms because, as described in chapter one, there are major differences 
between academic medical centers and community hospitals, such as academic medical 
centers employing both physicians and medical residents, which lowers the physician–
patient ratio, and having specialty and subspecialty consultants available 24 hours a day, 
whereas community hospitals have fewer physicians on staff and, generally, very limited 
specialty support.  Although the only naturalistic “before, during, and after” analysis of 
an emergency room’s EMR adoption is valuable (Park et al., 2012), the findings from 
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that study are applicable only to academic medical centers, and, therefore, they are not 
generalizable to the majority of emergency room settings.  Hence, in keeping with 
Barley’s advice, I have not “lumped together organizations” (p. 81) by using findings 
from studies to explain EMR-induced structural changes that I observed at the hospital 
studied but, instead, I conducted a study that contributes to scholarly understanding of 
EMR adoption in a community hospital emergency room setting. 
In sum, this study set out to accomplish three things: (a) enhance scholarly 
understanding of EMR-induced changes in a community hospital emergency room, (b) 
contribute an ethnographic study to the emergency room literature, and (c) test the 
relevance of structuration theory and its derivatives for explaining the effects of an EMR 
adoption.  I tried to be sensitive to the skills that agents used as they coordinated their 
day-to-day behavior and to what Giddens (1984) called “the time–space constitution of 
social life” (p. 286), which meant studying both agents’ interactions and the locale that 
housed those interactions.  I, thus, conducted a longitudinal analysis of an EMR adoption 
in a community hospital emergency room to produce a document rich with thick 
description.  To address the broader goals of this study, I posed four research questions 
(see chapter three), with the next section summarizing the study’s major findings with 
regard to those research questions. 
Summary of Major Findings that Addressed the Research Questions and 
Contributed to the Scholarly Literature 
 
My preliminary research and my reading of structuration theory and its 
derivatives (see chapter three) led to posing four research questions for this study: (a) 
How do EMRs influence social interactions among providers working in the emergency 
room at Hospital H? (b) How does the EMR impact structures, agents, and systems in the 
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emergency room at Hospital H? (c) What, if any, unintended consequences emerge 
during and after EMR adoption at Hospital H? and (d) Do providers working in the 
emergency room at Hospital H experience SD?  To answer these questions, findings 
culled from participant observational fieldwork, in-depth interviews, document analysis, 
and questionnaire data were grouped into seven major themes: (a) EMR training for 
providers; (b) providers’ appropriation moves; (c) SD, which included immobilization 
and negative communication spirals; (d) providers’ strategies for coping with the EMR; 
(e) changes to providers’ communication patterns, (f) how the EMR affected provider–-
patient interactions and patients’ experiences; and (g) unintended consequences 
associated with the EMR.  In answering each of the research questions, the themes are 
revisited in the sections below. 
Findings for Research Question One: Electronic Medical Records Systems and 
Providers’ Social Interactions 
 
Findings from themes (a) and (e) answer the question, “How do EMRs influence 
social interactions among providers working in the emergency room at Hospital H?”  In 
line with other studies (Brooks & Grotz, 2010; Granlien & Hertzum, 2012; Top & Gider, 
2011), formal EMR training ignited dissonance and reactance in physicians, and, 
moreover, it hindered their learning (see, e.g., Robinson et al., 2003).  Hierarchical 
tensions also were aroused in formal EMR training, as Nambisan et al. (2013) found, but, 
in the present study, those tensions were exacerbated when physicians’ trainers were 
nonmedical, information technology (IT) department staff members as opposed to nurses 
or midlevel providers.  Interactions between physicians and IT staff, largely, were 
ineffective and negative, but physicians’ reliance on nurses and midlevel providers who 
were designated as “super-users” also was problematic because their exchanges created 
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role-reversal tensions for super-users.  Given results from earlier studies, role-reversal 
tensions were expected to aggravate dissonance in physicians (see Nambisan et al. 2013; 
Robinson et al., 2003), but, instead, nurses and midlevel providers were more likely to 
report dissonance when they trained physicians than were the physicians being trained.  
The unease that super-users felt, in many instances, impeded communication between 
them and physicians.  No study to date, that I am aware of, has identified training-
induced cognitive dissonance in nurses and midlevel providers, pursuant to their training 
physicians.  This is an important finding, because identifying and eliminating sources of 
dissonance, which manifest as resentment, anger, unease, annoyance, frustration, and/or 
discomfort (Sweeny et al., 2000) and which contribute to nurses and midlevel providers 
feeling dissatisfied in their work, can lower providers’ risk of burnout. 
In accordance with studies conducted by Hill et al. (2013) and Park et al. (2012), 
EMR adoption was found to limit providers’ face-to-face interactions.  Although 
providers at Hospital H, by their accounts, spoke less, they spent more time clarifying 
orders after, as compared to before, the EMR and CPOE components were installed.  
Although this finding seemed contradictory, providers did speak less overall after those 
technologies were installed, and much of what they did discuss involved clarifying CPOE 
orders that nurses found confusing.  The result, according to providers, was that they 
spent less time with patients, which, in turn, delayed patient care.  This finding 
corroborates research that suggests EMRs decrease the time that providers spend with 
patients (Hill et al., 2013; Park et al., 2012; Person et al., 2013). 
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Similar to the EMR that was used at the Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital 
where the Dallas Ebola case unfolded (see chapter one), the EMR at Hospital H divided 
physicians’ and nurses’ notes into separate programs (see, e.g., Frazao, 2014; Giblom & 
Chen, 2014; Jones, 2014).  Many providers at Hospital H indicated that the separate 
workflows made them feel isolated from one another’s clinical work and decision 
making, and, consequently, providers reported that they felt less like members of a team.  
Additionally, in line with other findings (see Hill et al., 2013; Park et al., 2012; Person et 
al., 2013), the EMR abolished paper charts, which, previously, stimulated interactions 
among providers as they shared charts in common work areas.  After the EMR 
installation, providers’ designated EMR workstations isolated nurses from both midlevel 
providers and physicians, which, consequently, reduced further providers’ face-to-face 
encounters (see, e.g., Hill et al., 2013; Park et al., 2012; Person et al., 2013).  Fewer 
interactions led to dropped orders, and they increased the likelihood of medical mistakes 
occurring.  Both dropped orders and medical mistakes were uncovered when studying 
providers’ appropriation moves, described next. 
Findings for Research Question Two: Electronic Medical Records Systems and 
Structuration 
 
Findings linked to themes (b) and (f) helped to answer the question, “How does 
the EMR impact structures, agents, and systems in the emergency room at Hospital H?”  
This study of providers’ appropriation moves showed that the EMR was an allocative 
resource (i.e., tool) that providers used and talked about regularly, and, thereby, made the 
EMR part of Hospital H’s social context and system (i.e., the patterning of social 
relations across time and space).  Microanalysis of providers’ speech acts, however, 
showed that the EMR was perceived negatively, which corroborates findings that EMRs, 
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generally, are not well liked by providers (see Fernando, Georgiou, Holdgate, & 
Westbrook, 2009; Feufel, Robinson, & Shalin, 2011; Francis, 2013; Georgiou et al., 
2013; Lee, Kuo, & Goodwin, 2013; Makam et al., 2013; Ward et al., 2013). 
Relating moves showed that the EMR changed, fundamentally, structures at 
Hospital H in several ways.  The EMR altered workflow patterns (e.g., increased 
workload and documentation tasks), changed providers’ thought processes (e.g., 
interrupted their train of thought and/or reorganized their mental checklists for 
examination procedures), and changed providers’ perceptions of the completeness of 
medical records.  Nurses, when compared with physicians, found electronic health 
records to be more complete than paper records, and, generally, nurses were more 
accepting of the EMR, which supports other findings (see Lærum, Karlsen, & Faxvagg, 
2004; Likourezos et al., 2004, Otieno, Toyama, Asonuma, Kanai-Pak, & Naitoh, 2007; 
Weiner et al., 1999). 
Providers’ constraining moves revealed that the EMR inhibited their agency; 
mainly, by limiting the time that providers could spend with patients.  Whereas relating 
moves indicted that changes in workflow patterns occurred, constraining moves showed 
that providers regarded the workflow changes negatively.  In line with Park et al.’s 
(2012) findings, the EMR duplicated workflow (e.g., multiple providers documented the 
same thing in separate portions of the health record), led to delayed work, interrupted 
providers’ cognitive processes (e.g., train of thought), increased documentation time, and 
doubled work for providers who relied on paper notes as memory aids.  Moreover, the 
EMR’s incoherent spirit meant that software glitches dropped orders frequently, which 
increased the likelihood of mistakes occurring.  In line with many of the EMR studies 
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that were reviewed in chapter two (see Fernando et al., 2009; Feufel al., 2011; Georgiou 
et al., 2013; Ward et al., 2013), the EMR’s effects in this study, largely, were negative. 
Patients, who, like providers, are agents in emergency rooms, also appeared to be 
affected adversely by the EMR.  For instance, nurses who used computers on wheels 
(COWs) during triage looked at patients less than did nurses who used the old paper 
triage forms.  COWs were a physical barrier between nurses and patients, and, as Pearce 
et al. (2013) observed, the EMR forced patient–provider interactions to unfold in a 
prescribed fashion that shifted exchanges toward data gathering and away from patients’ 
narratives.  Providers reported that they believed the EMR affected negatively their 
relationships with patients (in line with research conducted by Callen et al., 2013 and 
Frankel, 2005) and patients’ emergency room experiences (see Ward et al., 2013), with 
patient satisfaction, as measured by questionnaires administered to them by Hospital H 
representatives, falling after the EMR was installed. 
In sum, the EMR introduction was “an exogenous shock” (Barley, 1986, p. 80) 
that altered radically the structures and systems at Hospital H, by limiting providers’ 
agency, altering workflow, impeding communication among agents, and worsening 
patients’ experiences.  Providers’ efforts to “subvert the mechanics of disciplinary 
power” (Giddens, 1984, p. 292) and regain lost agency led to some of the unintended 
consequences that are described next. 
Findings for Research Question Three: Electronic Medical Records Systems and 
Unintended Consequences 
 
Findings associated with themes (d) and (g) helped to answer the question, “What, 
if any, unintended consequences emerge during and after EMR adoption at Hospital H?”  
Several unintended consequences emerged during Hospital H’s EMR adoption.  As 
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expected, patients’ narratives were cut short frequently (see Pearce et al., 2013), which 
contributed to physicians’ perceptions that electronic health records lacked context and, 
thus, usability.  Contrary to research that showed EMRs increased healthcare costs and, 
thus, hospitals’ revenue (see Bukata, 2014; Callen et al., 2013; Fernando et al., 2009; 
Feufel al., 2011; Georgiou et al., 2013; Kellerman & Jones, 2013; Ward et al., 2013), 
billing declined at Hospital H because of conflicting structures (e.g., the EMR and 
accounting software were incompatible), and because billable charges were not checked 
off regularly in the electronic record by providers.  Metrics, legislated by an external 
structure (i.e., the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services [CMS]), were monitored 
more closely once the EMR was installed, which led providers to “game the system,” a 
maladaptive strategy for stopping the clock on door-to-doc times.  Metrics increased 
providers’ workplace stress, which substantiated other accounts (Bukata, 2011; Leep, 
2014; “Metric Madness,” 2014).   Older physicians, in particular, compared with younger 
physicians, did not acclimate quickly to EMR-induced workflow changes, which, as 
Berger (2012) noted, signals a generational divide in providers’ adaptability when it 
comes to new technologies being introduced into emergency rooms.  Moreover, the 
results of this study showed that physicians believed that an unintended consequence of 
EMR adoption was increased malpractice risk (see Reyes, 2015), which increased their 
self-reported stress and contributed to their workplace dissatisfaction.  Additionally, 
providers cited increased wage theft as contributing to their dissatisfaction. 
In sum, the EMR introduced many unintended consequences, which, oftentimes, 
fed “the unacknowledged conditions of further acts” (Giddens, 1984, p. 8), setting off an 
infinite cycle of unintended consequences.  For example, metrics, which were meant to 
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ensure faster and more efficient care, actually led providers to game the system, which, 
for patients, led to increased wait times, longer lengths of stay, unnecessary tests, 
increased costs, and diminished satisfaction.  Additionally, metrics increased providers’ 
dissatisfaction, added to their workplace stress, and contributed to order dumping, which 
exacerbated hierarchical tensions between providers, and, as explained next, set off 
negative communication spirals that were associated with SD.  
Findings for Research Question Four: Electronic Medical Records Systems and 
Structurational Divergence 
 
Findings from theme (c) answered the question, “Do providers working in the 
emergency room at Hospital H experience SD?”  Questionnaire results showed that 
providers at Hospital H experienced moderate SD and that many providers experienced 
burnout, a hallmark symptom of SD (Nicotera & Clinkscales, 2010; Nicotera & Mahon, 
2013).  In accordance with other research (Nicotera & Clinkscales, 2010; Nicotera & 
Mahon, 2013; Nicotera et al., 2010; Nicotera et al., 2014), conflicting structures 
contributed to providers’ immobilization and created an SD-nexus.  SD-nexus conditions 
were amplified by “us” versus “them” interactions between floor and emergency room 
staff, which also led to some instances of workplace bullying (see Nicotera & 
Clinkscales, 2010; Nicotera & Mahon, 2013).  Negative communication spirals (i.e., SD-
cycles) among providers oftentimes were triggered by physicians’ dumping orders on 
subordinates, which, for many physicians, were attempts to regain their lost agency.  This 
observation suggested that agency-restorative steps escalated an SD-nexus into an SD-
cycle.  This finding is especially important because what pushes an SD-nexus into an SD-
cycle had not been established empirically (A. Nicotera, personal communication, April  
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7, 2015).  As explained next, the findings presented here, and in previous sections, have 
important conceptual/theoretical, methodological, and practical implications. 
Conceptual/Theoretical, Methodological, and Practical Implications of the Findings 
The findings from this study have several important conceptual/theoretical, 
methodological, and practical implications.  Below, I describe the conceptual/theoretical 
implications for structuration theory, AST, and SD theory.  Methodological implications 
then are discussed, followed by this study’s practical implications, which includes 
recommendations for healthcare administrators, providers, and patients. 
Conceptual/Theoretical Implications 
As noted above and in chapter three, because health communication research 
“often lacks theoretical underpinnings” (Nazione et al., 2013, p. 22), this study tested the 
relevance of structuration theory and its derivatives for explaining an EMR’s influence on 
healthcare providers in an emergency room setting.  Giddens’s (1984) structuration 
theory is an ontological theory of social organization (Jones et al., 2004), but it seldom 
has been employed in empirical health communication research (Heracleous, 2013), with 
one notable exception being Barley’s (1986) analysis of technology adoption and 
resulting systemic changes experienced by members of a radiology practice.  Extensions 
of structuration theory, however, have been used in medical and health communication 
research.  Schwieger et al. (2004, 2006) used a modified adaptive structuration model to 
analyze a family practice clinic’s medical billing system integration, and Nicotera and 
Clinkscales (2010) expanded Giddens’s (1984) work on contradictory structures and 
devised SD theory to explain discordant communication patterns among nurses.  This 
study used structuration theory, AST, and SD theory to explain aspects of the EMR 
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adoption at Hospital H, and, as discussed next, the findings showed that structuration 
theory and its derivatives can be applied successfully to emergency room communication.  
Moreover, the findings reflected the conceptions and expectations of structuration theory 
and AST, and, importantly, they advance SD theory. 
Conceptual/theoretical implications for structuration theory.  Because 
structuration theory has been used widely in organizational communication research since 
the 1980s (McPhee, Poole, & Iverson, 2014), using it to frame a study of a hospital 
undergoing a critical organizational change (e.g., EMR adoption) made sense.  Moreover, 
McPhee at al. (2014) wrote that structuration theory “focuses especially on systems of 
human practices or meaningful patterns of activity that range from narrow micro-level 
activities . . . to broader arrays of processes, such as project management or medicine” (p. 
76).   In fact, emergency room and hospital studies have highlighted relevant 
structuration concepts, such as structures, structural constraint, and agency (see Nugus et 
al., 2011; Xiao et al., 2007), but they have stopped short of employing structuration 
theory as a critical lens through which interactions or processes were viewed and 
analyzed.  This study, therefore, is unique in its application of structuration theory to 
frame an analysis of emergency room system reproduction, and, as described next, the 
theory proved to be a valuable lens for examining agents and systems experiencing 
change. 
Structuration theory provided a useful language for describing what providers 
experienced during their EMR adoption and how their day-to-day practices were 
changed.  Moreover, using the theory primed me, as a researcher, to investigate what 
agents thought and felt over time, and, thus, the theory extended this analysis beyond the 
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typical variables studied (e.g., length of stay or number of laboratory tests ordered; see 
Han et al., 2005; Koppel et al., 2005; Linder et al., 2007; Walsh et al., 2006; Ward et al., 
2013).  In so doing, I examined deeper structuration processes and uncovered patterns of 
behavior that the theory predicted would emerge during structural constraint and/or 
hierarchically imbalanced exchanges.  For example, structuration theory predicts that 
when their agency is suppressed, agents, in general, and subordinates, in particular, will 
“subvert the mechanics of disciplinary power [and] assert their autonomy of action” 
(Giddens, 1984, p. 292).  These behaviors appeared at Hospital H in the form of “order 
dumping” and “gaming the system,” both of which allowed physicians and midlevel 
providers to sidestep disciplinary forces that required EMR use, and, in so doing, they 
reasserted some measure of their autonomy. 
Giddens (1984) predicted that “the greater the convergence of contradictions . . .  
the more likely that open conflict will develop along the ‘fault line’ of those 
contradictions” (p. 318).  Structural contradictions between groups of organizational 
members (e.g., administrators, physicians, midlevel providers, and nurses) led frequently 
to conflict, which disrupted routines at Hospital H.  This study revealed how providers 
coped with fractured routines (e.g., order-entry processes), and the findings validated 
aspects of structuration theory; namely, Giddens’s predictions about how routines are 
restored. 
For Giddens (1984), routines are “a fundamental concept of structuration theory . 
. . [and] curb the sources of unconscious tension that would otherwise preoccupy most of 
our waking lives” (pp. xxiii, xxiv).  Routines are the “basic elements of [agents’] day-to- 
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day social activity,” and, hence, they make up “the recursive nature of social life” 
(Giddens, p. xxiii).  Additionally, as Giddens claimed: 
Routinization is vital to the psychological mechanisms whereby a sense of trust or 
ontological security is sustained in the daily activities of social life.  Carried 
primarily in practical consciousness, routine drives a wedge between the 
potentially explosive content of the unconscious and the reflexive monitoring of 
action which agents display. (p. xxiii) 
 
Giddens (1984) suggested that the psychological nature of routines could be 
elucidated by “considering the results of situations where the established modes or 
accustomed daily life are drastically undermined or shattered—by studying what may be 
called ‘critical situations’” (p. 60).  The EMR’s introduction at Hospital H initiated a 
critical situation, “a circumstance of radical disjuncture of an unpredictable kind which 
affects substantial numbers of individuals [or] situations that threatens or destroys the 
certitude of institutionalized routines” (Giddens, p. 61).  Giddens explained that, even in 
critical situations, routines are resurrected in a predictable fashion through a series of 
stages.  To illustrate, Giddens described how the actions of many who were held in 
concentration camps could be interpreted as “reroutinization.”  Following a critical 
situation (e.g., expulsion to a concentration camp), according to Giddens, there is an 
expected breakdown of social order, with hierarchically superior agents (e.g., wealthy or 
privileged individuals) experiencing the greatest shock.  All agents experience increasing 
anxiety, followed by regressive behaviors (e.g., name-calling and bullying).  For many 
agents, there follows a period of “resocialization” and identification with authority 
figures, and, finally, reconstruction of typical behaviors that mimic the lost routines.  On  
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this last point, Giddens wrote that “old prisoners” who had survived the camps for several 
years 
reconstituted themselves as agents by integrating themselves into camp life as 
participants in the very rituals of degradation which, as new prisoners, they had 
found so offensive. . . .  The end result, found in most but not all prisoners, was a 
reconstructed personality based upon identification with the oppressors 
themselves, the camp guards.  Old prisoners aped the activities of their captors, 
not merely to curry favor with them but also . . .  because of an introjection of the 
normative values of the SS. (p. 63) 
 
Giddens concluded that “such a sequence of heightened anxiety, regression, followed by 
a reconstruction of typical patterns of action, appears in a range of critical situations in 
otherwise very different contexts” (p. 64). 
The reroutinization pattern that Giddens (1984) theorized unfolded at Hospital H.  
Following the critical situation studied in this research (i.e., the installation of the CPOE), 
hierarchically superior agents (e.g., physicians) experienced the greatest shock and loss of 
agency, which led regularly to their heightened anxiety, ill tempers, and foul moods.  
Regressive behavior, such as name-calling, was commonplace, with insults directed, 
typically, at the CPOE (e.g., calling the CPOE “crappy” and “a piece of shit”).  Although 
not every provider acclimated to the change (e.g., Dr. W, who, depending on the 
viewpoint, either left or was let go), many providers adapted to the CPOE or adopted 
strategies (e.g., order dumping) to restore familiar patterns of action.  Some providers, 
such as Q, “resocialized” and identified with administrators, even finding value in the 
EMR’s potential.  Q’s resocialization was surprising because she and Dr. F had been 
instrumental in deploying avoidance strategies that slowed the electronic TSheet 
implementation.  In April 2015, Q told me that she had withdrawn her resignation, in 
part, because she had come to see administrators “in a new light.”  As Q said: 
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I think they [administrators] are in a tough place.  They’re being told what to do, 
too, so they are just as powerless as I am in some ways.  I feel sorry for them.  I 
see that they’re trying to do their jobs and that means pushing the EMRs.  I think 
the EMR will get better, with time.  At this point, I guess you could say this is my 
“new” normal. 
 
Several other providers echoed Q’s assertions that the EMR ushered in a “new normal” at 
Hospital H, and they accepted it, albeit reluctantly (see chapter five).  Thus, this study’s 
findings validated Giddens’s predictions about routinization during critical situations. 
In sum, structuration theory contains several concepts that are valuable when 
applied to the study of communication in healthcare organizations.  The theory’s core 
concepts, as Giddens (1984) noted, are “sensitizing devices . . . useful for thinking about 
research problems and the interpretation of research results” (p. 326).   For instance, as 
described here and in chapters three and five, structuration theory promotes consideration 
of agents, resources, agency, routines, social interaction, critical situations, front and back 
region distinctions, structural contradiction, and unintended and perverse consequences, 
which, when taken together, can yield rich data for analysis and elucidate EMR adoption 
processes in emergency room settings.  Next, I describe how this study’s findings reflect 
tenets of AST. 
Conceptual/theoretical implications for adaptive structuration theory.  As 
noted in chapter three, DeSanctis and Poole (1994) proposed AST to study “the role of 
advanced information technologies in organization change” (pp. 121).  DeSanctis and 
Poole proposed that during technology adoption, there always is a “dialectic of control” 
(p. 131), which is a phrase that Giddens (1984) used to describe “the two-way character 
of the distributive aspects of power” (p. 374).  During technology adoption, the dialectic 
of control, according to DeSanctis and Poole, means that 
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technology structures shape the group, but the group likewise shapes its own 
interaction, exerting control over use of technology structures and the new 
structures that emerge from their use.  Organizational change occurs gradually, as 
technology structures are appropriated and bring change to decision processes.  
Over time, new social structures may become a part of the larger organizational 
life. (p. 131) 
 
Thus, the theory poses two key questions:  (a) “What changes do these [technology] 
systems actually bring to the workplace?” and (b) “What technology impacts should we 
anticipate, and how can we interpret the changes that we observe?” (DeSanctis & Poole, 
p. 122). 
To answer those questions, this study examined providers’ appropriation moves, 
revealing how the EMR at Hospital H was brought into social interaction and how it 
changed system reproduction.  Findings showed, as DeSanctis and Poole (1994) 
predicted, that “if group interaction processes are inconsistent with the structural potential 
of the technology, then the outcomes of group use of the structures will be less 
predictable and, on the whole, less favorable” (p. 131).  Providers’ interaction habits 
varied across user groups, and the patterns, largely, were inconsistent with the EMR’s 
structural potential (e.g., physicians circumvented order-entry tasks by dumping orders), 
and, consequently, the EMR was not viewed favorably.  Furthermore, the EMR had an 
incoherent spirit from providers’ perspectives, demonstrated by its poor design, lack of 
usability, and limited features.  Technologies with incoherent spirit, according to McPhee 
et al. (2014), “fail to deliver intended benefits . . . [or] lead to unexpected effects” (p. 85), 
and, hence, they are harder to incorporate into group practices (DeSanctis & Poole).  
Thus, this study confirmed what DeSanctis and Poole had theorized with respect to 
incoherent technologies: An incoherent spirit impedes adoption practices, even, in this 
case, in forced adoption scenarios. 
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Although AST has been applied, mainly, in free-adoption scenarios where agents 
can chose to use or disregard a technology (see DeSanctis & Poole, 1994), applying AST 
to a forced-adoption scenario, as this study did, was useful because it showed that even 
when direct use of a technology (i.e., freely chosen use) was out of the question, relating 
and constraining moves, in particular, demonstrated important ways in which the EMR 
was integrated into the system.  For example, analysis of providers’ relating and 
constraining moves showed that the EMR changed workflow patterns, lengthened 
documentation times, led to duplicated and delayed work, and changed providers’ 
thinking about healthcare delivery (e.g., interrupted their train of thought). 
When DeSanctis and Poole (1994) proposed AST, they stressed that “technology-
triggered changes at micro, global, and institutional levels can be studied,” but they noted 
that “individual studies tend to target one level of analysis, rather than multiple levels” (p. 
144).  They called for more multilevel analyses, and this study answered that call by 
analyzing microlevel, global, and institutional interactions across user groups and units.  
By documenting providers’ appropriation moves over a period of 18 months, important 
themes emerged that, likely, would have remained undetected had the analysis been 
contained to microlevel interactions.  This study, consequently, validates the utility of 
AST for deepening scholarly understanding of the effects of EMRs on emergency 
medicine practice.  Furthermore, the findings demonstrated that AST is useful for 
examining free and forced EMR-adoption scenarios. 
Conceptual/theoretical implications for structurational divergence theory.  
SD theory expanded on Giddens’s (1984) work by addressing structural contradiction, 
and, specifically, “what happens to agency under contradictory structures” (Nicotera & 
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Mahon, 2013, p. 94).  Nicotera and Clinkscales (2010) theorized that SD exists when 
incompatible rule systems and unresolvable conflict (i.e., SD-nexus) lead to negative, 
ineffective, or aggressive communication spirals (i.e., SD-cycle).  SD immobilizes 
agents, impinges agency, and manifests, often, as bullying, stress, dissatisfaction, and 
intention to quit (Nicotera et al., 2010).  The theory has been used in research conducted 
in hospitals; primarily, to study discordant interactions among nurses (see Nicotera & 
Clinkscales, 2010; Nicotera & Mahon, 2013; Nicotera et al., 2010; Nicotera et al., 2014).  
The theory’s utility in that setting is evident given that hospitals are at “the intersection of 
multiple institutional, professional, community, and other cultural meaning systems” 
(Nicotera et al., 2010, p. 364), and, accordingly, they are vulnerable to SD. 
Given the presence of so many conflicting internal and external structures in the 
emergency room at Hospital H, by default, it was an SD-nexus.  Consequently, SD theory 
provided an angle for exploring structural contradictions that the EMR exacerbated at 
Hospital H and ramifications for its agents, which were immobilization and diminished 
agency.  Because SD theory has not been used to study technology adoption, this study’s 
application of the theory was novel.  Moreover, this study used SD theory to analyze 
interaction patterns among physicians, midlevel providers, and nurses, which marked the 
first time that SD theory had been applied to a heterogeneous sample of healthcare 
providers. 
As SD theory predicts, this study’s findings showed that providers in the SD-
compromised emergency room reported surface-level manifestations of SD, such as 
dissatisfaction, burnout, and intention to quit.  Moreover, there was evidence of an 
increased likelihood of medication errors, as the theory predicts (see Nicotera et al., 
	   339 
2010).  Moreover, in line with other reports (see Nicotera & Clinkscales, 2010; Nicotera 
& Mahon, 2013; Nicotera et al., 2010, 2014), this study demonstrated that providers’ 
agency, largely, was impotent because they could not change structures in a 
transformative way.  Findings revealed that a pattern of attempted restoration of agency 
(e.g., order dumping) led to negative communication spirals, which suggested that lost 
agency and efforts to restore it tipped the SD-nexus into the SD-cycle.  Given that why or 
how the SD-cycle emerges had not been explained empirically, this study provided 
valuable insight into the SD-nexus to SD-cycle escalation (A. Nicotera, personal 
communication, April 7, 2015), and, thereby, this study advanced that theory. 
To review, this study tested the relevance of structuration theory, AST, and SD 
theory for explaining an EMR’s influence on emergency medicine providers.  The 
findings supported Giddens’s (1984) theorized reroutinization processes following 
critical situations.  Findings also demonstrated the utility of AST in forced-adoption 
scenarios and supported predictions that incoherent technologies constrain agency and are 
not well liked.  SD theory’s predictions regarding SD manifestations also were 
substantiated by this study; furthermore, the findings advanced the theory by suggesting 
an explanation for the SD-nexus to SD-cycle escalation.  In addition to these 
conceptual/theoretical implications, as explained next, this study had important 
methodological implications. 
Methodological Implications 
This study has important methodological implications.  First, it used proven 
ethnographic techniques to address researchers’ calls for more in-depth, observational 
research to be conducted in emergency rooms (e.g., Cooper & Endacott, 2007; Nugus et 
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al., 2011; Paltved & Musaeus, 2012).  Second, it is the only naturalistic study of an EMR 
adoption in a community hospital’s emergency room.  Additionally, as described next, 
the study’s methodological approach enhances understanding of communication in 
emergency rooms by addressing gaps in the emergency room literature. 
When studying social interactions and specific communicative acts, 
“quantification and the use of a statistical method pose a fixity of social life that it does 
not in fact have” (Giddens, 1984, p. 330).  Studies about EMR adoptions in emergency 
rooms have relied, mainly, on quantifying relevant phenomena (e.g., number of 
medication errors, number of mouse clicks per order-entry task, or how providers’ 
minutes are allocated), and although such studies are valuable (see Han et al., 2005; 
Koppel et al., 2005; Linder et al., 2007; Walsh et al., 2006; Ward et al., 2013), according 
to Nugus and Forero (2011), numerical studies tell only part of the story.  Paltved and 
Musaeus (2012) explained that observational researchers “can help to unpack the 
processes surrounding EM [emergency medical] care and explain ‘how, why and what’ is 
going on” (p. 772).  Thus, more observational work is needed in emergency rooms to 
illuminate processes pertaining to providers’ thinking, feeling, and acting, and to capture 
organizational and team processes amid medical and social practices; such research may 
lead to the development of theory that has important clinical and/or organizational 
implications (Paltved & Musaeus, 2012).  Ethnographic research, in particular, “can 
advance the understanding and delivery of emergency care [by] capturing the moment-to-
moment action of life when and where it happens, and in the context of, reflecting and 
amending, broader social patterns” (Nugus et al., 2011, p. 69). 
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Much of the observational research conducted in emergency rooms, however, 
lacks methodological rigor (Cooper & Endacott, 2007); hence, this study employed 
proven techniques, such as saturation, triangulation, and member checks (Cooper & 
Endacott, 2007), to increase the accuracy of the findings.  Over 18 months, data were 
collected via participant observations, in-depth interviewing, a questionnaire, and 
document analysis.  Findings were validated through triangulation, which involved 
identifying convergent data “in fieldnotes, interviews, [and] documents” (Lindlof & 
Taylor, 2011, p. 274).  Following open and in vivo coding, themes were identified using 
Owen’s (1984) criteria, which posit that themes emerge when there are recurring 
descriptions using similar phrases and with the same forcefulness of expression.  Seven 
major themes answered the four research questions posed, and, hence, the themes 
contributed to the scholarly understanding of communication in emergency rooms, 
generally, and in community hospital-based emergency rooms, specifically.  Moreover, 
this study is the only one to date to employ ethnographic techniques to analyze an EMR 
adoption and its ramifications in a community hospital’s emergency room.  The findings, 
then, may be generalizable to some of the 5,724 community hospitals (Dunn & Becker, 
2013)—more than 90% of the hospitals—in the United States and yield important 
practical applications that may prove useful as more community hospitals adopt federally 
mandated EMRs in the coming years. 
Despite this study’s utility, however, it is important to note that ethnography, 
similar to other methodologies, “has its strengths and weakness” (Perlmutter, 2015, para. 
1).  Perlmutter (2015) identified five potential weaknesses that characterize ethnographic 
research: (a) the problem of witnessed truth, (b) researchers’ lack of objectivity, (c) 
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researchers’ credibility, (d) replicability of findings, and (e) valorization of the observed 
community.  Below, I describe how I grappled with each of these issues. 
First, with respect to the potential issue of witnessed truth that characterizes 
ethnography, Perlmutter (2015) argued that “human beings are terrible at accurately 
understanding, remembering, and recounting what happened at an unexpected, fast-
moving event” (para. 9).  The emergency room at Hospital H, indeed, was a fast-paced, 
hectic environment, but even amid the chaos, typically, there were moments of calm 
during which I asked healthcare providers to explain and clarify events and interactions.  
During those and other times, I took copious notes, conducted frequently member checks, 
and elicited on-the-fly commentary from the site’s inhabitants about their interactions.  
Moreover, by triangulating fieldnotes with interview transcripts, questionnaire data, and 
document analysis, I achieved a measure of descriptive validity and, thus, overcame, in 
part, the problem of witnessed truth.  There is, however, “no way of seeing, hearing, or 
representing the world of others that is absolutely, universally valid or correct” (Van 
Maanen, 2011, p. 35). 
Second, the perceived lack of “objectivity,” as Perlmutter (2015) pointed out, is 
not exclusive to ethnography but is evident in all other methodologies as well.  
Researchers who have employed positivistic methods, such as experiments, surveys, and 
content analysis, have long been, as Perlmutter noted, “concocting data sets, suppressing 
negative findings, and embellishing positive results” (para. 11); hence, “the idea that 
ethnography is especially flawed is absurd” (para. 11).  However, because researcher 
subjectivity “is an inherent part of research,” and, especially, ethnography, researchers 
should “contextualize [their] own positionality, thereby making it accessible, transparent, 
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and vulnerable to judgment and evaluation” (Madison, 2012, pp. 10, 11).  To that end, I 
have acknowledged at various places in this dissertation my researcher subjectivity, such 
as my relationship with Dr. C influencing my view of emergency medicine practice, 
physician–nurse and provider–administrator dynamics, and EMRs.  Such researcher 
subjectivity, however, was counterbalanced both by my formal training in conducting 
research and by use of numerous methodological procedures to achieve intersubjective 
understanding and interpretation of events and interactions that occurred at Hospital H. 
My positionality on three key points—physician–nurse interactions, provider–
administrator relationships, and EMRs—warrants further discussion.  First, as noted in 
chapter three, I began preliminary research by identifying with physicians, but, gradually, 
I gravitated to the nurses’ camp.  My identification with nurses intensified over the 
course of the study, to the extent that by the end of the study, nurses, almost exclusively, 
reviewed, critiqued, and evaluated my work during routine member checks.  Hence, this 
report did not privilege physicians’ perspectives and experiences over those of nurses.  
As Nurse B believed, my strong identification with nurses resulted in “a fairly balanced 
study, overall, especially considering it was written by a doctor’s wife.  To be honest, we 
[nurses] thought you’d make us look bad while glorifying the docs.  You make some of 
them [physicians] look like assholes.” 
Moreover, as Nurse B noted, this dissertation “paints administrators in a pretty 
bad light, at times.”  With regard to Hospital H’s administrators, I am, decidedly 
opinionated, as apart from granting me access to the site, administrators were uninvolved 
in my research and, generally, unresponsive to my requests for interviews.  Admittedly, I 
could have been more persistent in my requests for interviews with administrators, but as 
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the study wore on and the electronic TSheet implementation stalled, I feared losing 
access to the site if I “rocked the boat,” and, consequently, I would have missed an 
opportunity to observe the electronic TSheet aftermath that I wanted to document.17  Still, 
my reticence to pursue the administrators’ perspective is an important limitation of this 
study. 
Lastly, my position on EMRs, unquestionably, is negative.  Despite Dr. C’s 
incessant complaining in recent years about EMRs, I began this study, more or less, with 
an open mind about them.  Dr. C is not technologically savvy, and I assumed that his 
complaints about EMRs were indicative of his typical complaints when confronted with a 
new technology that he does not like (e.g., a new television remote control or a new 
computer operating system).  I soon discovered, however, in the early stages of 
preliminary research that Dr. C was not alone in his dislike of EMRs, as the majority of 
providers I observed and/or interviewed did not like EMRs.  Although many providers 
preferred some EMRs (e.g., Epic) over other EMRs (e.g., McKesson’s Paragon), 
overwhelmingly, providers railed against EMRs and CPOEs.  Moreover, in reading the 
scholarly literature for this dissertation (see chapter two), it was apparent that most 
studies about EMRs, especially studies appearing in the emergency medicine literature, 
were negative.  Those studies were in line with the findings from this study, which also 
pointed to negative consequences of EMRs (e.g., increased risk of medical mistakes 
occurring and diminished provider satisfaction in light of increased workload, workplace 
stress, and likelihood of burnout).  Moreover, during a formal EMR training session, I 
was allowed to engage with the EMR and its medication-ordering platform, and despite 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Although not documented in this dissertation, my work at Hospital H is ongoing and I 
will observe the electronic TSheet’s implementation and its aftermath during Fall 2015. 
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being adept technologically18, I found the EMR cumbersome and very hard to use.  Thus, 
over the course of this study, my view of EMRs shifted from “undecided” to “squarely 
against” them.  I do, however, see the potential for EMRs to improve healthcare delivery 
and health information exchange, but, similar to most of the informants in this study, I do 
not believe that current EMR technology is poised to deliver such improvements. 
Third, with respect to the issue of researcher credibility (Perlmutter, 2015), this 
report is credible to the extent that my positionality is “accessible, transparent, and 
vulnerable to judgment and evaluation” (Madison, 2012, p. 11).  Moreover, as Perlmutter 
(2015) attested, ethnography is “very hard to fake outright,” because the “volume of work 
required to produce credible ‘thick description’ . . . is immense” (para. 12).  The many 
hours that I spent at Hospital H can be corroborated by informants and gatekeepers, and, 
furthermore, many of the people who participated in this study member-checked my 
work, and, thereby, ensured an added measure of credibility.  Additionally, my fieldnotes 
and interview transcriptions are available for review, and they may be used to validate 
findings that are described in this dissertation. 
Fourth, replicability of findings is no more guaranteed in any other methodology 
than it is in ethnography (Perlmutter, 2015).  “Furthermore,” according to Perlmutter 
(2015), “the lack of replicability inherent in ethnography is a guidepost to reliability, not 
a fundamental flaw” (para. 14).  Although “no two ethnographers can study the same 
community” (Perlmutter, para. 14), typically, that is the case for other methodologists as 
well (e.g., experimental researchers).  As Frey et al. (2000) contended, “There is, of 
course, no way to ever replicate someone’s study exactly, since every investigation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18I have spent 20 years as a videographer and film editor, and use, regularly, advanced 
editing, special effects, and compositing software; hence, I am adept technologically. 
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involves a different researcher and different research participants” (p. 135).  Nonetheless, 
other ethnographers, certainly, can replicate some of the findings from this study by 
examining the use of EMRs in other emergency rooms, just as this study replicated other 
researchers’ findings (e.g., Park et al.’s, 2012, finding that EMRs reduce face-to-face 
interactions among providers) by using “different procedures, measurement instruments, 
sampling procedures, and data-analytic techniques” (Frey et al., 2000, p. 136). 
Fifth, there is “a longstanding criticism that ethnographers tend to valorize the 
communities they are immersed in . . . [and] to turn the people [they] aren’t studying into 
a stereotype” (Perlmutter, 2015, para. 19, 21).  Although I valorized, to a large extent, the 
community of emergency medicine providers I studied, I was, oftentimes, critical of 
providers’ behaviors; additionally, I did not reduce patients and administrators to 
simplistic stereotypes.  Although my descriptions of patients and administrators are not 
drawn as richly as are those of providers, such descriptions are individualized and true to 
my experience.  Moreover, as Perlmutter (2015) noted, ethnographers “give voice to 
people who aren’t necessarily otherwise heard” (p.), and although I would take exception 
with the concept of “giving voice to people,” I did offer many opportunities to hear the 
voices of emergency medicine physicians, midlevel providers, and nurses, whose views 
on EMRs have been, largely, ignored by policy makers, EMR makers, and hospital 
administrators. 
In sum, although this study may have some important limitations due to the 
methodology employed—specifically, ethnography—the study attempted to address 
those limitations.  In particular, (a) the problem of witnessed truth was offset by the use 
of triangulation of procedures, including member checks; (b) my subjectivity was 
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acknowledged and made available for judgment by readers, which, in part, addressed (c) 
my, and this report’s, credibility; (d) the lack of complete replicability, and the need for 
additional replication, was acknowledged; and (e) the people studied were valorized, to 
an extent, but much of that valorizing emerged from opportunities to hear their voices 
and to respect their views, but also by engaging in some criticism of their views.  Next, 
the practical applications arising from the findings of this study for administrators, 
providers, and patients are described.  
Practical Implications 
This study identified a number of problems that (a) plagued the EMR installation 
at Hospital H, and, ultimately, derailed its full implementation; (b) affected negatively 
providers’ experiences and workflow; and (c) impeded effective communication among 
providers.  Below, I offer suggestions for improving EMR adoption processes, generally, 
and for Hospital H, in particular.  First, I offer recommendations to healthcare 
administrators for improving providers’ receptivity to EMRs, improving EMR training, 
encouraging providers’ autonomy, addressing EMR-induced workflow changes, and 
cultivating an environment of inclusion.  I then offer recommendations to providers for 
improving their communication with one another.  Lastly, I offer suggestions for patients 
and their companions for improving their emergency room experiences and interactions 
with healthcare providers. 
Suggestions for administrators.  Forced EMR adoptions, as this and other 
studies have demonstrated, are problematic and invite providers’ reactance (see Brooks & 
Grotz, 2010; Estrada & Dunn, 2012; Farley et al., 2013; Francis, 2013; Huryk, 201; 
Nambisan et al., 2013; Tomes, 2010).  As Bukata (2009) noted, “Resistance is 
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fundamental and doctors, more than most, seem not to like being told what to do” (p. 2).  
Kellermann and Jones (2013) cautioned that successful and widespread EMR adoption is 
possible only when providers are engaged “early in the health IT development process” 
(p. 65).  In their white paper on facilitating change in emergency rooms, Lozano, Biehl, 
and Organ (2011) wrote that “workers will always find excuses to forestall a process 
change” (p. 5).  Fittingly, then, this study uncovered providers’ maladaptive avoidance 
strategies, which delayed the electronic TSheet implementation.  According to Lozano et 
al. (2011), “To obtain complete buy-in of any process change, the ED [emergency 
department] staff and providers must feel that they had a say and fully agree with the new 
approach” (p. 5).  Hence, the first recommendation emerging from the findings of this 
study is that administrators should solicit providers’ input at the start of the EMR 
selection process, and, generally, they should communicate more with providers during 
the process by offering providers updates regularly and requesting providers’ feedback 
about the EMR. 
The second recommendation is that following an EMR installation, administrators 
should seek providers’ feedback about the EMR’s performance and address providers’ 
concerns.  As Xiao et al. (2007) noted, administrators should allow “physicians and 
nurses to tailor an electronic system appropriately to meet their needs” (p. 394).  
Providers’ suggestions for improvements to the EMR at Hospital H, largely, were 
ignored.  For instance, changing the EMR’s interface and electronic TSheet template to 
reduce the number of checkboxes and to increase the space available for free-text entries, 
and, thereby, allow providers to capture patients’ narratives, would have enhanced many 
providers’ perceptions of the completeness and utility of the EMR.  This suggestion, 
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however, was ignored by administrators, which triggered reactance in providers and 
contributed to negative communication spirals between providers and administrators. 
The third recommendation for administrators is that they avoid “homegrown IT 
systems” (Kellermann & Jones, 2013, p. 65).  Although designing EMR components in-
house can afford some advantages, such as customizable features, “most healthcare 
organizations lack the in-house technical expertise and resources to develop and maintain 
them” (Kellermann & Jones, 2013, p. 65).  True to Kellermann and Jones’s (2013) 
predictions, Hospital H’s IT department failed—for nearly 2 years—to design, unveil, 
and launch its “homegrown” electronic TSheet, which exacerbated providers’ uncertainty 
and dread.  Thus, for the administrators at Hospital H, the recommendation is that they 
abandon plans to design and install a generic, electronic TSheet system, and, instead, 
purchase the proprietary TSheet system. 
The fourth recommendation for administrators, generally, and administrators at 
Hospital H, specifically, is to examine and improve formal EMR training programs.  
Formal training sessions at Hospital H ignited dissonance and reactance in physicians, 
because, essentially, the designated trainers were nonmedical, IT department staff 
members—one of the trainers was especially insensitive to physicians’ concerns amid the 
forced adoption, and her insensitivity fueled physicians’ reactance.  A suggestion for 
lessening physicians’ reactance and dissonance is that persons well known to physicians, 
or who, themselves, are medical providers, should lead EMR formal training sessions.  
Alternatively, physicians’ EMR training could be self-taught via handouts or through the 
use of online- and/or video-training modules, which would allow physicians to complete 
the training at their leisure.  Furthermore, self-guided training would curb some of the 
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reactance and/or dissonance that this study demonstrated was associated with in-person 
training that impeded physicians’ learning. 
Any overhaul of an EMR training program also must take into account the role of 
super-users.  This study leads to three recommendations for improving informal training 
that relies on super-users.  First, because this study showed that informal training  
dependent on super-users stimulated role-reversal tensions and dissonance for nurses and 
midlevel providers, super-users should self-select rather than be forced to learn EMR 
components and then made to train physicians, as they were at Hospital H.  Moreover, 
nurses and midlevel providers who volunteer to train as super-users, presumably, would 
feel less reactance than would nurses and midlevel providers forced to learn how to use 
EMR components (e.g., CPOE) that they do not employ regularly in the course of their 
work.  Second, super-users should be offered additional compensation for their added 
work.  At Hospital H, additional compensation for the extra work that being a designated 
super-user entailed may have alleviated some of the hard feelings that providers harbored 
against administrators, which only fueled the SD-nexus conditions.  Third, because many 
of the physicians at Hospital H could not always identify the designated super-users, 
super-users could wear a special name badge to ensure that physicians directed their 
inquiries to those who were equipped to offer assistance using the EMR.  This simple 
solution could have saved time and alleviated frustration for the nurses, who, repeatedly, 
were asked for help using the EMR and CPOE, despite their inability to provide the 
requested help. 
Peer-to-peer training exacerbated “us” versus “them” tensions between 
emergency room nurses and floor nurses, who were sent to the emergency room to cover 
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staffing shortages.  Peer-to-peer training was made worse because the EMR interface in 
the intensive care unit did not resemble the EMR interface in the emergency room.  A 
single EMR interface at Hospital H would cut down on problems, as would giving 
emergency room staff and the nurse manager, in particular, more autonomy in deciding 
appropriate staffing levels.  Thus, the fifth recommendation is that administrators give 
emergency room personnel more autonomy to make staffing decisions.  At Hospital H, 
nursing managers regularly sent floor nurses down to the emergency room to assist 
during perceived staff shortages or during high patient volume, but, oftentimes, decisions 
were made without input from the emergency room staff.  As several emergency room 
nurses pointed out, the “extra help” often made them less productive because their time 
was spent training floor nurses how to use the EMR instead of treating patients. 
The EMR’s introduction at Hospital H changed many workflow patterns for 
providers, and although some changes (e.g., to providers’ perceived cognitive processes) 
cannot be addressed easily, other changes, such as where work takes place, can be 
addressed.  The sixth recommendation, therefore, is that administrators and providers 
examine ways to encourage collaborative work and face-to-face communication among 
providers by developing common workspaces and/or reconfiguring where computer 
terminals are placed, such that nurses, midlevel providers, and physicians are not isolated 
physically from one another.  Additionally, administrators may consider replacing COWs 
with smaller, handheld devices or tablets, which could alleviate providers’ perceptions 
that EMRs interfere with provider–patient interactions. 
The seventh recommendation is that administrators consider ways to alleviate 
additional EMR-induced workflow changes that affect providers negatively, such as 
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increased documentation time.  Lengthy documentation processes at Hospital H ran 
counter to CMS-mandated metrics, which, oftentimes, led providers to delay 
documentation chores until after their shifts ended.  This delayed work affected the 
completeness and utility of the electronic health record, especially for providers who 
cared for admitted patients, such as floor nurses and specialists.  Heeding providers’ 
suggestions for EMR improvements, such as incorporating voice-recognition software to 
limit the amount of typing that providers must do, may shorten the time needed for 
completing documentation tasks.  Additionally, charting tasks completed after providers’ 
shifts ended led many providers to complain of wage theft.  Administrators, therefore, 
should reexamine how physicians’ reimbursable time is measured, which could alleviate 
physicians’ dissatisfaction.  Better training also could mitigate the problem of delayed 
work and perceived wage theft: If providers were trained better, they could use EMRs 
more efficiently during their shifts, and, consequently, they could limit the number of 
documentation chores that they completed after their shifts. 
The eighth recommendation is that administrators foster an environment of 
inclusion, which should involve regular communication between administrators and 
providers about managing emergency room operations and the EMR installation.  For 
Hospital H’s administrators, initiating regular feedback sessions in which they listen to 
providers’ concerns would help providers to feel integrated into hospital practices and 
supported in their work.  Because providers and IT staff department members disagreed 
routinely on what was said in their shared exchanges, meeting minutes should be 
distributed to everyone to ensure agreement among and between administrators and 
providers.  Additionally, developing an employees’ lounge would allow nurses to feel 
	   353 
supported, as their exclusion from physicians’ and paramedics’ lounges contributed to 
their dissatisfaction and eroded their organizational identity. 
The last recommendation is that administrators and policy makers should 
reexamine metrics.  Many metrics are incompatible (“Metric Madness,” 2014), which has 
forced providers to adopt strategies, such as “gaming the system,” to satisfy door-to-doc 
and patient greet times.  Gaming the system adds to healthcare costs, increases providers’ 
work-related stress and burnout, adds to patients’ lengths of stay, and diminishes patients’ 
satisfaction with the care process. 
To review, this study proposed nine recommendations that administrators should 
take into account: administrators should (a) involve providers at the start of the EMR 
selection process; (b) solicit and then act on providers’ suggestions; (c) avoid 
“homegrown” EMR systems; (d) improve EMR training processes and, simultaneously, 
be attentive to role-reversal tensions that nurses and midlevel providers experience; (e) 
give emergency room leaders autonomy over staffing decisions; (f) address EMR-
induced workflow changes by maintaining or creating spaces for collaborative work, and 
acquiring handheld devices and/or tablets; (g) devise ways to lessen providers’ 
documentation time; (h) foster an environment of inclusion by listening to and supporting 
providers; and (i) review the utility of metrics, which lead to unintended and perverse 
consequences.   
Suggestions for providers.  Because many healthcare providers are powerless to 
decide which EMR they use, the recommendations emerging from this study focus on 
ways in which providers can (a) improve communication, especially face-to-face 
communication, with their coworkers after EMRs are installed; (b) reduce the frequency 
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of negative communication spirals, which are exacerbated by EMRs; (c) enhance 
collegial relationships with coworkers; and (d) improve their interactions with patients by 
changing how they use COWs. 
The first recommendation is that providers make time to communicate, face-to-
face, about each of their shared patients.  After an EMR is installed, typically, providers 
no longer share common charts, and, consequently, physically isolated workspaces 
reduce face-to-face encounters among nurses, midlevel providers, and physicians.  All of 
the providers involved in this study admitted the need for frequent verbal updates, but 
they also acknowledged that during high patient volume, face-to-face interactions did not 
occur, which, oftentimes, led to dropped orders and/or mistakes.  A solution may be 
implementing nurse–midlevel provider and/or nurse–physician rounds, whereby 
providers converge at appointed times and discuss care plans for their patients. 
The second recommendation is that physicians examine their order-dumping 
habits and limit the practice.  Moreover, physicians should be sensitive to hierarchical 
tensions that order dumping may incite in midlevel providers and nurses, and, when order 
dumping is necessary, physicians should pose their requests politely.  As this study 
demonstrated, the emergency room at Hospital H, inherently, is an SD-nexus, and, 
consequently, it is prone to ineffective, aggressive, and negative communication spirals.  
Order dumping tips the SD-nexus into an SD-cycle, which inhibits collaborative work 
and diminishes providers’ workplace satisfaction.  To curb SD tensions, according to 
Nicotera et al. (2014), providers must regard those with whom they are locked in SD-
cycles not as enemies but as persons with a common problem.  Thus, the third 
recommendation is that providers at Hospital H try to reframe perceptions of themselves 
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from hierarchically and diametrically opposed providers, to providers who are burdened 
equally by the EMR. 
Because EMR-induced changes to workflow patterns limit the time for small talk 
among providers and, hence, their relational growth, the fourth recommendation is that 
providers look for opportunities outside of the emergency room to encourage relational 
growth and maintenance with their coworkers.  This study found that many providers at 
Hospital H viewed themselves as being less connected with their coworkers after, as 
opposed to before, the EMR was installed; consequently, planned activities may stimulate 
bonding and cut across nurse–physician–midlevel lines.  Moreover, improved 
interpersonal relationships may curb SD-cycle development. 
The final recommendation is that providers should rethink how they use and 
position COWs in examination rooms.  This study found that nurses, typically, place the 
COW between themselves and patients during triage, and, thereby, create a physical 
barrier between them.  The practice appeared to limit eye contact between nurses and 
patients.  Positioning COWs next to patients may improve eye contact between nurses 
and patients, as well as nurses’ perceptions of their provider–patient interactions. 
In sum, this study offers five recommendations for providers: (a) make time for 
regular face-to-face interactions; (b) examine order-dumping habits and be sensitive to 
hierarchical tensions; (c) regard themselves as colleagues with a common problem, which 
would reduce SD; (d) create opportunities outside of the emergency room for bonding 
with coworkers; and (e) reposition COWs such that they are not barriers between 
themselves and patients.   
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Suggestions for patients.  Although this study did not assess directly patients’ 
perspectives about emergency medical care or ways that EMRs affected their interactions 
with healthcare providers, many of the providers’ comments, as featured throughout this 
dissertation, centered on their perceptions of patients’ experiences, providing the basis for 
offering some suggestions for patients.  Thus, I offer the following recommendations on 
ways that patients and their companions can improve their experiences in emergency 
rooms and their interactions with providers. 
First, emergency rooms should be reserved for medical emergencies (e.g., injuries 
sustained in major motor vehicle crashes, heart attacks, strokes, and other traumatic 
injuries).  Thirty-seven percent of emergency room visits are for nonurgent conditions—
conditions not requiring immediate attention, and for which a delay of several hours does 
not result in adverse outcomes (Uscher-Pines, Pines, Kellermann, Gillen, & Mehrotra, 
2013).  Nonurgent conditions (e.g., upper respiratory infections, sinusitis, and/or 
toothaches) can be treated more effectively by primary care physicians (PCPs) or by 
urgent care providers, with better health outcomes for patients, and for less cost 
(Weinick, Burns, & Mehrotra, 2010; Mehrotra, Wang, Lave, Adams, & McGlynn, 2008).  
Emergency rooms, typically, charge two to five times more than do PCPs to address 
minor medical problems (Mehrotra et al., 2008; Weinick et al., 2010).  For instance, 
PCPs charge, on average, $160 to diagnose and treat a urinary tract infection, whereas a 
similar diagnosis and treatment in an emergency room can cost $570 or more (Mehrotra 
et al., 2008). Continued reliance on emergency rooms for primary and nonurgent care, 
thus, is a problem that contributes both to overcrowding in the emergency room and  
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spiraling healthcare costs (Overton, in press-b). Hence, people should exercise caution in 
going to the emergency room for healthcare. 
Second, because most emergency rooms are overcrowded, patients and their 
companions should anticipate long waits.  EMRs exacerbate the problem of long wait 
time because they slow providers’ documentation chores and medication-administration 
processes.  Moreover, patients and their companions should note that “advertised wait 
times,” appearing most frequently on billboards for emergency room services, usually 
refer to the time that it takes for a patient to be triaged and not the total time that it takes 
for a patient to be evaluated by a physician, diagnosed, and released or admitted.  As Dr. 
F explained: 
We advertise 15 minutes, but that’s not the whole truth; that’s the typical wait for 
getting to triage, but, afterward, they [patients] might wait another 1 or 2 hours to 
see a doc.  Average visits from start to finish, on a good day, last about 4–5 hours.  
Some days, it might be 6 or 7 hours. 
 
Thus, patients and their companions should be prepared to wait and, furthermore, because 
emergency medical care is not administered on a “first come, first serve” basis, patients 
and their companions should be prepared to wait even longer if persons with critical 
health problems (e.g., heart attack or stroke) present to the emergency room. 
Third, EMRs are not interoperable; consequently, patients and their companions 
should not assume that emergency medicine providers can access patients’ pertinent 
medical records, histories, and/or medication lists.  Even within the same hospital system, 
patients’ medical records often are not accessible from within the emergency room.  
Consequently, patients and their companions, should, when possible, bring a list of their 
medical issues and medications, including over-the-counter medications and dietary 
supplements (e.g., vitamins), noting dosages and frequency of use; legal documents (e.g., 
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medical power of attorney); health insurance provider information; and, if applicable, 
their physicians’ names and contact information.  Moreover, because electronic health 
data stored on portable hard drives, usually, will not be accessed because of security 
concerns (e.g., portable drives may contain malware), it is important that patients and 
their companions bring hardcopies of patients’ health data. 
Fourth, patients and their companions should anticipate that COWs and/or other 
technologies will be used during triage, and throughout the medical examination process, 
and that these technologies will affect their interactions with providers.  In particular, 
generally, there will be less eye contact between them and providers, compared with 
provider–patient interactions in non-EMR settings, and that many of their interactions 
with providers will flow according to prescribed data-gathering tasks.  Normal 
conversational turn taking, oftentimes, will be suspended to satisfy EMR-induced 
changes to triage and examination processes.  To facilitate efficient triage interviews, 
patients should answer questions as they are posed by providers, avoid volunteering 
information out of turn (e.g., stating allergies or past surgeries before asked), and speak 
slowly to allow providers to type accurate information into the medical record.  
Additionally, it is important for patients and their companions to remember that providers 
looking at and using these technologies are engaged in healthcare delivery and are not 
otherwise “goofing off.”  Patients should keep in mind that providers, frequently, are just 
as frustrated as patients by the barriers that EMRs introduce to provider–patient 
interactions. 
Lastly, patients and their companions should ask questions about the purpose and 
utility of the medical tests and procedures that providers order.  Because emergency 
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medicine providers, oftentimes, order tests that are not medically necessary to satisfy 
performance metrics, which increase healthcare costs, patients and their companions 
should understand and consent to tests and procedures, and, thereby, to some extent, co-
construct the medical interaction  
In sum, this study offers five recommendations for patients involved in 
emergency care: (a) avoid seeking emergency medical care for nonurgent conditions, 
which can be treated more efficiently in other healthcare settings and cost less; (b) be 
prepared to wait a long time to see a physician; (c) know that EMRs are not interoperable 
and, therefore, when possible, bring printed copies of their health data, medical 
conditions, and medications; (d) understand that EMRs and other technology will affect 
providers’ eye contact with them and limit spontaneity during the medical interview; and 
(e) ask questions about the necessity of medical tests and procedures.  Next, the 
limitations of this study are addressed and suggestions for future research are offered. 
Limitations of the Study and Directions for Future Research 
Despite the important findings and conceptual/theoretical, methodological, and 
practical implications of this research, there are several limitations that merit discussion.  
First, although I intended to study the EMR adoption process during and after installation 
of key components, such as the CPOE and the electronic TSheets, the installation was 
delayed repeatedly because of IT staff’s difficulty designing and building the TSheets, 
which was exacerbated by providers’ avoidance strategies; thus, I could comment only on 
a partial, stalled adoption.  Moreover, because nurses had been using aspects of the EMR 
for 5 months before I arrived on the scene, I was unable to make “before, during, and 
after” comparisons of their interactions and workflow habits; instead, I had to rely 
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exclusively on nurses’ accounts of changes that they believed the EMR introduced to 
their emergency room operations. 
Second, I interviewed only two administrators and would have preferred input 
from additional members of Hospital H’s executive staff.   Efforts to schedule interviews, 
largely, were unsuccessful because many administrators did not respond to my requests.  
The absence of administrators’ voices from this study is unfortunate, as it was not 
possible to corroborate the many claims made by providers about administrators’ 
intentions and actions. 
Third, although I did not set out to capture how patients’ emergency room 
experiences and interactions with providers would change because of the EMR, many of 
the findings from this study centered on providers’ perceptions of patients’ experiences; 
however, I do not know what patients, themselves, experienced.  Talking with patients 
about how they viewed the EMR and its effects, thus, would have produced a more 
robust reading of the EMR installation process. 
Fourth, the questionnaire administered to providers was potentially problematic in 
two ways.  First, the questionnaire should have teased out and/or separated providers’ 
satisfaction with their workplace and satisfaction with their careers, which are two 
separate things.  Second, because the questionnaire was not administered before the 
CPOE installation, I was unable to measure changes in physicians’ and midlevel 
providers’ self-reports of burnout and career satisfaction before and after the installation. 
Fifth, I was the only researcher collecting and analyzing data, which, according to 
Lindlof and Taylor (2011), can affect the validity of findings, whereas “multiple 
researchers can be used to overcome the biases of other short comings of a lone 
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researcher” (p. 275).  To mitigate potential errors or misunderstandings due to being the 
sole researcher, I conducted member checks regularly to ensure that my interpretations of 
events and conversations were accurate.  I also shared early drafts of this research with 
key respondents for feedback to make certain that my reporting was correct. 
Sixth, my husband is an emergency medicine physician and served as a key 
informant in this study, which, as describe above, influenced my view of EMRs and 
emergency room operations.  To mitigate partiality on my part, I limited his participation 
in this study to formal EMR training and working with scribes; otherwise, I did not 
observe him during the course of my regular fieldwork. 
Lastly, this study’s findings may have only short-term implications.  For instance, 
many older physicians experience reactance when forced to abandon paper-based 
charting systems, but most younger physicians, whose training on healthcare 
documentation, largely, is EMR-based, appear to adapt easily to new and changing EMR 
systems.  Thus, the reactance-inspired behaviors that were identified in this study (e.g., 
order dumping and negative communication spirals) may not appear in future studies, 
especially when younger healthcare providers are studied.  Moreover, as EMR 
technologies evolve, the incoherent spiritual properties (e.g., lack of usability, multiple 
tabs, small text, and slow performance) that were identified in the EMR used at Hospital 
H and in EMRs that were described in the literature (see chapter two), undoubtedly, will 
improve, and, consequently, prevent—not contribute to—medical errors.  This study’s 
findings and other findings on EMR use in emergency rooms, however, have long-term 
implications and point to a continuing decline in the frequency of face-to-face 
interactions among healthcare providers, providers’ growing dissatisfaction, strained 
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provider–patient interactions, and increased healthcare costs (see Bukata, 2014; Callen et 
al., 2013; Fernando et al., 2009; Feufel al., 2011; Georgiou et al., 2013; Hill et al., 2013; 
Kellerman & Jones, 2013; Park et al., 2012; Person et al., 2013; Ward et al., 2013).   
Future research should address the limitations noted above by: (a) following an 
EMR adoption in a community hospital’s emergency room from start to finish, (b) 
including more administrative figures as participants, and (c) incorporating patients’ 
perspectives.  Future research also could explore several of the practical implications and 
recommendations that this study advanced.  For instance, a study comparing a forced 
adoption with an adoption in which providers are active participants may inform 
understanding of EMR adoption outcomes, providers’ acceptance and/or rejection of 
EMRs, and providers’ workplace satisfaction after adoption of an EMR.  Testing 
alternative EMR training methods, such as online and/or video modules, could produce 
findings that may alleviate training-induced dissonance and reactance in providers, and, 
thereby, enhance providers’ learning.  Additionally, studies could examine the utility of 
common workspaces for enhancing face-to-face communication after EMRs are installed. 
Some of this study’s conceptual/theoretical implications also should be examined 
in future research.  For instance, this study suggested that there are, likely, relationships 
among EMR adoption, SD, and burnout, but those relationships have not been 
demonstrated empirically; establishing whether such relationships exist, thus, would be 
worthwhile.  Additional research should test relationships among providers’ agency, 
restoration attempts, and SD-nexus to SD-cycle escalation.  Although this study 
explained the nexus to cycle escalation in providers at Hospital H, the relationship  
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between agency-restorative efforts and negative communication spirals may not manifest 
in other agents and contexts. 
Conclusion 
This study investigated the effects of electronic medical records systems in an 
emergency room setting to extend what is known about forced adoptions of those systems 
in a community hospital and subsequent changes to providers’ social interactions and 
workflow patterns.  The findings were in accordance with tenets of structuration theory 
and adaptive structuration theory, respectively, that predicted reroutinization following 
critical situations, and that technology adoptions are impeded by incoherent structural 
features.  The findings also advanced structurational divergence theory by identifying a 
trigger for SD-nexus to SD-cycle escalation.  Because this study used sound ethnographic 
methods and, to date, is the only naturalistic study of an electronic medical records 
systems adoption in a community hospital’s emergency room, the study is an important 
methodological extension of the research literature.  Finally, the findings suggest ways 
that administrators and providers can improve communication and workflow during and 
after electronic medical records systems adoptions.  In sum, this study invites careful 
consideration of electronic medical records systems, because, as Giddens (1984) wrote, 
“Once all those in a given sector of the economy have introduced the same technological 
innovation, they may all be worse off than they were before” (p. 312). 
Although this research contributes to a richer understanding of emergency room 
work and communication among providers during and after an electronic medical records 
systems adoption, there is much more to be explored by communication scholars.  Future 
research that extends this study’s findings, hopefully, will result in collaborative efforts 
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of communication scholars and healthcare providers to integrative electronic medical 
records systems adoptions that incorporate providers’ wishes and perspectives; enhance 
communication among emergency medicine providers and between providers and their 
patients; improve workflow for providers in ways that contribute to their workplace and 
career satisfaction, and, consequently, decrease their risk for burnout; and improve 
patients’ safety, health outcomes, and experiences with the emergency medical care 
system.  The Dallas Ebola case demonstrated that flawed electronic medical records 
systems have deadly consequences, and this study explains some of the systemic changes 
that electronic medical records systems introduce that put patients in harm’s way.  This 
and future studies, hopefully, facilitate improvements to the design and usability of 
electronic medical records systems by eliminating design flaws that inhibit collaborative 
work and face-to-face communication among and between providers, and, consequently, 
reduce risks for patients.  The very best medical care must be provided to people and to 
do so requires effective communicative practices among healthcare providers in 
emergency room and hospital settings that are facilitated—not inhibited—by health 
information technology. 
	  
	   	  
365 
REFERENCES 
Ackermann, S., Bingisser, M. B., Heierle, A., Langewitz, W., Hertwig, R., & Bingisser, 
R. (2012, June 18). Discharge communication in the emergency department: 
Physicians underestimate the time needed. Swiss Medical Weekly, 142, w13588. 
doi:10.4414/smw.2012.13588 
Ackerson, L. K., & Viswanath, K. (2009). The social context of interpersonal 
communication and health. Journal of Health Communication, 14(Suppl.), 5–17. 
doi:10.1080/10810730902806836 
Agarwal, R., Sands, D. Z., & Schneider, J. D. (2010). Quantifying the economic impact 
of communication inefficiencies in U.S. hospitals. Journal of Healthcare 
Management, 55, 265–282. 
Ajami, S., & Bagheri-Tadi, T. (2013). Barriers for adopting electronic health records by 
physicians. Acta Informatica Medica, 21, 129–134. doi:10.5455/aim.2013.21.129-
134 
American Medical Association. (2014). CPT—Current procedural terminology. 
Retrieved from http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/solutions-
managing-your-practice/coding-billing-insurance/cpt.page 
Apker, J., Mallak, L. A., & Gibson, S. C. (2007). Communicating in the “grey zone”: 
Perceptions about emergency physician–hospitalist handoffs and patient safety. 
Journal of the Academy of Emergency Medicine, 14, 884–894. doi:10.1197/ 
j.aem.2007.06.037
Apker, J., Propp, K. M., & Ford, W. S. Z. (2005). Negotiating status and identity tensions 
in healthcare team interactions: An exploration of nurse role dialectics. Journal of 
Applied Communication Research, 33, 93–115. doi:10.1080/00909880500044620 
Arkes, H. R., Shaffer, V. A., & Medow, M. A. (2007). Patients derogate physicians who 
use a computer-assisted diagnostic aid. Medical Decision Making, 27, 189–202. 
doi:10.1177/0272989X06297391 
Armstrong, R. (2014, February 19). My EMR/CPOE rant/tantrum [Web log post]. 
Retrieved from https://app.sermo.com/posts/posts/209258 
Ash, S. R., & Ulrich, D. K. (1986). Portable and desktop microcomputers for patient care 
charting. Journal of Medical Systems, 10, 361–373. doi:10.1007/BF00992437 
Atwal, A., & Caldwell, K. (2005). Do all health and social care professionals interact 
equally: A study of interactions in multidisciplinary teams in the United Kingdom. 
Scandinavian Journal of Caring Sciences, 19, 268–273. doi:10.1111/j.1471-
6712.2005.00338.x 
366 
Augustine, J., & Holstein, J. G. (2014, January 30). The cost of the click. Retrieved from 
Emergency Physicians Monthly website: http://www.epmonthly.com/features/current-
features/the-cost-of-a-click 
Barley, S. R. (1986). Technology as an occasion for structuring: Evidence from 
observations of CT scanners and social order of radiology departments. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 31, 78–108. doi:10.2307/239276 
Beach, W. A., Easter, D. W., Good, J. S., & Pigeron, E. (2005). Disclosing and 
responding to cancer “fears” during oncology interviews. Social Scientific Medicine, 
60, 893–910. doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2004.06.031 
Bensing, J. M., Tromp, F., van Dulmen, S., van den Brink-Muinen, Verheul, F., & 
Schellevis, F. G. (2006). Shifts in doctor–patient communication between 1986 and 
2002: A study of videotaped general practice consultations with hypertension 
patients. BMC Family Practice, 7, 71–97. doi:10.1186/1471-2296-7-62 
Berger, E. (2012). Web 2.0 in emergency medicine: Specialty embracing the future of 
medical communication. Annals of Emergency Medicine, 59, 21–23. 
doi:10.1016/j.annemergmed.2012.02.012 
Berger, E. (2013). Electronic health records: Promises, promises. Annals of Emergency 
Medicine, 62, 19–21. doi:10.1016/j.annemergmed.2013.05.011 
Blackwell, R. T., Galassi, J. P., Galassi, M. D., & Watson, T. E. (1985). Are cognitive 
methods equal? A comparison of think aloud and thought listing. Cognitive Therapy 
and Research, 9, 399–413. doi:10.1007/BF01173089 
Blumenthal, D. (2010). Launching HITECH. New England Journal of Medicine, 362, 
382–385. doi:10.1056/NEJMp0912825 
Brehm, J. W. (1966). A theory of psychological reactance. New York, NY: Academic 
Press. 
Brehm, S. S., & Brehm, J. W. (1981). Psychological reactance: A theory of freedom and 
control. New York, NY: Academic Press. 
Brooks, R., & Grotz, C. (2010). Implementation of electronic medical records: How 
healthcare providers are managing the challenges of going digital. Journal of 
Business & Economics Research, 8(6), 73–84. Retrieved from 
http://www.cluteinstitute.com/journals/journal-of-business-economics-research-jber 
Brundage, M. D., Feldman-Stewart, D. & Tishelman, C. (2010). How do interventions 
designed to improve provider–patient communication work? Illustrative applications 
of a framework for communication. Acta Oncologica, 49, 136–143. 
doi:10.3109/02841860903483684 
367 
Brunk, D. (2013, October). Survey: EHR use cuts into resident education, productivity. 
Retrieved from Clinician Reviews website: http://www.clinicianreviews.com/ 
home/article/survey-ehr-use-cuts-into-resident-educationproductivity/ 
4b09d227ea79399915b31b949c318c7d.html 
Bryant, S., Moshavi, D., Lande, G., Leary, M., & Doughty, R. (2011). A proposed 
method for the role of physician peer mentoring in improving physician 
communication and patient satisfaction. Academy of Health Care Management 
Journal, 7(1), 45–58. Retrieved from http://www.alliedacademies.org/ 
public/journals/JournalDetails.aspx?jid=20 
Bukata, W. R. (2009). Optimizing physician time. Emergency Medical Abstracts, 33(3), 
1–4. 
Bukata, W. R. (2011). Electronic health records: Where’s the beef? Emergency Medical 
Abstracts, 35(2), 1–5. 
Bukata, W. R. (2013). Never mind. Emergency Medical Abstracts, 37(1), 1–4. 
Bukata, R. (2014, September 26). EHRs are inevitable, yet studies still pose serious 
questions. Retrieved from Emergency Physicians Monthly website:  
http://www.epmonthly.com/features/current-features/ehrs-are-inevitable-yet-studies-
still-pose-serious-questions 
Burley, D. (2011). Better communication in the emergency department. Emergency 
Nurse, 19, 32–36. doi:10.7748/en2011.05.19.2.32.c8509 
Cacioppo, J. T., von Hippel, W., & Ernst, J. M. (1997). Mapping cognitive structures 
through verbal content: The thought-listing technique. Journal of Consulting and 
Critical Psychology, 65, 928–940. doi:10.1037/0022-006.X.65.6.928 
Callahan, R. (2012, November). HITCH, EMR, HER, ONC-ATCB, MU, HL7 . . .: 
Acronyms can be confusing sometimes, but these are important to know. Retrieved 
from Medical Laboratory Observer website: http://www.mlo-
online.com/articles/201211/hitech-emr-ehr-onc-atcb-mu-hl7.php 
Callen, J., Paoloni, R., Li, J., Stewart, M., Gibson, K., Georgiou, A., . . . Westbrook, J. 
(2013). Perceptions of the effect of information and communication technology on 
the quality of care delivered in emergency departments: A cross-site qualitative 
study. Annals of Emergency Medicine, 61, 131–144. 
doi:10.1016/j.annemergmed.2012.08.032 
Cameron, K. A., Engel, K. G., McCarthy, D. M., Buckley, B. A., Kollar, L., M., Donlan, 
S. M., . . . Adams, J. G. (2010). Examining emergency department communication 
through staff-based participatory research method: Identifying barriers and solutions 
368 
to meaningful change. Annals of Emergency Medicine, 56, 614–622. 
doi:10.1016/j.annemergmed.2010.03.17 
Cegala, D. J., McGee, D. S., & McNeilis, K. S. (1996). Components of patients’ and 
doctors’ perceptions of communication competence during a primary care medical 
interview. Health Communication, 8, 1–27. doi:10.1207/s15327027hc0801_1 
Cegala, D. J., & Post, D. M. (2009). The impact of patients’ participation on physicians’ 
patient-centered communication. Patient and Education Counseling, 77, 202–208. 
doi:10.1016/j.pec.2009.03.025 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2015a, April 29). Emergency department 
visits. Retrieved from http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/emergency-department.htm 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2015b, June 2). Ebola outbreak in West 
Africa—Case counts. Retrieved from http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-
west-africa/case-counts.html 
Chapman, R. R., & Berggren, J. R. (2005). Radical contextualization: Contributions to 
anthropology of racial and ethnic health disparities. Health, 9, 145–167. 
doi:10.1177/1363459305050583 
Christensen, T., & Grimsmo, A. (2008). Instant availability of patient records, but 
diminished availability of patient information: A multi-method study of GP’s use of 
electronic patient records. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making, 8, 1–9. 
doi:10.1186/1472-6947-8-12 
Clark, N. M., Cabana, M. D., Nan, B. Gong, Z. M., Slish, K. K., Birk, N. A., & Kaciroti, 
N. (2008). The clinician–patient partnership paradigm: Outcomes associated with 
physician communication behavior. Clinical Pediatrics, 47, 49–57. 
doi:10.1177/0009922807305650 
Cohen, E. L., Wilkin, H. A., Tannenbaum, M., Plew, M. S., & Haley, L. L. (2013). When 
patients are impatient: The communication strategies utilized by emergency 
department employees to manage patients frustrated by wait times. Health 
Communication, 28, 275–285. doi:10.1080/10410236.2012.680948 
Colpas, P. (2013, August). Contemplating meaningful use. Retrieved from Health 
Management Technology website: http://www.healthmgttech.com/articles/ 
201308/contemplating-meaningful-use.php 
Cook, A. F., Aora, V. M., Rasinki, K. A., Curlin, F. A., & Yoon, J. D. (2014). The 
prevalence of medical student mistreatment and its association with burnout. 
Academic Medicine, 89, 1–6. doi:10.1097/ACM.0000000000000204 
	   369 
Cook, T. (2014). After the match: Doctors waiting tables? Emergency Medicine News, 
36(3), 1, 24–25. doi:10.1097/01.EEM.0000444855.15758.74 
 
Cooke, M., Irby, D. M., Sullivan, W., & Ludmerer, K. M. (2006). American medical 
education 100 years after the Flexner report. New England Journal of Medicine, 355, 
1339–1344. doi:10.1056/NEJMra055445 
 
Cooper, S., & Endacott, R. (2007). Generic qualitative research: A design for qualitative 
research in emergency care? Emergency Medicine Journal, 24, 816–819. 
doi:10.1136/emj.2007.050641 
 
Coran, J. J., Arnold, C. L., & Arnold, J. C. (2010). Physician–patient communication: 
This time, from the physician’s perspective. Florida Communication Journal, 38, 1–
12. 
 
Crane, J. A. (1997). Patient comprehension of doctor–patient communication on 
discharge from the emergency department. Journal of Emergency Medicine, 15, 1–7. 
doi:10.1016/S0736-4679(96)00261-2 
 
Dallas Ebola patient vomited outside apartment on way to hospital. (2014, October 2). 




Dean, M., & Oetzel, J. G. (2014). Physicians’ perspectives of managing tensions around 
dimensions of effective communication in the emergency department. Health 
Communication, 29, 257–266. doi:10.1080/10410236.2012.743869 
 
DeGaspari, J. (2014, October 4). Emergency physicians find their telemedicine niche. 
Retrieved from Healthcare Informatics website: http://www.healthcare-
informatics.com/article/emergency-physicians-find-their-telemedicine-niche 
 
DeSanctis, G., & Poole, M. S. (1994). Capturing the complexity in advanced technology 
use: Adaptive structuration theory. Organization Science, 5, 121–147. 
doi:10.1287/orsc.5.2.121 
 
DesRoches, C. M., Audet, A. M., Painter, M., & Donelan, K. (2013). Meeting meaningful 
use criteria and managing patient populations: A national survey of practicing 
physicians. Annals of Internal Medicine, 158, 791–799. doi:10.7326/003-4819-158-
11-201306040-00003 
 
Diana, M. L., Kazley, A. S., Ford, E. W., & Menachemi, N. (2012). Hospital 
characteristics related to intention to apply for meaningful use incentive payments. 
Perspectives in Health Information Management, 1, 1–11. Retrieved from 
http://perspectives.ahima.org 
 
	   370 
Drake, D. (2014, April 14). How being a doctor became the most miserable profession. 
Retrieved from The Daily Beast website: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/ 
2014/04/14/how-being-a-doctor-became-the-most-miserable-profession.html 
 
Duggan, A. P., & Thompson, T. L. (2011). Provider–patient interaction and related 
outcomes. In T. L. Thompson, R. Parrott, & J. F. Nussbaum (Eds.), The Routledge 
handbook of health communication (pp. 414–427). New York, NY: Routledge. 
 
Duhigg, C. (2012). The power of habit: Why we do what we do in life and business. New 
York, NY: Random House. 
 
Dunn, L., & Becker. S. (2013). 50 things to know about the hospital industry.  Retrieved 




du Pré, A. A. (2010). Communicating about health: Current issues and perspectives (3rd 
ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Eagly, A. H., & Chaiken, S. (1993). The psychology of attitudes. Fort Worth, TX: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.  
 
Eastaugh, S. R. (2013). Electronic health records lifecycle cost. Journal of Health Care 
Finance, 39(4), 36–43. 
 
Eggertson, L. (2012, May). On the same team? Nurse–physician communication. 
Retrieved from Canadian Nurse website: http://www.canadian-nurse.com/ 
articles/issues/2012/may-2012/on-the-same-team-nurse-physician-communication 
Eisenberg, E. M., Baglia, J., & Pynes, J. E. (2006). Transforming emergency medicine 
through narrative: Qualitative action research at a community hospital. Health 
Communication, 19, 197–208. doi:10.1207/s15327027hc1903_2 
 
Eisenberg, E. M., Murphy, A. G., Sutcliffe, K., Wears, R., Schenkel, S., Perry, S., & 
Vanderhoef, M. (2005). Communication in emergency medicine: Implications for 
patient safety. Communication Monographs, 72, 390–413. 
doi:10.1080/03637750500322602 
 
Electronic health record blamed for rising ER waits. (2012, August 8). Retrieved from 
Modern Healthcare website: http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/ 
20120808/INFO/308089990 
 
Ellingson, L. L. (2003). Interdisciplinary health care teamwork in the clinic backstage. 




	   371 
Estrada, N. A., & Dunn, C. R. (2012). Standardized nursing diagnoses in an electronic 
health record: Nursing survey results. International Journal of Nursing Knowledge, 
23, 86–94. doi:10.1111/j.2047-3095.2011.01201.x 
 
Fairbanks, R. J., Bisantz, A. M., & Sunm, M. (2007). Emergency department 
communication links and patterns. Annals of Emergency Medicine, 50, 396–406. 
doi:10.1016/j.annemergmed.2007.03.005 
 
Farhan, M., Brown, R., Woloshynowych, M., & Vincent, C. (2012). The ABC of 
handover: A qualitative study to develop a new tool for handover in the emergency 
department. Emergency Medicine Journal, 29, 941–946. doi:10.1136/emermed-
2011-200199 
 
Farley, H. L., Baumlin, K. M., Hamedani, A. G., Cheung, D. S., Edwards, M. R., Fuller, 
D. C., . . . Pines, J. M. (2013). Quality and safety implications of emergency 
department information systems. Annals of Emergency Medicine, 62, 399–407. 
doi:10/1016/jannemergmed.2013.05.019 
 
Farmer, S. A., Roter, D. L., & Higginson, I. J. (2006). Chest pain: Communication of 
symptoms and history in a London emergency department. Patient Education and 
Counseling, 63, 138–144. doi:10.1016/j.pec.2005.09.009 
 
Fernando, S., Georgio, A., Holdgate, A., & Westbrook, J. I. (2009). Challenges associated 
with electronic ordering in the emergency department: A study of doctors’ 
experiences. Emergency Medicine Australasia, 21, 373–378. doi:10.1111/j.1742-
6723.2009.01214.x 
 
Feufel, M. A., Robinson, F. E., & Shalin, V. L. (2011). The impact of medical record 
technologies on collaboration in emergency medicine. International Journal of 
Medical Infomatics, 80, 85–95. doi:10.1016/j.ijmedinf.2010.09.008 
 
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press. 
 
Flomenbaum, N. (2014, January 24). We told you so! Now what? Retrieved from 
Emergency Medicine website: http://www.emed-journal.com/home/article/we-told-
you-so-now-what/bb50d05f604bf73c2ef6fdf78ba9205d.html 
 
Fontenot, S. F. (2013). The affordable care act and electronic health care records: Does 
today’s technology support the vision of a paperless health care system? Physician 
Executive Journal, 39(6), 72–74, 76. 
 
Foppe, M. (2014, May/June). Scribes: How did we ever live without them? Common 
Sense: The Newsletter of the American Academy of Emergency Medicine, pp. 23–24. 
Retrieved from http://www.aaem.org/UserFiles/MayJun14CS.pdf 
 
	   372 
Fortney, L., Luchterhand, C., Zakletskaia, L., Zgierska, A., & Rakel, D. (2013). 
Abbreviated mindfulness intervention for job satisfaction, quality of life, and 
compassion in primary care clinicians: A pilot study. Annals of Family Medicine, 11, 
410–420. doi:10.1370/afm.1511 
 
Foucault, M. (1979). Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison (A. Sheridan, Trans.). 
New York, NY: Vintage Books. 
 
Francis, T. (2013). Electronic health records: Where we are and where we’re going. 
Physician Executive Journal, 7(4), 82–84. 
 
Frankel, R., Altschuler, A., George, S., Kinsman, J., Jimison, H., Robertson, N. R., & 
Hsu, J. (2005). Effects of exam-room computing on clinician–patient 
communication: A longitudinal qualitative study. Journal of General Internal 
Medicine, 20, 677–682. doi:10.1111/j.1525-1497.2005.0163.x 
 
Frazao, K. (2014, October 7). Ebola in the U.S. raises questions about electronic health 




Frey, L. R., Botan, C. H., & Kreps, G. L. (2000). Investigating communication: An 
introduction to research methods (2nd ed.). Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon. 
 
Gaddis, G. (2015, January/February). Ebola: Be concerned but don’t panic. Common 
Sense: The Newsletter of the American Academy of Emergency Medicine, p. 36. 
Retrieved from http://www.aaem.org/publications/common-sense 
 
Garra, G., Albino, H., Chapman, H., Singer, A. J., & Thode, H. J. (2010). The impact of 
communication barriers on diagnostic confidence and ancillary testing in the 
emergency department. Journal of Emergency Medicine, 38, 681–685. 
doi:10.1016/j.jemermed.2009.01.004 
 
Gáspárik, A. I., Ábrám, Z., Lörincz, E. A., & Ceană, D. (2012). Particularities of 
communication between doctor and patient: Comparison of results of an evaluation 
from Romania with similar data from Japan and the United States of America. Acta 
Medica Transilvanica, 17, 163–164. 
 
Genes, N. (2014, September 26). So EHRs don’t hurt patient sat or throughput. Next? 




Georgiou, A., Prgomet, M., Paoloni, R., Creswick, N. Hordern, A., Walter, S., 
Westbrook, J. (2013). The effect of computerized provider order entry systems on 
clinical care and work processes in emergency departments: A systemic review of the 
	   373 
quantitative literature. Annals of Emergency Medicine, 61, 644–653. 
doi:10.1016/j.annemergmed.2013.01.028 
 
Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society: Outline of the theory of structuration. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Gilblom, K., & Chen, C. (2014, October 3). Electronic-record gap allowed Ebola patient 
to leave hospital. Bloomberg News. Retrieved from http://www.bloomberg.com 
 
Giles, H. (2008). Communication accommodation theory. In L. A. Baxter & D. O. 
Braithwaite (Eds.), Engaging theories in interpersonal communication: Multiple 
perspectives (pp.161–173). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Goffman, E. (1956). The nature of deference and demeanor. American Anthropologist, 58, 
473–502. doi:10.1525/aa.1956.58.3.02a00070 
 
Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of self in everyday life. Garden City, NY, Anchor 
Books. 
 
Goffman, E. (1961). Encounters: Two studies in the sociology of interaction. American 
Anthropologist, 65, 473–502. 
 
Goffman, E. (1967). Interaction ritual: Essays on face-to-face behavior. Garden City, 
NY: Anchor Books. 
 
Goldberg, R., Boss, R. W., Chan, L., Goldberg, J., Mallon, W. K., Moradzadeh, D., . . . 
McConkie, M. L. (1996). Burnout and its correlates in emergency physicians: four 
years’ experience with wellness booth. Academic Emergency Medicine, 3, 1156–
1164. doi:10.1111/j.1553-2712.1996.tb03379.x 
 
Goodall, H. L. (2000). Writing the new ethnography. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press. 
 
Govindarajan, P., Larkin, G. L., Rhodes, K. V., Piazza, G., Byczkowski, T. L., Edwards, 
M., & Baren, J. M. (2010). Patient-centered integrated networks of emergency care: 
Consensus-based recommendations and future research priorities. Academic 
Emergency Medicine, 17, 1322–1329. doi:10.1111/j.1553-2712.2010.00939.x 
 
Granlien, M., & Hertzum, M. (2012). Barriers to the adoption and use of an electronic 
medication record. Electronic Journal Information Systems Evaluation, 15, 197–227. 
doi:10.5455/aim.2013.21.129-134 
 
Greenhouse, S. (2014, August 31). More workers are claiming wage theft. The New York 




	   374 
Grey, J. B. (2011). From “directing them” to “it’s up to them”: The physician’s perceived 
professional role in the physician–patient relationship. Journal of Communication in 
Healthcare, 4, 281–288. doi:10.1179/1753807611Y.00000000013 
 
Grosch, K., Medvene, L., & Wolcott, H. (2008). Person-centered caregiving instruction 
for geriatric nursing assistant students. Journal of Gerontological Nurses, 34(8), 23–
32. doi:10.3928/00989134-20080801-07 
 
Gu, Y. (1996). Doctor–patient interaction as goal-directed discourse. Journal of Asian 
Pacific Communication, 7, 156–176. 
 
Haddad, A. (2003). Ethics in action: Avoiding the power play. RN, 66(11), 27–30. 
 




Han, Y. Y., Carcillo, J. A., Venkataraman, S. T., Clark, R. S., Watson, R. S., Nguyen, T. 
C., . . . Orr, R. A. (2005). Unexpected increased mortality after implementation of a 
commercially sold computerized physician order entry system. Pediatrics, 116, 
1506–1512. doi:10.1542/peds.2005-1287 
 
Heracleous, L. (2013). The employment of structuration theory in organizational 
discourse: Exploring methodological challenges. Management Communication 
Quarterly, 27, 1–8. doi:10.1177/0893318913504498 
 
Henning, D., Horng, S., & Sanchez. (2013). Evaluating how electronic charting affects 
resident productivity. International Emergency Medicine, 8, 169–172. 
doi:10.1007/s11739-012-0881-y 
 
Herman, W., Karpinos, A., & Rothman, R. (2012, April 1). Mastering the language: 
Communicating with parents who have low health literacy. Retrieved from 




Herndon, J. B., Chaney, M., & Carden, D. (2011). Health literacy and emergency 
department outcomes: A systemic review. Annals of Emergency Medicine, 57, 334–
345. doi:10.1016/j.annemergmed.2010.08.035 
 
Hess, V., & Ledebur, S. (2011). Taking and keeping: A note on the emergence and 
function of hospital patient records. Journal of the Society of Archivists, 32, 21–33. 
doi:10.1080/00379816.2011.563102 
 
Hewitt, P. (2010). Nurses’ perceptions of the causes of medication errors: An integrative 
literature review. MEDSURG Nursing, 19, 159–168. 
	   375 
Hill, R. G., Jr., Sears, L. M., & Melanson, S. W. (2013). 4,000 clicks: A productivity 
analysis of emergency medical records in a community hospital. American Journal of 
Emergency Medicine, 31, 1591–1594. doi:10.1016/j.ajem.2013.06.028 
 
Hillestad, R., Bigelow, J., Bower, A., Girosi, F., Meili, R., Scoville, R., & Taylor, R. 
(2005). Can electronic medical record systems transform health care? Potential 
health benefits, savings, and costs. Health Affairs, 24, 1103–1117. 
doi:10.1377/hlthaff.24.5.1103 
 
Hobgood, C. D., Riviello, R. J., Jouriles, N., & Hamilton, G. (2002). Assessment of 
communication and interpersonal skills competencies. Academic Emergency 
Medicine, 9, 1257–1269. doi:10.1197/aemj.9.11.1257 
 
Hoffmann, L. (2009). Implementing electronic medical records. Communication of the 
ACM, 52, 18–20. doi:10.1145/1592761.1592770 
 
Hooker, R. S., Cipher, D. J., Cawley, J. F., Herrmann, D., & Melson, J. (2008). 
Emergency medicine services: Interprofessional care trends. Journal of 
Interprofessional Care, 22,167–178. doi: 10.1080/1356182-701751468 
 
Hsu, J., Huang, J., Fung, V., Robertson, N., Jimison, H., & Frankel, R. (2005). Health 
information technology and physician–patient interactions: Impacts of computers on 
communication during outpatient primary care visits. Journal of the American 
Medical Informatics Association, 12, 474–480. doi:10.1197/jamia.M1741 
 
Huryk, L. A. (2010). Factors influencing nurses’ attitudes towards healthcare information 
technology. Journal of Nursing Management, 18, 606–612. doi:10.1111/j.1365-
2834.2010.01084.x 
 
Ilie, V., van Slyke, C., Parikh, M. A., & Courtney, J. F. (2009). Paper versus electronic 
medical records: The effects of access on physicians’ decisions to use complex 
information technologies. Decision Sciences, 40, 213–241. doi:10.1111/j.1540-
5915.2009.00227.x 
 
Johnson, S., & Kring, D. (2012). Nurses’ perceptions of nurse–physician relationships: 
Medical-surgical versus intensive care. MEDSURG Nursing, 12, 343–347. 
 
Jones, S. (2014, October 3). “Flaw” in electronic health record blamed for medical error 
involving Ebola patient. CNS News. Retrieved from http://cnsnews.com 
 
Keller, K. L., & Koenig, W. J. (1989). Sources of stress and satisfaction in emergency 





	   376 
Kellerman, A. L., & Jones, S. S. (2013). What it will take to achieve the as-yet-
unfulfilled promises of health information technology. Health Affairs, 32, 63–68. 
doi:10.1377/hlthaff.2012.0693 
 
Kessler, C., Kutka, B. M., & Badillo, C. (2012). Consultation in the emergency 
department: A qualitative analysis and review. Journal of Emergency Medicine, 42, 
704–711. doi:10.1016/j.jemermed.2011.01.025 
 
Kohn, L. T., Corrigan, J. M., & Donaldson, M. S. (Eds.). (1999). To err is human: 
Building a safer health system. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 
 
Koppel, R., Metlay, J. P., Cohen, A., Abaluck, B., Localio, A. R., Kimmel, S. E., & 
Strom, B. L. (2005). Role of computerized physician order entry systems in 
facilitating medication errors. Journal of the American Medical Association, 293, 
1197–1203. doi:10.1001/jama.293.10.1197 
 
Koriwchak, M. J. (2014, February 15). Six years later: What has meaningful use 
accomplished? [Web log post]. Retrieved from http://www.wiredemrdoctor.com/ 
2014/02/15/six-years-later-what-is-meaningful-use-good-for 
 
Krauthammer, C. (2014, February 6). The healthcare myths we live by. The Washington 
Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com 
 
Kristensen, T. S., Borritz, M., Villadsen, & Christensen, K. B. (2005). The Copenhagen 
Burnout Inventory: A new tool for the assessment of burnout. Work & Stress, 19, 
192–207. doi:10.1080/02678370500297720 
 
Kuhn, G., Goldberg, R., & Compton, S. (2009). Tolerance for uncertainty, burnout, and 
satisfaction with the care of emergency medicine. Annals of Emergency Medicine, 54, 
106–113. doi:10.1016/j.annemergmed.2008.12.019 
 
Lærum, H., Karleson, T. H., & Faxvaag, A. (2004). Use of and attributes of a hospital 
information system by medical secretaries, nurses, and physicians deprived of the 
paper–based medical record: A case report. Medical Informatics and Decision 
Making, 4, 1–10. doi:10.1186/1472-6947-4-18 
 
Landman, A. B., Bernstein, S. L., Hsiao, A. L., & Desai, R. A. (2010). Emergency 
department information system adoption in the United States. Academic Emergency 
Medicine, 17, 536–544. doi:10.1111/j.1553-2712.2010.00722.x 
 
Lateef, F. (2011). Patient expectations and the paradigm shift of care in emergency 





	   377 
Lee, J., Kuo, Y. F., & Goodwin, J. S. (2013). The effect of electronic medical record 
adoption on outcomes in US hospitals. Health Services Research, 13, Article 39. 
doi:10.1186/1472-6963-13-39 
 
Leep, E. (2014). Second opinion: Distracted doctoring. Emergency Medicine News, 
36(6), 15. doi: 10.1097/01.EEM.0000450851.62228.29 
 
Leigh, J. P., Kravitz, R. L., Schembri, M., Samuels, S. J., & Mobley, S., (2002). Physician 
career satisfaction across specialties. Archives of Internal Medicine, 160, 1577–1584. 
doi:10.1001/archinte.162.14.1577 
 
Leigh, J. P., Tancredi, D. J., & Kravitz, R. L. (2009). Physician career satisfaction within 
specialties. Heath Services Research, 9, 1–12. doi:10.1186/1472-6963-9-166 
 
Leonardi, P. M. (2009). Why do people reject new technologies and stymie organizational 
changes of which they are in favor? Exploring misalignments between social 
interactions and materiality. Human Communication Research, 35, 407–441. 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2958.2009.01357.x 
 
Lewin, K. (1947). Frontiers in group dynamics: Concept, method and reality in social 
sciences: Social equilibria and social change. Human Relations, 1, 5–41. 
doi:10.1177/001872674700100100 
 
Likourezos, A., Chalfin, D. B., Murphy, D. G., Sommer, B., Darcy, K., & Davidson, S. J. 
(2004). Physician and nurse satisfaction with an electronic medical record system. 
Journal of Emergency Medicine, 27, 419–424. doi:10.1016/j.jemermed.2004.03.019 
 
Linder, J. A., Ma, J., Bates, D. W., Middleton, B., & Stafford, R. S. (2007). Electronic 
health record use and the quality of ambulatory care in the United States. Archives of 
Internal Medicine, 167, 1400–1405. doi:10.1001/archinte.167.13.1400 
 
Lindlof, T. R., & Taylor, B. C. (2011). Qualitative communication research methods (3rd 
ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Lozano, M., Biehl, D., & Organ, D. (2011).  How to modify Lean for emergency 




Makam, A. N., Lanham, H. J., Batchelor, K., Samal, L., Moran, B., Howell-Stampley, T., 
. . . Halm, E. A. (2013). Use and satisfaction with key functions of a common 
commercial electronic health record: A survey of primary care providers. Medical 




	   378 
Marcinowicz, L., Pawlikowska, T., Windak, A., & Chlabicz, S. (2013). Perceptions of an 
older patient in the role of the family doctor in health promotion: A qualitative case 
study. Journal of Medical Case Reports, 7, Article 57. doi:10.1186/1752-1947-7-57 
 
Marshall, S. N., Adams, T., Fischer, M., Mould, K. J., Shafiq, M., Tse, C., & . . . Santen, 
S. A. (2011). Perceptions of the patient handover process between emergency 
medicine and internal medicine. Annals of Emergency Medicine, 58(Suppl. 4), S253. 
doi:10.1016/j.annemergmed.2011.06.256 
 
Maslach, C., & Jackson, S. E. (1981). The measurement of experienced burnout. Journal 
of Occupational Behavior, 2, 99–113. doi:10.1002/job.4030020205 
 
McCarthy, D. M., Cameron, K. A., Courtney, D. M., & Vozenilek, J. A. (2012). Self-
reported use of communication techniques in the emergency department. Journal of 
Emergency Medicine, 43, e355–e361. doi:10.1016/j.jemermed.2012.02.033 
 
McCarthy, D. M., Ellison, E. P., Venkatesh, A. K., Engel, K. G., Cameron, K. A., 
Makoul, G., & Adams, J. G. (2013). Emergency department team communication 
with the patient: The patient’s perspective. Journal of Emergency Medicine, 45, 262–
270. doi:10.1016/j.jemermed.2012.07.052 
 
McGrath, J. M., Arar, N. H., & Pugh, J. A. (2007). The influence of electronic medical 
record usage on nonverbal communication in the medical interview. Health 
Informatics Journal, 13, 105–118. doi:10.1177/1460458207076466 
 
McManus, I. C., Smithers, E., Partridge, P., Keeling, A., & Fleming, P. R. (2003). A 
levels and intelligence as predictors of medical careers in UK doctors: 20 year 
prospective study. British Medical Journal, 327, 139–142. 
doi:10.1136/bmj.327.7407.139 
 
McPhee, R. D., Poole, M. S., & Iverson, J. (2014). Structuration theory. In L. L. Putnam, 
& D. K., Mumby (Eds.), The Sage handbook of organizational Communication: 
Advances in theory, research, and methods (pp. 75–99). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Mehrotra, A., Wang, M. C., Lave, J. R., Adams, J. L., & McGlynn, E. A. (2008). Retail 
clinics, primary care physicians, and emergency departments: A comparison of 
patients’ visits.  Health Affairs, 27(5), 1272–1282. doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.27.5.1272 
 
Merriman, K. (2014, April 15). Re: How being a doctor became the most miserable 
profession. [Web log comment]. Retrieved from 
https://app.sermo.com/posts/posts/214730 
 
Metric madness. (2014, July/August). Common Sense: The Newsletter of the American 




Miller, K. H., Ziegler, C., Greenberg, R., Patel, P. D., & Carter, M. B. (2012). Why 
physicians should share PDA/smartphone findings with their patients: A brief report. 
Journal of Health Communication, 17(Suppl. 1), 54–61. 
doi:10.1080/10810730.2011.649102 
Montague, E., & Asan, O. (2014). Dynamic modeling of patient and physician eye gaze to 
understand the effects of electronic health records on doctor–patient medication and 
attention. International Journal of Medical Informatics, 83, 225–234. 
doi:10.4172/2329-9126.1000137 
Moore, K. (2014). Improving communication between emergency department staff. 
Emergency Nurse, 22(2), 29–36. doi:10.7748/en2014.04.22.2.29.e1251 
Morgan, S. R., Kawar, M., Rahman, S., Gatewood, J. S., & Fairbanks, R. J. (2011). 
Physician and nurse perceptions of non-urgent communication in the emergency 
department. Annals of Emergency Medicine, 58(4, Suppl.), S189. 
doi:10.1016/j.annemergmed.2011.06.058 
Nadeem, M. M. (2007). Post-purchase dissonance: The wisdom of the “repeat” purchases. 
Journal of Global Business Issues, 1, 183–192. 
Nader, L. (1972). Up the anthropologist—Perspectives gained from studying up. In D. 
Hymes (Ed.), Reinventing anthropology (pp. 285–311). New York, NY: Pantheon 
Books. 
Nambisan, P., Kreps, G. L., & Poli, S. (2013). Understanding electronic medical record 
adoption in the United States: Communication and sociocultural perspectives. 
Interactive Journal of Medical Research, 2, Article e5. doi:10.2196/ijmr.org/ 
2013/1/e5 
Nazione, S., Pace, K., Russell, J., & Silk, K. (2013). A 10-year content analysis of 
original research articles published in Health Communication and Journal of Health 
Communication (2000–2009). Journal of Health Communication,18, 223–240, 
doi:10.1080/10810730.2012.688253 
Nesterkin, D. A. (2013). Organizational change and psychological reactance. Journal of 
Organizational Change Management, 26, 573–594. 
doi:10.1108/09534811311328588 
Neergard, L., & Weber, P. (2014, October 1). Ebola patient told hospital he came from 
Liberia. Huffington Post.  Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
Nicotera, A. M., & Clinkscales, M. J. (2010). Nurses at the Nexus: A case study in 
structurational divergence. Health Communication, 25, 32–49. 
doi: 10.1080/10410230903473516 
	   380 
Nicotera, A. M., & Mahon, M. M. (2013). Between rocks and hard places: Exploring the 
impact of structurational divergence in the nursing workplace. Management 
Communication Quarterly, 37, 90–120. doi: 10.1177/0893318912458214 
 
Nicotera, A. M., Mahon, M. M., & Wright, K. B. (2014). Communication that builds 
teams: Assessing a nursing conflict intervention. Nursing Administration Quarterly, 
38, 248–260. doi:10.1097/NAQ.0000000000000033 
 
Nicotera, A. M., Mahon, M. M., & Zhao, X. (2010). Conceptualization and measurement 
of structurational divergence in the healthcare setting. Journal of Applied 
Communication Research, 38, 362–385. doi:10.1080/00909882.2010.514001 
 
Nicotera, A. M., Zhao, X., Mahon, M. M., Peterson, E. B., Kim, W., &  
Conway-Morana, P. (2014). Structurational divergence theory as explanation for 
troublesome outcomes in nursing communication. Health Communication, 30, 
 371–384. doi:10.1080/10410236.2013.863139 
 
Noor, S., Mahmood, S. ul, & Khan, K. (2012). Reluctance of US doctors in adopting 
EHR technology. Global Journal of Management and Business Research, 12(23), 
15–22. 
 
Nugus, P., & Forero, R. (2011). Understanding interdepartmental and organizational work 
in the emergency department: An ethnographic approach. International Emergency 
Nursing, 19, 69–74. doi:10.1016/j.ienj.2010.03.001 
 
Nugus, P., Holdgate, A., Fry, M., Forero, R., McCarthy, S., & Braithwaite, J. (2011). 
Work pressure and patient flow management in the emergency department: Findings 
from an ethnographic study. Academic Emergency Medicine, 18, 1045–1052. 
doi:10.1111/j.1553-2712.2011.01171.x 
 
O’Hair, D. (1989). Dimensions of relational communication and control during 
physician–patient interactions. Health Communication, 1, 97–115. 
doi:10.1207/s15327027hc0102_2 
 
Opoku, S. T, & Apenteng, B. A. (2014). Career satisfaction and burnout among Ghanaian 
physicians. International Health, 6, 54–61. doi:10.1093/inthealth/iht038 
 
O’Shea, J. S. (2007). The crisis in America’s emergency rooms and what can be done. 




Otieno, O. G., Toyama, H., Asonuma, M., Kanai-Pak, M., & Naitoh, K. (2007). Nurses’ 
views on the use, quality, and user satisfaction with electronic medical records: 
Questionnaire development. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 60, 209–219. 
doi:10.1111/j.1365-2648.2007.04384.x 
	   381 
Overton, B. C. (in press-a). Electronic health records. In L. A. Schintler, C. L. McNeely, 
& J. G. Golson (Eds.), Sage encyclopedia of big data. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Overton, B. C. (in press-b). Emergency room visits. In F. F. Wherry & J. G. Golson 
(Eds.), Sage encyclopedia of economics and society. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Overton, B. C. (in press-c). Patient records. In L. A. Schintler, C. L. McNeely, & J. G. 
Golson (Eds.), Sage encyclopedia of big data. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Owen, W. F. (1984). Interpretive themes in relational communication. Quarterly Journal 
of Speech, 70, 274–287. doi:10.1080/00335638409383697 
 
Paltvad, C., & Musaeus, P. (2012). Qualitative research on emergency medicine 
physicians: A literature review. International Journal of Clinical Medicine, 3, 772–
789. doi:10.4236/ijcm.2012.37A136 
 
Park, S. Y., Lee, S. Y., & Chen, Y. (2012). The effects of EMR deployment on doctors’ 
work practices: A qualitative study in the emergency department of a teaching 
hospital. International Journal of Medical Informatics, 81, 204–217. 
doi:10.1016/j.ijmedinf.2011.12.001 
 
Peck, B. M. (2011). Age-related differences in doctor-patient interaction and patient 
satisfaction. Current Gerontology and Geriatrics Research, Article 137492. 
doi:10.1155/2011/137492 
 
Pearce, C. M., Kumarapeli, P., & de Lusignan, S. (2013). Effects of exam room EHR use 
on doctor–patient communication: A systematic literature review. Informatics in 
Primary Care, 21, 40–42. doi:10.14236/jhi.v21i1.39 
 
Pennebaker, J. W. (2000). Telling stories: The health benefits of narrative. Literature and 
Medicine, 19, 3–18. doi:10.1353/lm.2000.0011 
 
Perlmutter, D. D. (2015). In defense of ethnography.  Retrieved from The Chronicle of 
Higher Education website: http://chronicle.com/article/In-Defense-of-
Ethnography/231191/ 
 
Person, J., Spiva, L., & Hart, P. (2013). The culture of an emergency department: An 
ethnographic study. International Emergency Nursing, 21, 222–227. 
doi:10.1016/j.ienj.2012.10.001 
 
Pilnick, A., Hindmarsh, J., & Gill, V. T. (2009). Beyond “doctor and patient”: 
Developments in the study of healthcare interactions. Sociology of Health and Illness, 




	   382 
Pipersburgh, J. (2011). The push to increase the use of HER technology by hospitals and 
physicians in the United Sates through the HITCH act and the Medicare incentive 
program. Journal of Health Care Finance, 38(2), 54–79. 
 
Politi, M. & Street, R. (2011). Patient-centered communication during collaborative 
decision-making. In T. L. Thompson, R. Parrott, & J. F. Nussbaum (Eds.), The 
Routledge handbook of health communication (pp. 399–427). New York, NY: 
Routledge. 
 
Quick, B. L., Shen, L., & Dillard, J. P. (2013). Reactance theory and persuasion. In J. P. 
Dillard & L. Shen (Eds.), The Sage handbook of persuasion: Developments in theory 
and practice (pp. 167–183). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Real, K., & Poole, M. S. (2011). Health care teams: Communication and effectiveness. In 
T. L. Thompson, R. Parrott, & J. F. Nussbaum (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of 
health communication (2nd ed., pp. 100–116). New York, NY: Routledge. 
 
Redfern, E., Brown, R., & Vincent, C. A. (2009). Improving communication in the 
emergency department. Emergency Medicine Journal, 26, 658–661. 
doi:10.1136/emj.2008.065623 
 
Rehder, K. J., Cheifetz, I. M., Markovitz, B. P., & Turner, D. A. (2014). Survey of in-
house coverage by pediatric intensivists: Characterization of 24/7 in-hospital 
pediatric critical care faculty coverage. Pediatric Critical Care Medicine, 15, 97–103. 
doi:10.1097/PCC.0000000000000032 
 
Reyes, C. (2015). At your defense: Errors in EMRs: The root cause of fallen 
expectations. Emergency Medicine News, 36(12), 7. doi: 
10.1097/01.EEM.0000459004.27192.4e 
 
Rhodes, K. V., Vieth, T., He, T., Miller, A., Howes, D. S., Bailey, O., . . . Levinson, W. 
(2003). Resuscitating the physician–patient relationship: Emergency department 
communication in an academic medical setting. Annals of Emergency Medicine, 44, 
262–267. doi:10.1016/j.annemergmed.2004.02.035 
 
Rice, R. E., & Leonardi, P. M.  (2014). Information and communication technologies in 
organizations. In L. L. Putnam, & D. K., Mumby (Eds.), The Sage handbook of 
organizational communication: Advances in theory, research, and methods (pp. 
425–448). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Richards, J. D., & Harris, T. (2011). Beam me up Scotty! Impact of personal wireless 
communication devices in the emergency department. Emergency Medicine Journal, 





Roberts, C. A., & Aruguete, M. S. (1999). Task and socioemtional behaviors of 
physicians: A test of reciprocity and social interaction theories in analogue 
physician–patient encounters. Social and Science Medicine, 50, 309–315. 
doi:10.1186/1472-6939-261 
Roberts, C., & Sarangi, S. (2005). Theme-oriented discourse analysis of medical 
encounters. Medical Education, 39, 632–640. doi:10.1111/j.1365-2929.2005.02171.x 
Robinson, F. P., Gorman, G., Slimmer, L. W., & Yudkowsky, R. (2010). Perceptions of 
effective and ineffective nurse–physician communication in hospitals. Nursing 
Forum, 45, 206–216. doi:10.1111/j.1744-6198.2010.00182.x 
Robinson, P., Purves, I., & Wilson, R. (2003). Learning support for the consultation: 
Learning support and decision support should be placed in an educational 
framework. Medical Education, 37, 429–433. doi:10.1046/j.1365-
2923.2003.01498.x 
Rogers, E. M. (2003). Diffusion of innovations (5th ed.). New York, NY: Free Press. 
Roscoe, L. A., & Eisenberg, E. M. (2014). Emergency rooms. In T. L. Thompson (Ed.), 
Encyclopedia of health communication (pp. 393–395). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Rosenstein, A. H. (2012). Physician communication and care management: The good, the 
bad, and the ugly. Physician Executive Journal, 38(4), 34–37. 
Roter, D. L., & Hall, J. A. (2011). How medical interaction shapes and reflects the 
physician–patient relationship. In T. L. Thompson, R. Parrott, & J. F. Nussbaum 
(Eds.), The Routledge handbook of health communication (pp. 55–68). New York, 
NY: Routledge. 
Rouf, E., Whittle, J., Lu, N., & Schwartz, M. D. (2006). Computers in the exam room: 
Differences in physician–patient interaction may be due to physician experience. 
Journal for the Society of General Internal Medicine, 22, 43–48. 
doi:10.1007/s11606-007-0112-9 
Ruiz-Moral, R. (2009). The role of the physician–patient communication in promoting 
patient-participatory decision making. Health Expectations, 13, 33–44. 
doi:10/111/j.1369.7625.2009.00578.x 
Samuels-Kalow, M. E., Stack, A. M., & Porter, S. C. (2012). Effective discharge 
communication in the emergency department. Annals of Emergency Medicine, 60, 
152–159. doi:10.1016/j.annemergmed.2011.10.023 
Schrodt, P., Soliz, J., & Braithwaite, D. O. (2008). A social relations model of everyday 
talk and relational satisfaction in stepfamilies. Communication Monographs, 75, 190–
217. doi:10.1080/0363775080202316 
	   384 
Schulman-Green, D. J., Naik, A. D., Bradley, E. H., McCorkle, R., & Bogardus, S. T. 
(2006). Goal setting as a shared decision making strategy among clinicians and their 
older patients. Patient Education and Counseling, 63, 145–151. 
doi:10.1016/j.pec.2005.09.010 
 
Schwieger, D., Melcher, A., Ranganathan, C., & Wen, H. J. (2004). Appropriating 
electronic billing systems: Adaptive structuration theory analysis. Human Systems 
Management, 23, 235–243. 
 
Schwieger, D., Melcher, A., Ranganathan, C., Wen, H. J. (2006). Applying adaptive 
structuration theory to a health information systems adoption: A case study. 
International Journal of Healthcare Information Systems and Informatics, 1, 78–92. 
doi:10.4018/jhisi.2006010106 
 
Scott, D., Hallett, C., & Fettiplace, R. (2013). Data-to-text summarisation of patient 
records: Using computer-generated summaries to access patient histories. Patient 
Education and Counseling, 92, 153–159. doi:10.1016/j.pec.2013.04.019 
 
Shachak, A., & Reis, S. (2009). The impact of electronic medical records on patient–
doctor communication during consultation: A narrative literature review. Journal of 
Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 15, 641–649. doi:10.1111/j.1365-
2753.2008.01065.x 
 
Shankar, K. N., Bhatia, B. K., & Schuur, J. D. (2014). Toward patient-centered care: A 
systematic review of older adults’ views of quality emergency care. Annals of 
Emergency Medicine, 63, 529–550. doi:10.1016/j.annemergmed.2013.07.509 
 
Shannon, D. (2012). Effective physician-to-physician communication: An essential 
ingredient for care coordination. Physician Executive Journal, 38(1), 16–21. 
 
Sharf, B. F., Harter, L. M., Yamasaki, J., & Haidet, P. (2011). Narrative turns epic: 
Continuing developments in health narrative scholarship. In T. L. Thompson, R. 
Parrott, & J. F. Nussbaum (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of health communication 
(pp. 53–68). New York, NY: Routledge 
 
Shershneva, M. B., Carnes, M., & Bakken, L. L. (2006). A model of teaching–learning 
transactions in generalist–specialist consultations. Journal of Continuing Education 
in Health Professionals, 26, 222–229. doi:10.1002/chp.75 
 
Siegler, E. L. (2010). The evolving medical record. Annals of Internal Medicine, 153, 
671–677. doi:10.7326/0003-4819-153-201011160-00012 
 
Sikka, N., Carlin, K. N., Pines, J., Pirri, M., Strauss, R., & Rahimi, F. (2012). The use of 
mobile phones for acute wound care: Attitudes and opinions of emergency 
department patients. Journal of Health Communication, 17(Suppl. 1), 37–43. 
doi:10.1080/10810730.2011.649161 
	   385 
Smith-Dupre, A. A., & Beck, C. S. (1996). Enabling patients and physicians to pursue 
multiple goals in health care encounters: A case study. Health Communication, 8, 
73–90. doi:10.1207/s15327027hc0801_4 
 
Smulowitz, P. B., O’Malley, J., Yang, X., & Landon, B. (2014). Increased use of 
emergency department after health care reform in Massachusetts. Annals of 
Emergency Medicine, 64, 107–115. doi: 10.1016/j.annemergmed.2014.02.011 
 
Spencer, R., Coiera, E., & Logan, P. (2004). Variation in communication loads on clinical 
staff in the emergency department. Annals of Emergency Medicine, 44, 268–273. 
doi:10.1016/j.annemergmed.2004.04.006 
 
Stark, P. (2010). Congressional intent for the HITECH act. American Journal of Managed 
Care, 16(Suppl. 12), SP24–SP28. Retrieved from http://www.ajmc.com 
 
Stengle, J. (2014, October 4). Hospital: US Ebola patient in critical condition. Retrieved 




Stephens, R., Clark, L., & Patterson, E. (2012). Identifying communication-related 
barriers to timely admission emergency department patients requiring inpatient care. 
Annals of Emergency Medicine, 60(Suppl. 4), S51–S52. 
doi:10.1016/j.annemergmed.2012.06.119 
 
Stones, R. (2005). Structuration theory. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Street, R. L., & Giles, H. (1982). Speech accommodation theory: A social cognitive 
approach to language and speech behavior. In M. E. Roloff & C. R. Berger (Eds), 
Social cognition and communication (pp. 193–226). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
 
Sundar, S. S., Rice, R. E., Kim H.-S., & Sciamanna, C. N. (2011). Online health 
information: Conceptual challenges and theoretical opportunities. In T. L. Thompson,  
 R. Parrott, & J. F. Nussbaum (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of health 
communication (pp. 181–202). New York, NY: Routledge. 
 
Sweeney, J. C., Hausknecht, D., & Soutar, G. N. (2000). Cognitive dissonance after 
purchase: A multidimensional scale. Psychology and Marketing, 17, 239–385. 
doi:10.1002/(SICI)1520-6793(200005)17:5<369::AID-MAR1>3.0.CO;2-G 
 
Teufel, R. J., Kazley, A.B., & Basco, W. T. (2012). Is computerized physician order entry 
use associated with a decrease in hospital resource utilization in hospitals that care 




	   386 
Thompson, T. L., Whaley, B. B., & Stone, A. M. (2011). Explaining illness: Issues 
concerning the co-construction of explications. In T. L. Thompson, R. Parrott, & J. F. 
Nussbaum (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of health communication (pp. 55–68). 
New York, NY: Routledge. 
 
Tomes, J. P. (2010). Avoiding the trap in the HITECH act’s incentive timeframe for 
implementing the HER. Journal of Health Care Finance, 37, 91–100. 
 
Top, M., & Gider, O. (2012). Nurses’ views on electronic medical records (EMR) in 
Turkey: An analysis according to use, quality and user satisfaction. Journal of 
Medical Systems, 36, 1979–1988. doi:10.1007/s10916-011-9657-6 
 
Tracy, S. J., & Geist-Martin, P. (2014). Organizing ethnography and qualitative 
approaches. In L. L. Putnam, & D. K., Mumby (Eds.), The Sage handbook of 
organizational Communication: Advances in theory, research, and methods (pp. 
245–269). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Trenholm, S. (1989). Persuasion and social influence. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall. 
 
Tschannen, D., Keenan, G., Aebersold, M., Kocan, M. J., Lundy, F., & Averhart, V. 
(2011). Implications of nurse–physician relations: Report of a successful 
intervention. Nursing Economic$, 29, 127–135. 
 
Uscher-Pines, L., Pines, J., Kellermann, A., Gillen, E., & Mehrotra, A. (2013). 
Emergency department visits for nonurgent conditions: Systemic literature review.  




U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (2015). Health information privacy. 
Retrieved from http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy 
 
Vance, S. (2010, December 1). Actual legal risks if you did it but didn’t document: Any 
information could be critical. Healthcare Benchmarks and Quality Improvement, pp. 
143–144. 
 
Van Maanen, J. (2011). Tales of the field: On writing ethnography (2nd ed.). Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Venkatraman, S., Bala, H., Venkatesh, V., & Bates, J. (2008). Six strategies for electronic 






Ventres, W., Kooienga, S., & Marlin, R. (2006). EHRs in the exam room: Tips on 
patient-centered care. Family Practice Management, 13(3), 45–47. Retrieved from 
http://www.aafp.org/fpm/2006/0300/p45.html 
Ventres, W., Kooienga, S., Vuckovic, N., Marlin, R., Nygren, P., & Stewart, V. (2006). 
Physicians, patients, and the electronic health record: An ethnographic analysis. 
Annals of Family Medicine, 4, 124–131. doi:10.1370/afm.425 
Verdon, D. R. (2013). EHR divorce: What’s driving dissatisfaction? Medical Economics, 
90, 23–27. Retrieved from http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com 
Vishwanath, A. (2009). From belief-importance to intention: The impact of framing on 
technology adoption. Communication Monographs, 76, 177–206. 
doi:10.1080/03637750902828438 
Vishwanath, A., Brodsky, L., & Shaha, S. (2009). Physician adoption of personal digital 
assistants: Testing its determinants with a structural equation model. Journal of 
Health Communication, 11, 77–95. doi:10.1080/10810730802592270 
Walsh, K. E., Adams, W. G., Bauchner, H., Vinci, R. J., Chessare, J. B., Cooper, M. &, . . 
. Landrigan, C. P. (2006). Medication errors related to computerized order entry for 
children. Pediatrics, 118, 1872–1879. doi:10.1542/peds.2006-0810 
Walsh, K. E., Landrigan, C. P., Adams, W. G., Vinci, R. J., Chessare, J. B., Cooper, M. 
R., . . . Bauchner, H. (2008). Effect of computer order entry on prevention of serious 
medication errors in hospitalized children. Pediatrics, 121, e421–e427. 
doi:10.1542/peds.2007-0220 
Ward, M. J., Froehle, C. M., Hart, K. H., Collins, S. P., & Lindsell, C. J. (2013). Transient 
and sustained changes in operational performance, patient evaluation, and medication 
administration during electronic health record implementation in the emergency 
department. Annals of Emergency Medicine, 62, 557–568. 
doi:10.1016/j.annemergmed.2013.08.019 
Wei, E., Sharp, B., Santen, S., Hopson, L., Somand, D., & Bassin, B. (2012). 
Interdisciplinary comparison of attitudes towards patient safety, communication, and 
teamwork in the emergency department. Annals of Emergency Medicine, 60(Suppl. 
4), S51. doi:10.1016/j.annemergmed.2012.06.118 
Weiner, M., Gress, T., Thiemann, D. R., Jenckes, M., Reel, S. L., Mandell, S. F., & Bass, 
E. R. (1999). Contrasting views of physicians and nurses about an inpatient 
computer-based provider order-entry system. Journal of the American Medical 
Informatics Association, 6, 234–244. doi:10.1136/jamia.1999.0060234 
388 
Weinick, R. M., Burns, R. M., Mehrotra, A. (2010). Many emergency department visits 
could be managed at urgent care centers and retail clinics. Health Affairs, 29(9), 
1630-6. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/ 
755047690?accountid=12154 
West, C. P., Dyrbye, L. N., Sloan, J. A., & Shanafelt, T. D. (2009). Single item measures 
of emotional exhaustion and depersonalization are useful for assessing burnout and 
medical professionals. Journal of General Internal Medicine, 24, 1318–1321. 
doi:10.1007/s11606-009-1129-z 
Wolcott, H, F. (2010). Ethnography lessons: A primer. Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast 
Press. 
Xiao, Y., Schenkel, S., Faraj, S., Mackenzie, C. F., & Moss, J. (2007). What whiteboards 
in a trauma center operating suite can teach us about emergency department 
communication. Annals of Emergency Medicine, 50, 387–395. 
doi:10.1016/j.annemergmed.2007.03.027  
Zink, B. (2006). Anyone, anything, anytime: A history of emergency medicine. 
Philadelphia, PA: Mosby Elsevier. 
389 
APPENDIX A 




STANDARD PHOTOGRAPHIC RELEASE FORM 
I hereby consent to allowing my photograph, likeness, and voice to be recorded 
and referenced as it relates to the terms of this research study. 
I hereby release in perpetuity, the producer(s), their agents, successors, assigns 
and clients from all claims and demands arising from the use of my photograph (motion 
picture, video tape, still or television) and recordings of my voice in any manner 
whatsoever for. 
Participants hereby release, indemnifies and hold the producer(s), sub-contractors 
and client from any claims, liabilities, damages or cost of whatsoever nature (including 
attorney’s fees) and whether by reason of death of or injury to any person or loss of or 
damage to any property arising out of or in any way associated with this contract 
(including traveling to and from locations), the services provided by talent and/or model 
hereunder or any related act or failure to act by participants, its employees or sub-
contractors. 
NAME: ______________________________________________________________________________ 
SIGNATURE: ____________________________________  DATE: _____________________________ 
PRODUCER(S):   ______________________________________________________________________ 
PRODUCTION DATES:  _______________________________________________________________ 
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